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THE TUTORIAL
HISTORY OF ROME

THE TUTORIAL HISTORY OF ROME

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PREFACE.

THIS work presents the main facts, external and internal, of the History of Rome down to the death of Tiberius. Under these two headings of external and internal the authors have sought so to arrange their facts, as to furnish a narrative on the one hand of that outward growth whereby the Roman extended his power from the narrow precincts of the Palatine Hill to the Caucasus and the Atlantic; on the other hand of that inward growth whereby the Principate appears as the natural outcome of the entire political development of the Romans.

In following out the logical distinctiveness of these two lines of growth—the lines of internal and external change—the authors trust that they have never lost sight of the actual interdependence of the one upon the other. Entire separation of the two is of course as misleading as their non-separation is confusing, and the *via media* is hard to follow.

On the many disputed points which beset their subject, more especially in regard to the details of the earlier history external and internal, the authors have endeavoured to avail themselves of the latest results of classical scholarship. In the hope that their work will promote the intelligent

study of Roman History, they have discussed at considerable length such subjects as the following: the amount of historical truth concealed in the legends; the *ager publicus*; the origin and development of the tribunate, the *Concilium Plebis*, and the *Comitia Tributa*; the probable history of the Decemvirate; the real meaning of the Valerio-Horatian Laws, the Licinio-Sextian Rogations, and the Laws of Publilius Philo; the constituents of the Roman *civitas*; the status of the full citizens, passive citizens, and allies, Latin and non-Latin; the nature of Roman and Latin Colonies; the growth of the *latifundia*; the organization and condition of the provinces.

In addition to the ancient authorities, the great histories of Mommsen and Ihne have been constantly consulted, so far as they are available. The *Dictionary of Antiquities* (Third Edition) has been largely drawn upon, and many other standard works have been consulted. In chronology the writers have relied largely on Peter's *Zeittafeln der Römischen Geschichte*.

July 1893.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION.

For this edition the book has been carefully revised and brought into accordance with the results of modern research, and most of the sections dealing with constitutional history have been entirely rewritten. A section on the development of the army has been inserted.

August 1905.

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THE TUTORIAL HISTORY OF ROME.

CHAPTER I.

THE PEOPLES OF ITALY.

§ 1. Geography of Italy.—§ 2. Natural Divisions.—§ 3. The Aryan Peoples.—§ 4. Pelasgians, Ligurians, and Venetians.—§ 5. The Umbrians.—§ 6. The Etruscans: their Origin, Empire, Manners, and Decline.—§ 7. The Latins and their Neighbours, Volsci, Aurunci, Aequi, Hernici, Osci.—§ 8. The Sabellians.—§ 9. The Greeks in Italy: Cumae, the Achæan cities, Magna Græcia.—§ 10. The Gauls in Italy.

§ 1. Of the various chapters of ancient history, the scene of the greater number is laid upon the shores of the Mediterranean. Around this central Geography
of Italy. sea Egyptians, Phœnicians, Hellenes, Etruscans, and Carthaginians successively rose to power, contributed their share to human progress, and sank into decay. The people which was to succeed to them and gather to itself the fruits of all was of the native race of Italy. This was in the natural order of things, for Italy was the very centre of the ancient world: midmost of the three European peninsulas, she had Gaul and Spain as her neighbours on the west, Greece on the east; on the south, by the medium of Sicily, she almost joined hands with the continent of Africa. By her position she was destined to hold the keys

of the western and eastern basins of the Mediterranean : in point of civilization also she lay between the effeminate and corrupt East and the barbarous and savage West. It needed only union, for Italy to achieve the conquest of all.

The Italian peninsula is separated from the mainland of Europe by the semi-circular barrier of the Alps. Under its various names—Maritime, Cottian, Graian, Pennine, Rhaetian, Carnic, Julian—this range extends from the Mediterranean westward of the Gulf of Genoa to the head of the Gulf of Trieste. It attains to enormous heights, yet over and over again it has proved no insurmountable obstacle to invading forces, a fact which is to some extent due to natural configuration ; for while the Alps rise in precipitous and abrupt ascent from the south, the slopes on the north and west, the quarters of attack, are less impracticable. By way of the Alps alone is there a route into Italy, yet her history chronicles a series of successful inroads across this seemingly insuperable barrier.

At the point where the Western Alps fall into the sea, commences the range of the Apennines. Skirting the Gulf of Genoa, they run east for a time, and then turn in a south-easterly direction along the whole length of the Italian peninsula. Northward of Tuscany they rise to a height of 7000 feet, forming an almost impracticable wall between the valley of the Po on the north and the valley of the Arno on the south. As with the Alps, so with the Apennines : one side, the eastern, is abrupt, and falls almost directly to the sea ; the other, the western, is of more gradual slope, and leaves between its various spurs a series of lowland plains, which fringe the western shores of Italy from the Gulf of Spezzia to that of Salerno. Broadening continually, the range reaches its greatest

elevation (9500 feet) in the Abruzzi, east of Rome. * Sending out spurs eastward and westward to the sea, it proceeds with lessened height until it nears the Gulf of Taranto. Here it splits into two ridges : one trends eastward into Apulia, while the other turns west into Bruttium. This western ridge is for a moment broken by the Straits of Messina, but emerges again from the sea to form the triangular island of Sicily.

§ 2. The Italian peninsula consists of two well-defined parts : one is the level country of the north, comprised between the two great mountain Natural Divisions. ranges ; the other is the land traversed by the Apennines. The first is an exceedingly fertile plain, by far the largest in the peninsula, the product of the alluvial deposits made by the Po, the largest river of Italy. The second includes indeed the plains of Etruria, Latium, and Campania, and the rivers Arno and Tiber, on its western side ; but with these exceptions it is everywhere a country of mountains, intersected by an infinite number of streams which are devastating torrents in winter, but in summer shrink to mere rivulets or disappear entirely. Like other mountainous countries, it fostered a brave and hardy race, so jealous of liberty that every valley became the home of a free and independent state. Before Italy could proceed on her career of conquest it was necessary to force these communities into some sort of union. The more mountainous the land, the more intractable its people : it was on the west and south of the Apennines, in the plains of Etruria and Campania, in the Tiber valley, and in the lowlands about the Gulf of Taranto, that the civilization of Italy was developed ; while to the east of the central chain of mountains there were no plains, and the state of culture was rude, and rudest of all were the tribes who dwelt

amongst the still wilder highlands and forests of Lucania and Bruttium—the “toe” of Italy.

§ 3. Like the sister peninsulas, Spain and Greece, Italy was at a very early period invaded by tribes from the North, speaking, in some form or other, that language which is, however divergent in appearance, the common tongue of the peoples of Europe, and which is variously known as Indo-Germanic or Aryan. The first who used this language were a pastoral people, whose original home, according to a view now winning general acceptance, was somewhere in the great plain of Central Europe. Their civilization was of the rudest character. They clad themselves in skins, lived during the summer in reed-thatched huts and in winter in circular pits dug in the earth. Their implements were of unpolished stone. They knew nothing of metals. They were probably unacquainted with agriculture, and gained their livelihood as nomad herdsmen, wandering with their cattle over the lowlands of Europe. From this primitive people developed groups of nations speaking languages which are beyond question of common origin, but are at the same time marked by characteristic peculiarities. To some extent this variation was probably due to the fact that those who spoke this language were a conquering race who forced their speech upon less vigorous peoples, and these adopted it, but not without modification. In Europe there arose Slavs, Letts, Germans, Celts, Italians and Greeks, each with their own Aryan dialect, while others wandered off to Asia. The first Aryan-speaking peoples of Italy were allied far more closely to the Celts than to the Greeks; for Greek in various ways approximates rather to the Asiatic than to the European form of Aryan speech. At a date which may approximately be assigned to the year

2000 B.C., those Aryans who were destined to develop into the Italians of history made their way across the Alps into Italy : but even in that early age they found the land fully peopled, and after fifteen hundred years they had not altogether ousted its earlier inhabitants.

§ 4. The first inhabitants of Italy belong to an era long prior to all history. They were cave-dwellers, unacquainted with any metals, and occasionally, The Pelasgians, Ligurians, and Venetians. it would appear, of an even cannibal barbarism. Science classes them as belonging to the Iberian stock. Much later come the first inhabitants known to history, and even these are little more than names to us. We hear of Siculi or Sicels who dwelt in the valleys of the Po and Tiber, and along the western and southern coasts of the peninsula ; of Chones, Morgetes, and Oenotri in Brutium and the country to the north ; of Iapygians (divided into Daunians, Peucetians and Messapians) in Calabria ; of Liburnians along the eastern coast. These peoples were collectively known to the ancients by the vague appellation of Pelasgians, and they were probably akin to the oldest historical peoples of Illyria and Greece. They are said to have ousted a yet older people, the Sicani of Iberian stock, who fled into Sicily ; but in their turn they gave way before new peoples. Some of them, the Siculi in particular, fled to the south and settled in Sicily side by side with the Sicanians ; others submitted quietly and became the serfs of their conquerers. They disappear from the history of Italy, leaving behind them perhaps no memorials more notable than those walls, built of enormous blocks of stone without cement, to which in after ages men have given the name of Pelasgian and Cyclopean ; yet of a certainty they mingled to some extent with their conquerers, and there may have been Sicel blood in the Latins as there was in

the common folk of Etruria. To the very last they maintained their footing in the wilder parts of Southern Italy. The new-comers, before whom the Pelasgians fell back, were the Ligurians and Umbrians, both related to the so-called Celtic stock and both speaking Aryan languages. The Ligurians for ages occupied the northern Apennines between the valleys of the Po and the Arno, a rugged and barren land, where every valley had its own independent village-capital. At one period they reached south perhaps as far as Pisa and Elba; but in historical times their central and only town was Genua (*Genoa*), which they used as their common market. Poor in the extreme, they were brave and vigorous, so that they were able to offer a desperate and protracted resistance when attacked.

About the head of the Adriatic, where now is Venice, there dwelt a people akin to the Illyrians. These were the Veneti, who, settled in a most fair and fertile land, soon exchanged their old simplicity and courage for commerce, luxury, and indolence. More than fifty towns belonged to them. Patavium (*Padua*), their capital, was famous for its manufacture of woollen stuffs and cloths; they exported horses to Greece to take part in the Olympian races; and traded overland with the Baltic tribes for amber which they disposed of in Greece and Sicily.

§ 5. The Umbrians were, according to tradition, the oldest nation in Italy; they were the ancestors of the Italian stocks treated of in §§ 7 and 8. They seem to have descended upon Italy from the Alps between the years 2000 B.C. and 1500 B.C. Their first homes were built on wooden piles among the lakes of the Po valley, and from the relics which they have left behind we can trace their progress in civilization onward from their first appearance in the peninsula. The

The Um-
brians.

earliest remains show that the Umbrians on reaching Italy were a rude pastoral people, clad in skins, ignorant of agriculture, and having no tools or weapons but those of stone. Later they learned to weave mats successively from the bark of trees and from flax; and while originally the only animal they possessed was the dog, they subsequently tamed the goat, sheep, pig, and ox. With the help of the ox, they became skilled in agriculture. For ages their implements continued to be of stone, but metals were subsequently introduced from the East, and the Umbrians changed their weapons and tools of flint for better ones of bronze, and still better ones of iron.

The Umbrians expelled the Siculi and Liburni from the North of Italy, and as they grew in numbers they fought their way southwards until they reached the Tiber and the confines of Apulia. North of this line their territories stretched across Italy from sea to sea, and only the Ligurians maintained their liberty in the Apennines of the north-west. The river Umbro in Etruria points to the early occupation of that country by the Umbrians. Their power had lasted for at least three centuries, when about the year 1000 B.C. the Etruscans made themselves masters of Etruria and reduced the Umbri of that region to serfdom. This was only the commencement of misfortune. The Etruscans speedily ousted them also from the valley of the Po and shut them up between the Apennines and the Adriatic. When, four centuries later, the Gauls came into Italy and drove the Etruscans back within the line of the Apennines, the Umbri were pressed still further to the south. Simultaneously the younger peoples which Umbria had sent to seek other homes and develop into the Osco-Sabellians of Central Italy, in turn grew too large for their territories,

and pressed back the mother-nation from the southern side.

Harassed by these foes, the Umbrians barely maintained themselves in a narrow uninviting region in the heart of the Apennines—the region which still bears the name of Umbria.

§ 6. The Etruscans (known in their native tongue as the Rasenna) were the most mysterious people in Italy. The problem of their origin is one which historians have not yet been able to solve. Nor can the philologist be of any service here to the historian, for their language (though the characters are similar to those of the Greek and Latin alphabets) has baffled all attempts to connect them definitely with any known nation. According to the traditional account they came by sea from Lydia in Asia Minor. The only evidence that can be alleged in support of this view is the resemblance of the word *Tyrseni* or *Tyrrheni* (the Greek name for the Etruscans) to *Tyrrha*, a town in Lydia. A legend to the effect that the Etruscans descended into Italy from the Rhaetian Alps is much better supported by internal evidence than the story of their Lydian origin. The facts that in Livy's time an Etruscan dialect was spoken by the Rhaeti, that inscriptions in the Etruscan language have been found near Lugano (in the canton Ticino, Switzerland), that Mantua remained Etruscan to a late period, point to a close connexion between the Etruscans and the tribes of the Rhaetian and Lepontine Alps. The theory that the Etruscans came to Italy by land from the Alps is further supported by the circumstance that the most important of the towns forming the Tuscan league of twelve cities lay far inland.

On descending into Italy they first wrested the valley of the Po from the Umbrians; they then spread over the Apennines

and occupied Tuscany, again driving out or subjugating the Umbrian inhabitants. Themselves but few, ^{Their} they constituted an alien nobility—^{Empire.} lucumons, or patricians—ruling over a population of serfs, as the Normans ruled the Saxons for a time in England. Leaving the barren eastern slope of the Apennines without molestation to the Umbri, they turned south, whither they were attracted by the fertile plains of the Tiber valley and of Campania. All-victorious by land, and famous as seamen and buccaneers, they overran all Western Italy as far as Surrentum (*Sorrento*), and planted colonies at each likely spot upon the coast, as at Antium (*Porto d'Anzo*) and Tarracina (*Terracina*). In Etruria Proper (Tuscany), in Upper Etruria (valley of the Po), and in Lower Etruria (Campania), they formed three several leagues of twelve great cities, about which were grouped as dependencies the surrounding districts and the smaller towns of the land. Notable amongst these league-cities were Tarquinii (*Corneto*), Caere (*Cervetri*), Clusium (*Chiusi*), Arretium (*Arezzo*), Vulci, and Volsinii (*Bolsena*), in Tuscany ; in Campania, Volturnum, afterwards called Capua, Nola, and Pompeii ; in the Po valley Melpum, afterwards known as Mediolanum (*Milan*), Ravenna, Felsina (*Bologna*), Mantua, and Atria (*Hadria*), the port which gave its name to the Adriatic Sea ; and from them the waters west of Italy were known as *Mare Tyrrhenum*, the Tuscan sea. Each league-city was independent and sovereign, governed by its lucumons, or at times by a king chosen by the latter ; each league had its centre, whither the league-cities might send their deputies to debate upon affairs concerning the nation at large (in the case of Etruria Proper, this was the shrine of the goddess Voltumna at Volsinii). Their kings had the purple robe, the embroidered *toga* or gown,

the attendants (*lictors*) bearing the rods and axes (*fusces*), and the ivory chair (*sella curulis*), which are best known as insignia of the chief magistracy of Rome. The common people were serfs, not treated cruelly perhaps, but without

And
Manners.

political rights. In their fertile land the Etruscans reached a high degree of civilization, which, though bearing some resemblance to that of the Greeks, presents features without parallel in that of any European people. Their religion was remarkable for its elaborate ceremonial and its many "Books of Fate." Etruscan priests acquired renown for their skill in discovering the will of the gods by means of divination; and in this, as in many other points, they largely influenced the later Roman religion.

From Etruria too the Romans acquired a taste which shows the brutal side of the Etruscan character—the taste for gladiatorial contests, man fighting with man to the death to afford pleasure to the onlookers.

Sailing from their stations on the Adriatic and Tyrrhenian Seas, Etruscan merchants, combining piracy and trade, cruised about all the coasts of Italy. The Carthaginians closed the Straits of Gibraltar against them, but the Tuscan Sea was as it were their private domain, where every strange vessel might be treated as a prize. Greek commerce was active with the Adriatic ports and with Caere (*Cervetri*), but when Greek colonists began to found cities along the coast of Sicily and Italy, Etruscans and Carthaginians for a time united against a common foe.

The alliance was of no long duration, and each people settled down into fighting for its own hand.

Their
Decline.

In 600 B.C. the Gauls overran Upper Etruria. About 510 B.C. the cities of Latium threw off the yoke of

the lucumons, a fact which is concealed beneath the legend of the expulsion of the Tarquins, for undoubtedly the Tarquins were an Etruscan dynasty. At the same time the Volscians, aided by the Greeks of Cumae, began to attack the Etruscan ports of Antium and Tarracina. Shortly after 500 B.C. Anaxilaus the tyrant of Rhegium barred the straits of Messina, and in 474 B.C. the Syracusan navy in conjunction with the people of Cumae inflicted on them a terrible defeat off the latter town. Finally the Samnites swept down upon Campania and in 424 B.C. took its capital city of Capua. The leagues proved incapable of united action, and between the combined onsets of Romans and Gauls they fell into utter ruin; while the speed wherewith all trace of the Etruscan nationality was lost shows that the old Umbrian population was alike numerous and near akin to its conquerors the Romans.

§ 7. Most of the races which inhabited ancient Italy spoke languages which philologists have shown to be closely connected with one another, as well as with the Greek and Celtic tongues; these people were therefore all of Aryan speech, and they are generally grouped together and called the Italian races. The Italian stock may be divided into three main branches; the Umbrians, the Osco-Sabellians, and the Latins.

We have already described the Umbrians, who were the ancestors of the other Italian races. The Volsci. Volscians, whose language, judging from the only inscription we possess, was more closely akin to that of the Umbrians than any other race, occupied the district between the Trerus (*Sacco*) and the coast (*Maretima*). They were a nation of warriors, and in early times made themselves masters of the harbours of Antium (*Porto d'Anzio*) and Tarracina (*Terracina*) and, following the example of

the *Etruscans, became dreaded for their piratical raids. Their corsairs swept the whole coast as far as Messina. They were equally formidable ashore, and steadily encroached upon the lands of their Latin neighbours on the north.

Most of central and southern Italy was occupied by the largest branch of the Italian stock, the Osco-Sabellians. They consisted of the Sabines, the Sabellians of central Italy, and the Oscans of central and southern Italy. The Sabines, who dwelt between the Nar (*Nera*), the Anio (*Tevere*), and the Tiber, were the oldest and purest example of this stock. They were a nation of

The shepherds and husbandmen, religious, brave, honest, severely simple in their habits. They had no inclination for mental culture; indeed they viewed it with such contempt that we know nothing of their peculiar dialect. The Sabines were the parent stock of the rest of the Osco-Sabellian races. They had a peculiar institution called a *ver sacrum* (sacred spring-time). Whenever the district seemed in danger of being over-crowded they were accustomed to consecrate to the gods every child and animal born during the spring of a certain year. In the twentieth year thereafter, the children, now grown up, were turned adrift to find new homes wheresoever the gods should guide them. From this state-directed emigration sprang the

The Sabellian races of central Italy. The emigrants were always guided by a god-sent sign; thus we have the Marsi (guided by the war-god Mars) round the Fucine lake (*Lago di Celano*, now drained), and the Picentes (guided by a wood-pecker, *picus*, a symbol of the war-god), who occupied a strip of land on the Adriatic coast between Ancona and Pescara. Other Sabellian tribes were the Vestini south of the Picentes, the Marrucini south of the



Vestini, and the Paeligni between the Marrucini and the Fucine lake. The Aequi, between the Sabines and the upper Anio, and the Hernici, along the valley of the Trerus, wedged in between the Volsci and Aequi, were both near akin to the Sabines, and may be included among the Sabellian tribes.

Ancient authorities mention a language called Oscan and a people called Oscan. The language belongs to the same family as the Umbrian and the Latin, and was spoken by that portion of the Osco-Sabellian stock which, derived like the Sabellians from the Sabines, spread over a great portion of central and southern Italy. According to one theory the people called Oscans did not belong to the Italian stock at all, but were an unwarlike race in Campania, which was conquered by the Samnites (Sabinites), the most powerful of the tribes descended from the Sabines. But a more probable view is that the Oscan-speaking races were identical with the people called Oscans, and that the latter settled first in Samnium as Samnites and thence spread in various directions.

The Samnites were by far the most numerous and the most important of the Osco-Sabellian races. According to tradition they were, like the Sabellians of central Italy, the result of one of the "sacred springs" of the Sabines. They occupied the region of the central Apennines called Samnium (corresponding to the Molise and part of the modern Campania); here they formed a league consisting of four cantons—the Caraceni, Pentri, Hirpini, and Caudini. Of these the Pentri with their strong towns, Aesernia (*Isernia*) and Bovianum (*Boiano*), situated near Mount Tifernus (*Mount Matese*) at the upper waters of the Volturnus (*Volturno*), were the strongest. This league was for a time the most powerful

federation in Italy, though it was more adapted for defence than conquest.

From Samnium the Oscans overflowed westwards, eastwards, and southwards. In early times they followed the river Volturnus and occupied the rich and beautiful plain of Campania, between the Liris (*Garigliano*) and the Silarus (*Sele*). Here they succumbed to the luxurious civilisation of the Greeks and Etruscans, and became effeminate and unwarlike. Some centuries later, about 450 B.C., the Oscans again poured down the Volturnus and carried all before them in Campania, overwhelming Etruscans, Greeks, and their Oscan kinsmen with equal facility. In 424 B.C. they drove out the Etruscan Lucumones from ^{Oscan conquest of Campania.} Capua; in 420 they captured the illustrious Greek colony of Cumæ, as well as other Greek cities of the Campanian coast.

It was to this onset that the Latins owed their ability to throw off the Etruscan yoke and to beat back the Volsci; but by the year 260 B.C., the last of the Oscans had laid down their arms before the eagles of Rome.

About the time of their second conquest of Campania, the Oscans sent an offshoot southwards from Samnium and formed the nation of Lucanians, who ^{The Lucanians.} subdued and occupied the whole of south Italy as far as the straits of Messina. Some years later the native population living in the toe of Italy (modern ^{The Bruttii.} Calabria) freed themselves from their Lucanian masters and formed the savage mountain tribe of the Bruttii.

The Oscans at an early period also spread eastwards from Samnium, forming the tribe of the Frentani, which stretched along the coast of the Adriatic ^{The Frentani.} between the Marrucini and Apulia, and wrested a portion of Apulia itself from the Iapygian settlers.

The Latins seem to have been originally near kinsmen of the Sabines. They descended from the country around Reate and Amiternum, in the central Apennines, and settled in the district bordered by the lower Tiber, the Apennines about Praeneste, and the Volscian mountains. Here they lived clustered about the Alban Mountains, on the highest peak of which lay Alba Longa, the capital of their confederacy of thirty cities.

The Latins.

§ 9. The Greeks crossed to Italy for purposes of colonization at an early period. The east coast was too inhospitable to invite settlement, but there were excellent harbours along the south and west. The

The Greeks
in Italy.
Cumae.

first Greek colony was undoubtedly the Campanian Cumae, on Cape Misenum (*Punta di Miseno*), founded not earlier than 800 B.C. by a band of emigrants from the town of Cyme in Euboea (*Negropont*). Cumae sent off several offshoots, the most famous of which was Parthenope, later called Neapolis (*Naples*). In 743 B.C. Rhegium (*Reggio*), which commanded the entrance to the Straits of Messina, was founded by other colonists from Euboea, and a few years later (728 B.C.) the Sicilian side of the straits was secured by emigrants from Cumae who settled at Zancle, afterwards Messana (*Messina*). About this time the

The Achaean
Cities.

Achaean of the Peloponnesus (*Morea*) began to move westwards. They founded the powerful and luxurious Sybaris (721 B.C.) and Crotona (710 B.C.), on the western shore of the Tarentine Gulf. The Achaean colonies were less commercial than agricultural, and with their numerous dependent cities occupied a wide territory inland across to the opposite sea. By 600 B.C. Sybaris possessed twenty-five towns and ruled over four native tribes. It was constantly at variance with the people of Crotona, by whom it was ultimately taken and rased

(510 B.C.). In 708 B.C. the Dorians effected their only settlement on Italian soil by colonizing Tarentum (*Taranto*) at the head of the gulf of the same name, a city destined to rival in wealth and duration any of the Grecian colonies. Other Greek cities of more or less importance were Metapontum, Heraclea, Scylacium, and Locri, along the southern sea; and Laus and Poseidonia (or Paestum) on the Tyrrhenian shore. A glance at the map will show how completely the Greeks had taken possession of Southern Italy, and such was their prosperity in their new homes that they were not without justification in calling the country Great Greece (Magna Graecia). Until about 600 B.C. they grew and prospered exceedingly, but shortly after that date they were involved in perpetual strife with the navies of Etruria and Carthage on the one hand, and with Lucanians and Samnites on the other. The former enemies were jealous of their commercial prosperity, the latter envied their wealth and their fertile lands. Yet despite their hostilities, Greeks and Etruscans traded freely with one another, and in particular the Etruscan Caere (*Cervetri*) became almost Hellenized, and passed on much that was Greek to the neighbouring Latins and to Rome. Cumae fell before the Samnites 420 B.C., but on the other hand the Etruscan cities of Campania became Hellenic in tongue and manners despite the Sabellian conquest. Far away from the Italian Greeks, colonists from Phocaea in Asia Minor founded (about 600 B.C.) near the mouth of the Rhone the city of Massilia, famous to-day as Marseilles.

§ 10. Last of all the invaders came the Gauls, a Celtic people like the Umbri before them. As told by Livy, the story of their migration is as follows:—About 600 B.C., when the Bituriges were the

Magna
Graecia.

The Gauls
in Italy.

leading nation of Gaul, the modern France, their king Ambigatus sent out from the over-abundant population two great hordes under the leadership of his nephews : one of these settled in the Black Forest ; the other under Bellovesus crossed the Graian Alps and reached the valley of the Po. The Etruscans were routed, and Bellovesus established his people, the Insubres, on the northern bank of the Po, where Mediolanum (now *Milan*) became their chief town. After an interval other Gauls followed. A chieftain named Elitovius or "Lightning" led the Cenomani into the country east of the Insubres. Brixia (*Brescia*) and Verona became the chief towns of this second host. Little by little they displaced the Etruscans, who still held out in isolated strongholds like Melpum, until they were masters of the whole northern side of the Po. When other swarms arrived, they crossed to the southern side, expelling thence the Etruscans and Umbrians. The Lingones established themselves along the coast of the Adriatic from the mouth of the Po to the Rubicon (*Rugone*). The land between the Rubicon and the *Æsis* (*Esino*) was seized by the Senones, who thus shut off the Umbrians completely from the sea. The more powerful tribe of the Boii settled in the hilly country in their rear, having the Po as their boundary on the north and the Apennine range on the south. The conquest was completed by about the year 400 B.C. It was these Gauls who, by their incursions, first set the Sabellian tribes afoot for the conquest of Southern Italy, and then combined with them to dismember the Etruscan empire ; thereby giving to the Latins their opportunity to throw off the yoke of Etruria, and to Rome her first impulse towards the conquest of that land.

CHAPTER II.

ROME IN THE REGAL PERIOD.

- § 11. Topography of Rome.—§ 12. The Legends of Rome: The Coming of Æneas.—§ 13. The Birth of Romulus: The Founding of the City: the Asylum: Rape of the Sabines: Tarpeia.—§ 14. The Romulan Constitution.—§ 15. The Story of Numa.—§ 16. The Story of Tullus Hostilius: the Battle of the Horatii: the Treachery of Mettus Fufetius and Fall of Alba.—§ 17. The Story of Ancus Marcius.—§ 18. The Story of Tarquinius Priscus: his Origin: his Reforms: the Story of Attus Navius.—§ 19. The Story of Servius Tullius: his Accession.—§ 20. His active Reign.—§ 21. The Story of Tarquinius Superbus: his Accession: his Tyrannical Reign: the Stratagem of Brutus.—§ 22. The Fall of the Tarquins: Lucretia.—§ 23. The Beginning of the Republic.—§ 24. The Laws of Valerius.—§ 25. The Stories of Lars Porsena and Horatius: of Mucius Scaevola: of Cloelia: and of Attius Clausus.—§ 26. The Latin War and Battle of Lake Regillus.
- § 27. The Materials of this Legendary History.—§ 28. Absurdity of the Legends.—§ 29. Ætiology in Legend.—§ 30. Legends of Greek Origin.—§ 31. National Vanity and Family Pride in Legends.—§ 32. Repetition in Legends.—§ 33. The Credible Element in the Legends.—§ 34. Latium and the Latins.—§ 35. The Rise of Rome.—§ 36. The Sabines in Rome.—§ 37. The Etruscans in Rome.

§ 11. THE river Tiber (*Tevere*), which rises in the centre of the Apennine range in the latitude of Florence, divides Italy by an irregular line from north to south. For the greater part of its course the river flows between mountains and hills which make it, in times of rain, a torrent; but after passing beyond the line of Mounts Soracte (*Sant' Oreste*) in Etruria and


Topography of
Rome.

Lucretilis (*San Gennaro*) in the land of the Sabines, it winds more slowly through the plain of Latium, where its last tributary the Anio (*Teverone*) falls into it from the Æquian hills. Here the banks are low and muddy, and rains in the uplands result in sudden and frequent floods in the lowlands, for the higher ground on either hand springs as a rule at some little distance from the river's bed, and only at one or two points is the soil on the immediate bank of the stream sufficiently high to escape inundation. At one such point, sixteen miles from the sea, where the land on either bank presents a series of irregular elevations, was founded the city of Rome.

From north to south the river winds through the city roughly S-wise: the upper curve includes the Field of Mars (*Campus Martius*), a level space whose eastern boundary is the Quirinal Hill (*Collis Quirinalis*), and the Capitol (*Mons Capitolinus*). The latter abuts abruptly upon the river and faces the Janiculan Hill (*Mons Ianiculus*) on the western bank, whose gentle slopes in a measure fill up the river's lower curve. Immediately below the Capitol, the Aventine (*M. Aventinus*) overhangs the river. Eastward of this rises the Caelian (*M. Caelius*), and between this and the Quirinal to the north lie two less marked elevations, the Esquiline (*C. Esquilinus*) and the Viminal (*C. Viminalis*). These last, with the Quirinal, form three spurs of the higher level of the plain of Latium. The other hills on the eastern side of the river are isolated mounds. All lie irregularly round a quadrangular central mound, the Palatine (*M. Palatinus*), also isolated. Together these form the Seven Hills of Rome.

Long centuries of wear and tear, of improvement or destruction, have removed the once steep scarps of the hills, lessened their elevation, levelled their summits, and filled

ROME IN THE REGAL PERIOD



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REFERENCE NOTE

- | | |
|---|-------------------------|
| 1 Citadel (Arx) | 7 Walls of Romulus |
| 2 Capitoline, Temple of Jupiter Capitolinus | 8 Wall of Servius |
| 3 Tullianum | 9 Temple of Vesta |
| 4 Pons Sublicus | 10 Senate House (Curia) |
| 5 Quay of the Tarquins | 11 Comitium |
| 6 Janiculum Citadel | 12 Via Sacra |

Tribes of Servius

- | |
|---------------|
| I Suburana |
| II Palatina |
| III Esquilina |
| IV Collina |

up the hollows between, which in the earliest times were mere swamps. To-day it is hard to find the whereabouts of many of the hills: once they were worthy of their name, and the Capitol and Palatine especially, defended by the river and the swamps about them, were formidable strongholds.

§ 12. In the preceding chapter we have seen that the
 The Legends of Rome.
 The Counting of Æneas.
 Latins were a people of Celtic affinities, nearly related to the Hernicans, Volscians, Æquians and Sabines, and like them invaders from the North. The Romans however, having long lost all knowledge of their true origin, had invented or borrowed a cycle of legends which connected them with Troy and the heroes of Homeric Greece. These legends must be related in brief: the reader will remember that they are but fictions.

When Agamemnon, the leader of the Greeks, had waged war against King Priam of Troy for ten years, that city was destroyed. Æneas, son of Anchises by the goddess Venus and a kinsman of King Priam, gathered together the remnant of the Trojans and sailed into the West. Seven years had he wandered over seas, when at last he reached Laurentum on the coast of Latium, ten miles below the Tiber's mouth, and he knew that this was the goal which the gods by their oracles had pointed out. Latinus, king of the land, made peace with the strangers, and gave to Æneas his daughter Lavinia in marriage. In her honour the Trojans built and named the town of Lavinium, five miles south-east of Laurentum. But Turnus, king of the Rutuli who dwelt in Ardea yet seven miles further to the south, to whom had been promised the hand of Lavinia, now claimed his bride by force. There followed a war in which Turnus was defeated but Latinus fell. Thenceforth Æneas

reigned over the combined peoples of Laurentum^{*} and Lavinium, called Latins from the dead Latinus. Three years passed, and Æneas was again assailed by the disappointed Turnus, who had called in to his assistance Mezentius of Caere (*Cervetri*) and the Etruscans. The Latins conquered, but the victory was bought by the death of Æneas, who disappeared in the waters of the Numicius, nigh to Ardea.

§ 13. Ascanius, Æneas' son, who succeeded him on the throne, did not stay in the little town of Lavinium. He built Alba Longa on the highest ridge (*Monte Cavo*) of the Alban Hills, eighteen miles from the coast. The new city became the capital of the surrounding plain, the mother of thirty several colonies, whose people came to her every year to offer up sacrifice to Jupiter Latiaris, the god of the Latins. So powerful was this federal state that the Etruscans did not venture to attack it, and an agreement was made that the boundary between the two peoples should be the Albula, afterwards famous as the Tiber. Ascanius was succeeded by a long line of kings. Three hundred years after the coming of the Trojans, Procas, twelfth in descent from Ascanius, occupied the throne. On his death a quarrel broke out between his two sons, Numitor and Amulius. Amulius, the younger, ousted his brother Numitor, whose daughter Rhea Silvia he compelled to become a Vestal Virgin, that so she might be always childless and no son of hers might ever claim the throne. But it was ordained otherwise. The Vestal bore twin sons to the god Mars: for her fault she was put to death, and King Amulius bade that the two children should be cast on the Tiber. In their cradle of wicker-work they floated down the river until they reached the Palatine Hill, where

The Birth of
Romulus.
The Found-
ing of the
City.

the cradle was arrested by the branches of a fig tree. The children did not perish from hunger, for a she-wolf came out of a neighbouring cave and suckled them. A shepherd, Faustulus, who saw the marvellous sight, took them home and named them Romulus and Remus. One day when they had grown up and become shepherds, they were accused of robbery, and Remus was taken before Numitor. The story of their birth was revealed by the shepherd, and Numitor recognized his grandsons. After this the two brothers slew Amulius and replaced their grandfather Numitor on the throne. They refused to stay at Alba, and determined to found a city on the hill where they had been suckled by the wolf. As they were twins they asked the gods to show by a sign which should be the founder of the town; and there appeared six vultures to Remus, but twelve to Romulus, and Romulus knew that he was the favourite of the gods. He marked out the site of his city by drawing a furrow around the Palatine, and began to build a wall. But Remus was jealous, and to show his contempt he leaped over the rising rampart, and Romulus in anger slew his brother. Rome was founded, said legend, in 753 B.C.

Although many followers had come with Romulus from Alba, the people were not large enough to fill the city; wherefore he opened an Asylum, or place of refuge, on the Capitoline Hill, to which flocked outcasts and evil-doers from the neighbouring tribes.

The Asylum.
The Rape
of the
Sabines.

But wives were still wanted, for the Sabines and other peoples refused to give their daughters in marriage to robbers and exiles. Romulus accordingly resorted to stratagem: he invited the inhabitants of the neighbouring cities to games in honour of the god Consus, and there came together a great concourse of people

gathered from the Sabine towns of Caenina and Crustum-
erium and Antemnae; and in the midst of the games
Romulus and his warriors carried off the young Sabine
women. The wronged parents on reaching home appealed
to Titus Tatius, King of the Sabines, but he seemed slow
in revenging the injury; wherefore the people of Caenina
at once invaded the Roman territory. They were defeated
and lost their king Acron. Then also they of Crustum-
erium and Antemnae marched against Rome and were
easily driven back. After this Titus Tatius led the whole
force of the Sabine nation against Rome, and pitched his
camp on the Quirinal Hill. The Capitoline Hill had been
entrusted by Romulus to the care of Spurius Tarpeius,
and his daughter Tarpeia offered to admit the Sabines to the fortress, provided they would The Story of
Tarpeia.
give her what they carried on their left arms, meaning by
this the heavy golden bracelets which they wore. Thus the
Sabines got possession of the Capitol, but they requited the
maiden's treachery by overwhelming her with their shields;
for these also they wore upon their left arms. After this
the Romans and Sabines met in battle on the level ground
between the Capitoline and the Palatine Hills, afterwards
known as the Forum. The Romans had at first the worst
of the fight, but Romulus called on Jupiter to stay their
panic, and they again faced the enemy. At this moment
the Sabine women, fearing for their fathers and brothers
on the one hand and on the other for their husbands,
rushed between the opposing ranks and entreated them to
make peace; and a compact was made between Romulus
and Titus Tatius that they should rule in common and
that their two peoples should become one. The Sabines
left their capital of Cures, far up the Tiber's valley, and
came to dwell at Rome. Thereafter some of the relatives

of King Tatius killed envoys from Laurentum, and when he went to Lavinium to offer up sacrifice, he was beset and slain in revenge for the wrong. Romulus now became sole king of the two peoples and ruled with great glory: he captured the Etruscan town of Fidenæ and deprived the people of Veii of part of their territory. But though popular with the multitude and the soldiers, he was not so much loved by the senators. While he was reviewing his army near the Goat's Pool in the Campus Martius a furious tempest sprang up, and when it had passed away, the king was no longer to be seen. Some said he had been slain by the senators; but one Proculus Julius declared that Romulus had appeared to him, and bade him command the people henceforth to worship him as a god.

§ 14. To Romulus was due, said the legend, the political organization of the state. He divided his people into patricians (*patres, patricii*) and plebeians (*plebs*): the patricians were the nobles, the plebeians the common multitude, and the plebeians were attached to one or other of the patricians. In this relation the plebeian was known as a client (*cliens*), and the patrician upon whom he was dependent was termed his patron (*patronus*). The client was bound to honour his patron, and the patron on his part was obliged to protect the client.

Romulus divided the patricians into three tribes (*tribus*), called Ramnes, Tities and Luceres. Each of these tribes was divided into ten parts called curies (*curiæ*). Each of the curies was subdivided into ten clans (*gentes*); and each *gens* again into ten families or households; so that in the whole state there were three tribes, thirty curies, 300 clans, and 3000 households. The plebeians were not divided in this way, said the legend. From the patricians,

Romulus choose 100 of the wisest old men (*senes, seniōres*), whom he named senators (*senatores*). Together they were the senate (*senatus*, from the same root as *senex*, old), and them he consulted when any grave matter demanded attention.

The patricians met in their curies to decide on questions of war and peace: if a majority of those in a curia voted for war, the voice of that curia counted as one vote for war; and if a majority of the thirty curies were in favour of war, then war was declared.

Romulus picked out 3000 of the young men to form the foot-soldiers of his army, and 300 more to serve as horsemen (*equites*), in three centuries of one hundred each. In this way every family would furnish one foot-soldier, and every ten families one horseman. The horsemen he called *Celeres*, and to command them he chose an officer termed the Tribune of the *Celeres* (*Tribunus Celerum*).

For a year after the disappearance of Romulus there was no king at Rome. During that time the senators chose between-kings (*interreges*) from their own body, and these ruled the city for five days each. At last it was agreed to elect Numa Pompilius, a Sabine famed for his righteousness.

§ 15. Romulus had been a great warrior, and under him the Romans had grown accustomed to a life of violence and rapine: Numa taught them religion and the fear of the gods and the arts of peace. He had learned wisdom from

The Story of
Numa (715—
673 B.C.¹).

¹ The dates of the reigns of the kings are of course just as legendary as is the date and story of the city's founding. Nevertheless it is necessary to know the latter date, for to the Romans of the Empire it constituted the era from which they reckoned all other dates, and many modern writers adopt the same system in dealing with Roman History. Such dates are marked by the letters A.U.C. (*Anno Urbis Condita*e, in the year from the city's foundation). To change any

Pythagoras, the philosopher of Magna Graecia, and from the goddess Egeria who met him secretly in a grove by night and instructed him in sacred lore. When the people refused to listen to his teaching, he convinced them of his divine power by inviting them to a banquet and converting the plain earthenware dishes into silver and gold. He told the Romans by what ritual they might win the favour of the gods. To superintend the religious worship of the state he made Numa Marcius chief Pontiff (*Pontifex Maximus*), and under him he appointed four lesser Pontiffes. He instituted four Augurs, who were to discover the will of the gods by observing the flight of birds. He created three Flamens, so called because they kindled the sacred fire; one of these was the servant of Jupiter, another of Mars Gradivus, another of Quirinus the deified Romulus. The fire on the city hearth was kept burning by the Vestal Virgins, who were vowed to a life of chastity as long as they kept their office.

The god Mars was also served by twelve Salii, wardens of the *Ancilia* or sacred shields. Numa built a temple to the double-faced god Janus, whereof the gates were closed in time of peace and opened only when the army went forth to war. During all Numa's long reign they remained shut, for the neighbouring peoples did not once attack the Romans. Numa also divided the land among the people, and in commemoration of this he built a temple to Terminus, the god of boundaries. Anxious that the

date A.U.C. into the corresponding date B.C. or A.D. : take the difference between 753 and the number representing the date A.U.C. If 753 be the greater of the two numbers, the difference *plus* one will represent the date B.C. ; if 753 be the lesser number, the difference will give the date A.D. Thus the year 477 A.U.C. = 277 B.C. (for $753 - 477 = 276$, and $276 + 1 = 277$); and the year 2646 A.U.C. = 1893 A.D. (for $2646 - 753 = 1893$).

people should forget their division into Romans' and Sabines, he divided the craftsmen into gilds according to their occupations. He formed eight in all—musicians, goldsmiths, masons, dyers, shoemakers, braziers and potters. Moreover he introduced the calendar. He died after a reign of forty-two years.

§ 16. Numa Pompilius was succeeded by Tullus Hostilius, a warlike king of Roman descent. At this time Alba Longa was ruled by a king called Gaius Cluilius. Now a quarrel arose between some Roman and Alban farmers, and

The Story of
Tullus Hos-
tilius (673—
642 B.C.)

Tullus Hostilius sent heralds (*fetiales*) to demand reparation for the wrong done to his people. Gaius Cluilius refused it, and encamped with his army five miles from the Roman wall at the Ditch of Cluilius (*Fossa Cluilia*), and there he died, and in his stead the Albans chose Mettus Fufetius to be their commander (*dictator*). Mettus represented to Tullus what danger they would bring upon themselves if they fought while the Etruscans were so near and so powerful, and proposed that champions should be chosen from each army to decide by single combat which people should rule the other. It so happened that in the Roman army there were three brothers born at one birth called the Horatii, and in the Alban army were three brothers also born at one birth called the

The Battle
of the Horatii.

Curiatii; and these were chosen as the champions. The Romans had the worst of the fight at first, for while the three Albans were only wounded, two of the Romans were killed outright; the third however was both unhurt and vigorous, and he prevailed by his cunning; for making pretence to flee, he led the wounded Curiatii after him, and turning upon each one severally, so slew them all; for by reason of their wounds they could not all keep pace and

fall upon him together. Therefore the Romans were declared lords of the Albans, and they escorted Horatius in triumph to the gates of Rome. And as he entered into the city he was met by his sister, who was betrothed to one of the slain Curiatii. She recognized her lover's cloak amongst her brother's spoils, and cursed Horatius for the murder. Then Horatius was wroth and slew her, uttering the wish that such might be the fate of every Roman woman who should lament the fall of an enemy of Rome. For the shedding of his sister's blood Horatius was tried before two judges (*duumviri*) appointed by the king, and was condemned to death; but Tullus granted him the privilege of appealing to the people. His father pleaded his cause, and entreated the citizens that he might not lose all three sons in one day; and for his valour in the fight, and for his father's sake, the people granted pardon to Horatius.

After this the peoples of Veii in Etruria and of Fidenae, upon the banks of the Tiber five miles away, declared war. In doing so they relied on pledges of help from Alba, for the Albans bore

The Treachery
of Mettus
and Fall of
Alba.

uneasily the Roman supremacy, and their dictator Mettus Fufetius was dissatisfied with his lessened dignity. In the battle, when the Romans were hard pressed, Mettus caused the Albans to flee from the fight; yet in spite of this Tullus bore himself bravely, and the Romans won the day. When the fight was ended, Mettus came back to the field and made pretence to be glad that the Romans were victorious. But Tullus had observed his treachery, and he ordered the Alban to be seized and torn to pieces by wild horses; and for their treachery he transferred the whole population of Alba to Rome, where he settled them on the Caelian Hill. From this time Alba Longa was a wilderness. Tullus was successful in other wars,

but his pride caused the gods to send a pestilence upon the people. Therefore he tried to find a remedy by consulting the sacred books of Numa, and while he did sacrifice to Jupiter, he was smitten with lightning, and with his house disappeared for ever.

§ 17. Ancus Marcius, the grandson of the Sabine Numa Pompilius, was the fourth king. Like Numa he was a peaceful monarch and anxious to serve the gods. The Latins, thinking that he would not retaliate, made war on him, but Ancus proved himself no coward: he captured Politorium and Tellenae and Ficana, and so extended the lands of Rome along the southern shore of the Tiber as far as the sea; and he brought the whole population thereof to Rome, just as Tullus had done with them of Alba. He settled these new subjects on the Aventine Hill and on the lower ground between the Aventine and the Palatine. He also fortified the Janiculan Hill and connected it with the city by a bridge of piles (*pons sublicius*); he deprived the people of Veii of all their land on the right bank of the Tiber from Rome down to the sea; and he founded Ostia at the river's mouth, to serve as a harbour. To Ancus is attributed the construction of the ancient prison, the Tullianum, as a menace to evil-doers, and the institution of the College of Fetials (State-heralds), whose duty it was to declare war on an enemy with the due solemnities, to demand reparation for injuries, and to preserve the record of the treaties which were ratified by the Romans.

§ 18. When the oligarchy of the Bacchiadae at Corinth was overthrown by the tyrant Cypselus, one of their number, Demaratus by name, sailed across the sea and came to Tarquinii in Etruria. He had a son called Lucumo, who wedded an Etruscan

The Story
of Ancus
Marcius (642
—616 B.C.).

The Story
of Tarquinius
Priscus (616
—578 B.C.).
His Origin.

lady of the name of Tanaquil. Now the Etruscans held Lucumo in little esteem as being the son of a foreigner ; wherefore Tanaquil, who was wealthy and ambitious, induced her husband to seek his fortune at Rome. When they reached the Janiculan Hill on their journey, an eagle carried away the cap from Lucumo's head and then flew back and replaced it. By this sign Tanaquil, who was versed in Etruscan divination, knew that her husband was destined to attain to the highest rank. Lucumo settled in Rome, and changed his name to Lucius Tarquinius. He soon became a favourite with King Ancus, who frequently consulted him on business of importance, and dying, made him guardian to his two sons ; and the people chose him for their king. He was a vigorous and successful ruler : he defeated the Sabines, and annexed Collatia on the Anio (*Teverone*), one of their towns ; then turning his arms against the Latins, he took Crustumerium, Medullia, Nomentum and other places between the Tiber and the Anio, and compelled the whole of the Latin nation (*nomen Latinum*) to swear allegiance to himself. Moreover he even subdued Etruria, so that the Etruscans became his subjects, and sent him the golden crown and other regal ornaments in token of their obedience.

Tarquinius tried to alter the constitution as settled by

Romulus. He proposed to add three new tribes to the three old ones, a change which would involve the doubling of the numbers of the senate and the cavalry as fixed by Romulus ;

but Attus Navius the augur declared that such an innovation was contrary to the will of the gods. Then Tarquinius asked the augur : " Say you that the thing whereof I am now thinking is possible ? " Attus consulted the auspices and declared that it was. Then said the king,

*His Reforms,
The Story
of Attus
Navius.*

"Here are a whetstone and a razor; I was thinking that you should cut through the whetstone with this razor." Attus took the whetstone and cut it through without effort. Tarquinius now desisted from his plan of making new tribes, but he increased the old tribes to twice their former magnitude by the admission of new clans, so that henceforth each tribe (Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres) consisted of old or greater clans (*maiores gentes*) and of new or lesser clans (*minores gentes*); the three centuries of knights were consequently increased to six, so that the horsemen of the city numbered 600; the senate was increased to double its former numbers, and now consisted of 200 senators, of whom half belonged to the greater houses and half to the lesser. Tarquinius left some famous buildings to commemorate his reign: amongst these were the great *cloacae* or sewers which drained the low-lying parts of the city and rendered them fit for habitation. On the ground between the Capitoline and the Palatine he made a market-place or Forum, and between the Palatine and the Aventine he laid out a racecourse (*circus*), at which games were performed every year.

§ 19. Now Tarquinius had in his household one Servius Tullius, the son of a slave-girl. Once when Servius was asleep before the hearth, the onlookers saw that his head was surrounded with flames. They hurried to Tanaquil to report the marvellous sight, and the queen declared that Servius would one day be famous. From this time she showed particular favour to the boy, and when he was grown up Tarquinius gave to him his daughter in marriage, and evidently intended to make him his successor. Until this time the sons of Ancus, who had been passed over in favour of their guardian Tarquinius, hoped that the kingdom

The Story of
Servius Tul-
lius (578—
534 B.C.). His
Accession.

would be theirs when the king died ; but now they thought they would never reign, and hired two peasants to murder Tarquinius. One peasant went up to the king and pretended that there was a dispute between himself and his companion ; and while Tarquinius was listening to his complaint, the other struck him to the ground with an axe. But Tanaquil acted with promptitude. She addressed the people from an upper window, and declared that Tarquinius was not dead or even mortally wounded : until he recovered, he had appointed Servius to act as his deputy. So Servius sat in the king's place, and the people were so greatly pleased with his rule that, when it was at last formally announced that Tarquinius was dead, they bestowed the crown on Servius.

§ 20. The reign of good King Servius was long remembered, for under him Rome prospered exceedingly, and all that the king did for the better organization of his state and city and people remained to later times as the reforms of Servius. By these reforms the Roman army was made more mighty than ever, for all the people were told off each to his place and duty in the host. There was no citizen that was not a soldier, and the army of Servius mustered 80,000 men in the Field of Mars. In Servius' day too the people came to have a clearer voice in questions of the state, for now was created the *Comitia Centuriata* ;¹ and the city was divided into four new tribes and surrounded with a great wall and mound.² Servius

¹ For an account of the Servian Reform, see below, chap. iii. §§ 46,

² These were the tribes Suburana, Palatina, Esquilina, and Collina, taking their names from their topographical position. They were determined therefore by locality, and embraced all who dwelt within their respective boundaries ; whereas the three ancient tribes which had existed even in Romulus' time were determined, at least in theory, by blood-relationship, so that no new-comer could find a place in them.

was as successful a warrior as legislator, for he compelled the Etruscans to pay homage to him as their overlord, and he made a treaty of alliance with the Latins and commemorated this by a temple of Diana on the Aventine, to which both nations came to offer sacrifice.

§ 21. Now Servius Tullius had two daughters : one of these was gentle and meek ; the other, haughty and ambitious. Tarquinius had left two sons, Lucius and Aruns : the disposition of Aruns was mild and unassuming, but Lucius aspired to the sovereign power. Servius married his gentle daughter to Lucius, while the ambitious one he wedded to Aruns, in the hope that partners of such diverse characters would neutralize each the other's defects. But the reverse of this happened, for Lucius Tarquinius despised his own wife as much as he admired his brother's. The ambitious Tullia returned the feeling, and induced Lucius to murder his wife and brother, and to wed herself. Not content with this, they began to plot against the aged Servius. When Lucius Tarquinius had secured a sufficient body of followers, of whom he found many among the young patricians of the lesser houses, he put on the royal purple and, attended by an armed throng, burst into the senate-house. Then as he sat on the royal seat he commanded the senators to attend and listen to their king Tarquinius. Servius, on being informed of this daring act, hurried to the senate-house. He attempted to oust Tarquinius from his seat, but as he was now feeble with years, he was no match for the younger man, and was cast down the steps of the building. He was betaking himself homewards when he was cut down by armed men who had been sent in pursuit. As he was lying dead on the wayside, his daughter, the wicked Tullia, chanced to be passing in her chariot. She did not turn aside, but drove over the

The Story of
Tarquinius
Superbus
(534—510
B.C.). His
Accession.

body, and bespattered and defiled with her father's blood entered her home. Wherefore that road was known as the Via Scelerata—the Accursed Way.

Such was the commencement of the reign of Lucius Tarquinius, whom men for his cruel deeds soon began to name the Arrogant (*Superbus*). He surrounded himself with a body-guard of armed men; he was the first of the kings who neglected to ask the advice of the senate when he made war or peace with the surrounding peoples; many of the fathers he put to death, and their places he did not fill up, so that the senate became weak and despicable. The poor people he compelled to work at his public buildings, and he completed the great sewers (*cloacae*) and the Forum and the racecourse near the Aventine, which the first Tarquin had begun.

But though hated for his tyranny at home, he was a great warrior, and he carried the Roman arms further than any of the kings who had gone before him. He compelled the Latins to continue in their allegiance, and when Turnus Herdonius of Aricia spoke seditious words about his arrogance, he caused him to be arrested and executed on a false charge. The people of Gabii, a Latin town fifteen miles east of Rome, refused to submit to the tyrant and defeated his troops. So he won the town by stratagem: his son, Sextus Tarquinius, came disguised as a fugitive to Gabii, and implored the townspeople to protect him against his father's cruelty. They believed his tale and gave him part of the army to command. When his popularity was assured at Gabii he sent a messenger to his father to ask what was next to be done. Tarquinius made no reply in words, but passed into his garden, and in the presence of the messenger silently struck off with a switch the heads of the tallest poppies that grew there. All this was incomprehensible to the messenger, but Sextus grasped his

father's meaning, and by insidious accusations cut off the chief men of Gabii. When there was no one left to offer resistance, he handed over the town to his father. Tarquinius further strengthened his position by giving his daughter in marriage to Octavius Mamilius, who was king of the strong town of Tusculum (*Frascati*), fifteen miles to the south-east. He waged war against the Volscians and took from them the town of Suessa Pometia, which was more than fifty miles distant from Rome.

While he was engaged in sending out colonies to Signia (*Segni*), and Circeii (*Monte Circello*) in the Volscian land, great consternation was caused by the appearance of a snake within the palace. To learn what was the meaning of this portent, Tarquinius sent his two younger sons, Titus and Aruns, to the celebrated Greek oracle of Apollo at Delphi.

The Stragem of Brutus.

With them went their cousin Lucius Junius, surnamed Brutus or the Dullard. But his dullness he had only assumed to avoid awakening the jealousy of Tarquinius, and as an emblem of his own mind he offered to the god a rod of gold enclosed in a staff of cornel wood. When the young men had discharged their father's commission, it occurred to them to make inquiry who should rule after him at Rome, and there came answer: "He among you that shall first kiss his mother." The two Tarquins took the answer in its literal sense, but Brutus bethought him that the earth was the true mother of all; wherefore he stumbled and fell, accidentally as it seemed, and touched the ground with his lips.

§ 22. When the young men returned to Rome, they found Tarquinius engaged in besieging Ardea. One day the princes were banqueting with a kinsman, Tarquinius Collatinus, who dwelt at Collatia,

The Fall of the Tarquins. Lucretia.

and the conversation turned on the merits of their wives, and each was enthusiastic in praise of his own. Finally they agreed to leave the camp before Ardea and see with their own eyes how their wives were at that time occupied. At Rome they found the daughters-in-law of Tarquinius engaged in the revel and gaiety of the court; but when they came to Collatia, Lucretia, the wife of Collatinus, was sitting in the midst of her maidens and toiling at the loom, and the princes at once agreed that Collatinus had the best wife. But the beauty of Lucretia had filled Sextus Tarquinius with evil desires, and one day he left the camp unknown to Collatinus, and came in the evening to Collatia, attended by a single slave. He was welcomed by Lucretia, who had no suspicion of his intent. When all was still in the house, Sextus entered Lucretia's room. Entreaties and threats were powerless to move her, nor did she yield until Sextus declared that he would kill her and his slave, and lay the slave's dead body with her own, and then tell her husband that he had so found them. On the morrow Lucretia sent messengers to her father at Rome and to her husband at Ardea, bidding them come attended each by one faithful friend, for a great calamity had come upon her. Spurius Lucretius hastened from Rome and with him came Publius Valerius; Collatinus brought with him Lucius Junius Brutus. On their arrival Lucretia told them of the crime of Sextus, and when she had finished the story of her wrongs, she drew a knife from her robes and slew herself. Then Brutus drew out the knife from her heart and swore that he would pursue the accursed stock of the Tarquins until he had driven them from the land. And they carried Lucretia's body into the market-place, and Brutus assembled the people and bade them avenge the deed, as became men and Romans. All

the warriors joined him, and leaving a guard at Collatia, they marched on Rome. At Rome the words of Brutus were as effective as at Collatia, and the people declared that they would no longer be ruled by Tarquinius. On hearing of the tumult, Tarquinius hastened to Rome, but the gates were shut and he was unable to effect an entrance. The army at Ardea also declared against him: he was forced to go into exile among the Etruscans at Caere (*Cervetri*), and with him went his two younger sons. Sextus Tarquinius fled to Gabii, where he was at once put to death by the citizens. So the monarchy ended and the government became a republic, in the year 509 B.C.

§ 23. In this way the Tarquins were expelled from Rome. From this time forth the citizens in the Comitia Centuriata elected every year two magistrates, called consuls, who took the place of the king. The earliest consuls were L. Junius Brutus and L. Tarquinius Collatinus. The first action of Brutus was to replenish the senate, which had fallen far below its proper number owing to the murders of Tarquinius. A sufficient number of members was chosen from the centuries of the horsemen to bring it up to 300. These new members were known as *conscripti* because they were enrolled by the consul; the older members were *patres*, so that henceforth the senators were addressed as *patres conscripti*, this being a shortened expression for *patres et conscripti*.¹ As the centuries of the horsemen included plebeians, many of the latter thus found their way into the senate, and this concession tended greatly to unite patricians and plebeians firmly against the exiled king. At the same time Brutus bound the whole people by an

The Beginning
of the
Republic.

¹ See also § 45.

oath that they would never suffer a king to reign again in Rome. A king of the sacrifices (*rex sacrorum*) was instituted to perform the sacred duties which had been part of the royal functions, but he was no longer the chief of the priests, for the supreme authority in religious rites was given to the *pontifex maximus*.

§ 24. Though Collatinus had assisted in the expulsion of the Tarquins, yet he belonged to that hated family, and the people clamoured that he should give up his consulship. His colleague Brutus implored him to gratify their wish, so he resigned his magistracy and retired to Lavinium. Now many of the young patricians had been accustomed to riot and license during the reign of the Tarquins, and they lamented that they should be compelled to obey the laws like the poorest of the people. They now entered into a conspiracy to bring back the exiles, but the plot was revealed by a slave named Vindicius, who had overheard it. Though the sons and nephews of Brutus were implicated, the consul did not hesitate to inflict the punishment of death upon them; so great was his love for freedom. After this the Etruscan peoples of Veii and Tarquinii (*Corneto*) tried to restore the Tarquins by force of arms. Aruns Tarquinius was in command of the Etruscan cavalry, while Brutus was at the head of the Roman knights. When the two foes caught sight of each other they rushed forward; neither was careful to protect his own body, and both fell pierced by a mortal wound. By the death of Brutus, P. Valerius, who had been chosen his colleague on the retirement of Collatinus, became the sole magistrate of the state. He was accused of building a stronghold for himself at Rome, and when he neglected to ask the Comitia Centuriata to give him a colleague, people whispered that he was aiming at the royal power.

To quiet the discontent Valerius proposed two laws :*the first, that if the consul sentenced a citizen to death or the lash, the condemned man should have the right of *provocatio*—that is of appealing to the Comitia Centuriata, which might, if it so willed, cancel the punishment ; the second, that the offence of aiming at the kingship should be punishable by death. These proposals so pleased the people that Valerius won the title of Publicola, or the People's Champion. After this an election for a second consul was held, and Sp. Lucretius, the father of Lucretia, was chosen.

§ 25. After the failure of Veii and Tarquinii to cope with the Romans, Tarquinius betook himself to Lars Porsena of Clusium (*Chiusi*), who was at that time overlord of the Etruscans. Porsena collected a great army from all Etruria and marched on Rome. He captured the Janiculum on the right bank of the Tiber, and put a garrison in it ; nothing but a wooden bridge remained to be crossed, and the city would be in his hands. But Horatius, whose surname was Cocles, resolved to defend the bridge, and two warriors, Lartius and Herminius, agreed to live or die with him. The three Romans withstood the whole assault of the Etruscans until the bridge was broken down behind them. Lartius and Herminius darted back when only a few planks remained, but Horatius stayed until escape in that way was impossible : he plunged into the foaming Tiber, and reached the opposite bank in safety. Thus Rome was saved for the moment, but Lars Porsena proceeded to besiege the town, and the Romans were sore pressed by famine. Then C. Mucius, a youth of noble birth, thinking it disgraceful that Romans should thus be hemmed in by foes, went to the Etruscan camp with the resolution of killing King Porsena. He did not know the king, and

The Story of
Lars Porsena
and Horatius.

Of Mucius
Scaevola.

was afraid to ask, but seeing some one in authority who was paying out money to the troops, he attacked and slew him. It proved not to be Porsena, and Mucius was dragged before the king. Threatened with death, he did not lose his composure, and to show how little he recked of tortures he plunged his right hand into a brazier of burning coals, nor did he remove it until it was burnt to a cinder, wherefore he won the name of Scaevola, the Left-handed. Porsena, surprised at his fortitude, allowed him to go free, and Mucius told the king: "Three hundred Roman youths of courage and daring like mine have sworn to slay thee should I fail." On hearing this Porsena made peace: he was so generous that he only demanded that the Romans should give hostages, and surrender some territory which they had taken from the Veientines in olden times.

Of Cloelia. Cloelia, a noble maiden, who was one of the hostages, escaped from the Etruscan camp in the night-time, and swam across the Tiber. She was followed by her companions; but Porsena was so far from requiring their return that he allowed them to select one each from the male hostages, and these he set at liberty. After this Porsena made no further attempt to restore the Tarquins. The Romans soon had an opportunity of showing their gratitude to him for his chivalrous conduct, for on desisting from the siege of Rome, Porsena led his army southwards against Aricia (*Ariccia*). The people of that city got help from the Latins and from the Greek city of Cumae in Campania, and thus reinforced, they cut the greater part of the Etruscan expedition to pieces. The remainder were welcomed at Rome; many of them preferred to stay there altogether, and a spot known as the Tuscan Settlement (*Tusculus vicus*) was assigned to them to dwell in. Tarquinius at last gave up all hope of being reinstated by the

Etruscans, and betook himself to Tusculum, where his son-in-law, Octavius Mamilius, was king. There he began to intrigue with the Sabines and the Latins, with the result that the Sabines declared war on the Romans. But one of the most powerful of the Sabines, Attus Clausus, disapproved of these hostilities, and Of Attus Clausus. made an agreement with Valerius Publicola to migrate to Rome. He accordingly left Regillum with all his clients to the number of 5000, and settled on some territory on the right bank of the Anio, which was allotted to him by the Romans. He himself was admitted to the senate, and under the Roman name of Appius Claudius, became the progenitor of a house which was to give twenty-three consuls to Rome. Soon after this Valerius Publicola died, after being consul four times and leading the Romans in all their wars since the expulsion of the Tarquins. The matrons lamented him for ten months as they had lamented Brutus.

§ 26. Eight years after the downfall of the monarchy, in 501 B.C., there was great consternation at Rome lest the Latins should revolt, and it was rumoured that Octavius Mamilius had enlisted The Latin War, and Battle of Lake Regillus (496 B.C.). the thirty Latin towns in a conspiracy. It seemed to the people that the divided authority of the two consuls would be unequal to cope with the emergency, and they for the first time created a dictator, a magistrate against whose sentence of death there was no appeal, and who had the same unlimited power which the kings had enjoyed. The Roman historians were not agreed as to the name of the first dictator: some said it was Titus Lartius, others Manius Valerius, a relative of the great Publicola. This measure was sufficient for the time; but soon afterwards (in 499 B.C. or 496 B.C.) it was necessary to again appoint a dictator, and Aulus Postumius was chosen. The

Latin confederates and the exiled Tarquins met the Romans at Lake Regillus, not far from Tusculum, and the Romans won the battle after a hot conflict, in which Mamilius was slain. According to legend, they were assisted by the twin-gods Castor and Pollux, who appeared on white horses in the front of the battle and encouraged them to renewed exertions. After this defeat Tarquinius made no further attempt to return to Rome; he went to Cumae, where he was protected by the tyrant Aristodemus, and there he died.

§ 27. In the year 390 B.C. the Gauls sacked and burned Rome, and in doing so destroyed most, if not all, written authorities for the years preceding that date. These authorities could not have been very copious, for it was not until many years later that anything like a yearly history of events was made; and still less could they have been reliable for any period as ancient as the kings, since writing, if used at all, was only used very sparingly. There remained, then, only tradition to fill in the details of the years previous to 390 B.C. Tradition was copious, but utterly inconsistent. Scarcely two writers agreed on any but the most salient points. None took the trouble to examine the credibility of the legends. Each chose what he thought most interesting, and avoided all discussion; but even thus each falls into inconsistencies and impossibilities, as, for instance, when Livy prefers the account that Tarquin the Arrogant was the son, and not the grandson, of Tarquinius Priscus, in which case he must have been about seventy years of age when he threw Servius down the steps of the senate-house, and seized the kingdom. A few pieces of evidence

The Materials
for this
Legendary
History.

there may have been, such as laws and treaties engraved on metal or stone, and therefore able to resist the ruin of the Gauls and the hand of time ; and there were other such monuments, as the still-existing fragments of the wall of Servius Tullius and that which encircled Roma Quadrata, the cloacae, the foundations of the Capitoline temple, and the Mamertine prison, which was said to have been built by Ancus. But the Roman writers were not antiquaries ; they could neither read ancient Latin nor understand the “sermons in stones” which were all around them.

§ 28. The legends are not history : a brief consideration will show that they are in many particulars impossible. The tale of Romulus' birth is Absurdity of the Legends. common to half a score of national heroes : this and his ascent into heaven may be dismissed as myth, pure and simple. So also may the story of Rome's connection with Troy, and the whole body of legends which has become grouped about the name of Æneas ; the story of the Asylum, of Tarpeia, of the miracles of Numa's dishes and Attus Navius' razor and the death of Tullus, and the portents in the lives of Tarquinius Priscus and of Servius ; the appearance of Castor and Pollux at Regillus. Apart from the more palpable myths, some of the legends defy all chronology : thus Numa is said to have learnt wisdom from Pythagoras, who lived two hundred years later than the date assigned to Numa ; and Romulus is said to have founded the temple of Jupiter Stator, which was only built many years afterwards. The miraculous and impossible elements grow less frequent as the story progresses—a proof that the Romans themselves saw their lack of credibility. Probably the Latins, like many other peoples, had their folk-lore and folk-songs, going back to the times when the

gods were supposed to deal openly with men ; and extracts from these songs gradually made their way into the prose narrative of the ancient days of Rome.¹

§ 29. The account of Romulus creating the senate, Ætiology in
Legend. dividing the people into patricians and plebeians, and causing the free Romans to assemble in their curies, is scarcely less incredible, when we consider that the Council of the Old Men and the Assembly of the People are found among the political institutions of almost every nation of Europe. As a matter of fact, they were common to all Italian communities—whether Latin, Sabellian, or Umbrian, and the Romans no doubt received them as their heritage from remote ages, just as did the Athenians and Spartans. It is still more absurd to ascribe the religious organization of the state to Numa ; for this involves the folly of asserting that before his reign the Romans had neither religious rites nor priestly functionaries—a state of things without parallel among any people, civilized or uncivilized.

Such legends belong to the class called ætiological, that is, legends constructed purposely to explain existing facts. It is a fact that there was a Senate, a Comitia, certain classifications of the people by local tribes, by families, and by property, and a complete religious organization : it was a simple matter to invent originators for all these facts. It is especially with names and customs that the ætiological legend concerns itself : the meaning of the name of Rome was forgotten, therefore Romulus was invented as its founder and the author of its name ; there was a Tarpeian Rock on the Capitol, and Tarpeia was invented to account for the name ; there was a Via Scelerata and a Vicus

¹ Some idea of these folk-songs may be gathered from Macaulay's *Lays of Ancient Rome*.

Tuscan in Rome, and to explain these names arose the stories of Tullia driving over her father's corpse and of the welcome given to Porsena at Rome. So too for the right of *provocatio*, an origin was found in the legend of Horatius' murder of his sister; and because it was the custom at Rome, as even in parts of England till lately, for the bridegroom to pretend violence in carrying away his bride, there arose the story of the rape of the Sabines to account for what was in reality a custom of world-wide extent and antiquity.

§ 30. Many features of the legends can be traced to a Greek source, the fact being that the first Legends of Greek Origin. historians of Rome were Greeks, who introduced into the meagre annals of the Romans some of their own more striking stories. To this side of the legends belong among others the tale of Æneas' wanderings, and of the Trojan origin of the Romans. The story of the Asylum (a Greek term) betrays its origin. So too the name of Numa, the law-giving king, is connected with the Greek *νόμος*, law. Tarquinius Superbus, who overrides the laws, humiliates the senate, refuses to consult the elders, crushes the people with great public tasks, and sends embassies to the oracle at Delphi, is a Greek tyrant of the type of Peisistratus and Periander. Just as Sextus Tarquinius got possession of Gabii, so did Zopyrus in Herodotus' story secure Babylon for his king, Darius. Tarquin's advice to his son about the poppies is also found in Herodotus, who says it was given by Thrasybulus of Miletus to Periander of Corinth.

§ 31. When at length, in the second century B.C., there appeared historians of Roman blood and language, they were not slow to follow the National Vanity and Family Pride. example of the inventive Greeks; and they had the additional motives of national vanity and family

pride. The former led them to make conquerors of their mythical kings and to represent Rome's early history as one steady advance from little to great; the latter had already constructed elaborate genealogical histories for all great *gentes*—never was any so proud of his ancestors as a true-born Roman—and of these the later historians availed themselves. They were not critics, and if the great houses of the Horatii and the Valerii had invented or borrowed stories which carried back the glory of their family to the days of Tullius and Tarquin, the historian did not trouble himself to examine too closely their probability. When the Romans came into contact with the Greeks of Cumæ, they found that it was a matter of punctilio with every Greek state or family to trace its descent from the Grecian heroes who fought at Troy; while similarly all non-Greek peoples who had had dealings with the Greeks, made themselves out to be of Trojan blood. Roman pride could not bear to be without part in that famous story, so it invented the story of Æneas' wanderings and claimed lineal descent from Priam of Troy.

§ 32. However, Roman genius was not imaginative or poetical; and after claiming an antiquity which went back through seven centuries and a half, the annalists found it very difficult to invent details for filling up the early centuries for which there were no records and but few traditions. So they contented themselves with telling the same old tales twice over.

Thne has shown that the legends are often repeated in slightly different forms. Tullus Hostilius, the warlike monarch, is the double of Romulus, and it can be shown that the details of their reign are, with a few variations of name, practically identical. Ancus Marcius, the peaceful king, is a copy of Numa, and the two Tarquins are evolved

from one original type. So in the matter of events : time after time recur the same wars, revolts, and sieges, as, for instance, at Veii and Fidenæ ; and if one historian avoids repeating himself, another is less careful, and scarce one event is associated with the name of one king alone.

§ 33. But clumsy and incredible and contradictory as the legends are, they nevertheless contain here and there germs of truth. To say exactly where truth ends and fiction begins is impossible, but it is not difficult to detect occasionally the bare outlines of real historical events. By comparing the customs, myths, and languages of other nations, we may be enabled to reject much that is false, as, for instance, the story of Gabii and the rape of the Sabines. By comparing the legends with themselves, we can trace the growth of other myths. But it is by comparing the legends of early Rome with the known facts of her later history, law, language, customs, and religion, that we best gain an insight into their origin and value. A knowledge of the Roman constitution, as existent in republican times, will help to throw light on the earlier period ; for relics of older times persist among modern developments. For instance, even if the legends said nothing about a time when Rome was governed by kings, and if we could not infer its existence from the analogy of other peoples, yet the mere existence of "between-kings" (*interreges*) appointed to hold the elections in the absence of duly qualified magistrates, would justify our belief in a regal period ; while from the fact that under the republic there was a "king of sacred matters" (*rex sacrorum*), we should rightly conclude that in an earlier age the king had taken a chief part in religious ceremonies. From hints such as these, and from a consideration of Rome's position with regard to her Latin,

The Credible
Element in
the Legends.

Sabine, and Etruscan neighbours, and from the known history of these peoples, we can indicate some main facts which underlie the legends, and can from these construct in vague outline a history of Rome from the time when she rises above her sister Latin cities until she establishes the republican constitution within her walls. After this we are on surer ground, although it is not until the war with Pyrrhus in the fifth century of the city's existence that we commence to feel certain about the details of the struggles by which she achieved the conquest of the world.

§ 34. While yet the Latins were little differentiated from the Sabines, they descended from the high-lands about Reate (*Rieti*) on the upper waters of the Nar (*Nera*), and at the dawn of history we find these, the Old Latins (*Prisci Latini*), settled in the "Broad Land" (Latium, cp. *latus*, broad), the fertile plain which stretched along the southern and eastern bank of the Tiber from its confluence with the Anio (*Teverone*) to the sea. On every available hill and mound, secure as far as might be from human foes, and safe from the more deadly malaria—the poisonous atmosphere of the marshes—they planted their settlements, which dotted so closely their confined territory of some 700 square miles—an area less than that of Buckinghamshire—that in the earliest days of the Republic there were thirty towns of importance upon the roll of the Latin League. The central point of their land was the Alban Mount (*Monte Cavo*), and here stood Alba Longa, which from its strength and commanding site—for it overlooked the whole of Latium like a watch-tower—became naturally the centre of their nationality. Here was the temple of the Latin Jupiter (*Iuppiter Latiaris*), and hither came the whole people year by year to do him honour and sacrifice in the Latin Festival (*Feriae Latinae*). But league

in any proper sense of the term there was as yet none, and certainly the Latin towns were not colonies from Alba. Each town was independent, and presumably ruled by its own king as was Rome. Probably also the inhabitants of all the Latin towns possessed, as members of one people, the right to intermarry, to migrate from one town to another, and to acquire and dispose of property as they could. It is possible that the deputies of all may have met from time to time to debate upon matters which affected all alike; and probably such congress would have in fact, if not in theory, a certain control over the individual towns. They were not a belligerent folk, but as occasion demanded they might doubtless levy a conjoint army to defend the interests of all, and might appoint a dictator, or, later, two praetors to take the supreme command; yet there could have been no compulsion in the matter, and each several town was its own master, whether it were Tusculum (*Frascati*), or Praeneste (*Palestrina*), or Tibur (*Tivoli*), or Rome, or any other settlement large or small.

§ 35. The Latins were in a state of constant feud with their neighbours and kinsmen. South and east were the Volscians, Hernicans, Æquians, and Sabines; and to the north, across the Tiber, the more menacing power of the Etruscans stretched far and wide; and while their corsairs were coasting southwards to Campania and their armies advancing towards the Tiber, it was inevitable that they should come into conflict with the Latins. It required little insight to discover the importance of guarding the frontier which nature provided for the land in the wide stream of the Tiber. Thus a minor settlement, not yet deemed worthy to rank as one of the thirty cities of the League, but strongly placed on a group of hills on the southern bank, speedily grew into importance. This was

The Rise of
Rome.

Rome. The city owed its rise solely to its strategic consequence, for in many respects its situation contrasted unfavourably with that of other Latin cities; the soil was barren and unhealthy; the hollows between the hills were mere morasses; there were no springs, and the Tiber overflowed whenever there was any unusual rainfall. But, on the other hand, these hills formed in themselves a series of closely-grouped strongholds, and in connection with the Janiculan Hill on the further bank they commanded alike the lands on either bank of the river and the river itself down to the sea. Merchants had only to reach this haven to be secure from Etruscan pursuit; here would fall the brunt of any advance from the side of Etruria; and from hence the Latins might maintain relations of alliance with the kindred cities between the river and the Ciminia Silva, or, when these had fallen into Etruscan hands, might harass from hence the invaders' possessions. From the legends and certain archaeological indications the growth of the city may be traced as follows. Beyond doubt the Palatine was the spot first occupied by the Latins. Around this primitive stronghold, known from the shape of its walls as Square Rome (*Roma Quadrata*), there sprang up several minor settlements: the Cermalus, the Velia, the three peaks of the Esquiline (the Fagutal, Oppius, and Cispius), and the Sucusa or Subura; the last a strong fortress intended to repel the men of the Quirinal. Together with the original settlement on the Palatine, these formed the Septimontium, the population of which, known as the Men of the Mounts (*Montani*), spread subsequently over the Capitol and the Aventine. At a later date the Quirinal and Viminal, occupied by a hostile Sabine tribe from the hill-country (§ 36), were also incorporated; and then, probably towards the end of the regal period, all the different settlements

were enclosed within a fosse, wall, and rampart of immense strength, the so-called Wall of Servius.

§ 36. Contemporaneously with, or subsequent to the Latin settlement on the Palatine, some of the more adventurous among the Sabines issued The Sabines in Rome.

from their mountain home and followed the course of the Tiber. We know that Cures, about twenty-five miles from Rome, was their capital, and that they had villages about the Tiber and the Anio (*e.g.* Caenina, Crustumerium, and Antemnae), the latter not three miles from the Capitol Hill. It was no difficult task for them to advance a little further and occupy the hill which lay nearest to them, the Quirinal. At first the Latin dwellers on the Palatine and the Sabine dwellers on the Quirinal were always at feud, although at that remote epoch the two peoples must have been little, if at all, diverse; and one settlement may even have carried off women from the other,—a state of things which would help to give rise to the legend of the Sabine women. After a while, however, the two peoples agreed to coalesce, and instead of each having its own king and senate and army and priests, to be jointly ruled by the two kings, to have a double senate, a double army, and united colleges of priests. This is indicated in the legends by the joint reign of Romulus and Tatius; but there are also some very significant constitutional facts which point to the same union. Throughout the priestly organization there runs a peculiar duplication, which cannot be due to chance: among the Salii, for instance, there were two distinct gilds, of which one belonged to the Palatine, the other to the Quirinal city; there were two gilds of Luperci or priests of the god Lupercus, one Roman, the other Sabine; the Roman *Fratres Arvales*, a college of priests in honour of a rural divinity, were in all probability the counterpart of the Sabine *Sodales Titii*.

Augurs, pontiffs, vestals, and fetials show traces of similar doubling; and both Numa and Ancus are said to have been Sabines. When the union of the two cities occurred, the Sabines were enrolled in the same three tribes as the Romans—the Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres: but they took lower place, so that afterwards the tribes consisted of two ranks. They in fact formed the lesser houses (*minores gentes*), which we hear of in the legend of Tarquinius Priscus, while the Romans were the greater houses (*maiores gentes*). The story of Tarquinius and the augur Attus Navius indicates that the union was attended with difficulties and not effected at once; but when once accomplished, it marked a distinct advance. Rome had even at this early stage commenced that policy of absorption and union which was to lead to such wonderful results.

§ 37. One other assertion we may make with confidence about the regal period: its close was a time of Etruscan conquest. We have seen how the Etruscans, after settling in Etruria, carried their victorious arms beyond the Ciminian Forest to the Tiber and as far south as the ports of the Volscians and the Campanian plain. Whether their advance thither was by land or sea, or by both these routes, they must have come into conflict with the Latins. This is borne out by the legends: the Tarquins are expressly said to be of Etruscan origin; even Servius, according to one version, was an Etruscan by name Mastarna, who came to Rome with an armed force and settled on the Caelian Hill. That the Etruscans reigned over Rome cannot be doubted: their lucumons ruled over Latium also, for this is the meaning of the legend which gives to Tarquinius Superbus dominion over Gabii and Signia and indeed over all the Latin League, and makes his son-in-law Mamilius to be lord of Tusculum. Nay, Tusculum

means the city of the Tuscans, as Tarracina means City of Tarquin ; we are told that the Etrurians ruled the Volscians ; and traces of them are found at Ardea, at Praeneste (*Palestrina*), at Tibur (*Tivoli*), and at Velitrae (*Velletri*). Roman historians, too patriotic to acknowledge any such conquest, minimize the connection between the Tarquins and Etruria, and altogether distort the real events of the war with Lars Porsena. Porsena was probably one of the Etruscan dynasty which bore sway over Rome, and we are actually told that the city was surrendered to him, and that he forbade the Romans to use iron except for purposes of agriculture. The details of the expulsion of the Etruscans cannot be supplied, but Ihne suggests the following outline : The Etruscans met with their first disasters when attacking the Greek cities of Campania. Cumae, in particular, offered a successful resistance ; and encouraged by this, the Latins, Volscians, and Sabines also rose more or less simultaneously against the invader, and in conjunction with the Romans gained a great victory at Lake Regillus and so secured their freedom. The Etruscans were driven back beyond the Tiber, and only Fidenae for some time longer maintained its position as an Etruscan outpost on the river's southern bank. But the rule of the Tarquins had done much for Rome : their skill had built her stoutest walls, drained her low-lying spots, fringed her riverside with quays, and brought to her all the varied trade and culture, science and art, of an Etruscan merchant-city. To the last she showed the traces of the aliens' teaching : the Roman's dress (*toga*) was Etruscan, his house was Etruscan ; much of his religion, his favourite amusements, were Etruscan ; and it was from Etruscan masons that he learnt to build as no nation has built before or since.

CHAPTER III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE ROMAN CONSTITUTION.

¶¶ 38—46. The State in the Regal Period.—¶¶ 47—48. Religion and Priests at Rome.—¶¶ 49—52. Change to the Republican Constitution.—¶¶ 53—54. Grievances of the Plebeians.—¶¶ 55—58. The First Conflict between Patricians and Plebeians; the Tribunate; the Plebeian Assembly.—§ 59. Spurius Cassius.—¶¶ 60—64. The Decemvirate; the Laws of the Twelve Tables; the Valerio-Horatian Laws.—§ 65. The *Conubium*; Consular Tribunes.—¶¶ 66—67. The Censorship and Quaestorship.—§ 68. Spurius Maelius.—¶¶ 69—71. The Agrarian Question and the Licinian Rogations.—§ 72. The Praetorship and *Ædileship*.—¶¶ 73—76. Further changes down to the *Lex Hortensia*; the Rule of the Senate.

§ 38. THE free population of every primitive community comprises two classes, those who enjoy the
The Primitive State.
Its Components. privileges of the state, and those who do not.
The former are citizens, the latter non-citizens.

The earliest traditions of Rome reveal the existence of two such classes, the Patricians and Plebeians. The patricians, until the time of Servius Tullius, constituted the citizen community (*populus*) of Rome. They were the descendants of the Latin founders of Rome, and of the other peoples who afterwards amalgamated with the early Romans; the original plebeians were called "clients" (dependents), they were mainly descended from enfranchised slaves of the patricians, and each client was attached to the clan to which the master of his emancipated ancestor had belonged. Somewhat later, there grew up a class of

plebeians who occupied an intermediate position between the clients and the patricians. This class may be called the *plebs* or "plebeians" in the stricter sense, in order to distinguish it from the clients; but it must be remembered that all (except slaves, who had no personality whatever) who were outside the circle of patricians were plebeians, whether clients or non-clients, and constituted the *plebs* ("complement" of the patricians). By the time of Servius Tullius the clients had obtained the same rights and privileges as were enjoyed by the rest of the plebeians.

§ 39. The word *patricii* (patricians), derived from *pater*, signified all who had sprung from *patresfamilias* (heads of a household, in the legal sense of the word), and were themselves capable of becoming *patresfamilias*. Only those who were recognised by law as *patricii* or *patresfamilias* had, in early times, the full public and private rights of citizens. The *paterfamilias* was the only member of the household who had any legal status at all; he exercised in theory absolute control over the rest of the *familia*, which consisted of wife, children, clients and slaves. Over his wife he exercised a power which was called *manus*, over his children *potestas*, over his clients *patrocinium*, over his slaves *dominium*. A son, on attaining his majority, was still subject to the will of the *paterfamilias*; and was incapable of acquiring property of his own. Thus, from a legal point of view, the *pater* was an irresponsible despot; but in practice the abuse of his power was prevented in various ways. Lunatic or extravagant *patres* were put under control; custom (which was in this case as rigid as law) required the father, before pronouncing an extreme sentence upon any member of the family, to call a council of near relatives (*consilium domesticum*) and submit the

case to their decision. Finally, the *paterfamilias* was prohibited by religious law from selling or putting to death a son or wife.

§ 40. From the original family or household developed the clan (*gens*) or family in the larger sense, composed of all who could trace descent in the male line from a single progenitor. The clan arose in the following way. On the death of a *paterfamilias*, the various sons became themselves heads of households. When this process had been repeated several times there would arise a number of households sprung from a common ancestor, the original *paterfamilias*. They would be called by the same gentile name,¹ and, taken collectively, would form a *gens*. In very early times each *gens* had its own territory and hamlet (*vicus*), and was a self-governing community with common property, customs, and religion distinct from those of other *gentes*. In historic times the right of the *gens* to hold property survived in the law that a man's estate (*familia*) should be divided among the members of his *gens*, in default of nearer relations. The religious ties which bound the *gens* together persisted through the whole of the historic period. All the members of a *gens* united in worshipping some patron divinity (usually the common ancestor of the clan), and the religious rites of the *gens* were called *sacra gentilitia*. The state took great pains to perpetuate these *sacra*; one condition of the inheritance of property was the obligation to keep up the *sacra*, and when a person changed his *gens* he was forced by the ceremony of *sacrorum*

¹ The gentile name (*nomen gentilitium*) was that which specified a man's *gens*, and was, *par excellence*, the *nomen*. A free-born Roman had usually three names, and the *nomen* was the middle one of the three. The third (*cognomen*) marked the *familia* to which he belonged, the first (*praenomen*) marked the man himself as an individual.

detestatio to renounce all claim to partake in its religious rites. Since the heads of families were all patricians, and the family was the unit of the clan, all the *gentes*, in early times at least, were composed entirely of patricians. After the union of the Palatine and Quirinal cities, the *gentes* were divided into greater (*maiores*) and less (*minores*), the former being the older, or Roman, the latter the younger, or Sabine, *gentes* (§ 36).

§ 41. The *curiae* or wards were composed of neighbouring clans which grouped themselves together for common religious worship. Their origin was The Curia or Ward. thus natural and spontaneous, not artificial; but since they were essentially local divisions, they soon began to be used for political purposes, and their number was fixed at thirty, ten for each of the three tribes which united to form the city of Rome. As a religious association each *curia* had its own traditional rites (*curionia sacra*), its own place of worship, and its own priest (*curio*). As a topographical and political association, each *curia* had its own parish hall, where the members (*curiales*) met to decide political matters. Since the *curiae* consisted of *gentes*, and since *gentes* could in early times be formed only by patricians, the plebeians were at first excluded from the *curiae*; it was not till they had acquired political rights that they were admitted, and allowed to vote in the Comitia Curiata (assembly of the citizens voting by *curiae*), which in the time of the kings was the sovereign assembly of the Roman people (§ 46).

§ 42. The division into the three tribes (*tribus*) of Ramnes, Tities, and Luceres had its origin in a difference of race. The original settlers, who The Tribe. founded Rome, had belonged to three different tribes, and the *curiae* in each were organised and regulated in such a

way that there were ten to each tribe, and thirty in all. They ceased as early as Servius' time to have any political significance, being replaced by the later system of territorial tribes.

§ 43. We have seen (§ 39) that the patricians, composed of men who alone were capable of becoming *patresfamilias* in the legal sense of the word, were the only full citizens of Rome.

Patricians
or full
citizens. The duties and rights (expressed by the word *civitas*) of a full citizen were (a) public, (b) private. (a) The public rights in the time of the kings comprised the privilege of serving in the army and the right of voting in the assembly (*ius suffragii*). In republican times the right of eligibility to office (*ius honorum*) was included. (b) The private rights, which the citizen exercised in virtue of his public duties, comprised the right of buying, selling, holding, defending, recovering at law, and transmitting property (*ius commercii*), and the right of contracting a legal marriage (*ius conubii*), i.e. one over the issue of which he exercised *potestas* and the other rights of a *paterfamilias*.

All these privileges were from the first possessed by patricians, and for a time by patricians alone. Plebeians. The rest of the population, the part forming the *plebs*, or "complement" of the patricians, had originally no share in them.

We have already (§ 38) seen that the original plebeians were clients ("hearers" or "dependants") Clients. These clients were, for the most part, descendants of enfranchised slaves; others of them derived their origin from exiles or wanderers, who, coming from states which had no treaty relations with Rome, put themselves under the protection of one of the citizen body. In

either case, the original freedman or refugee attached himself to the person of a patrician, who became his *patronus* (patron), and in either case he transmitted the relation of clientship (*clientela*) to his descendants, who remained attached to the *gens* of the original patron and assumed his gentile name. The system of clientship was not peculiar to Rome, but was prevalent among most of the Italian races at an early stage of their history. The client was a member of the *familia* of his patron, and originally possessed no more rights than the slave or the son. He was bound to place his personal services at the disposal of his patron. In many cases he would be settled upon some portion of his patron's land, taking the position of a tenant, and cultivating the soil for his patron's profit in return for his own maintenance. At an early date the client became practically a free man ; but he had no legal personality, and his *patronus* still represented him in the law-courts.

Meanwhile there was growing up a more privileged class of plebeians. The nucleus of this class was formed by clients who, on the extinction of the family or clan to which they were attached, were confirmed by the state in the freedom which they already practically enjoyed, and were allowed to hold property and defend it at law without the aid of a patron. Ultimately, all clients obtained this right, and later on shared in the other citizen rights which the plebeians gradually won ; so that the clients were eventually merged, so far as political rights are concerned, in the rest of the plebeian body. But during the early republic some of the plebeians were still clients who, in the long struggle between the orders, took the side of their patrons ; gradually, however, the hereditary tie of clientship became weaker and weaker, and was at length completely broken.

But the class of plebeians which had private rights of citizenship did not consist wholly of quondam-clients who had become independent through the extinction of their patrons' families. From a very early period the rights known collectively as the *ius commercii* were interchanged by treaty between Rome and the Latin cities; so that a Latin citizen who settled in Rome could make contracts according to Roman law, and acquire, defend, and transmit property according to Roman forms. Such an immigrant would have no need to apply to a patron and become a client, because he already possessed advantages greater than those which were derived from the tie of clientship.

Just before the period of the Servian reforms all plebeians, whether clients, emancipated clients, or the descendants of settlers who had never been clients, were equal in the eyes of the law. They possessed the *ius commercii*, but had no *ius conubii* (or "right of inter-marriage" with patricians). The next step in the enfranchisement of the plebeians was

the reform attributed to King Servius Tullius
 Their (§ 46). By this reform the plebeian was
 Progress. formally admitted to service in the army and a

share in the spoils of conquest. He could now rise to the rank of a military tribune, a promotion which must have had a marked effect on his position, and which long afterwards led the way for laws admitting him to civil office. To the army, as enrolled on the Servian plan, was transferred the political functions of the *Comitia Curiata*, the patrician assembly meeting according to *curiae*, and by this change the plebeian gained one more step towards full citizenship, for he now had a voice in the making of law and in the ratification of the appointment of a king. We have already seen (§ 38) that the word *populus* (citizen community) was in early times confined to patricians, who

were then the only true citizens ; but when, by the Servian reform, the plebeians had won the rights of serving in the legions and voting, the word was extended to embrace the whole free community, patricians and plebeians alike. The word *plebs* henceforth differed from the word *populus* only as the part differs from the whole. The *plebs* was that portion of the *populus* to which patrician families did not and could not belong.

Though the status of the plebeian was thus greatly improved, there still remained a vast difference between him and the patrician. The plebeian was incapable of contracting an equal marriage with the more privileged class. He voted in the assembly of the people, but his voice was drowned by the predominant influence of the patricians.

§ 44. In the polity of most of the Aryan peoples there are three characteristic features—the Chief or King, the Council of Elders, and the Gathering of the People. The King. All these were from the earliest times in existence at Rome. The king derived his authority from the people ; he ruled as their representative. But though in theory his power was less than that of the community, in practice the whole of the state was in his hands ; for in addition to being the representative of the community, he occupied the same position with regard to the state as the *paterfamilias* did with regard to the family. The only checks imposed upon him were those which sprang from custom ; just as the father of the household was restrained by public opinion from undue exercise of his power, so the king was prevented from becoming a despot by the feeling of the community and the sense of moral responsibility. The king was usually nominated by his predecessor, but the appointment was not complete until the nomination had been ratified by a

lex of the *comitia curiata*, which conferred the *imperium* ("right to command") on which the executive powers of the king were based. The senate (§ 45) had also to be consulted by every king before he appointed his successor. Finally, the appointment was invalid until it had received divine sanction. The new king had to win the approval of the gods by taking the auspices (*i.e.* finding out the will of heaven by watching the flight of birds), and it was only after the special ceremony of inauguration (where the auspices were taken, not by himself, but by an augur) that he became high-priest of the people.

When a king died without nominating his successor, the task of nomination fell to the senate. The senate appointed a series of *interreges* ("between-kings"), the last of whom chose a king by means of the auspices, his choice being ratified by a *lex* of the *comitia curiata*.

The *imperium* bestowed upon the king made him supreme judge and sole commander in time of war, and constituted him the only person in the state competent to summon the senate and people, and to initiate legislation.

As judge, the king decided in person criminal cases which affected the welfare of the state; crimes affecting the individual were tried by delegates, whom he instructed according to traditional or customary law. In trials which the king conducted himself, he was advised by the senate, and assisted by two Commissioners for Treason (*duumviri perduellionis*) and two Trackers of Heinous Crime (*quaestores parricidii*). These officers dealt with the facts, as distinguished from the law, of the case. The king had the power of life or death; but in all cases he could if he pleased allow a condemned criminal to appeal to the people; while in certain capital cases the condemned man could claim this appeal (*provocatio*) as a right. In civil

jurisdiction the king was the ultimate source of procedure ; for the decision rested with the gods, and the king and his *pontifices* alone knew the forms which had to be used in addressing them. As commander in war the king had the disposal of booty and conquered territory. In military matters he generally took the advice of a council of war composed of members of the senate ; but he could make binding treaties without consulting anyone. The king was high priest of the community by virtue of the act of inauguration. As head of the state religion he appointed and controlled the members of the religious colleges and of the various priesthoods (§ 48) and punished offences against the gods.

The king enjoyed various marks of distinction, such as the curule chair and the eagle-headed sceptre. Wherever he went he was preceded by twelve attendants (*lictors*, “summoners”) carrying bundles of rods (*fascēs*, signifying the power to scourge) with axes (*secures*, signifying the power of life and death) bound up in them.

We have already noticed the power of the king to appoint delegates for criminal jurisdiction. He could appoint them for other purposes also. Thus the *tribunus celerum* was appointed by him as commander of the cavalry ; while the prefect of the city (*praefectus urbi*) was entrusted with the whole of the executive powers of the king during the latter’s absence from Rome in time of war.

§ 45. The king was assisted in his deliberations by the Council of Elders—the Senate (*senatus*), as this council was called in Rome. The members of the senate were called *patres*, since they were selected by the king from the *patresfamilias*. The king in his selection took care that each of the *gentes* was represented. When the union

between the Palatine and the Quirinal took place, the number of *gentes*, and therefore of senators, was greatly increased. Before the end of the monarchy the number of senators was definitely fixed at 300. Both under the kings and in the republican era the senate was in theory a purely advisory body; such powers as are generally assigned to it arose from the circumstance that the consulting magistrate usually followed its advice. But it must be remembered that there was nothing, either in the monarchical or the republican constitution, to compel the magistrate to carry out its wishes. It was not until the period of the Empire that the senate had any independent authority.

The king was bound by custom to ask (and generally to follow) the advice of the senate on all questions of importance; the principal of these were the appointment of a successor and the foreign relations of the state. The power of nominating a new king, when the late king had died without naming a successor, had a religious, not a political basis.

§ 46. The assembly of the citizens consisted of *patres-*
The Comitia *familias* who voted according to *curiae*; hence
Curia. it was called the *comitia curiata*. Until the time of Servius Tullius, the *curia* was the only political unit known to the Roman constitution. In theory the king was merely the representative of the people assembled in the *comitia*; but in practice the sovereignty was co-ordinate, and since the executive was entirely in the hands of the king, and he had the sole right of initiative, the people's power was little more than nominal. The *comitia* could meet only when summoned by the king; it could not debate or discuss, but only accept or reject, measures proposed to it. When the king had introduced his motion, the citizens in each *curia* determined whether the vote of

that *curia* should be aye or no. If a majority of the thirty *curiae* voted aye, the proposal became law.

The assembly ratified the nomination of a new king by a *lex* conferring the *imperium* (§ 44); and it was summoned by the king to pass ordinances (*leges*), which were, however, not "laws" in our modern sense (enactments regulating the relations of citizens to one another), but decisions on such points as the declaration of war, the breaking of treaties by a foreign power, or the grant of citizenship to aliens. The *comitia* sometimes acted also as a court of appeal.

Since the *curiae* were composed of *gentes* and the *patres-familias* forming the *gentes* were all patrician, the *comitia curiata* was in early times exclusively patrician. In course of time, however, the plebeians (though still as a class quite distinct from the patricians) began to be recognised as *patres* in the legal sense. They then became members of the *comitia curiata*, though not till it had lost its political importance.

But it was in connection with the necessity of maintaining an effective army that substantial political rights were gained by the plebeians. Servius Tullius availed himself of the increasing numbers and wealth of the plebeians by enrolling them in the army (§§ 20, 52). Patricians and plebeians alike, provided their property exceeded a certain minimum, assembled for military service, and their rank in the army was determined according to the amount of their wealth in land, slaves, and cattle. Political power could not be denied to those whose privilege it was to defend the state; the army developed insensibly but irresistibly into a *comitia*. Thus arose the *comitia centuriata*, which arrogated to itself more and more functions, until at length (by the period of the early republic) it superseded

the *comitia curiata* for all practical purposes. In historic times the only political act of the latter was purely formal—the passing the *lex curiata* by which the *imperium* (§§ 44, 49) of a newly elected magistrate was ratified. Without this ratification no magistrate could exercise the full *imperium*.

§ 47. The religion of Rome, so far as it did not consist of gentile or family cults, was closely interwoven with politics; Church and State were inseparable; on the one hand, the state could not exist without its particular gods and ceremonies; on the other, the [religion of the state required the participation and support of the whole body of citizens. The civil law of Rome had a religious origin, and the worship of the Romans was always business-like, always of the nature of a bargain or contract. To take one instance, that of a vow, “the worshipper promised certain offerings, provided that the prayers which accompanied the promise were realised. . . . The conditions of the vow were recorded upon wax tablets and sealed as a kind of contract. If the god failed to perform his part, the worshipper was free from his vow. On the other hand, the worshipper was bound to carry out his promises if his prayers were answered. . . . Vows were made conditional upon recovery from disease, upon safe return from a journey, upon victory over an enemy, and many other occasions.”¹ It was the same with sacrifices and festivals. The Roman offered the former and celebrated the latter because he feared that the gods would send misfortunes upon him unless he did so; and having performed his part of the bargain, he expected the gods to do theirs, by intervening

¹ Frank Granger, *The Worship of the Romans*, pp. 280-281.

to ward off blight and disease from his crops and herds and to preserve his own life.

The Roman deities were originally spirits or powers of nature who became individualised by the association of their worship with a particular holy place. As we might expect from the legal or contractual conception which underlay Roman religion, the worship was essentially formal and ritualistic. The gods would not listen if there was the slightest deviation from the prescribed forms of word and act which were connected with the special ritual appropriate to the cult of each. The letter, not the spirit, was the all-important factor. Hence religion meant little more than certain precise and detailed ceremonies.

§ 48. There were at Rome two classes of priests ; first, the members of the religious guilds (*collegia*) or clubs (*sodalicia*) ; secondly, priests (*flamines*) who offered up sacrifice to particular deities in the name of the community.

Priests.

By far the greatest of the *collegia* was that of the Pontiffs (*pontifices*), who exercised their powers in virtue of their knowledge of religious law. They formed a religious rather than a priestly guild. The king, as the head of the pontifical college, was supreme controller of the Roman religion. On the abolition of the monarchy, the priestly functions of the king were given to *rex sacrorum*, while his religious presidency of the state was given to the chief pontiff (*pontifex maximus*). The latter was a magistrate rather than a priest. Though the official head of the state religion, he ranked as a priest below the *rex sacrorum* and the *flamines*. The pontiffs informed the people in what manner it was most lawful to worship the gods. They also kept the calendar, and made some sort of a national record

Religious
Guilds. The
Pontiffs.

(*Annales maximi*) and drew up a collection of ordinances (*leges regiae*) dealing with religious offences. They were the source of civil and criminal law, since they alone knew the precise forms in which the gods must be addressed.

Next in importance was the College of Augurs, whose
 The College of Augurs. function was to interpret the will of the gods by means of the signs they send to mortals. The Romans believed that the gods declared their will by means of cries and flight of birds (*auspicium*¹ in the strict sense), and also by other natural phenomena, especially by thunder and lightning. The gods were supposed to vouchsafe these signs in two distinct ways. Some signs were offered by the gods of their own initiative; these signs were called *auspicia oblativa*; they included flashes of lightning, fits of epilepsy, etc., and were all signs of ill-omen, stopping at once whatever business was contemplated by the beholders. Other signs could only be obtained by asking the gods for them; these signs were called *auspicia impetrativa*. They could only be asked for by patrician magistrates, and were only granted when certain prescribed forms were followed. The augurs were versed in the rules which guided these forms, and they alone could interpret the meaning of the signs when given, and say whether they were favourable or unfavourable. But the augurs could not themselves ask for signs; they could only interpret them when called upon by the patrician magistrate. The magistrate alone had the right of seeking signs from heaven, of "taking the auspices," as it was called; the augurs acted as his assistants. He was not even bound to consult

¹ From *avis* "bird" and *spicere*, "to look." The meaning of the word was extended so as to include any sign expressing the will of the gods.

them at all; but if he did consult them, he was compelled to follow their rulings. For a magistrate to possess the right of taking auspices was called *auspicia habere*, the watching for signs in a particular case was called *spectio*.

The auspices had to be taken before any important act, such as the election of a magistrate, the meeting of the *comitia*, or the setting out of a general against the enemy. The reporting of unfavourable omens (*obnuntiatio*) suspended, and the discovery of a flaw (*vitium*) in the ritual rendered invalid, every election and every act of legislation or government. Thus the auspices were used as an instrument of political intrigue both by patrician magistrates and augurs. In republican times the principal mode of taking the auspices was by "watching the sky" for lightning, and if a patrician magistrate simply gave notice that he intended to "watch the sky" (*servare de caelo*) this was equivalent to the actual reporting of unfavourable omens, and was enough to prevent another magistrate from holding the *comitia*. The augurs also, when they were consulted, often (for a consideration) declared the omens unfavourable, or discovered that there had been a flaw in the ritual. In the latter case it was necessary that the act for which the auspices had been taken should be performed over again; magistrates had to submit themselves a second time for election, and laws had to be again brought before the *comitia*. The augurs could also report on the large class of *auspicia oblativa*, and thus at once suspend or render invalid any election or act of legislation. ✓

The *Fetiales* were state heralds, who went through the traditional ceremonies without which war or peace could not legally be made.

The Fetials.

The principal religious clubs (*sodalicia*) were those of the Arval Brethren (*Fratres Arvales*), the *Salii* and the *Luperci*. The Arval Brethren offered sacrifice to Dea Dia for the fertility of the fields. The *Luperci* celebrated in February the festival of the *Lupercalia* in honour of the god Faunus Lupercus. The *Salii* (Dancers) had the guardianship of the sacred shields (*ancilia*) of Mars, which had fallen from heaven. In the sacred month of March they carried them through the city.

Flamens ("Blowers," i.e. "kindlers of the sacred fire") were priests who ministered to a particular deity. The three chief flamens were consecrated to the service of Jupiter (*Flamen Dialis*), of Mars (*Flamen Martialis*), and of Quirinus (*Flamen Quirinalis*) respectively.

All religious offices were confined to patricians, for patricians alone were believed to possess the right of communing with the gods. The plebeians had no part in the relation of the state, and no part in the knowledge of the laws of the state, for this, too, was collected and guarded by the king and his pontiffs. It was not till 300 B.C. that the plebeians gained admission to the two great colleges of pontiffs and augurs, the only priesthoods of political importance.

§ 49. On the expulsion of the last of the kings, the royal functions were divided in such a way as to render it constitutionally impossible for any one man to gain supreme power and rule as a despot. The religious duties that had devolved on the king were divorced from his civil and military powers. The presidency of religion was entrusted to the *pontifex maximus*, and a new official, called the *rex sacrorum*

The Religious
Clubs.

The Flamens.

The Plebeians
and the
Priesthoods.

The
Consulship.

("regulator of sacrifices") was created to represent the king in sacrifice and ritual. All the civil and military powers of the king (expressed in the simple word *imperium*) were transferred to two new magistrates, who were at first called *praetores* ("those going in front") as leaders in war or *iudices* (judges). These magistrates were true heirs and successors of the king; but their power was not so great as his had been, since it was limited in several important ways. (1) The king had held office for life, but each of his successors held office for twelve months only. (2) The powers of each magistrate were materially restricted by the fact that his colleague had powers identical with his own. By the right of *intercessio* (veto) each of the new officers could render invalid any act of the other. The restriction imposed by collegiality became such a special mark of the office that from about 460 B.C. the new magistrates were known as "consuls" instead of praetors. (3) The king allowed an appeal to the people only in certain cases; but by the Lex Valeria of 509 B.C. (the first year of the Republic) it was enacted that every citizen should have the right of appealing to the *comitia centuriata* (§ 52) against a capital sentence of the consul. (4) The king had been nominated by his predecessor, whose choice was ratified by the *comitia curiata*. The consuls were elected by the people in the *comitia centuriata*, though they retained the right of nomination, and in the exercise of this right could reject the names of particular candidates. They could also render null and void the election of a candidate who had been chosen by the votes of the people, simply by refusing to make a formal announcement (*renuntiatio*) of his name. (5) The king had enjoyed full military authority both within and without the city. But in the case of the consuls a distinction was drawn between

mendations. When an opinion was thus adopted by a consul and was not vetoed by the other consul it became a decree (*senatus consultum*), and was equivalent to a law.

To the senate drifted the management of every department of state affairs. In addition to its deliberative and legislative functions it assisted the consuls in administering justice, it gained control of the finances, it decided what forces should be levied and with what object, and in time it settled all questions relating to foreign affairs.

The number of the senate was definitely fixed at 300, and every year the consuls revised the list of members (*album senatorium*), filled up vacancies, or struck off the names of any who had by misconduct or misfortune forfeited their seats. The consul could, if he pleased, fill up vacancies with plebeians, but this was hardly ever done (since the consuls were themselves patricians); and during the first hundred years of the republic the senate was the ^{b. p. c.} doughty champion of patrician prerogative. It soon became the practice for ex-consuls to be at once enrolled as senators, and their experience tended to render the whole body still more fitted for its various duties.

§ 52. The Assembly of the Centuries (*comitia centuriata*) arose from the gathering and registration of the people for military purposes instituted by Servius Tullius. This organisation was, in its origin, purely military; it was the classification of all the citizens, patrician and plebeian alike, according to wealth, with the view of creating an efficient military force and providing a basis for the imposition of taxes. The formation of the new citizen army was due to the advisability of placing at the disposal of the state the fighting powers and financial resources of the plebeians. That the army should develop into a political assembly

The Assembly
of the
Centuries.

was, in the nature of things, inevitable, since those who were entrusted with the task of defending the state were sure eventually to gain the power of making the laws and electing the magistrates of the state. Just as rights imply obligations, so obligations give rise to rights. Even under the kings this assembly obtained the right of deciding upon questions of peace and war, and of assessing the war-tax (*tributum*). It soon replaced the *comitia curiata* for all political purposes, and when, on the fall of the monarchy, the people asserted their powers as the ultimate sovereign of the *State*, it was in the *comitia centuriata* that they assembled. Now that the plebeians were definitely recognised as exercising political rights, the name *populus Romanus* denotes the whole Roman people, plebeians as well as patricians.

But the military origin of the *comitia centuriata* was never forgotten; it was summoned only by magistrates having the *imperium*; like everything that was military in Rome, it had no place within the walls, but met in the Campus Martius; and the citizens assembled in centuries were addressed as *Quirites* or "warriors."¹

The qualification for admission to the new assembly was now property instead of birth. All citizens, patricians and plebeians alike, who possessed property in land, slaves, and cattle, were arranged in five classes (*classes*). In the first class were enrolled those who owned property valued at 100,000 *asses librales*, or pounds of copper; the minimum value of property which qualified for the second class was 75,000 *asses*; for the third, 50,000 *asses*; for the fourth, 25,000 *asses*; for the fifth, 11,000 *asses*. Each of these classes was divided into two equal parts as regards age,

¹ Literally "lancers," from the Sabine word *quiris*, "a lance."

the juniors (*juniore*s, between the ages of 17 and 46), who formed the field force, and the seniors (*seniore*s, between the ages of 46 and 60), who formed the reserve. Each of the classes was divided into centuries (*centuriæ*), the military unit, consisting nominally of 100 men: there were 80 centuries (*i.e.* 40 of seniors and 40 of juniors) in the first class; 20 centuries (*i.e.* 10 of seniors and 10 of juniors) in each of the three intermediate classes, and 30 (*i.e.* 15 of seniors and 15 of juniors) in the fifth and lowest class. In addition, there were two centuries of *fabri* (smiths and carpenters) who voted with the first class, and one century each of *cornicines* (buglers) and *tubicines* (trumpeters) voting with the fifth class. In later times, when the military origin of the assembly had been lost sight of, the citizens whose property amounted to less than 11,000 *asses*, but who were still liable to taxation, were enrolled in a single century; they were known as *proletarii* ("producers of children") or *capite censi* (those rated on their position as head of a family). The cavalry formed eighteen centuries, and voted before the first class. They consisted of the six original centuries of patrician knights (§ 18) together with twelve centuries (now added for the first time) drawn from the richest of the patricians and plebeians.

THE COMITIA CENTURIATA.

CLASSES.	PROPERTY QUALIFICATIONS.	CENTURIES.	NO.
<i>Equites</i>	Not fixed	6 (old) + 12 (new)	18
First Class	100,000 <i>asses</i>	40 seniors + 40 juniors	80
<i>Fabri</i>	None required		2
Second Class	75,000 <i>asses</i>	10 seniors + 10 juniors	20
Third Class	50,000 <i>asses</i>	10 seniors + 10 juniors	20
Fourth Class	25,000 <i>asses</i>	10 seniors + 10 juniors	20
Fifth Class	11,000 <i>asses</i>	15 seniors + 15 juniors	30
<i>Cornicines</i> and <i>Tubicines</i>	None required		2
<i>Proletarii</i> or <i>Capite Censi</i> ^a	Below 11,000 <i>asses</i>		1
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The reason why no property qualification was required from the smiths and buglers was that their position in the census was due, not to their wealth, but to their services in the army.

As each century had but one vote, determined by the majority in that century (exactly as in the old assembly of the *curiae*), the predominance of wealth was secured by the division of the first and richest class (which would naturally include fewer members than the others) into the large number of eighty centuries. The *equites* also belonged to the wealthiest rank, since they represented the most expensive branch of the service. Now, the eighty-two centuries of the first class, combined with the eighteen centuries of the knights, possessed greater voting power than the centuries of all the four other classes, and if they were unanimous it would be unnecessary to call upon the other classes to vote at all, since they were too few to alter the decision already arrived at. At the commencement of the republican era, the *comitia centuriata* had the following duties:—

- (a) It elected candidates nominated for the consulship (see § 49).
- (b) It was the only body in the state competent to make or repeal a law.
- (c) It decided upon all questions involving the making of war, peace, or treaties.
- (d) It decided cases of appeal from the capital sentence of the consuls.

From the first there were various checks on its freedom of action. The power of election was limited by the right of nomination possessed by the consuls (§ 49). It could only meet for legislative purposes when summoned by the consul, and its motions did not become valid till they received the formal approval of the senate (§ 51). Even with respect to cases of appeal, no penalty was imposed

upon the consuls if they refused to obey the *Lex Valeria de provocazione* of 509 B.C. (§ 49). ✓

§ 53. The collapse of the efforts of the Tarquins to recover their dominion in Rome and Latium
 Patricians and Plebeians. left the patricians free to rule the city as they chose. Their attitude towards the plebeians led to acute discontent and hostility.

In addition to the rights of private law the plebeians had now gained the power to vote in the *comitia centuriata*. But this assembly was itself greatly dependent on the consuls and the senate (§ 52), and although a few of the plebeians had risen to wealth and eminence, the artificial arrangement of the *comitia* by classes and centuries based upon the qualification of property made it impossible for them to compel attention to their views.

They were prevented, as we have seen (§ 43), from contracting an equal marriage with any member
 Political Disabilities of the Plebeians. of the patrician order, and an impassable barrier separated them from the consulship and other magistracies and priesthoods. A still more serious disability was constituted by the fact that the patricians had entire control of the administration of the law. At Rome, there was in early times no written code of criminal or civil law. The consuls, instructed by the patrician pontiffs, were the guardians and interpreters of the traditional criminal code; it was only on their initiative that a criminal case could be brought before the *comitia* at all: and when it was so brought it was introduced in the form of a question to which the people had to give either an affirmative or a negative answer. As regards the civil law, the patrician pontiffs alone knew the forms of legal procedure; and precise accuracy in these forms was

absolutely essential to the successful conduct of a suit. Thus litigants were entirely at the mercy of the pontiffs, who disclosed and interpreted the appropriate forms to the patrician magistrate who had charge of the case. Both consuls and pontiffs, of course, used their power in the interests of their own order. X .

By the side of these political disabilities there existed two economic grievances of much more pressing Economic Grievances. interest to the bulk of the plebeians. The first of these questions related to the law of debt, the second to the tenure of the domain land of the state.

We have noticed that there were a few wealthy plebeians; but the large majority of the plebeian order consisted of small landholders, who cultivated a few acres of ground. It must be remembered in this connection that in early Rome the tilling of the soil was almost the only occupation open to a free man, and that the Romans of the first three centuries of the republic were a nation of small farmers. It was inevitable that many of these peasant proprietors should fall into the hands of capitalists and money-lenders. A series of bad harvests, or the interruption of agricultural operations caused by absence from the farm in the time of war, would exhaust the scanty means of the small freeholder. When he had mortgaged his land, stock, and implements, there was nothing left for him but to borrow on the security of his The Roman Law of debt. person, which the Roman law of debt, a law which was plebeian in its origin, but had been adopted by the patricians, allowed him to do. The legal procedure in this case was called *nexum*; by the nexal contract the debtor agreed to sell himself to his creditor on condition of the debt not being paid within a certain time. If by the end of the specified period the debt was not paid, the debtor

became a bondsman (*nexus*) of his creditor till he had paid the debt by his labour. This practically meant perpetual servitude, for it lay in the power of the creditor to determine when the debt had been paid. Strange as it may seem, however, the *nexus*, though he was treated no better than a slave, retained all the rights of a Roman citizen. When an enemy threatened the state, he was temporarily released for service in the army.

If the debtor did not enter into the contract of *nexum* he was subject to the still more stringent patrician law. According to the form of procedure in this case, the debtor, after the lapse of thirty days from the proving of the debt in court, was summarily arrested by the creditor and brought before the consul. If no one appeared to pay the debt, the debtor was then bound over (*addictus*) to the creditor, and was put in chains and fed on bread and water for sixty days. If at the end of these sixty days the debt still remained unpaid, the debtor could be put to death or sold as a slave beyond the Roman territory. If there were several creditors, they were allowed to divide the debtor's body between them.

§ 54. The evil plight of the small landowners was made worse by the monopoly exercised by the patricians over the common or domain land of the state (*ager publicus*). From the earliest period of Roman history we hear of both private and public land. The private land consisted of (1) the *heredium*, or family farm, which was little more than house and garden, (2) private land owned in very early times by the *gens*, in later times by individuals. The public land formed the domain of the kings; under the republic it was the property of the whole people. It was acquired in the following manner. Whenever a neighbouring state was

The Agrarian
Question.

conquered its land became the prize of the victors. Part of it was given back to the old possessors (*ager redditus*), part was sold by the quaestors for the benefit of the treasury (*ager quaestorius*). The best portions of the arable land were sometimes distributed in allotments among poor citizens (*ager assignatus*). In all these cases the land became private property. There still, however, remained some arable land, as well as much waste land and pasture land. This was not allotted to citizens as their private property; it belonged to the state and constituted the *ager publicus*. The waste land was handed over to any citizens who chose to occupy it; the occupier (*possessor*) was at liberty to cultivate it on payment of a fixed due (*vectigal*) consisting of a tithe of the seed crops and a fifth of the oil or wine which it produced. This waste land would usually only be occupied by rich men, since it required capital for its cultivation. The *possessor* could bequeath it or sell it, but it never became his property. It belonged in perpetuity to the state, which could resume possession whenever it so desired. The pasture land was left free for any citizen to graze his cattle upon it; but for the privilege he had to pay a tax (*scriptura*) for each head of stock. Such arable land as was not "allotted" was occupied by *possessores* like the waste land, or let out on long leases to the highest bidders.

In the regal period the *ager publicus* was used by the king for the benefit of the plebeians. With the establishment of the republic the patricians claimed to have the sole right to the public land. This claim was ostensibly based upon the principle that the land belonged to those who conquered it; but since the plebeians now took their full share in the military operations of the state, this

argument lacked cogency. The patrician claim to exclusive rights affected the interests of the plebeians in several ways. In the first place, no allotments were made to poor plebeians, all the arable land as well as the waste land being occupied by *possessores*. In the second place, the waste land was occupied solely by patricians, to the exclusion of such plebeians as possessed the capital requisite for working it. In the third place, the plebeians, whether rich or poor, were excluded from the public pastures. Finally, the patrician officials of the treasury neglected to enforce payment of the pasture-tax and of the proportion of the produce due from the user of the tilled land.

§ 55. In 494 B.C. the quarrel between the two orders of patricians and plebeians burst into flame. It proved the commencement of a struggle which lasted for more than two centuries.

In this year a more than usually harsh enforcement of the law of debt, and complete failure on the part of the patricians to redeem their promises of reform, caused the plebeians to adopt the expedient of "seceding" from the state. Bound by their military oath, the army (composed mainly of plebeians) was led forth from Rome by the consuls to fight the Volscians. But as soon as they had left the city, the plebeian soldiers elected plebeian generals in place of the consuls, and instead of marching against the enemy, crossed the Anio and occupied a hill afterwards known as the Mount of Curses (*Mons Sacer*). They threatened to build there a new plebeian city, and to leave the patricians to inhabit Rome by themselves. They chose from their military tribunes two magistrates of their own. They then bound themselves by a solemn oath to kill anyone who should offer violence to their new officers, who were called "tribunes of the *plebs*," and made it the

first condition of reconciliation with the patricians that the tribunes should be recognised as magistrates, and be empowered to protect the plebeians from arbitrary decrees of the consuls. The patricians now saw that nothing but a compromise would save the state. Accordingly a law was passed by the *comitia* recognising the tribunes as magistrates, and granting the powers demanded by the plebeians.

§ 56. The new officers established by the law of 494 B.C., the Tribunes of the Plebs (*tribuni plebis*), were, by analogy with the consuls, at first two in The Tribunes of the Plebs. number, but they soon became a college of five, and later, from 457 B.C., of ten. Their term of office lasted for a year, and they were elected at first (494-471) by the *comitia curiata*,¹ to which plebeians now belonged. None but plebeians were eligible for the tribunate. The power of the tribunes was at first entirely negative. It consisted in the *ius auxilii* ("right to succour"). If any plebeian suffered injustice at the hands of a consul he applied for relief to one of the tribunes; and the tribune by the exercise of *prohibitio* (prohibition) could forbid the consul to act as he intended, and by the exercise of *intercessio* (veto) could render invalid an act which the consul had already performed. Since the patricians had recognised the validity of the solemn oath which the plebeians had sworn on the Sacred Mount, to the effect that they would kill anyone who offered violence to their tribune, the person of the latter was declared inviolable (*sacrosanctus*) and whoever attacked him was accursed (*sacer*) and in the position of an outlaw. This religious sanction was rendered necessary by the fact that the tribune, not being a magistrate of the whole people, had not the *imperium*, and therefore could not be

¹ Perhaps by a plebeian assembly meeting according to *curiae*.

protected by the law of treason. It was this position of inviolability that was the basis of the tribunes' power, and the tribune himself had the sole power of punishing anyone who attempted to do violence to his person. This right of punishing was called *coercitio*; it was part of the magisterial power (*potestas*) of every magistrate; but the tribune, owing to his peculiar position and rights, was the only one who could use it against the consuls themselves. It will readily be seen that if this right of inflicting punishment had been denied to the tribune, not only would he have been debarred from defending his inviolability, but his power of forbidding or vetoing would have been of no effect. But, like every other magistrate, the tribune could exercise this power of punishing only within certain limits. He could on his own responsibility arrest a consul or make him pay a fine up to a certain limit; but if he imposed a fine beyond the legal maximum, or passed sentence of death, the consul could appeal from his sentence. Since it was in defending the persons or interests of the plebeians that the tribune had exercised his *coercitio*, it was the plebeians who obtained the right of hearing the appeals from his sentence. Closely connected with this right was the formation of a plebeian assembly (*concilium plebis*). Before treating of this assembly, and the positive aspect of the tribune's authority which its existence implied, it will be well to state some of the consequences of the negative aspect of his power.

We have seen that the negative power of the tribunes consisted primarily in the exercise of the *ius auxilii*. The right of prohibition or veto, by means of which such assistance was effectively given, soon began to be used for other purposes besides its primary object—the protection of oppressed plebeians, so that by degrees the tribunate gathered powers so extensive as to menace the independ-

ence of magistrates and senate alike. Before long the tribune began to veto administrative acts of the consul which only indirectly affected the plebeians. Thus, by the exercise of prohibition he could prevent a consul from carrying on the business of the state; by the exercise of intercession he could render null and void the bill which the consul proposed to bring before the *comitia*, or the decree on which he had consulted the senate. The tribune was said in the latter case to veto the decree of the senate (*senatus consultum*), thus depriving it of legal validity and causing it to become a mere expression of opinion (*senatus auctoritas*).

Since, however, the veto or prohibition of a single tribune was as final as the veto or prohibition of all, the patrician (or, in later times, the senatorial) party could, by enlisting a single tribune on their side, prevent the plebeians (or later, the democrats) from reaping the full advantage of their magistrate's powers.

§ 57. Soon after their appointment in 494 B.C. the tribunes gained, in addition to their negative authority, a positive right, that of convening the plebeians for certain purposes, so as to form a *concilium plebis*. These meetings were at first quite informal. The business was confined to a discussion of grievances and the assembly could be dispersed at any time by a consul. In 492 B.C., however, under the tribune Spurius Icilius the *concilium* passed a resolution (*plebiscitum*) to the effect that "when the tribune is addressing the *plebs*, no one shall speak against or interrupt him." The penalty for such interruption was a fine to be imposed by the tribune on the interrupter, and if the latter disputed the fine the case was to be tried by the *plebs*. This resolution had not, of course, legal validity; but it was brought in the form of a petition before

The Concilium
Plebis.

the senate. On being approved by the senate, it was passed in the form of a law (the *Lex Icilia*, 492 B.C.) by the *comitia centuriata*. On this law rested the power of the plebeians, which we have already noticed (§ 56), to hear appeals against the sentence of the tribune in case he imposed the penalty of death or a fine beyond a certain limit. Thus, the *concilium plebis*, as a legally recognised assembly, was originally judicial in its character. But it became more and more the custom for the tribune (following the example of Spurius Icilius) to ask the plebeian assembly to vote upon proposals which affected either the plebeians as a body or the state as a whole. When such resolutions (*plebiscita*) affected only the plebeian body they did not need to be brought before the senate and the *comitia* for confirmation. When, on the other hand, they dealt with matters that affected the whole community, they were mere petitions, and were not legally binding on anyone till they had received the sanction of the senate, and had been passed as a *lex* by the *comitia centuriata*. Such was the origin of the *concilium plebis* as a legislative, as distinguished from a judicial, body. We have already seen that the tribunes were elected either by the *comitia curiata* or by an assembly of plebeians voting according to *curiae*. For judicial and legislative purposes the plebeians probably from the very first met and voted according to their local tribes (see § 58). This mode of voting was found to be so far preferable to the other that in 471 B.C. a *plebiscitum* was passed by the tribune Publilius Volero, which enacted that

Plebeian magistrates shall be elected by the plebeians meeting according to tribes.

This *plebiscitum*, as it concerned the interests of the plebeians only, did not require to be ratified by the senate

and people. From this date (471 B.C.) the plebeian assembly met for all purposes according to tribes, and was called the *concilium plebis tributim*. It must be remembered that though the right of the tribunes to convoke and do business with the plebeians had been recognised by the *Lex Icilia*, the *plebs* was not yet a legally recognised corporation, and *plebiscita* which dealt with plebeian affairs only, were only binding on those who chose to accept them as valid.

§ 58. In order that the advantage to the plebeians of the voting according to local tribes may be fully understood, some account of these tribes must be given.

King Servius Tullius, the first of the Roman reformers, had, as we have already seen (§ 20), divided the city into four districts or tribes. His main object in creating these new divisions was to avail himself of the growing numbers and growing resources of the plebeians. It was not considered advisable at this early period to admit the plebeians into the *curiae*; it was therefore necessary to create new tribes in which they could be included. By means of the new organisation the military levy and collection of the war-tax was facilitated. Each of the four tribes comprised not only a part of the city itself, but also a large district outside the city walls. The tribes were purely territorial; the landholder was registered in the tribe which contained his freehold, and the landless man in the tribe in which his dwelling was situated. In the time of the republic the Servian system of division was so far modified that the original Servian tribes were confined within the city, while the country round about Rome was distributed into additional tribes, so that in 471 B.C. the whole number amounted to twenty-one. Other tribes were added as the Romans conquered

The Local
Tribes.

more and more of Italy, until by 241 B.C. there were thirty-five tribes; after this year they underwent no augmentation.

It is uncertain whether the tribunes had, before 471 B.C., been elected by the *comitia curiata* (including both patricians and plebeians) or by the plebeians alone, voting according to *curiae*. Since the new *concilium plebis tributim* was composed entirely of plebeian tribesmen, it is evident that, whichever of these views is taken, the new mode of election was to the advantage of the plebeians. For if the tribunes had hitherto been elected by the whole curiate assembly, the *plebs* now got rid of the adverse patrician vote; while if they had before the Publilian law been elected by a curiate assembly of plebeians only, the plebeian members of the seventeen country tribes (mostly small landholders) would now for the first time be able to have a voice in the election; for the *curia* seems to have been a purely urban division. Moreover the plebeian clients (who were entirely under patrician influence) outvoted the other plebeians in the *curiae*, but (as they were mainly confined to the city) not in the tribes.

The advantages of meeting and voting according to tribes soon became so evident that the patricians determined to adopt the method. Somewhere between 471 B.C. and 449 B.C. the whole people (patricians and plebeians alike) began to meet according to tribes and to form the *comitia tributa*. The powers of this new assembly were at first judicial only; later it elected all the minor magistrates of the whole people (*e.g.* the quaestors and curule aediles) and heard judicial appeals against penalties imposed by them; still later it received legislative powers, and ultimately became the principal legislative assembly in the state.

The Comitia
Tributa.

The distinction between a *comitia* and a *concilium* should be carefully noted. A *comitia* was an assembly of the whole people (*populus Romanus*), patricians and plebeians. It could be summoned and presided over only by magistrates of the whole people; it could elect only magistrates of the whole people; it could hear appeals only from the magistrates it elected. Its legislative enactments were called *leges*. A *concilium*, on the other hand, was an assembly in which only part of the people were allowed to vote. Thus an assembly which included plebeians only was called a *concilium*, not a *comitia*; and the only *concilium* of any importance at Rome was the *concilium plebis tributim*. It could be summoned and presided over by plebeian magistrates only; it could elect none but plebeian magistrates, and could hear appeals only from those magistrates it had elected. Its legislative decrees were called *plebiscita*, not *leges*.

Comitia and
Concilium
distinguished.

Thus from 450 B.C. there were four political assemblies at Rome. Three of these (the *comitia curiata*, the *comitia centuriata*, and the *comitia tributa*) were assemblies of the whole people; the fourth (the *concilium plebis tributim*) was an assembly of part of the people only, viz. the plebeians. But in course of time the patricians dwindled down to a few families, so that during the last two centuries of the republic the *comitia tributa* was composed of practically the same persons as the *concilium plebis tributim*. The material difference between the two bodies consisted in the exclusion of patricians from plebeian gatherings.

Political
Assemblies at
Rome after
450 B.C.

“When the consul or praetor summoned the tribes, the members of the few patrician families could attend; when

the tribune summoned the tribes, these members were bound to keep away.”¹

§ 59. The plebeians had now won protection from personal injustice, judicial power, and the germ of legislative power. They next attempted to wrest from the patricians their monopoly of the public land. We now begin to hear of agrarian laws (*leges agrariae*) which form so important a feature of the history of republican Rome. These agrarian laws were generally promoted by tribunes; their main object was the distribution of arable *ager publicus* among the poor. Hence they were as a rule opposed by the rich, who wished to hold as occupiers (*possessores*) as much public land as possible, whether arable or waste, and to monopolise the public pastures.

Agrarian laws either disposed of land which had just been conquered, or asserted the right of the state to a portion of the land already occupied by *possessores*. In both cases the land dealt with by the agrarian law was divided in allotments among poor plebeians. There were two different modes of distribution. Either a number of men (generally three hundred) were sent out to occupy as colonists a portion of conquered territory, or the land was divided among individuals (*ager viritim assignatus*), each man getting a certain fixed share.

According to tradition, the first agrarian law was proposed (486 B.C.) by Spurius Cassius, famous as the man who brought about the league of Rome with the Latins and Hernicans (§§ 78-79). Every consideration of equity was in favour of the reform, for, as we have seen, the public land was acquired

Agrarian Law
of Spurius Cas-
sius, 486 B.C.

¹ Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*, p. 446.

by war, and not only did the plebeians contribute largely to the *tributum* or war-tax, but they formed by far the largest part of the Roman army. The precise nature of Cassius' proposal is quite uncertain. He seems to have provided in some way for the resumption of public land from patrician occupiers, and its distribution in allotments among poor plebeians. His law was suffered to pass, but the patricians managed to prevent its being carried out.

§ 60. In the establishment of the tribunician power the plebeians had gained protection against the most flagrant abuses by the consul of his judicial functions; but the continual exercise of the *ius auxilii* was a cumbrous, if effective, expedient; and the tribunes soon made it their chief political aim to secure a codification and publication of the unwritten customary law which was known only to the patrician families and the pontiffs, and regulated the sentences of the consul.

Development
of Law.

The king in giving judgment had acted as the interpreter of divine law (*fas*) and of civil justice (*ius*). To a great extent he was guided by public opinion and by the advice of the senate. The decisions or "dooms" of the kings served as precedents for future decisions; and in this way there grew up a body of traditional law which was preserved by being entrusted to the guardianship of a particular class in the community,—the patricians.

The demand for codification did not involve any radical change in the criminal or civil law. The contention of the champions of the plebeians was that the patrician monopoly of legal knowledge rendered possible unjust and capricious decisions on the part of the consuls. If the traditional law were codified and made known to all, uniformity of administration would be secured; no one would any longer be in doubt as to what he might and might not do;

the magistrate would frame his awards not in accordance with class-prejudices, but by reference to a fixed and permanent code wherein the penalties of evil-doing were published for the guidance of all. In instituting a civil action, the litigant would still be at the mercy of the patricians, since knowledge of the *forms* in accordance with which all claims had to be framed would still be confined to the pontiffs.

The spokesman of the agitation for a codifying of the customary law was C. Terentilius Arsa, one of the tribunes of 462 B.C., who carried a proposal in the *concilium plebis* that

A body of five commissioners, with consular powers (*consulari imperio*) should be appointed to codify and publish the laws.

The patricians bitterly resented the proposed interference with their most cherished prerogative, and year after year the senate refused to allow the petition of the *plebs* (see § 58) to be brought before the *comitia centuriata* for ratification. The plebeians with equal resolution elected the same tribunes over and over again and reiterated their demands. In order to stave off the evil day the patricians made a few minor concessions. In 457 B.C. it was agreed that the number of tribunes should be increased from five to ten. In the following year (456 B.C.) a *plebiscitum* of the tribune, L. Icilius, proposing that the Aventine Hill, which like the Capitol was *ager publicus*, should be distributed in plots for building purposes among the plebeians, was ratified by the centuriate assembly. But the demand for a written code did not die away, and in 454 B.C. the senate yielded so far as to send envoys to Greece to study and procure copies of the laws of Athens and of other Greek states. It was no doubt felt that the existing traditional rules needed correcting and supplementing by the aid of existing codes.

§ 61. On the return of the envoys in 452 B.C., it was agreed that ten commissioners (*decemviri*)¹ with consular power should be appointed to frame a code of laws. Their work was to be done within the year, and during their term of office they were to carry on the government as the sole magistrates of the state, and administer justice without being subject to the law of appeal. It was no doubt tacitly understood that the consulship should be only temporarily suspended; but the plebeians probably agreed that the tribunate should not be revived. On the one hand the patricians consented to limit the powers of the consuls by establishing a code; on the other, the plebeians acknowledged that, if the consuls were bound to administer justice according to written law, the *raison d'être* of the tribunician authority would disappear.

Since the decemvirate was legally open to both orders, the plebeians no doubt expected that the new board would act as a kind of court of arbitration, and would make some attempt to decide the points at issue between patricians and plebeians. But these hopes were frustrated by the patricians, who made full use of their superior voting powers in the *comitia centuriata*, and contrived that the whole board of ten should consist solely of patricians. But the year 451 B.C. was marked by no acts of tyranny or oppression; ten tables of laws were drawn up and approved by the people in the *comitia*. The code was, however, not yet complete, and decemvirs were again chosen for the year 450 B.C. to finish the code. According to the traditional account, Appius Claudius, the chief of the first

¹ Their full title was *Decemviri consulari imperio legibus scribendis*.

body of decemvirs, and representative of the proud patrician *gens* of the Claudii, now began to pose as a demagogue. He intrigued with the plebeian party, and not only secured his own re-election, but also contrived that three at least of the new decemvirs should be plebeians. But when his power was secure he is represented as playing the part of a tyrant, and carrying his colleagues along with him in a career of oppression. By the end of 450 B.C. the decemvirs had prepared two additional tables of laws, full of clauses, directed against the plebeians, and only the assent of the senate and the centuriate assembly was needed for their complete ratification. At the end of their year of office the decemvirs refused to hold *comitia* for the election of consuls; and, according to the letter of the constitution, there was no power which could compel them to do so. Accordingly the decemvirs, by the simple expedient of refraining from holding elections for new magistrates, continued their tyranny into the year 449 B.C. At length their rule became so despotic, and their acts of oppression (especially those committed by the ex-demagogue, Appius Claudius) so shameless, that the plebeian soldiers were roused to mutiny against the tyrants.

They occupied the Aventine, and elected military tribunes of their own to lead them against the decemvirs. They were then joined by most of the plebeians in the city, and marched to their old place of secession, the Mons Sacer. Their demands for the restoration of the tribunate and the right of appeal (which *ipso facto* involved the abolition of the decemvirate) were accepted by the senate. The decemvirs were compelled to abdicate, a resolution of the plebeian assembly that the consulate should be re-established was accepted by the senate, and the *comitia centuriata* chose as consuls for the rest of 449 B.C.

L. Valerius and M. Horatius, popular patricians who had acted as mediators between the seceders and the senate. The plebeians then came back to Rome and elected new tribunes.

. Soon after the return of the plebeians to the city the new consuls carried in the *comitia centuriata* three laws which greatly improved the position of the plebeians. These laws were as follows:—

The Valerio-Horatian Laws, 449 B.C.

(a) No magistrate shall in future be elected from whose sentence appeal is not open.

(b) Anyone who injures the plebeian magistrates shall be an outlaw (*sacer homo*).

(c) Whatsoever the plebeians assembled in their tribes command shall be binding on the whole people (*ut, quod tributim plebs iussisset, populum teneret.*)

§ 62. The above is the traditional account of the decemvirate; but modern criticism points to many inconsistencies and misrepresentations in the narrative, especially in that part of it which deals with Appius Claudius. It has been shown that the Claudian *gens*, so far from being a type of patrician haughtiness and arrogance, actually sided with the plebeians in their struggle for reform. Though the decemvirate was legally open to both orders, it was only by the help of Appius Claudius that plebeians were included in the commission; in other words, it was owing to the influence of Appius Claudius that plebeians became for the first time magistrates of the whole people, an incalculably important step in their political advance. The conduct of Appius has certainly been misrepresented; so far from being a despotic oppressor, he seems to have belonged to the moderate party of compromise among the patricians.

The Truth about Appius Claudius.

§ 63. In the light of this view of Appius' attitude and policy, we may reconstruct the history of the

Probable
History of the
Decemvirate.

second and third years of the decemvirate as follows. When Appius had secured a clear majority upon the commission, he inserted in the two tables required to complete the code clauses which improved the plebeian status. Patrician influence was strong enough to prevent these new tables from being confirmed by a *lex* of the *comitia centuriata*; but Appius persisted in his attempt to carry them through, and refused to abdicate so long as they remained unratified. The second board of ten thus retained their power till the beginning of 449 B.C., when the senate forced them to resign. Two consuls, Valerius and Horatius, were elected in place of the decemvirs, and these magistrates re-drafted the two tables left by Appius, and among their alterations introduced enactments unfavourable to the plebeians. Finally, the senate, referring to the compromise of 451 B.C., refused to sanction the further election of tribunes. It was then, and not till then, that the plebeians left the city; thus, their secession was the result not of decemviral tyranny but of patrician oppression. The consuls then, by means of the Valerio-Horatian laws, restored the tribunate and guaranteed and extended the privileges of the plebeians.

The code drawn up by the decemvirs was known as the Law of the Twelve Tables and was the basis of all Roman law. It consisted mainly of traditional law

Law of the
Twelve Tables.

committed to writing; but in nearly every case the plebeian was chosen in preference to the patrician law; for the latter had a purely religious origin and was rigid, complex, and formal; whereas the former had developed naturally and was essentially simple and elastic. Thus the plebeian law of marriage by mutual

agreement (*consensus*) was permitted to take the place (for patricians as well as plebeians) of the solemn religious ceremony (called *confarreatio*) of the patricians. In the domain of public or constitutional law the most important innovation of the Twelve Tables was that the formation of guilds or unions (*collegia*) for trade or other purposes was sanctioned by law; the rules made by such associations were to be binding on their own members and also on the whole community, so far as they were compatible with the law of the state. In the sphere of private and social law the new code not only recognised civil marriages, but fixed the legal rate of interest at 10 per cent., punished usury, and facilitated the making of wills.

§ 64. By the second of the Valerio-Horatian laws (§ 61) the oath sworn by the plebeians on the Mons Sacer in 494 B.C. (§ 55), that they would slay anyone who injured their tribunes, received legal recognition. The oath had been accepted by the patricians on the institution of the tribunate; it was now confirmed by a positive legal enactment, while the inviolability was extended to all plebeian magistrates.

Import of the
Valerio-
Horatian Laws.

The first law was something more than a re-enactment of the great *Lex Valeria* of 509 B.C. (§ 24). It forbade the election by the sovereign people of any magistrate from whose decisions there was no appeal. It should be noted that this law did not affect the dictatorship (§ 50), since the dictator was nominated by the consul, not elected.

The remaining law, "Whatsoever the plebeians assembled in their tribes command shall be binding on the whole people," probably made the *concilium plebis* a legal corporation. Before the passing of this law all *plebiscita* affecting the interests of the plebeians as a community were

only binding on those plebeians who chose to accept them ; for it is only corporations recognised by law that can pass rules which all their members are compelled to obey. Henceforward all *plebiscita* dealing with purely plebeian affairs would be legally binding on all plebeians ; and they would be binding on the rest of the *populus* as well ; for a patrician in his dealings with plebeians would be compelled to respect and obey such resolutions in so far as they were consistent with public law.

All *plebiscita* which dealt with the affairs of the whole community were still nothing more than petitions to the magistrates, and required to be ratified by a law of the whole people in the *comitia*. //

§ 65. The goal of the plebeians was now no longer mere protection from oppression, but the right to take part in the government of the state on equal terms with the patricians. It was a necessary preliminary to the realisation of this aim that the plebeians should be on a religious and social equality with the patricians. Accordingly in 445 B.C. the tribune C. Canuleius carried a *plebiscitum* that

Aims of the
Plebeians.

Plebeians should have right of inter-marriage (*conubium*) with patricians.

The patricians strongly opposed this resolution ; they held that only patricians could communicate with the gods, and if the patrician blood should be contaminated the favour of heaven would be lost. But the real grounds of their opposition were political ; if *conubium* were permitted there would no longer be any valid reason for refusing the consulship to plebeians.

And it was for the consulship that the plebeians were really striving. As soon as the senate had been forced to give

The Lex
Canuleia de
Conubio, 445 B.C.

way, and the *plebiscitum* of Canuleius¹ had been ratified by the *comitia*, the tribunes demanded that plebeians should be eligible for the consulship. Their admission to the decemvirate, by establishing a precedent, served to strengthen their claim. The patricians were unable to resist the demand. At the same time they felt that the functions which had to be performed by the consuls were so varied and onerous that two men were hardly enough to cope with them. Accordingly they determined to kill two birds with one stone; to satisfy the plebeians while at the same time they promoted the interests of the state and maintained the patrician dignity. So they agreed that the chief magistrates should no longer be consuls, but new officers, chosen equally from both orders, who were to bear the title of Military Tribunes with Consular Power (*tribuni militum consulari potestate*). Military Tribunes with Consular Power.

By this compromise they shared the chief magistracy with the plebeians, while on the other hand they kept from degradation the honours and insignia enjoyed by the consuls, and secured the adequate performance of the various duties that had appertained to the consulship. The number of consular tribunes (as the new magistrates were called for brevity's sake) varied from three to six, according to the requirements of the state.

Every year at the elections the presiding magistrate put it to the assembly whether consuls or consular tribunes should be chosen for the coming year. Patrician influence was sometimes strong enough to carry the election of consuls, and for long the patricians managed to secure the return of their own nominees for the consular tribunate. It was not till 400 B.C., forty-four years after the institution of the new office, that the first plebeian was chosen as consular tribune. This fact "shows that the masses

preferred the safety of the state to the advancement of their own order; for military skill and experience, and even knowledge of law, were still chiefly to be found in the ranks of the patres."¹ In time however, as the plebeian leaders became more experienced, patrician influence was unable to prevent their election; and after 400 B.C. we find that plebeians are included almost every year in the college.

§ 66. In 443 B.C. the patricians, by the institution of the censorship, still further distributed the powers of the chief magistracy. As in the case of the consular tribunate, they met the growing requirements of public business by creating new magistracies, but this time they withheld from the plebeians the substance as well as the shadow of the new office. When compelled to share the supreme magistracy with the plebeians, they had diminished the value of the concession by withholding the title and honours of consul and by putting the office into commission; they now deprived the chief magistrates of their registrative functions and bestowed them on new patrician officials—the censors. In both cases they were justified by the growing complexity of the state organisation.

It had been the duty of the consuls to arrange the people in centuries according to their wealth and in tribes according to the position of their allotments or (in the case of those not possessing land) of their dwellings. By the list so drawn up it was determined what citizens were entitled to vote in the various assemblies, as well as to which of the army divisions each member of a century belonged. Moreover the estimate of the wealth of those included in the centuries served as a basis for the imposition of the war-tax (*tributum*). Enrolment in a tribe was of the utmost

¹ Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*, p. 113.

political consequence, since none but tribesmen could vote in the *comitia tributa* or in the *concilium plebis*. Thus the holding of the census had become such an important function that the annual magistrates found it incompatible with the proper performance of their other duties. Two new patrician officials, with the title of Censors (*Censores*, "Valuers"), were now created, and their election entrusted to the *comitia centuriata*.

The primary duties of the censors were to register the people in centuries according to their property, and in tribes according to the position of their freehold or dwelling. Whenever a *census* was held an estimate was made of the amount of each citizen's property, and according to this estimate his place in the army and the *comitia centuriata* was determined, and the amount of his contribution to the war-tax (*tributum*) assessed. The assignment of a tribe depended on where a man lived, not on how much property he possessed. Landless men, however, were usually confined to the four city tribes until, in course of time, membership of a tribe became hereditary. But in making out the tribal lists the censor exercised a power which was practically despotic. Since it was to the interest of the state that its citizens should not lead evil lives, the censors soon obtained the right of inquiring into moral qualifications of citizens; for the Romans considered that men who had been guilty of criminal, social, or political offences should not be allowed to vote or to serve in the army. This right was called "control of manners" (*regimen morum*). In virtue of it, the censors could remove a citizen from one tribe to another of less repute; they could refuse to enter his name on a tribal roll at all; and they could exclude him from the centuries.

In later times, this *regimen morum* was extended so as

to involve control not only of the tribal and centuriate assemblies, but also of the senate and the knights. A century after the institution of their office, the censors gained the right of admitting new members to the senate and expelling old ones from it. The disqualification (*infamia*) of a senator by a censor could only be prevented by the veto of the other censor, and removed only by the order of succeeding censors. By exercise of the *regimen morum* the censors could also review the knights and dismiss on moral grounds any they pleased. The estimation of property at the census for the purpose of levying the war-tax led to the financial functions of the censors. They let parts of the public land and also such state property as mines and salt works on lease to the highest bidder; they sold to tax farmers (*publicani*) the right to collect the due (*vectigal* or *scriptura*) which occupiers of public land (§ 54) owed to the state, as well as the right to collect harbour-dues (*portoria*) and, in later times, the right to collect titlies (*decumae*) in the provinces. But the censors had no control over the disbursement of state revenues, and touched no portion of the public moneys except what the senate might grant for their use in the construction or repair of such public works as roads, aqueducts, drains, bridges, and public buildings. Such works were let out to contractors at the lowest tenders. The censors also had some power of jurisdiction arising from their financial duties and exercised in connexion with public works and the public land.

Censors were elected once in every five years, but as early as 434 B.C. it became the rule that they should abdicate after holding office for eighteen months.

The first plebeian censor was C. Marcius Rutilus (351 B.C.). In 339 B.C. one of the *Leges Publiliae* (§ 74) made

imperative the election of at least one plebeian to the censorship.

§ 67. From the beginning of the republic the consuls had chosen two subordinate magistrates, called quaestors (*quaestores parricidii et aerarii*), to assist them in criminal jurisdiction and finance. From 447 B.C. the quaestors were no longer nominated by the consuls, but were elected by the *comitia tributa* from patri- ^{The Quaestors.} cians alone. Their number was raised to four in 421 B.C., and plebeians were made eligible. The two original quaestors (now called *quaestores urbani*) always remained in the city, while the two additional ones (called *quaestores militares*) were assigned to the consuls in the field. After the conquest of Italy (267 B.C.) four more quaestors were added to assist in Italian affairs, and in 81 B.C. the number was increased to twenty. After 447 B.C. the two urban quaestors continued to assist the consul in such criminal jurisdiction as was social rather than political, e.g. in cases of murder or arson. But their duties were henceforward mainly financial, forming a complement to the authority of the censor. They had the guardianship of the state treasury (*aerarium*) where the laws and public accounts were kept. They collected money due from the *publicani* to the censors (§§ 66, 204) and judicial fines. They also disbursed money to the consuls and other magistrates on the orders of the senate.

The military quaestors (appointed in 421 B.C.) were attached to the consuls when they took the field; their duties were chiefly financial, but they also acted as delegates in judicial and military matters.

The four quaestors appointed about 267 B.C. were called *quaestores classici* (quaestors of the fleet). Their functions will be described in § 191.

§ 68. In 439 B.C. Spurius Maelius, a wealthy plebeian, gained great popularity by distributing corn in time of famine among the starving populace. The senate, fearing he wished to make himself king, proclaimed him a traitor, and he was assassinated by the patrician Servilius Ahala.

This is a summary of the earliest account of the episode of Maelius. But the story is quite untrustworthy. Maelius could not at that early date have dreamed of aiming at the kingship; the most probable view is that he was a champion of the poor who, owing to his great popularity, fell a victim to patrician jealousy.

§ 69. About this time Rome began to make headway against the Volscians and Aequians. But the more successful she was in war, the more burning became the dispute about the conquered territory which became public land. Not only were the poor still excluded from the pasture-land, but arable as well as waste land was now "occupied" by wealthy squatters (§ 54) instead of being assigned in freeholds to individuals or employed for the settlement of the landless poor in colonies, Roman or Latin (§ 106). Moreover, the devastation caused by war, the growth of capital, and the enforcement of the law of debt led to the gradual replacement of yeoman farmers with small holdings by rich nobles with large estates.

There was also a growing tendency to turn arable land into pasture land, which was occupied by capitalist syndicates. The men who had thus lost their homesteads found their way to Rome and formed the nucleus of the city rabble which in later times constituted a grave political peril.

The conquest of Ardea in 442 B.C., the fall of Fidenæ in 428 B.C., and of Labicum in 418 B.C. were each followed by agrarian agitations. When Veii was captured (396

B.C.) and the extensive and fertile domain of that city became Roman spoil, a number of allotments of seven *iugera* or about four and a half acres each were distributed among poor plebeians. But the relief afforded by these measures was quite inadequate.

§ 70. M. Manlius Capitolinus (see § 86) stands out as a champion of the plebeian yeomen. The real import of his proposed reforms is obscure. He M. Manlius,
384 B.C. is said to have spent his property in freeing those who were slaves for debt. This account is probably an invention of the later republic, when many attempts were made to abolish existing debts and their authors wished to appeal to the example of this hero. It is fairly certain that M. Manlius in some way or another made the cause of the agricultural bankrupts his own, and that his popularity led to his trial and execution on a charge of treason.

§ 71. A determined attack on the monopoly of the public land by the rich, and of the public offices by the patricians, began in 376 B.C. It was The Licinio-Sextian Laws,
367 B.C. by a combination of the political and social reformers among the plebeians that success was eventually gained. Since many of the plebeians were men of wealth, the plebeian order was divided into two distinct sections, each with its own particular grievances or ambitions. The plebeian capitalists had no wish to change the existing social laws; they had doubtless often enforced the law of debt against the poorer plebeians, and their capital had now opened up to them the public land, the monopoly of which they shared with the patricians. But they aimed at complete political equality with the patricians, and the discontent of their impoverished brethren was utilised by them to effect their own purpose. On the other hand the

mass of the plebeians gratefully accepted the alliance, since it seemed to open a sure way to relief.

Forten years (376-367 B.C.) the plebeian coalition struggled desperately for social and political reform. In 376 B.C. the tribunes C. Licinius Stolo and L. Sextius passed a comprehensive *plebiscitum* which the senate endeavoured by every means in its power (including the winning over of tribunes and the nomination of dictators) to prevent from becoming law. At length, in 367 B.C., it was brought before the *comitia* and passed as a series of measures called the Licinio-Sextian Laws. They were as follows:—

(a) Consuls and not consular tribunes were to be elected in future, and one consul *must* henceforth be a plebeian.

(b) The Keepers of the Oracles (*decemviri sacris faciundis*) were to be raised from two to ten, and half were to be plebeians.

(c) No citizen was to occupy more than 500 *iugera* (about 312 acres) of public land, or to keep more than 100 oxen and 500 sheep on the public pasture.

(d) Debtors were to deduct the money already paid as interest from the capital representing their original debt, and were to pay the remainder in three instalments.

(e) A landlord was compelled to employ a number of free labourers proportioned to that of his slaves employed in agriculture. //

The first law made the *plebs*, as represented by the wealthy members of the order, “the dominant element in the state.” This law completely altered the

The First Law.

character of the aristocracy. Hitherto it had consisted entirely of patricians, who based their claims to priority on superior birth. But it was now replaced by a new nobility based on office. All who attained curule office¹ became *ipso facto* nobles (*nobiles*); this nobility was hereditary, and was transmitted to their descendants; hence every man whose ancestors had had curule office was

¹ *I.e.* the consulship, censorship, praetorship, and curule aedileship (§ 72).

reckoned to belong to the new aristocracy, whether he himself ever held curule office or not. Since few ever attained curule office save wealthy plebeians and members of the old patrician houses the new nobility was as exclusive as the old. Owing to the rapid diminution of the number of patrician families, the new aristocracy was practically composed of rich plebeians. The struggle was henceforth between rich and poor instead of between the well-born and the base-born. It was an unequal struggle; for the leaders of the poor could only hope for economic reforms if they attained office, and only those who possessed genius and force of character could hope to fight their way to the higher magistracies of the state.

The two Agrarian Laws did not permanently benefit the small freeholders. The main reason for this was that they were not properly enforced.

*The Agrarian
Laws.*


"Their regulations were set aside or evaded by putting in men of straw. The plebeian nobles used these proposals as a stalking-horse for their own purposes. They were a solemn imposture, and sanctioned the evils they pretended to check."¹ The success of the Roman arms enabled colonies to be formed, and for a time prevented agrarian distress; but gradually the capitalists again occupied most of the public land and treated it as private property.

§ 72. Now that consuls had again taken the place of consular tribunes, the function of the supreme magistracy (even with the relief afforded by the institution of the censorship) could not be adequately performed by two men. When the consuls were called away from Rome on military service, there was no one to administer jurisdiction in the city. Hence

*New
Magistrates.
The Praetors,
366 B.C.*

in 366 B.C. the judicial powers of the consulship were transferred to a new magistrate, called a Praetor.

The Praetor was a curule magistrate, possessing the *imperium* (since this was an indispensable adjunct of jurisdiction) and elected by the *comitia centuriata*. He was therefore a true colleague of the consuls, though occupying an inferior position to them. His judicial powers were mainly concerned with civil cases, since criminal cases were, in virtue of the right of appeal, brought as a matter of course before the people. Like the kings and the consuls the praetor gave the ruling in law applicable to the case, and left the questions of fact to be decided by a judge or judges. The part of the trial held before the praetor was called *in iure*, that held before the judge was called *in iudicio*. Since one aspect of the *imperium* could not be divorced from the rest, the praetor, in addition to his judicial powers, exercised all the administrative functions of the consuls, though usually only when the latter were absent from Rome.

In 241 B.C. another praetor was created for the purpose of trying cases in which foreigners (*peregrini*) resident in Rome were concerned. The new praetor was styled *praetor peregrinus*, and the original one was from this date called *praetor urbanus*. In 227 B.C. two more praetors were created to administer jurisdiction in the newly acquired provinces of Sicily and Sardinia; in 197 B.C. when two new provinces were formed in Spain, two more were added. The number of praetors was raised by Sulla (81 B.C.) to eight, by Caesar to sixteen, but was reduced again by Augustus to six. It is doubtful whether plebeians were ever definitely excluded from the office, though no plebeian was elected till 337 B.C. 

But the consuls were prevented by the exigencies of war

from acting as police as well as from acting as judges. Accordingly in 365 B.C., the year after the institution of the praetorship, two officers called Curule Aediles were appointed for purposes of police and urban administration. The plebeian aediles, who hitherto had been merely assistants of the tribunes, were henceforth, like their curule brethren, concerned only with the supervision of city matters. The aediles were the general assistants of the consuls in matters of administration. They saw to the repairing of roads and houses and the cleansing of public places; they prevented the introduction of foreign worships; they provided a supply of corn for the needs of the city; they controlled the market, destroying unjust weights and measures, and regulating sales; they superintended the police of the city; they celebrated the public games, generally at their own expense.

The Curule
Aediles,
365 B.C.

The plebeian aediles were, of course, plebeians and were elected by the *concilium plebis*. The curule aediles were elected from patricians and plebeians in alternate years; they were, as magistrates of the whole people, elected by the *comitia tributa*. Like the censors, though they had not the *imperium*, they shared the honour of the curule chair with the consuls and praetors. Thus it will be seen that though the functions of all four aediles were pretty much the same, there was a great difference between the curule and plebeian offices in other respects. Moreover, the curule aedileship was an important step towards the consulship, whereas the plebeian aediles had no prospects of higher office—in fact, they were hardly magistrates at all.

§ 73. After the great victory of 367 B.C., the plebeians rapidly secured admission to the other magistracies that were still closed to them. The patricians were not able to retain exclusive possession even

Opening of the
Magistracies.

of the new offices, the praetorship and curule aedileships. There was a plebeian dictator, C. Marcius Rutilus, in 356 B.C., there was a plebeian censor in 351 B.C., and a plebeian praetor in 337 B.C.

Finally the patricians had to surrender their sole right to membership in the greater priestly colleges. Lex Ogulnia, 300 B.C. In 300 B.C. the *Lex Ogulnia* was passed, providing that—

The College of Augurs should be increased to nine, and the College of Pontiffs to eight (exclusive of the Supreme Pontiff), and that the new members should be plebeians.

This reform was, doubtless, in part due to the fact that Cn. Flavius, 304 B.C. the pontifical college had ceased to be a stronghold of patrician privilege. It had been as custodians of the formularies of legal procedure that this college was valuable to the patricians, and this value was largely lost when, in 304 B.C., Cn. Flavius, a pontiff's clerk, published a list of the forms of claim and a list of the days on which an action could be brought. Henceforth, plaintiffs had no need to consult the pontiffs.

§ 74. The next great political struggle after the Licinio-Sextian laws had as its object greater legislative freedom for the assemblies, both popular and plebeian. Laws of Publilius Philo, 339 B.C. In 339 B.C. a plebeian dictator, Q. Publilius Philo, carried the following laws, that—

(a) The resolutions of the plebeian assembly should be binding on all the citizens (*ut plebi scita omnes Quirites tenerent*).

(b) The senate should give their sanction to laws of the *comitia centuriata* before the voting began.

(c) One censor at least should always be a plebeian.

We have seen (§ 64) that those measures of the *concilium plebis* which concerned the whole state, and not the plebeian community only, could not become law till the consuls, after consulting and obtaining leave from the

senate, had brought them before the *comitia* and had them passed as *leges*. The first Publilian law probably meant that the consul should bring the resolution of the plebs directly before the *comitia* without asking the advice of the senate.

We have also seen (§ 51) that no motion carried in the *comitia centuriata* became law until it had received the sanction of the senate (*patrum auctoritas*). But now that the senate consisted largely of plebeians, this sanction was becoming a mere form; it was not thought right to dispense with it altogether, but the second Publilian law, in enacting that it should be given beforehand, recognised that it was no longer of material consequence.

The third law marked yet another step in the equalisation of the two orders: it was doubtless grounded upon partiality and other abuses on the part of patrician censors in the exercise of their power of degrading senators, knights, and citizens alike. ✓

§ 75. Owing to the series of successful campaigns in which Rome was engaged, the number of slaves increased greatly during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C. These slaves were continually being manumitted by their masters, so that in time a large class of freedmen (*libertini*) arose. Since these freedmen were mainly mechanics and rarely possessed land, they were confined to the four city tribes, so that their voting power, in spite of their numbers, was insignificant. In 312 B.C. one of the censors was Appius Claudius, a man in many respects resembling the great decemvir, and like him belonging to the party of reform. He resolved to break through the customary usage, and in making out the tribal rolls he distributed the freedmen, as well as the rest of the landless

Votes of the
Freedmen.

The Censor-
ship of Appius
Claudius.

citizens, over all the thirty-five tribes. This transference of political power to the democratic city population was a menace to the rule of the new aristocracy, and the innovation of Appius did not remain unchallenged. The next censor, Q. Fabius Maximus (304 B.C.), again limited freedmen and other landless citizens to the four city tribes. The distribution of the votes of the freedmen and other non-landowners became one of the burning questions in the struggles between conservatives and democrats which marked the last two centuries of the republic.

Appius Claudius also admitted the sons of freedmen to the senate, and completed two great public works, which make his censorship memorable for all time. He built the first of the great Roman aqueducts (the *Aqua Appia*) and constructed the great military road (*Via Appia*) leading from Rome to Capua.

§ 76. Absolute legislative independence of the plebeian assembly was now the only thing wanting to
Lex Hortensia,
287 B.C.
bring about complete political equality between the two orders. This final reform was effected in 287 B.C. In that year the plebeians seceded for the third and last time; but they agreed to return on a law being passed by the plebeian dictator, Q. Hortensius, to the effect that

All the citizens shall be bound by the laws of the plebeians (*ut eo iure quod plebs statuisset omnes Quirites tenerentur*).

The *Leges Publiliae* of 339 B.C. probably provided, as we have seen (§ 74), that the resolutions of the *plebs* should be brought *at once* (without consultation of the senate) before the *comitia*. After the passing of the Hortensian law these resolutions (*plebiscita*) no longer required such ratification. Thus the plebeian assembly was entirely independent, so far as legislation was concerned, of any other authority in

the state, and the measures passed by it had precisely the same validity as laws (*leges*) passed by either of the assemblies of the whole people. "Henceforth there is between *lex* and *plebiscitum* merely a difference of form and name. . . . A law could repeal a plebiscite and a plebiscite a law."¹

At the time when the *Lex Hortensia* was passed the patricians still formed a large minority of the community, and the difference between the *concilium plebis* and the *comitia tributa* was a very real difference. But with the rapid diminution in the numbers of patrician families, the constituent elements of the two assemblies became more and more alike; until at length citizens who voted in the plebeian assembly were practically identical with those who voted in the tribal assembly of the *Populus*. Thus not only had *plebiscita* the full force of *leges*, but the assembly which passed *plebiscita* was composed, to all intents and purposes, of the same persons as the tribal assembly which passed *leges*. But though the practical difference between the two assemblies, as legislative bodies, was thus reduced to a minimum, the formal difference still remained great. Only consuls or other magistrates with *imperium* could convene the *comitia tributa*; and only plebeian magistrates could convene the *concilium plebis*. It should be noted that it was only in legislation that the functions of the two tribal assemblies were, after 287 B.C. essentially the same. For elective and judicial purposes, it made all the difference whether the tribes were summoned by a plebeian magistrate or by a magistrate with *imperium*. Tribunes could be elected only by the *concilium plebis*, quaestors and curule aediles only by the

¹ Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*, p. 126.

comitia tributa. Appeals against plebeian magistrates could be heard only by the former, and appeals against curule aediles only by the latter, assembly.

The *comitia centuriata* was after 287 B.C. mainly used for elective purposes and for the declaration of war; it was too cumbrous and unwieldy to be employed for the passing of laws, and its place as a legislative body was superseded by the *concilium plebis* and the *comitia tributa*.

The long and weary struggle for political equality had now terminated in a victory for the plebeians. But it was only the wealthy plebeians, not the rank and file of the order, who gained any substantial benefit. It was for the redress of social and economic grievances that the masses were striving. But their leaders cared for none of these things; their only aim was to be admitted into the circle of the aristocracy that they might have a share in the sweets of office and the profits of government. When they posed as economic or social reformers, their only motive was to gain the support of their poorer brethren for the realisation of their political ambitions. But the social and economic problems were only shelved for a time; their solution in one form or another was bound to come sooner or later. If the plebeian leaders had been actuated by genuinely altruistic motives, this solution might have been speedy, satisfactory, and permanent; but owing to their selfish policy the distress of the masses was intensified rather than alleviated, and social and economic reform was only attained as the result of revolutionary upheavals which culminated in a second monarchy.

Meanwhile the new nobility (§ 71), which for all practical purposes meant the senate, remained for one hundred and fifty years subsequent to the passing of the Hortensian law the well-nigh absolute head of the state.

CHAPTER IV.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF LATIUM, 496—338 B.C.

§§ 77-78. Rome and Latium.—§§ 79-81. Wars against the Aequians and Volscians; Cincinnatus and Coriolanus.—§§ 82-84. Wars against the Etruscans; Fall of Veii.—§ 85. Rome and the Latin League.—§ 86. The Gallic Invasion.—§§ 87-91. The League after 390 B.C.—§ 92. The Samnites.—§ 93. First Samnite War.—§§ 94-95. The Great Latin War.—§ 96. Settlement of Latium and Dissolution of the League.—§ 97. The Organisation of Italy.

§ 77. THE year 509 B.C. may be taken as a definite date in Roman history; but for one hundred and ^{History still doubtful.} thirty years afterwards the events recorded by our authorities are still mainly legendary. As we have already seen (§ 37), the monarchy of the Tarquins implies a period during which Etruscan princes ruled over a conquered Latin race, while the expulsion of the kings (510 B.C.) represents a national rising of the Latins by which the foreign domination was overthrown. The victory of the Latins was slow and difficult, but it was complete; in Fidenæ (*Castel Giubileo*) alone, a town nearly as strong as Rome itself and situated on the left bank of the Tiber, did the Etruscan Lucumons hold out for a time, aided by the important Etruscan town of Veii.

ANCIENT LATIUM

AND ITS NEIGHBOURS.



Towns of Latin League
in small capitals thus.....TUSCULUM
Garrison Towns *

The history of Rome for the next century (500 B.C.—400 B.C.) falls into two periods: for fifty years she fought a doubtful battle against Etruscans on the north, and against the Sabines, the Aequians, and the Volscians on the south-east; then suddenly (after 450 B.C.) we find her no longer on the defensive, but as chosen champion of the Latin race, pushing her conquests alike to the east, the south, and the north.

As Rome had been the centre of the Etruscan power in Latium, so she reaped the fullest advantages therefrom. The commerce which their policy had gathered to her quays, as to the only river-port on all the coast of peninsular Italy, still flourished after their fall. More important than all, though she lay nearest to the nation's most redoubtable foes, yet was she the most secure; for while the Volscians and their fellows ravaged the undefended borders of further Latium and wasted its fields, Rome lay safe beyond their reach, and grew rich by her commerce, protected by her wide river against the Etruscans on the further bank.

§ 78. Nevertheless, beset as Rome and Latium were on all sides by so many enemies, there was need of real union if they were to hold their own, and such union was speedily achieved by the formation of the new Latin League, the "first great political act" of the new republic. Tradition said that Spurius Cassius was the diplomatist who effected this, 493 B.C. Tradition also said, with small probability, that the members were always thirty, but we have no reliable list of their names. Such towns as Tibur, Praeneste, Tusculum, Aricia (*Tivoli, Palestrina, Frascati, Ariccia*), would certainly be included, as also Gabii, Bovillae, and Laurentum. We find included also Nomentum (*Mentana*) and other

Character of
Roman
history,
500—400 B.C.

Position of
Rome, 500 B.C.

The Latin
League becomes
a Political
Union, 493 B.C.

towns beyond the Anio (*Teverone*), which shows that the Sabines were already giving way before the Latins. Brought into existence by the attacks of the surrounding peoples, the object of the League was to unite against those peoples the whole power of the Latin nation.

With this definite object in view, definite statements of Articles of the League. privileges and duties took the place of the looser ties of the ancient Latin religious federation (§ 34). Henceforth the voice of the conference had a binding force upon all the members of the League. The conference called out the federal army, and apportioned the numbers of the levy to be contributed by each Latin city. The command of the army lay alternately year by year with Rome and with two Latin praetors nominated by the conference.

§ 79. Here then were the first requisites for the national security—national union and a national army, and how greatly these were needed is proved by the traditions of the next fifty years (500 B.C.—450 B.C.). The expulsion of the Etruscans, and the consequent disturbances in each town, had left the land seemingly helpless and divided, while it had set free the Volscians to advance at will by removing the power which beforetime had checked them and overawed the Aequians. The Aequians were but a nation of shepherds and robbers, who came only to plunder, and vanished forthwith into their mountains; but the Volscians were a warlike people with a more organized policy; they aimed at the permanent conquest of Latium, and secured their advance by rasing or colonizing the towns which they conquered. While the Volscians pushed northwards by land, the last strongholds of Etruscan power, the seaports of Antium (*Porto d'Anzo*) and Tarracina (*Terracina*) were beset from the seaward side

by hostile Greeks, and soon fell beneath the double attack. Satricum, Cora (*Cori*), Corioli, Velitrae (*Velletri*), Lavinium, all strong positions in the south and west of Latium, fell into their hands; and at length (*circa* 450 B.C.) Volscian garrisons occupied Bovillae on the slopes of Mons Albanus, a bare ten miles from the walls of Rome, and from thence ravaged the land to her very gates. Simultaneously the Aequians, grown bolder by impunity, pushed westward as far as Mount Algidus, the north-eastern ridge of the Alban Mount, and threatened to seize Tusculum. It seemed as if the invaders might effect a junction at any moment, thereby cutting off Rome and the Latins of the north-east from their fellows in the south-east, while south of these they were parted only by the narrow territories of the Hernicans along the valley of the Trerus (*Sacco*). If the junction were effected the Latins were of a certainty lost.

Accordingly the Latin League was extended to embrace the all but isolated Hernicans, a second act of diplomacy attributed to Spurius Cassius, 486 B.C. The Hernicans
join the
League. It probably came at a later date, after the last efforts of the Carthaginians and Etruscans to crush the Greeks had been broken at the famous battle of Himera (*Bonformello*) in Sicily (480 B.C.), and in the great sea-fight off Cumae (474 B.C.); when the Gauls, who had already wrested from the Etruscans their possessions in the valley of the Padus, were threatening to cross the Apennines into Etruria proper; when the Sabellian tribes were already seizing upon the Etruscan cities of Campania, and threatening the rear of the Volscian land; and when the patricians had to some extent secured internal quiet by various concessions to the plebs.

§ 80. After 450 B.C. Rome set herself in earnest to redeem her past neglect of her allies. She must first rid herself of

Fidenæ, which hung always upon the flank and rear of her armies when moving against Aequians and Volscians. In 428 B.C. Fidenæ was rased utterly and Rome was left with a free hand.

Advance of
Rome against
the Aequians.

Her next care was to secure communication with the Hernicans, and this object was attained by the assignation of land to Roman citizens at the old Latin town of Labicum (418 B.C.) at the foot of Mount Algidus a measure which made the position of the Aequians on the mount no longer tenable, and forced them to withdraw—and by garrisoning Bola near Praeneste (414 B.C.). For five-and-twenty years the Aequians ceased to be a danger to Rome, retreating eastward into the highlands behind Praeneste and Tibur, and the inaccessible valleys of the upper Anio (*Teverone*).¹

Not less successful were the operations against the Volscians, a foe far superior in point alike of numbers, resources, and valour; but they were more tedious, for the Volscians had driven the garrisons from a number of strong Latin fortresses, and had destroyed no fewer than thirteen when at last fortune turned against them. Nevertheless the repulse of the Volscians was steadily effected, commencing probably with the recovery of Bovillæ, which would fall about the time when the Aequians were driven from Algidus (*circa* 418 B.C.). We have few reliable details of the war, but we can trace the advance of the Romans by the destruction of Corioli and by the mention of colonies planted at Velitrae, Cora, and Norba, through central Latium, and along the Hernican frontier; and as time went on the coast-towns also fell again into the hands of the allies, for we find Lavinium and Laurentum restored to the League. By the close of the century (400 B.C.) the Volscians must have been hemmed in between two lines of fortresses, in the narrow range of hills between

And against
the Volscians.

the Trerus (*Sacco*) and Ufens (*Ufente*), and the lands of the Latino-Hernican League were once more free. Nevertheless they had suffered heavily, and many towns had been utterly destroyed by the Volscians. In some instances, *e.g.* Corioli, they were rebuilt, and became so-called Latin colonies—mixed communities of Romans and Latins, amongst whom were divided the adjoining lands and those of other ruined towns.

§ 81. Needless to say, the course of the Aequo-Volscean wars is given in very different style in the Latin historians, and reads with wearisome monotony and little approach to likelihood. The narrative given above is the probable and natural kernel of history which may be extracted from the mass of tradition. There are, however, one or two legends, those of Coriolanus and Cincinnatus, which must be recorded

At the time when the plebeians were struggling with the patricians about the tribunate, there was a grievous famine in Rome (492 B.C.), and there was bought corn by the senate to distribute amongst the starving. Now Gaius Marcius, to whom men had given the name of Coriolanus, because he had captured Corioli from the Volscians, was of the proudest of the patricians, and he would have prevented the distribution of the corn: wherefore the tribunes summoned him to trial, and as he came not, he was declared an exile, and went to the Volscians of Antium. Now the Volscians were glad to have him with them, for he was wroth with the people of Rome and swore to be revenged; and having gathered an army, they came up against the city and took eleven towns of Latium, and encamped at five miles distance from the walls. Then were the senate and the people in great fear, for there was none that could withstand the enemy, and they sent to Coriolanus, first the chiefest of the senators,

The Story of
Coriolanus.

and then the priests of his fatherland, to pray for mercy, but he would not hear them. But when there came the noblest of the mothers of Rome, and with them his own mother and wife and children, his anger went from him, and he led away the host of the Volscians and granted peace to the Romans. ✓

The story is beautiful perhaps, but absolutely baseless. If the Volscians were strong enough to capture eleven walled towns in one campaign and to bring Rome to terms, they would never have relinquished alike the conquered towns and their triumph over Rome in order to gratify the sentimental feelings of an exiled Roman. The legend was invented to point a moral, and to make less humiliating the real victories of the Volscians by attributing even these to the good generalship of a Roman, albeit an exile.

In the year 459 B.C. there was truce between Rome and the Aequians; but next year the Aequians broke the peace, and appeared upon Mount Algidus near Tusculum, and there they defeated the consul Minucius and hemmed in his army. Then the senate looked about for a man brave and skilled in war, who should save the blockaded army, and they named T. Quinctius Cincinnatus to be dictator. Cincinnatus was a patrician, but he had no false pride: when the summons came to bid him attend upon the senate he was ploughing his own small farm beyond the Tiber like any plebeian peasant. He came to the senate, and accepted its behests. He bade all business be stayed save that of war, and ordered all that were of military age to meet him at sundown in the Field of Mars, each with five days' provisions and twelve stakes. By midnight he came to Mount Algidus, and when morning arrived, the Aequians found themselves in their turn shut in by a rampart of earth, bristling with a palisade of stakes.

The Story of
Cincinnatus.

They had no choice but to surrender, and Cincinnatus⁷ let them depart after they had passed beneath the yoke (one spear bound crosswise upon two others upright) in token of their submission. Then he returned to Rome with the rescued army twenty-four hours after his setting out.

The legend is scarcely credible; for even allowing that the dictator's army might in five hours' time march the twenty miles from Rome to Algidus, yet it is inconceivable that it could in as many hours more, and without interruption, erect a rampart of sufficient size and length to shut in the Aequians, themselves spread out widely to encircle Minucius' army.

§ 82. Less formidable, but not less harassing, were the wars with the Etruscans, though here too it is impossible to sift out the truth from the mass of tradition. Chief amongst the traditions is the story of the Fabii. Once when the Etruscans, and notably the men of Veii, were vexing the Romans and attacking their lands about Janiculum, the patricians of the house of the Fabii volunteered to take upon themselves the burden of the war beyond the Tiber: they built them a fortress upon the river Cremera near to Veii, and there for many days they fought valiantly. But the men of Veii laid an ambush and fell upon the Fabii and slew them all, even 306 warriors, so that of the whole of the gens there remained alive but one child to raise up again the Fabian line (477 B.C.). And thereafter matters went hard with Rome, and the Etruscans took Janiculum; but the Romans drove them out again, and there was peace for forty years (474—434 B.C.).

The Story of
the Fabii at
the Cremera,
477 B.C.

Another fable. The Fabian gens could scarcely have numbered 306 fighting men; still less could 306 warriors of full age have left behind them but a single child.

Doubtless the whole legend is a late invention to glorify the Fabii.

The fall of Fidenæ has been already mentioned, though reserved for fuller relation here. The Etruscans, The Etruscan Wars. Fidenæ. after repeated efforts to reconquer Latium, relapsed into a sulky quiescence. The centre of their power in Southern Etruria was Veii, and Fidenæ was to Veii what Janiculum was to Rome—a doorway into the enemy's land. The town stood upon a small hill by the Tiber's left bank five miles above Rome, now a desolate spot known as *Castel Giubileo*. Fidenæ revolted from Rome for the last time in 428 B.C., and called in the aid of Lars Tolumnius, the *lucumon* or king of Veii. He marched to aid the town, and in the battle which ensued Cornelius Cossus, the Roman consul, slew the Veientine king with his own hands, and was thus the first general in Roman history to win the *spolia opima*.¹ The Etruscans were utterly routed; Fidenæ was rased to the ground, and such was the value of this victory to the Romans that the Veientes made a truce of twenty years with Rome. With the fall of Fidenæ the Etruscans gave up all hope of re-establishing their power over Latium.

§ 83. In fact the tables were completely turned. Twenty years later Rome found herself rid of Sabines, Roman advance upon Etruria. Aequians and Volscians, and virtual head of all Latium. Several reasons led her now to deal first with the Etruscans; first, they were too near to be

¹ The arms taken by a Roman general from the enemy's general in single combat were called *spolia opima* ("spoils of honour"). According to the traditional account, the last revolt and the destruction of Fidenæ took place in 426 B.C. But Cossus was consul in 428, not in 426; and we know from the evidence of archaeology that Cossus was consul when he won the *spolia opima*.

desirable neighbours; secondly, they were little in a condition to defend themselves; and lastly, she could not as yet disown the terms of the Latin alliance and extend her territories to the south at the expense of the Latins.

That the attack was premeditated we have additional reason to believe, because it is just at this date (406 B.C.) that we find her army put upon a ^{Establishment of Military Pay.} new footing. Hitherto the forces of Rome had been a mere militia, called out upon occasion and kept in the field only for a few months in each year, and therefore entirely unfitted for distant expeditions or for such as entailed continued activity for a long period. All this was altered when the State undertook to pay its troops for their services. The soldier could now, if he choose, leave his farm untilled or pay another to attend to it, and the State could have troops at its command from year's end to year's end.

In the year 405 B.C. the newly-organized army appeared before Veii and commenced to blockade the town. Many circumstances combined to favour ^{Attack upon Veii, 405 B.C.} the attack of Rome. Caere was her ally, and south of the Ciminian forest there were no other important towns than Capena and Falerii. Moreover the Gauls were already raiding Etruria Proper, so that when the Veientes sent for aid against Rome they received none but such as came voluntarily from Tarquinii and elsewhere. Even the dependent cities of Capena and Falerii lent only intermittent help.

Perched upon a steep cliff by the rock now known as Isola Farnese, naturally protected further by the Cremera and a tributary stream which ran by two of the three sides of the town, and fortified also with all the strategic and architectural ability of the Etruscans, Veii shared with

Caere the dominion of Southern Etruria, and had grown to an opulence which Rome could not parallel. Its people might well laugh at their enemy's hopes of capturing so strong a

Its Fall
396 B.C.

fortress, nor do we know how it fell at last. Tradition said that the siege lasted ten years, and that during all this time the Roman army lay before the city which it had hemmed about with colossal siege works, well-nigh impervious alike to the Veientes from within and the assaults of the Faliscans¹ and Capenates from without. Yet Veii fell at length; its site was left desolate, its wealth and much of its population were transferred to Rome. With it fell the resistance of Capena and Falerii, which hastened to ally themselves with the conquerors; and having these cities and Caere as her allies, Rome occupied the lands of Veii with Roman settlers, and subsequently (387 B.C.) created from them four new tribes (so that now there were twenty-five in all), for whose protection she founded also the two colonies of Sutrium (*Sutri*) and Nepete (*Nepi*), where the Ciminian Hills afforded too insecure a frontier.

§ 84. But these facts are as usual wrapped up in fable.

The Legendary
Account.

For ten years (so runs the legend) the siege dragged on, and the people murmured at the burden of the war, to which it seemed there would be no end. But in the eighth year a Roman soldier overheard a Veientine say mockingly that the labour of Rome was in vain, for Veii could fall only when Fate's decrees were fulfilled. By a stratagem the soldier took the seer prisoner, and he was sent to Rome there to explain his words. The gods, he said, had decreed that Veii should fall only when the waters of the Alban Lake had been drawn off over the

¹ *Falisci* is the name of the inhabitants of Falerii (*Civita Castellana*).

fields of Latium. In doubt and perplexity the senate sent to consult the oracle of Delphi, and thence also they received a like answer. Therefore they set about doing the oracle's bidding, and they made a great tunnel through the rock of the Alban Hills, and so drew off the waters of the lake. And now, confident of success, they named as dictator M. Furius Camillus, and all the people flocked eagerly to conclude the war and to spoil Veii. Camillus dug a mine from the Roman lines up into the citadel of Veii, and the troops poured into the city and took it. But Camillus had made a vow that a tithe of the spoils should be dedicated to the gods, and the people murmured thereat, and condemned him to pay a fine; and in wrath Camillus left the city, and went to live at Ardea amongst the Latins.

It seems that after the taking of Veii there were violent quarrels between the patricians and plebeians as to the distribution of the conquered lands, and from this arose the legend of Camillus cheating the people. Whether he was ever fined we do not know: but the legend of the coming of the Gauls required that he should be an exile a few years later, and this quarrel was made to account for it. As for the story of the Alban tunnel, such a tunnel does exist, and dates probably from the days when the Etruscans were lords of Latium. Perhaps it was in some way cleaned out or restored about this date, and so arose the legendary connection between its construction and the capture of Veii.

§ 85. Thus, while the Etruscans lost ground on all hands,—for Capua, and with it all Campania, had fallen into the hands of the Samnites in Rome and the Latin League. 424 B.C.,—Rome grew stronger and stronger. The league between Rome and the cities of Latium (§ 78) was

originally an equal alliance. Rome on the one side, the Latins and Hernicans on the other, were to share alike all burdens, all territory, and all spoils. Rome and Latium were to furnish equal contingents of troops. Rome was to have command of the entire federal forces for one year, the Latins for the next, and wars and treaties were to be decided by the federation as a whole. Moreover there was complete equality as regards burgess rights. Each of the Latin cities had the *ius conubii* and the *ius commercii* with Rome and with one another, while Rome possessed corresponding rights in each of the Latin cities. Thus any citizen of a Latin state could buy, sell, bequeath, or make contracts about land or other property in Rome, and could contract a legal marriage with a Roman and so obtain *patria potestas* at Rome; and any Roman citizen had the same privileges in an allied city. In the case of private contracts lawsuits were to be decided in the law-courts of the city in which the contract had been made. Moreover, any Roman citizen migrating to a Latin city, and any Latin citizen migrating to Rome or to another Latin city, kept the private rights of both states.

Since the Latin states lay between Rome and the chief enemies of the League, the Aequi and Volsci, it was inevitable that the chief burden of the wars should fall upon them. In consequence of this they grew weaker, while Rome grew stronger at their expense. Thus the Latins were compelled to look more and more to Rome for protection; and as the price of this protection they were forced to give up their military equality. Soon after 450 B.C., Rome was entrusted with the officering of the entire army of the League, and with the supreme command on all occasions. But her progress was soon to be checked by a great disaster.

Rome the Head
of the League,
400 B.C.

§ 86. It has been said (§ 10) that various tribes of Gauls crossed the Apennines during the sixth and fifth centuries B.C. One of these, the The Senonian Gauls. Senones, had pushed beyond the rest, ousted the Umbrians from the coast of the Adriatic, and there settled. Their frontier to the south was the Aesis (*Esino*), which flows eastward from the Apennines to the sea near Ancona. About the source of this river the great chain of the Apennines suddenly becomes dwarfed, so forming a natural and easy pass between the lands of the Senones and those of the Etruscans, Sabines, and Latins.

The Gauls were not the people to remain inactive. Plunder was their one object, and in pursuit of this they at last (391 B.C.) attacked the great The Burning of Rome, 390 B.C. city of Clusium (*Chiusi*). Clusium baffled their onset, and they turned southward down the Tiber, seeking easier prey. At the news of their approach the Roman army advanced to the streamlet of the Allia, eleven miles from the gates. There, on July 18, 390 B.C., the Gauls won a decisive victory, and three days later they entered Rome. The city was at once sacked and fired; but there had been time for most of the inhabitants to fly to the friendly city of Caere or elsewhere, and for a handful of warriors to garrison the Capitol. The Gauls were unskilled in sieges, and for many months they beset the citadel, at the same time ravaging Latium far and near. At length they withdrew, bought off by a heavy ransom.

The story of tradition is more poetical. When the Gauls beset Clusium, says Livy, its people begged aid of Rome, and the senate sent ambassadors of The Story of Camillus and the Gauls. the Fabian gens to bid the Gauls not molest the friends of the Romans. The Gauls bade the Fabii begone, and set themselves to the storm of Clusium. The

fight went hard with the Etruscans, and the Fabii forgot that they were ambassadors and therefore bound by the law of nations not to use the sword : they came to the aid of the men of Clusium, and saved the day. The Gauls forthwith sent to Rome to demand that justice should be done on the Fabii for their breach of law. But the people of Rome scorned their demands ; nay, they elected the three Fabii among the consular tribunes of the ensuing year. Then the Gauls swore revenge. They came down upon the city, turning neither to right nor to left, and routed the Romans at the Allia, so that but few escaped to Veii. At Rome all was terror. The senate bade each man save himself, while a thousand patrician youths put the Capitol in a state of defence ; the older men, ex-consuls and others, refused to fly, but robed in their garb of office they sate upon their chairs of state each in his own home, and awaited their doom. The Gauls entered the city, and wondered that it should be deserted. They found the old men sitting calm and silent, and marvelled again. At last as one stroked the white beard of an aged patrician, the old man smote him, and then the Gauls massacred all and fired the city. Then the barbarians set themselves to besiege the Capitol. For long they beset it in vain, and meanwhile the remnant of the Roman people gathered at Veii. They looked for Camillus, but he was in exile and only the senate could give permission that he should be named dictator. Therefore a young warrior made his way from Veii to the Capitol, and returned with the senate's fiat, and Camillus was recalled and made dictator. But meantime the Gauls had marked how the Capitol might be climbed, and in the dead of night they sent a company to scale it. The very watch-dogs slept, and the fortress was well-nigh

heard the Gauls' approach, and clangoured aloud. M. Manlius heard them, and rushed to the spot in time to hurl down the first of the Gauls, and his comrades joined him and foiled the attack. For this feat, says the legend, was Manlius surnamed Capitolinus. Thereafter the garrison were forced for very starvation to offer terms, and in the seventh month they paid a thousand pounds of gold taken chiefly from the temples. As the gold was being weighed out Camillus suddenly arrived : he bade the Gauls withdraw and leave the gold behind, and when they tarried he set upon them and defeated them utterly, nor did a man of all the Gallic host escape to tell the tale.

It is needless to point out all that is false in this legend. The Etruscans of Clusium were little likely to ask aid of Rome, and Rome was little likely to grant it. Falsity of the Story. Camillus certainly did not surprise the Gauls and take from them the gold of the ransom. He was not an exile : from the legend's own showing, he had left Rome of his own accord, and could come back when he chose, and no law was necessary for his recall. Neither could the senate on the Capitol make him dictator, but only one of the Consular Tribunes. The Roman writers were forced to acknowledge Rome's defeat, and they distorted the fact to make it glorious to Camillus and less disgraceful to themselves.

§ 87. Rome had not recovered from the Gallic raid when she was suddenly assailed by foes on every hand. Attacks on Rome. The Etruscans sought to avenge Veii ; the Volscians and Aequians resumed their ancient aggressions ; worst of all, the Latins and Hernicans, long discontented, regarded the old League as dissolved by Rome's ruin, and began to act severally for themselves. The Latins, in particular, had every reason to assert their freedom while there was yet time : by settling only Romans upon

the Veientine lands Rome had shown clearly how little she meant to consult the claims of her allies, albeit the alliance demanded that their due share of those lands should be given to the Latins and Hernicans, and albeit those people had served in the army which won the victory of Camillus.

We know little of the history of the next fifty years (389—339 B.C.). It is filled with confused Disorganization of the League. accounts of campaigns in which the hand of each city and people seems to be against that of all the others. It would seem that each Latin town chose its own line of action: a very few, such as Laurentum, stood loyally by Rome, for which they became objects of attack to their less loyal fellows. The stronger towns of the League, such as Tibur and Praeneste, stood up as independent powers, and made conquests of their weaker neighbours: thus Praeneste became mistress of eight or nine towns, and she seems to have as a rule acted in alliance with Tibur.

But Rome held her own, aided by divisions amongst her Reforms in the Army. enemies, by timely concessions here and there, and by her veteran army. About this time the army was reorganized. Until now, by an arrangement which was attributed to King Servius, the legion had consisted of five ranks, each marshalled in unbroken line and armed in various ways. The legion was now divided into three lines, all armed with the long pike (*hasta*), and each line again was divided into companies or maniples (*manipuli*). The resultant advantage was that the whole force was able to manœuvre with equal ease whether in one mass or by companies; its more open arrangement made it better able to deal with any attacking force whether of horse or foot; and the three lines could relieve one another without interrupting the course of an engagement.

§ 88. From its formation as a political union in 494 B.C. the Latin League had extended its limits, garrisoned its conquests, and provided for the surplus population of its cities by means of colonies planted in subjugated territory. These colonies (*Coloniae Latinae*) were joint foundations of Rome and the Latins, and were full members of the confederacy to which they owed their origin. Most of these colonies (including Signia, Cora, Norba, Suessa Pometia) had been founded in Volscian territory. In 385 B.C. the League by the foundation of Satricum firmly established its power among the Volscians. But Satricum was the last of the old style of Latin colony. Now that the League was disaffected and its members ripe for revolt, it was to Rome's interest that no new colonies, whose resources might make the revolt more formidable, should be admitted. Accordingly, all colonies founded after 385 B.C. were excluded from the confederacy and from all share in the festival on the Alban Mount which formed the religious basis of the League. Moreover, all colonies subsequent to this date were allowed rights of private law (*ius commercii* and *ius conubii*) with Rome only, not with one another or with members of the Latin League. At the same time the members of the Latin League were forbidden to make alliances with one another. Sutrium and Nepete (383 B.C.) were the first of the new style of Latin colony. They were founded for the purpose of garrisoning the Roman frontier in Etruria, which was now formed by the Ciminian forest. This new policy was not likely to conciliate the Latins, and in 382 B.C. we find Praeneste in open collision with Rome. Rome now determined to strengthen herself by a reversion to her old policy of incorporation; accordingly, in 381 B.C. she com-

peled Tusculum, one of the disaffected states, to give up her independence and accept Roman citizenship without voting rights (*civitas sine suffragio*). Tusculum was thus the first *municipium* (§ 97).¹

Tusculum becomes a *municipium*.

§ 89. Next Tibur joined the ranks of the discontented, and the men of Tibur and Praeneste, possibly the Latins at large, called in to their aid those very Gauls who had lately ravaged Rome and

The Latins in alliance with the Gauls.

Latium alike. In 363 B.C. the Hernicans took up arms, and being defeated appealed to a fresh Gallic host which was moving upon Campania. The dictator Pennus routed them (361 B.C.), and in this battle (so legend said) T. Manlius won his surname of Torquatus, because he slew a giant champion of their host, and despoiled him of his golden collar (*torques*). In 360 B.C. the Gauls returned again, united with the men of Tibur and the Hernicans, and were only driven off in a battle before the very gates of Rome. Thereafter the Hernicans submitted (358 B.C.). In the same year the bulk of the

Revolt of the Hernicans.

Latins also made peace, and renewed the Latin League, ancient league with Rome, but on terms less

Renewal of the Latin League, 358 B.C.

favourable to themselves: Rome was resolved to be supreme in Latium, and from their old position of equal allies the Latins now sank into that of subjects. The fortress-cities of Tibur and Praeneste, however, held out for five years longer: it was impossible to capture positions so strong, and Rome might be thankful when, in 354 B.C., they made separate treaties of alliance with Rome, by which they acknowledged her as their suzerain.

¹ Livy says that citizenship (*civitas*) was given to Tusculum. But other authorities describe Tusculum as a *municipium*, and it seems probable that Livy here means *civitas sine suffragio*.

§ 90. In 356 B.C. war broke out with Tarquinii, brought about perhaps by the encroachments of the new tribesmen and colonists in southern Etruria. Tarquinii and Caere. Even Caere, so long Rome's faithful ally, threw in her lot with Tarquinii (353 B.C.); but the conclusion of the war with the Latin cities had now left Rome free to act with decision: Caere was easily humbled (353 B.C.), and paid for her fault by exchanging her liberty for a position similar to that of Tusculum. She was incorporated with Rome, and her citizens became *cives sine suffragio* (§ 97). In the case of Tusculum and Caere alike Rome was aiming at strength and expansion by means of a policy of absorption or incorporation as distinguished from that of alliance. A truce of two years was made with Falerii and Tarquinii. The struggle with the Volscians had ceased to be of great moment when the Latins and Hernicans returned to their allegiance, Rome makes alliance with the Samnites. the rather as the Samnites were now pressing hard upon that people from the side of Campania. In 358 B.C. were formed two new tribes (so that now there were twenty-seven) in the Pomptine lands, a measure which at once drove to arms the town of Privernum, whose safety it threatened. One campaign sufficed to reduce the Privernates, and the senate virtually put the Volscians *hors de combat* when in 354 B.C. an alliance was concluded between Rome and the Samnites. When six years later (349 B.C.) the Gauls made their final appearance in Latium and wintered upon the Alban Hills, the dictator Lucius Camillus, son of the hero of Veii, was able to rout them easily and finally. It was in this fight that M. Valerius won his name of Corvus, because (said the legend) while doing single combat with a Gallic champion, he was aided by a raven, which flapped and

buffeted the barbarian's face, and so put him at the Roman's mercy.

§ 91. The Romans heard no more of the Gauls for some time. The Latins, however, were discontented with the position of inferiority into which they had been thrust in 358 B.C. (§ 89). They were preparing to make a fierce struggle against Roman rule, and the threatened defection of Antium (346 B.C.), and the actual revolt and punishment of Satricum in the same year, were but shadows of the coming trouble. But Rome was watchful, and only profited by these futile and sporadic outbreaks, as when in 345 B.C. she wrested from the Volscians the strong fortress of Sora commanding the Samnite frontier, upon the upper waters of the Liris (*Garigliano*), and reduced the Volscians and Auruncans again to peace. She had now pushed her frontiers to the borders of Samnium, and it was to no one's surprise that in 343 B.C. the Samnites came into collision with the legions.

§ 92. Long before history begins, the Oscans had broken off from the Sabines, the parent stock of the The Samnites
in Campania. Osco-Sabellian races, and had settled in Samnium, where, under the name of Samnites, they grew to be a distinct nation. In very early times Oscans from Samnium passed down the river Volturnus into Campania. Here they settled, and by about 700 B.C. had succumbed to the civilisation of the Greeks and the Etruscans, and had become enervated and unwarlike. About 450 B.C. new waves of Samnite Oscans poured down upon Campania, reduced their kinsmen to subjection, drove out the Etruscans from Capua (424 B.C.) and even captured the great Greek colony of Cumae (420 B.C.). These later Oscan conquerors became, like their kinsmen who had preceded

them, denationalised and degenerate under the influence of Greek culture and Etruscan fashions; they forgot their country and their people, and appear in 345 B.C. merely as the aristocratic or dominant element in the mixed population of Campania. They now cast apprehensive glances towards the hills among which dwelt their parent stock, and being unable themselves to make a serious stand against the attacks they saw to be impending, were prepared to call in alien nations as champions against their own kinsmen.

These kinsmen—the sturdy Samnites of the mountains—occupied the district which has Mount Matese as its centre. They formed four cantons, of which the Pentri and Caudini were by far the most important. The Pentri lived north of Mount Tifernus (Mount Matese), near the upper valley of the Volturnus (*Volturno*). The Caudini lived south-west and south of Mount Tifernus, along the Volturnus and its tributary the Calor (*Calore*). The chief towns of the Pentri were Bovianum, Saepinum, and Aesernia, of the Caudini, Beneventum and Telesia.

§ 93. Some miles north-west of Capua lay Teanum (*Teano*), the capital of the Oscan clan of Sidicini, which ranked on every ground of interest and policy as a Campanian town. For fifty years past the Samnites had harassed alike the Volscians and the Campanians, and when Rome entered into the alliance of 354 B.C. she had doubtless given the Samnites tacit permission to wrest from the Volscians whatever they could. Now the senate saw a new danger: the advance of the Samnites would replace the helpless Volscians by an energetic and warlike people. The Sidicini, powerless against the Samnites, had in vain called to their aid the Campanians of Capua (*S. Maria di Capoa*): the Samnites had occupied Mt. Tifata (*Monte di Maddaloni*) and were keeping Teanum

First Samnite
War, 343 B.C.
Its Cause.

and Capua alike in a state of siege. At this juncture came envoys from Capua seeking Roman aid, and the senate gladly gave it.

Now at Capua, as at Rome, there was violent party feeling: on the one hand was the patriciate, the The Equites Campani. so-called Campanian Knights (*Equites Campani*), who had stepped into a position very similar to that of the Etruscan Lucumons, and governed as a privileged aristocracy; on the other hand were the commons, a mixed population with a preponderance of Samnite blood, who had little or no share in the government. The latter represented the patriotic party, which was aware that Roman interference would sooner or later mean Roman dominion. The Knights' policy was simply to secure their own position, and they knew that they could purchase support from Rome by the betrayal of Capua. Their plan succeeded: the Roman senate, aristocratic itself, was always ready to support aristocrats, and only wanted an excuse for interference; the consul, M. Valerius Corvus, hurried south and relieved Teanum, and the Knights seem, despite the murmurs of the commons, to have put Capua into his hands (343 B.C.). The Samnites, according to the narrative of Livy, gave battle at Mt. Gaurus, a few miles north of Cumae, and again at Suessula (*Maddaloni*), but being defeated in each case they withdrew to their hills, while the Romans passed the winter in Campania (343 B.C.).

At this point a violent mutiny of the troops interrupted the course of conquest. Large numbers were dismissed for insubordination, but the mischief spread. Early in 342 B.C. Campania was evacuated, either voluntarily or because the discontented commons of Capua were too strong for the combination of their nobility with the remnant of Corvus'

mutinous army, and a new treaty of alliance was made between Rome and the Samnites.

§ 94. But the retreat of the Romans, and their seeming desertion of the interests of their allies, whether Sidicini, Campanians, or Latins, roused fresh anger amongst those peoples, who forthwith made war upon the Samnites on their own account. The latter appealed to Rome to protect them from her over-zealous allies. But things had gone too far : Rome felt that her control over the Latins was lost, and she said so. A few weeks later the Latin League formally demanded the full Roman franchise : it was of course refused, and thereupon the Latins, in alliance with the Volscians, Auruncans, Sidicini, and the mass of the Campanians, declared war on Rome. All the old grievances were now made weightier still by reason of Rome's appropriation of the Pomptine lands and her recent advance upon the Liris. It was a national war of independence for all the peoples from the Alban Hills to Vesuvius.

The Great
Latin War.
Its Causes.

But the senate's foresight in renewing its alliance with the Samnites checkmated the Latins, for it put at Rome's disposal more or less actively the whole of the Sabellian tribes from the Marsi southward to the Caudini. Moreover, now as always, her enemies were themselves divided : the Campanian Knights of course sided with Rome, albeit they could do little against the national feeling of the commons ; but when Fundi (*Fondi*) and Formiæ (*Formia*) among the Auruncans declared themselves neutral, when several Latin towns did the same, when some Latin cities such as Laurentum and Ardea took the side of Rome, the confederates began to realize their weakness. Nevertheless they were hardly prepared for the calculated boldness wherewith, early in

Value of the
Samnite
Alliance.

341 B.C., two consular armies traversed the country of the Aequi and Marsi, united with the Samnites, and by descending at once into Campania, drew from Rome towards the south the whole forces of the confederates. This stroke of generalship virtually decided the war. The combined

Battle of
Vesuvius,
340 B.C.

Latin and Campanian armies gave battle upon the rivulet Vesperis at the foot of Vesuvius, and were routed despite their valour with fearful loss by the consuls T. Manlius Imperiosus and P. Decius Mus. A second battle at Trifanum, near Minturnae, had the same result, and thereafter the war resolved itself into a series of sieges in which the fortresses of the allies, among them Pedom and Antium, fell in detail. In 338 B.C. the war was ended by the surrender of the remaining towns, and the famous Latin League came to an end.

§ 95. In connection with this war a famous legend may be related. While the Roman and Latin armies lay encamped over against each other, the consuls ordered that none should venture to do single combat with any of the foe, for they feared that the legions might refuse to fight against their ancient Latin comrades. Now T. Manlius, son of the consul, was captain of a troop of horse; and as he rode near to the enemy's lines there came upon the rampart one Geminus Mettius, of Tusculum, and challenged him to battle. And young Manlius forgot his father's bidding, and did battle, and slew Mettius; but his father was wroth that his son was disobedient, and he bade the lictors bind him and smite off his head.

§ 96. We have seen that Rome had adopted a policy of separate alliance with regard to all Latin colonies founded after 385 B.C. They were to have private rights of citizenship with Rome and with Rome alone, and a separate treaty (*foedus*) was

Roman Policies
of Alliance and
Incorporation.

made between each colony and Rome, defining exactly the relation between the two. We have also seen how Rome gave Tusculum (381 B.C.) and afterwards Caere (353 B.C.) the private without the public rights of citizenship. Thus there emerge two distinct methods, that of incorporation and that of separate alliance, followed by Rome in defining her relations to states which became dependent upon her.

When the Latin rebellion was crushed in 338 B.C. the Latin League was dissolved for ever as a political union, and Rome, in her relations with individual members, proceeded to adopt one or other of the two principles indicated above. Some of the states (such as Lanuvium, Aricia, Pedum, Nomentum) were forced to accept the partial franchise. The rest still retained the private rights of citizenship with Rome; but they were completely isolated from one another, and a separate treaty was made between each state and Rome. These cities (the chief of which were Tibur and Praeneste) were thus relegated to the position of the Latin colonies founded after 385 B.C. As all these states had a separate treaty with Rome, they were called *civitates foederatae*, and as they were bound to help her in war, they were called *socii*. As the power of Rome advanced beyond the bounds of Latium, she adopted the principle of separate alliance with nearly all the states which submitted to her, thus forming a military confederacy with herself at the head. Thus the class of *civitates foederatae* or *socii* became greatly extended. But all Latin colonies, together with such of the old Latin towns as were bound in 338 B.C. by separate treaties with Rome, were distinguished from the other *civitates foederatae* by the possession of the civic rights which they retained with Rome though not with one another. These privileges were known collectively as

Settlement of
Latium, 338 B.C.

Military
League founded
by Rome.

ius Latii (the Right of Latium) or *Latinitas*, and communities possessing it were called *nomen Latinum* (the Latin name) or simply *Latini* (Latins). The Latins must be distinguished not only from the other *civitates foederatae* or *socii*, but also from those states which, in pursuance of the policy of incorporation, received the partial franchise, and so became *civitates sine suffragio*. It is true that both the latter and the states with *ius Latii* had certain citizen rights with regard to Rome; but these rights were not the same in both cases, as will be seen in the next section. Moreover the Latins, as allies, were not, like the partial citizens, subject to control by Roman magistrates. In 338 B.C., on the dissolution of the Latin League, six Volscian and Campanian towns (Fundi, Formiae, Cumae, Capua, Calatia, Atella) also received the *civitas sine suffragio*. From this period the number both of *socii* and of partial citizens constantly increased with the advance of Rome, until by 250 B.C. the whole of Italy consisted either of citizens (full or partial) or allies of Rome, according as the policy of incorporation or that of alliance had been followed. It will be convenient to describe in outline the rights, privileges, burdens, etc., of the two classes and their sub-divisions as they existed about this date.

§ 97. The citizens (*cives*) of Rome were divided into

two classes, full citizens (*cives optimo iure*) and citizens who had not the right to exercise the Roman franchise (*cives sine suffragio*).

The rights possessed by full citizens have already been described (§ 43). Full burghers of Rome consisted of (a) the inhabitants of Rome and its neighbourhood and those citizens who occupied the *ager publicus*, (b) the burgesses of communities which had been wholly ab-

sorbed in the Roman state,¹ (c) citizens who were settled in conquered land in burgess-colonies (*coloniae Romanae*) established on the coast of Italy for the maintenance of Roman supremacy (§ 106). All Full Citizens. communities of full citizens outside Rome were equally with Rome itself subject to the jurisdiction of the Roman praetor, who tried some cases himself, while he left others to delegates called *praefecti iuri dicundo*.

The non-voting or passive citizens (*cives sine suffragio*) consisted of the burgesses of those towns in whose case the policy of partial incorporation Partial Citizens. as distinguished from that of alliance had been followed. Such citizens possessed the private rights (*ius commercii* and *ius conubii*) of the Roman citizen, but they were not enrolled in the tribes or centuries, and therefore could not come to Rome to vote or be themselves elected to office. In other words, they did not possess the public rights of Roman citizenship. They were liable to the war-tax, and served by the side of full citizens in the legions. They thus exercised the public duties (*munia*) but not the public rights of citizenship, and were therefore called *municipes* ("receivers of burdens"), and each state composed of such citizens was called a *municipium*.² Municipia or Praefecturae. Since all *municipes* had private rights of citizenship, the private law of Rome was administered in every *municipium* by a *praefectus iuri dicundo*, who was in some cases nominated by the praetor, in others elected by the *comitia tributa*. Thus every *municipium* was also known as a *praefectura*. But those states (such as Capua) which had received the partial citizenship as a reward for loyalty

¹ The only clear case is that of Satricum. For Tusculum see § 88.

² After 89 B.C. all the Italians were in possession of full citizenship, and the word thus came to mean a town of full Roman citizens.

were allowed to keep their own town council or senate, their own popular assembly, and even their own judge, corresponding to the Roman praetor. In such cases the praefect sent from Rome would administer justice according to Roman law, and the native judge would administer it according to native law. Thus, in these favoured *municipia* the Roman and native systems of law existed side by side.

On the other hand, those towns (such as Anagnia and Arpinum) which had been forced to accept the *civitas sine suffragio* as a punishment for rebellion had little or no local autonomy. Their native system of law was entirely replaced by the private law of Rome; the praefect sent from Rome was the sole judge and also, in many cases, the sole administrative magistrate.

But by 250 B.C. the towns with full or partial franchise were few in number compared with the federate states. Had the policy of incorporation prevailed over that of alliance, the victors would have become merged with the vanquished, and Rome as a city-state would have ceased to exist. Thus by the middle of the third century B.C. the greater part of Italy formed a military confederacy under the hegemony of Rome. Each state, as it was conquered, made a separate treaty with Rome; and the terms of these treaties varied, since it was to the interest of Rome that the rights accorded to the different members of the League should be graduated. Each city had its own measure of local government; but we must distinguish two broad classes of *civitates foederatae* or *socii*—the Latin federate states and the federate states without Latin rights.¹

¹ These are sometimes called *socii* to distinguish them from the Latins. But the fact that the Latins were *socii* must not be forgotten.

The Latins consisted of many of the old Latin towns and of all Latin colonies (§ 106), *i.e.* colonies The Latin Allies. the members of which received by treaty Latin rights, whether they were originally Roman citizens or not. Latin colonies founded before 268 B.C. (see § 119) had *commercium* and *conubium* with Rome, and their members had the *ius exilii*, or right of acquiring the full rights of a Roman citizen by leaving the colony and taking up their permanent abode in Rome. Colonies founded in and after 268 B.C. had *commercium*, not *conubium*, with Rome, and the *ius exilii* was confined to those who had held office in the colony to which they had belonged. Such were the rights which distinguished the Latin from the non-Latin federate states. All *civitates foederatae* or *socii*, whether Latin or not, had the following rights and duties, Rights and Duties of all Allies. varying in extent according to the terms of each treaty. All had more or less restricted local independence. All had to furnish auxiliary contingents to the Roman army, and ships to the Roman navy. All, owing to their position as allies, were free from direct taxation in money. All were absolutely under the control of Rome in questions of foreign policy.

CHAPTER V.

THE CONQUEST OF ITALY.

§ 98. Advance of Rome towards the South.—§§ 99—104. The second Samnite war.—§§ 105, 106. Roads and Colonies.—§§ 107—109. The third Samnite war.—§ 110. War with the Gauls.—§§ 111—117. The war against Tarentum and Pyrrhus.—§§ 118, 119. Rome, the Mistress of Italy.

§ 98. To strengthen its hold upon Campania and the communications therewith, and at the same
Magna Graecia.
Archidamus of time to fortify the frontier against the Sam-
Sparta. nites, was now the chief object of the senate.

The Samnites saw the process going on before their eyes, but did not interfere: they were occupied with a more immediate struggle in the south, where the Tarentines, hard-pushed by the Messapians and Lucanians, had (338 B.C.) at length called in the aid of the Spartans under King Archidamus. Despite his successes, Archidamus soon became unpopular with the inconstant Greeks, and was deserted and slain; but the Tarentines found another

Alexander of champion in Alexander, King of Epirus, uncle
Epirus. of Alexander the Great of Macedon, whose career of conquest was just commencing (336 B.C.). In 332 B.C. the Epirote army entered Magna Graecia, and overran much of Bruttium and Lucania. While the Samnites only watched his progress, the senate diplomatized: a treaty of alliance was concluded between Rome and

Alexander, but the assassination of the king by a Lucanian rid the Samnites of a formidable enemy, and left them free to give attention to Rome's advance.


There were two lines of communication between Rome and Campania: one, the lower or coast road, afterwards known as the *Via Appia*, passed through Aricia and western Latium to the sea at Anxur (*Tarracina*), and so along the coast by Minturnae (*Traetto*) and Suessa (*Sessa*) as far as Capua; the other, the upper road or *Via Latina*, traversed the Hernican land, passing between Mt. Algidus and the Aequian Hills to Anagnia, and so down the valley of the Trerus and the Liris to Teanum.

Advance of
Rome towards
the South.

In 334 B.C. Rome took advantage of a quarrel with the Sidicini and the people of Cales (*Calvi*) to occupy the latter town with a Latin colony. Two years later Acerrae (*Acerra*) in Campania put itself under Roman protection, and received the *civitas sine suffragio*. But though the Samnites looked on passively, the Volscians were less indifferent: Privernum, chastised already in 358 B.C., once more took up arms for freedom, and was joined in a half-hearted fashion by Fundi, but the revolt was speedily suppressed (330 B.C.). In the next year (329 B.C.) the seaport of Anxur (*Tarracina*), the last stronghold of the Volscian privateers and a chief fortress upon the coast-road into Campania, was occupied by a citizen-colony, and lastly (328 B.C.) Fregellae (*Arce*), the key of the valleys of the Liris and Trerus, through which ran the inland road from Rome to the south, became a Latin colony. When the Samnites at length took up arms it was too late: both roads to Rome were blocked against them, and their own frontiers were commanded by a line of colonies and of subject-towns which could each be garrisoned with ease.

MAP TO ILLUSTRATE THE SAMNITE WARS

Roman Miles
0 10 20 30



Military Colonies shown thus ★
Military Roads

§ 99. In its days of power the Greek town of Cumae had founded amongst others the two colonies of Palaeopolis and Neapolis, both on the site of the present great city of Naples. Here, as in every other town of Campania, there were two rival parties: the one, the democratic patriots, saw with misgivings Rome's advance into Campania; the other, the aristocracy, favoured it. The patriots of Palaeopolis attacked the subjects of Rome in Capua and elsewhere, and when Rome threatened hostilities they called in a garrison of Samnites. Whereupon Rome declared war upon the Samnites at large, and Q. Publilius Philo, one of the consuls, laid siege to Palaeopolis (327 B.C.).

The Second
Samnite War,
327 B.C.
Its Cause.

The war opened in 326 B.C. Rome was well prepared: besides her colonies on the Campanian frontier and in the Liris valley, she could reckon on the aristocratic party throughout Campania. Moreover, she had secured the alliance or neutrality of the northern Sabellians, the Marsi and Paeligni, through whose lands she could throw armies into Apulia, and the Apulians were the hereditary enemies of the Samnites. Her only anxiety in attacking the Greeks of Palaeopolis had been as to the attitude of Tarentum and the southern Greeks; but though the Tarentines fumed they took no active measures, for Rome had won over the Lucanians, who kept the Tarentines engaged at home. Within a few months indeed the Tarentines persuaded the Lucanians that their best policy was to support the Samnites against the common enemy; but by that time Palaeopolis had fallen into Philo's hands (326 B.C.), and with it all the other Campanian Greeks had gone over to Rome. On the other hand, the Samnites had no reliable allies, for they got little help from the democrats of Campania and the

The Resources
of Rome and
Samnium.

weak tribes of Vestini and Frentani. They were practically alone in the struggle, and their greatest strength was in the difficult and well-nigh impassable nature of their mountainous country.

§ 100. The war was commenced by the simultaneous advance of three consular armies of two legions each upon Samnium. One consul entered Apulia and advanced from the east; the other moved southward from the Liris valley; the third was that of Publilius Philo, consul of the preceding year, who made his attack from Palaeopolis and the west.

Philo's retention of command marks a new era in Roman military development. Heretofore the old constitutional doctrine that no military command should extend beyond one year had been strictly adhered to. The rule was necessary for liberty, for it prevented any one man from acquiring a dangerous power; but it was also ill-advised, as it entailed the dismissal of each general as soon as he had gained experience in any particular war and formed a definite plan of campaign, replacing him by another who must of necessity waste some time in realizing his true position, the nature of his enemy's resources and movements, and the value of his own army. But henceforth when occasion demanded, the consul of one year was continued in command with the title of Proconsul.

§ 101. We have little reliable information as to the course of the war. The triple attack of 326 B.C. was not repeated in the following years (325—323 B.C.), because Rome was occupied with troubles nearer home, and the Samnites for their part busied themselves with Apulia and the Vestini. The Romans, however, reduced the Vestini and

Military Re-
form. The
Proconsulate.

Renewed
Troubles in
Latium,
324 B.C.

Frentani, and so secured the road into Apulia at least as far as the frontiers of that country. Whether Samnite intrigues had anything to do with the troubles which broke out in Latium (324 B.C.) is uncertain: the important towns of Velitrae and Privernum took advantage of the war with which Rome was now busy to demand the full citizenship on threat of revolt. A Latin war at this juncture would entail the recall of all Roman forces, and would leave the Samnites free to occupy Campania, for the example of the Latins would certainly be followed by other subject-towns. Rome dared not refuse: she agreed that the three communities should be enrolled as full *cives*, and subsequently two new tribes were formed.

In 321 B.C. the consuls T. Veturius and Spurius Postumius, while commanding in Campania, received intelligence that the whole force of the Samnites was attacking Luceria (*Lucera*), the key to Apulia. To save the place they resolved to march straight across Samnium. The only practicable route led from Nola (*Nola*) past Calatia to Beneventum (*Benevento*), the capital of the Caudini. Its whole course was flanked by forests and mountains, and at a point between the modern villages of Arpaia and Montesarchio it traverses a narrow swamp surrounded by a complete amphitheatre of hills. Having crossed this, the consuls found the eastern outlet occupied by a Samnite force. To force the pass was impossible, and when they retraced their route to the western inlet, they found this also occupied. A desperate battle failed to dislodge the Samnites, and to save the remnant of their army the consuls capitulated and took oath that there should be peace. Thereupon they were permitted to retreat under the yoke, leaving six hundred knights as hostages in the enemy's hands. Such was the

The Disaster
of Furculae
Caudinae,
321 B.C.

famous disaster of the Caudine Forks (*Furculæ Caudinæ*). The Samnite who wrought it was C. Pontius of Telesia (*Telese*).

Great was the alarm and anger at Rome. The senate refused to acknowledge the peace sworn by its generals under fear of death. The oath it could not revoke, and as a salve to its conscience the two consuls were formally surrendered to the Samnites to deal with as they chose. C. Pontius, upbraiding the senate for its faithlessness, sent them back unharmed.

§ 102. But though the troops were saved, Roman prestige had suffered a terrible blow, to remove the effects of which required a struggle of six years (321—
The Samnites occupy Campania. 315 B.C.). Luceria was lost, and with it most of Apulia; throughout Campania the patriots bestirred themselves, and practically the whole of that country fell into the hands of the Samnites. The danger was intensified by the revolt of Fregellæ and the Latin colony of Satricum, which commanded the two roads into Campania. Satricum was soon recovered, and in 318 B.C. the discontent of the Latins and Volscians was calmed by the enrolment of large numbers of the inhabitants in two new tribes, an act which conceded to them the full Roman franchise. But further desultory campaigns were needful in Campania, and to fill up the gap in the records the Roman historians said that the Samnites asked for a truce. Nothing of the sort occurred, for they were actively engaged in the effort to drive the Romans out of Campania, and to close against them both roads to the south. In the year 315 B.C. the dictator Q. Fabius Rullianus assailed the Samnite fortress of Saticula. A fierce battle resulted in his falling back to the very borders of Campania, and there at Lautulæ, near the mouth of the Liris, he was completely

defeated. Thereupon the Samnites occupied the fortresses of Nuceria (*Nocera*) and Nola, and overran all southern Campania. Moreover, Capua again threatened to revolt.

This was the crisis of the war, which from this point began steadily to go in Rome's favour. A vigorous effort reopened the Liris valley by the recapture of Sora and Fregellae (314 B.C.).

Rome recovers
Campania,
312 B.C.

Capua was again strengthened and Nola recovered. Roman colonies were planted at Suessa Aurunca to guard the coast-road and at the Insulae Pontiae (*Ponza*) off the Latin and Campanian coasts; others at Calatia (near *Caserta*) between Capua and Nola, and even within the Samnite territories at Saticula (*S. Agata*). By the close of 312 B.C. the continuous line of fortresses was connected into one strategic whole by the reconstruction of the existing roads across Latium and along the coast, which were now united in the great military road known as the *Via Appia*, because undertaken under the censorship of Appius Claudius Caecus. Rome's grip upon Campania and the intervening lands had never been so firm as now, while Apulia was secured by the recovery of Luceria, to which half a legion of soldiers was sent as a permanent garrison.

§ 103. Foiled in Campania, and hemmed in on all sides, even in Apulia, by Roman colonies and fortresses, the Samnites changed their tactics, and their suggestions to revolt found a ready response in the rising of Etruria and of many of the Umbrians against Rome (311 B.C.). Fabius Rullianus hurried across the Tiber, passed the Etruscan army which was besieging Sutrium, and by descending from the Mons Ciminus upon the plain of central Etruria, compelled it to return for the defence of its own land. He is said to have gained a great victory, and to have repeated this achievement in the

The Rising
of Etruria,
311 B.C.

following year (310 B.C.), when he defeated Etruria's largest army at Lake Vadimo (*Laghetto di Bassano*). At any rate he had the credit of being the first to lead a Roman army beyond the Ciminian Forest. In 309 B.C. he penetrated as far as Perugia (*Perugia*), and compelled the bulk of the Etruscans to sue for peace. But unawed by Etruria's disasters, a host of Umbrians moved towards the Tiber valley in the same year. The movement was neither organized nor national, and Rullianus ventured to strike up the Tiber into the heart of the disturbed country. At Mevania (*Bevagna*) on the Clitumnus (*Clitumno*) he won a victory which ended the war with Umbria (308

War with
Umbria,
308 B.C.

B.C.), while Decius Mus completed the subjugation of Etruria. In the meantime the Samnites had been active, for their hopes depended upon

Rome's presumed inability to meet a simultaneous attack from opposite quarters. In 310 B.C. the consul C. Marcius Rutilus all but repeated the disaster of the Caudine Forks, and was only rescued by the appointment of Rome's best general, Papirius Cursor, as dictator; but we hear of no other successes of the Samnites, and in 308 B.C. they were finally ousted from Campania. The double attack had failed utterly, and the value of the Roman system of colonization had been splendidly vindicated.

§ 104. Disappointed in Etruria and Umbria, the Samnites

War with
the Marsi,
307 B.C.

now turned to the northern Sabellians for aid, and during the year 307 B.C. the Romans were engaged in hostilities against the Marsi and

Paeligni, which ended in the complete restoration of their neutrality. Probably the Romanizing party in those quarters was strong enough to paralyze any attempt at a national rising. In any case, the appeal of the Samnites came too late, for their brethren were not likely to join a manifestly falling

cause. The Hernicans were less prudent: taking no warning from the fate of others, several of their towns revolted openly in 306 B.C., and at once the Samnites in one last effort hurried towards the Liris and captured Sora and Arpinum (*Arpino*). But they had Fregellae and its fellow-colonies in their rear, and on reaching the Hernican country they learnt that the capital Anagnia had been taken by the Romans and that the three towns next in importance, Aletrium (*Alatri*), Ferentinum (*Ferentino*), and Verulae (*Veroli*), remained loyal to Rome. In the face of such lack of union the rising was doomed to failure from the first, and the Samnites were compelled to retire. The rebel Hernicans were, of course, mercilessly chastised, the remnant receiving the *civitas sine suffragio*, while the three towns whose treason to their nation had caused the failure of this last effort kept their liberty.

Revolt of
the Hernici,
306 B.C.

This was the last struggle of the Samnites. In the next year (305 B.C.) they were driven out of Sora and Arpinum, forced back beyond the Vulturnus, and saw Bovianum, the chief town of the Pentri, captured by the legions. They had tried all means, and all had failed, and they had no longer strength to continue the war. In 304 B.C. Rome granted to them peace on the old terms, that is, an equal alliance. Such a termination to twenty-two years of incessant warfare is the best proof of the valour of the conquered people: Rome was glad to make peace on any honourable terms, and she dared not ask for conditions which she might yet have to enforce with the sword. In the treaty were included the northern Sabellians, viz. the Marsi, Paeligni, Vestini, Marrucini, Frentani, and Piceni; but the question whether Latins or Samnites were to be rulers of Italy was only postponed, not decided.

End of the
War, 305 B.C.

§ 105. Rome knew this, and set herself to prepare the way for its final settlement. Sora became a Latin colony; Arpinum received the *civitas sine suffragio* in 303 B.C., and there was nothing else needed to secure Campania and the Samnite frontier. In the same year (303 B.C.) were completed two new military roads: the first, afterwards the *Via Flaminia*, led due north through southern Etruria to Falerii, and thence across the Tiber and up the valley of the Nar to Nequinum—which became a garrison under the name of Narnia (*Narni*) in 299 B.C.—opening the way across Umbria towards the Adriatic coast, and commanding that gap in the Apennines through which the Gauls had descended upon Latium; the second, afterwards the *Via Valeria*, passed eastward up the Anio valley by Tibur to Carsioli (*Carsoli*) and Alba Fuentia (*Albe*), which became a Latin colony in this year, thus bringing Rome into direct connection with the Marsi and Paeligni. It was probably along the line of this road that her armies had moved into Apulia during the late war, and its construction marks the final disappearance of the Aequians, whose land it traversed on the northern side. They made one last effort at resistance, but their forty feeble villages could not defy the legions, and their pacification was guaranteed when Carsioli also became a Latin colony in 298 B.C. The Marsi also saw too late that their independence was threatened, but Rome had little difficulty in quelling their uprising against the newly-founded fortress at Alba. At once the symbol of Roman conquest and the presage of its extension, the *Via Valeria* had a further value: it formed a means whereby Rome might at any moment sunder the Sabellians on the south of Alba from the peoples on the north, the Piceni, Sabines, Umbrians, Gauls, and Etrurians. It was intended to render impossible

Via Flaminia
and *Via*
Valeria,
303 B.C.

such a joint rising of the Italian peoples as the Samnites had recently, when it was too late, tried to effect.

These great roads, carried in direct line from point to point, by cuttings through hills and by embankments across hollows, so solidly made that they are in many cases used to this day, were a boon

The Roman
Road-system.
Its value.

to all at a time when roads of any sort were few, and especially in a land where other roads are commonly well-nigh impassable. They were, moreover, the complement of the Roman colonies, and it was with this aim that they were first constructed; for they connected one garrison with another throughout Rome's dominions, and furnished direct routes for the instant despatch of troops to any point, as far transcending the means of transmission in any other known country of the time as the railways of to-day transcend the roads. At every point of vantage for attack or of weakness for defence was stationed a colony, a "watch-tower" of the State and a "model" of Rome herself, forming a centre from which the manners, speech, and laws of Rome spread insensibly throughout the whole country. This was but an indirect result of their foundation, which was in intention solely strategic. The narrative of this chapter has shown how and why they were founded, and has furnished proof of their utility.

The System of
Colonization.

106. The colonies were of two classes, Roman and Latin. Each was so far a model of Rome in that it was organized upon the Roman plan of government by senate, popular assembly, and yearly magistrates; but whereas the members of a Roman colony enjoyed the same full franchise which they had possessed in Rome, those of a Latin colony were without the *ius suffragii* and the *ius honorum*, and had only the *ius commercii*

Colonies,
Roman and
Latin.

and occasionally the *ius conubii*. Roman colonies were formed, with few exceptions, upon the coast, while Latin colonies were sent usually into the interior; and lest the extension of the full franchise should be too rapid, the colonists in the former case were few in number, and the Roman colonies themselves not many. Of Latin colonies there were two classes, according as they were founded before or after the Latin war, 338 B.C.: the former were situate within the limits of Latium itself, and included many old Latins; the latter lay beyond its limits. Whatever the nature of the foundation, the original occupants of the town and district forfeited so much of their land as was needed to provide allotments for the colonists, and retained the rest as subjects, originally without legal rights, and when we hear of the revolt of a Latin colony we may generally understand that it was a rising of this lower class against their privileged and alien masters. Length of time assimilated one class to the other, and eventually made both to become one. For a Roman to take part in a Latin colony was legally a degradation, since he lost his public rights; but the offer of lands and the prospect of attaining to eminence in their new home tempted many to accept the change, despite the burden of garrison-duty, which was the primary function of every colonist.

In conclusion, the colonies, each a miniature Rome set down in an enemy's land, guarded the frontiers, advancing as conquest advanced and serving as cities of refuge to all loyal to Rome. They were fortresses which an enemy rarely assailed with success, while he dared not, if he could, pass on and leave them to fall upon his rear or block his retreat. Had the Samnites secured their conquests in the same way, the course of their struggle with Rome might have had a very different issue.

§ 107. Thus at the commencement of the third century B.C. the Roman state was beyond question the most securely organized in Italy. Its frontier was now protected by a continuous line of colonies, such as Cales (*Calvi*), Suessa (*Sessa*), Interamna (*Teramo*), Fregellae (*Arce*), Sora (*Sora*), Alba (*Albe*), and Carsoli (*Carsoli*), rendering it impossible for an enemy to cross the boundary of the Liris (*Garigliano*) and the Anio (*Teverone, Aniene*); while the Ciminian range in Etruria was commanded by the strongholds of Sutrium (*Sutri*) and Nepete (*Nepi*). The one gap in the line, that formed by the valley of the Tiber, had been secured (§ 105) in 299 B.C., when the Romans, prompted by the rumours of fresh movements amongst the Gauls, colonized Narnia (*Narni*), a strong position defended by lofty rocks and the river Nar (*Nera*).

The Roman
Territory,
300 B.C.

The surrounding nations looked on sullenly at the steady improvement of the Roman position. In particular the Samnites would not rest. They resolved, before it was too late, to make a last effort to overthrow their adversary, and their emissaries were active throughout Italy in seeking new allies and striving to revive once again the recent short-lived coalition against Rome. In the year 298 B.C. the anti-Roman party in Lucania got the upper hand, and invited their Samnite brethren to send an armed force to their assistance. The Samnites had in the late war learnt the value of the support of Lucania, and readily responded to the appeal, but before anything could be effected the Romans appeared upon the scene and compelled the Lucanians to give hostages as an assurance of fidelity. But the mischief was done: the Samnites had already declared war, and the nations of northern Italy, Etruscans and Umbrians, were slowly arming for the struggle. As usual there was no joint action

The Third
Samnite War,
298—290 B.C.

amongst the discontented peoples, and the Samnites found themselves left virtually alone. In 297 B.C. the consuls Fabius Rullianus and P. Decius were able to overrun Samnium, wasting it pitilessly and twice defeating the enemy, now led by Gellius Egnatius, at Tifernum and at Maleventum (*Benevento*). But Gellius would not despair. In the spring of 296 B.C. he contrived to equip three armies, of which one remained in Samnium, the second descended upon Campania, while the third marched without hindrance across the Abruzzi northward into Etruria. The policy of such a course was as wise as bold: it would distract the attention of the Romans, preventing them from concentrating their whole force at any one point, and it would overcome the hesitation of Umbrians and Etruscans. The national party in the Etruscan cities viewed with dislike the Romanizing policy of their aristocratic rulers; the Umbrians were disquieted by the recent colonization of Narnia; the Gauls were astir for booty. Could all these elements of discontent in the north only be united with those in the south, there was still hope of a successful fight against Roman ambition.

§ 108. Nevertheless, with the exception of some engage-

Battle of
Sentinum,
295 B.C.

ments in Campania, where C. Pontius once more captained the Samnites, the year 296 B.C. passed quietly away in further preparations for the struggle. In the spring of the following year, however, two great Roman armies amounting to 60,000 men marched into Etruria. At their head were the consuls Q. Fabius Maximus Rullianus, the hero of so many battles, and P. Decius Mus, son of him who had laid down his life at the battle by Vesuvius nearly fifty years before. The allies—Samnites, Etruscans, Umbrians, and Gauls—had gathered in Umbria, and thither through the gap in the Apennine

range the consuls directed their march, throwing off a corps under Scipio Barbatus to penetrate into central Etruria. As had been foreseen, this measure, though the corps itself was cut to pieces near Camerinum (*Camerino*), caused the Etruscans to desert their allies and withdraw for the protection of their own country. The rest of the confederates awaited the Roman attack at Sentinum (*Sentino*), between the Apennines and the Upper Sea. Here for the first time in history the Romans met the Gallic war-chariots. For long the issue remained doubtful—so doubtful that Decius Mus devoted himself to death as his father had done before him—but the good generalship of Fabius at length prevailed. Nine thousand Romans remained indeed upon the field of battle, but the victory was complete (295 B.C.). The Etruscans and Umbrians at once submitted.

§ 109. The Samnites continued the struggle for some years longer. Though unable to secure help from any of their old allies, they fought on in their mountain fastnesses, even at times gaining notable victories, as at Luceria (294 B.C.); but at Aquilonia (*Lacedogna*) they sustained (293 B.C.) a defeat so bloody that thenceforward they could scarcely raise forces for the war. In 290 B.C. they concluded peace: the old treaty of alliance was renewed, and no humiliating terms were imposed by the victors; no attempt was made to enslave the vanquished, no Roman colony was established within the limits of Samnium, nor were the Samnites deprived of any portion of their territory. But their spirit had been broken, their numbers and resources exhausted, by a struggle of seventy years, and henceforth they only ventured on hostilities with Rome after securing the co-operation of some powerful ally. The man who finally triumphed as their conqueror was M'. Curius Dentatus.

End of the
Third Samnite
War, 290 B.C.

The Romans proceeded to fortify their new position in the usual way. In 291 B.C. colonists to the extraordinary number of 20,000 were sent to Venusia (*Venosa*), which now became the chief Roman outpost in Southern Italy. The strategic importance of the new settlement is manifest: situated on the borders of Apulia, Samnium, and Lucania, it held the Samnites to their allegiance and checked any intrigues they might carry on with the Lucanians, while at the same time it faced towards Tarentum and the other Greek cities of the southern coast, destined to be the next object of Roman attack. The Appian Way was extended from Capua (*S. Maria di Capoa*) as far as Venusia, traversing the very heart of Samnium, and even those Caudine Forks which had once witnessed the ignominious surrender of a Roman army. Two new citizen colonies, Minturnæ (*Traietto*) and Sinuessa (*Mondragone*), had already (295 B.C.) in the course of the war been planted on the Campanian coast. The Sabines had aided the Samnites at Sentinum: over them (290 B.C.) M'. Curius Dentatus triumphed a second time, after overrunning their land as far as the Adriatic. In 289 B.C. they were declared to be *cives sine suffragio*, and a Latin colony was established upon their eastern flank at Hadria (*Adria*) in Picenum.

§ 110. Ten years after their great defeat at Sentinum, the Gauls again entered Etruria at the summons —the last summons—of the national party there and of the Umbrians (285 B.C.), and attacked Arretium (*Arezzo*), an Etruscan city in which the dominant aristocratic party had concluded a treaty of friendship with Rome. A Roman army under L. Caecilius, marching to the relief of the city, was annihilated beneath its walls; and the ambassadors who

Operations
against the
Gauls. Sub-
jugation of
Etruria.

came to negotiate for the restoration of the prisoners were put to death by Britomaris, the Gallic chief. Leaving Etruria to be dealt with later on, the consul Cornelius Dolabella passed by way of Sabina into the land of the Senones, massacred the greater part of the male population, enslaved the women and children, and drove into exile such as were fortunate enough to escape the sword. Henceforth there was no nation of Senones in Italy. They were the people which had once sacked Rome, and this was the retribution. The neighbouring tribe of the Boii, terrified into revolt by the dreadful fate of their kinsmen, at once united with the disaffected Etruscans, and being reinforced by the remnant of the Senones, marched direct upon Rome to retaliate upon her for the barbarities of Dolabella. At Lake Vadimo (*Laghetto di Bassano*) near Narnia they sustained a bloody defeat (283 B.C.), and a subsequent disaster near Populonia (*Populonia*), on the coast of Etruria, forced them to conclude peace (282 B.C.).

283 B.C.

After the expulsion of the Senones, the Romans had to decide whether they should occupy the desolated country—the *Ager Gallicus*—beyond the northern Apennines, a region where they had never yet ventured to make permanent acquisitions. They now determined that their attitude should be one of attack rather than of defence, and in token of their resolve a citizen-colony was established at Sena (*Sinigaglia*), the old Gallic capital of the land. This new outpost, together with the colony of Hadria, gave to the Romans a firm hold on the Upper Sea, where they forthwith stationed a fleet. It was the jealousy with which the Tarentines viewed the rising maritime power of Rome that hastened her inevitable conflict with the remnant of the free cities of Magna Graecia.

§ 111. The Third Samnite war had hardly come to an end when the Romans began to encroach upon those cities. Time had been when the Italian Greeks marched in the van of civilization, but the heyday of their mental culture and material prosperity had long since passed away. Most of their cities—Metapontum (*Torre di Mare*), Heraclea (near *Polichor*), Thurii (*Terranova*), Crotona (*Cotrone*), Locri, Rhegium (*Reggio*)—were but the shadows of what they once had been. Worn out by perpetual conflict with each other, and by the constant assaults of the Lucanian and Calabrian peoples and of the despots of Syracuse, they were, with one brilliant exception, ready to submit with feelings of relief to any power which would guarantee them peace. The one exception was Tarentum (*Taranto*). Placed securely at the head of the gulf to which it gave its name, this city had even now, in the fifth century of its existence, in Italy at least no rival in point of commercial importance. It was still the great emporium of the peninsula, and carried on with the ports of the Adriatic a considerable trade in the produce of its rich fisheries, its woollen fabrics and purple dyes. Its situation was one of great strength, for it lay upon a narrow tongue of land, defended at the seaward extremity by the citadel which crowned a considerable hill; and between this hill and the opposite shore there was but a narrow passage leading into a magnificent harbour for the city's multitude of ships. As in Capua and else where, the citizens of Tarentum were divided into two parties: the wealthier portion was favourable to Rome, while the lower classes generally represented the party of patriotism and independence. The latter, at this moment in possession of the government, viewed with alarm the constant and rapid advance of the Romans. They had held aloof from

The Greek
cities of the
south.

the recent wars, partly deterred by the attitude of Lucania and Apulia, partly from indolence. They had even made a treaty with Rome in 301 B.C.; but now, when all in Italy who might have sided with them were crushed and disabled, they commenced to cast about for allies in Greece.

§ 112. The Lucanians had aided Rome in the recent Samnite wars: in return Rome left them free to deal as they could with the Greek cities of the southern coast. Amongst these was Thurii.

Conflict with
Tarentum,
282 B.C.

Unable to make head against the onset of the Lucanians, the Thurians surrendered their city to Rome, whereupon C. Fabricius Luscinus marched to their relief, defeated Sthenius Statilius the Lucanian general, and placed a garrison in the city (282 B.C.). Not long afterwards Locri, Crotona, and Rhegium fell under Roman influence, so that very shortly Tarentum alone of the Greek cities retained its independence. In 282 B.C. ten Roman vessels, in contravention of an ancient treaty which forbade their appearance east of the Iacintian promontory (*Capo della Colonna*), anchored off Tarentum while on the voyage from the Tyrrhenian to the Adriatic Sea. Possibly they were in agreement with the aristocratic party within, and hoped to take quiet possession of the city; but their presence so exasperated the anti-Roman party that they rushed upon the ships, captured four and sank another; and when L. Postumius arrived in Tarentum at the head of an embassy to demand the release of the prisoners and the surrender of the leaders in the outrage, he was subjected to personal insult. Following this, a Tarentine corps surprised Thurii and expelled the Roman garrison thence. Thereupon the senate declared war, and the Tarentines called in the aid of Pyrrhus, the king of Epirus.

§ 113. From his cradle the life of Pyrrhus had been one

of strange vicissitudes. He lost his father, a kinsman and vassal of Alexander the Great, when yet an infant, and lived for some years in exile under the protection of Glaucias,

an Illyrian chief. At the age of twelve he
Early life of
Pyrrhus.

was restored to his father's dominions, but five years later he was again a fugitive. He took service under Antigonos, one of those who shared amongst them the vast empire of Alexander, but misfortune still dogged his footsteps: Antigonos was defeated and slain at the great battle of Ipsus (301 B.C.), and Pyrrhus found himself a hostage of the Egyptian King Ptolemy in Alexandria. His handsome person and daring courage soon made him popular at the Egyptian court, and Ptolemy not only gave him the hand of his step-daughter, the princess Antigone, but supplied him with Egyptian troops and Egyptian gold wherewith to win back his rugged inheritance of Epirus (296 B.C.). The wild Epirotes welcomed their young prince with enthusiasm, and Pyrrhus easily secured his restoration. Thereafter for many years he showed all the qualities of a brave and politic ruler: the weakness of Macedonia made it possible for him to extend his dominions at her expense; the acquisition of Ambracia (*Arta*) and Corcyra (*Corfu*) opened the sea to the commerce of Epirus; and for a short time in 287 B.C. he was in possession of Macedonia itself. From 287 B.C. to 281 B.C. he lived in comparative quietude, devising plans for the foundation of a great empire which might compare with that of his kinsman Alexander; and when at the latter date the war-party at Tarentum appealed to him for help, he eagerly welcomed this opening for conquest in the west. He dreamed of uniting under his rule the Greeks of Italy and Sicily and their foes the Carthaginians of Africa, and even if he failed in his aims, there is no reason to brand his enterprise as insane or

impracticable. Against all but one of the peoples of the west Pyrrhus was more than capable of holding his own : it was to the peculiar solidity of Roman political organization—a solidity which it was impossible for him to estimate at its true value—that he owed the overthrow of his schemes.

§ 114. Late in 281 B.C. Pyrrhus sent across to Tarentum 3000 troops under Milo, the most able of his generals. Cineas, the philosopher and diplomatist to whom he entrusted the conduct of his

First Italian
Campaign,
280 B.C.

negotiations with foreign states, was already in Italy, and in the spring of 280 B.C. Pyrrhus himself landed with a further force of 25,000 troops. He soon discovered that the hearty co-operation of the Italians as represented by the Tarentines existed mainly in the imagination of the latter, and that the Tarentines themselves were little inclined to render actual service in the field. Stern rule alone could ensure their obedience : the political clubs and all places of amusement were suppressed or closed, and from a gay and luxurious commercial centre Tarentum was transformed into a camp and an arsenal. The Romans on their side did not underrate the powers of their antagonist : they levied a war-loan (*tributum*), and summoned contingents from all their subjects and allies. While T. Coruncanius secured the inaction of Etruria with one army, a second, numbering at least 50,000 men, marched under P. Valerius Laevinus to meet Pyrrhus.

Pyrrhus awaited the attack on the eastern bank of the river Siris (*Sinno*) near Heraclea. The Romans forced the passage of the river, and commenced the battle by a cavalry charge which routed his Thessalian horsemen ; but though their infantry dashed seven times against the Epirote phalanx, it could make no impression on that serried mass of pikemen, and when at length

Battle of
Heraclea.

Pyrrhus brought up his battalion of elephants the legions broke in terror. Leaving 7000 of his troops on the field of battle, the consul retreated across the Siris, and thence fell back upon the strong outpost of Venusia, where he re-organized his forces. Pyrrhus himself suffered considerable loss. The battle is said to have cost him 4000 of his veteran soldiers, and he did not venture to press upon his retreating foes; but whatever the cost, his victory was amply repaid by the results. The Greek cities at once fell away from Rome. A legion of Campanian allies, commissioned by the senate to garrison Rhegium and guard the Straits of Messina, massacred the citizens and seized the town for themselves. At the same time many Bruttians, Lucanians, and Samnites passed over to the winning side. Yet, in spite of all these gains, Pyrrhus was anxious to come to terms with the Romans. No doubt he saw more clearly now than when he entered upon the war, the magnitude of the work he had in hand. If he could by negotiation induce the Romans to recognize the freedom of the Greek cities, still more if he could compel the evacuation of Luceria and Venusia, the Roman advance would be thrust back and a secure basis obtained for further operations against them in the future. With proposals to this effect Cineas proceeded to Rome. His reception was encouraging, and the senate appeared likely to give its assent, but at that moment Appius Claudius, the famous censor of 312 B.C., now aged and blind, delivered so vehement an oration against all concession, as to persuade the hesitating council to continue the struggle without compromise. On the failure of the negotiations, Pyrrhus, who was already in Campania, marched on Rome. He crossed the Liris, seized Fregellae, and pushed on to Anagnia; but when not one town stirred on his behalf, he retraced his steps to

Campania and thence to Tarentum, where he passed the winter. During this year the senate had finally reduced all Etruria to peace. From this time forward there is no further mention of any armed collision with the Etruscans, who rapidly died out and became a memory only.

§ 115. Pyrrhus selected a different region for his second campaign. In 279 B.C., probably hoping to take the great fortress of Venusia, he advanced into Apulia. At Asculum (*Ascoli di Puglia*)

Second Italian
Campaign,
279 B.C.

he met the Romans for the second time. The forces on either side amounted to about 80,000 men, and on this occasion Pyrrhus was assisted by Samnite, Lucanian, and Bruttian levies. The Roman leaders were the consuls Sulpicius Saverrio and P. Decius, son of him who fell at Sentinum. The fight raged for two days: on the first, Pyrrhus was unable to manœuvre his phalanx, which was involved amongst broken ground; but on the morrow he moved it into the plain, and though his main body was unable to obtain any decisive advantage, the onset of the elephants once more gave him the victory. Yet, though the Romans were undoubtedly defeated, we hear of no further operations on the part of Pyrrhus. Whether his apathy was due to the wound he had received in the battle, or to his heavy loss in troops, or to the threat of trouble in his own kingdom of Epirus, certain it is that he left the Romans in possession of Apulia and retired to Tarentum. As he was there passing the winter of 279 B.C., there came Sicilian envoys who offered him the sovereignty of Syracuse. That great city, more than once the mistress of all Sicily, was sore pressed by her inveterate enemy, Carthage. The Carthaginians, whom Agathocles, the late despot of Syracuse, had confined to the western part of the island and to their impregnable fortresses of Panormus

(*Palermo*), Eryx (*Monte S. Giuliano*), and Lilybaeum (*Marsala*), had at the moment of his death (289 B.C.) resumed the offensive, and there occurred one of those transformations so common in the history of Sicily: the Carthaginians overran the whole country as far as the walls of Syracuse, and were at this moment attacking those massive fortifications with their whole energy. In their distress the Syracusans, remembering the ties which bound Pyrrhus to them—for he was now married to the daughter of the dead Agathocles—turned to him for help.

§ 116. Pyrrhus seized with alacrity this opportunity of abandoning his difficult and unprofitable fight in Italy. In spite of the entreaties of the Samnites and Lucanians and the protests of the

Pyrrhus in
Sicily,
278 B.C.

Tarentines, he embarked (278 B.C.) for Syracuse, leaving his lieutenant Milo in command at Tarentum. The aspect of affairs in Sicily changed as though by magic. The mere appearance of Pyrrhus' fleet was sufficient to relieve Syracuse. He himself was welcomed as a saviour by the smaller Greek cities, and with their united aid drove the Carthaginians rapidly westward until all that remained to them was their inexpugnable stronghold of Lilybaeum. The only other enemy in the island with which Pyrrhus had to reckon was Messana, where some Campanian mercenaries of Agathocles had perpetrated an outrage similar to that of their compatriots at Rhegium, massacring the citizens and seizing the town for themselves. To reduce these two places a powerful fleet was necessary, and Pyrrhus was engaged in equipping a great armament in the harbour of Syracuse, when his Sicilian allies, impatient of the arbitrary fashion in which he had overridden their free constitutions, broke out into revolt. The Carthaginians emerged from Lilybaeum, and were again defeated; but this success notwith-

standing, Pyrrhus was embarrassed by the discontent fermenting throughout the island. Changing his plans yet once again, he sailed back to Tarentum (276 B.C.). His embarkation for Italy was the signal for the downfall of his Sicilian kingdom.

§ 117. Meantime in Italy his position had altered greatly for the worse. The Romans had made havoc with the compact line of fortresses which he had occupied along the southern coast: Heraclea, Crotona, and Locri were again in their hands, and Tarentum alone remained intact. The two parties, in fact, were precisely where they had been at the outbreak of the war. But apart from this, Pyrrhus was far less favourably situated now than when he first set foot in Italy: he had held his own indeed against the legions, but he had deserted the allies whom his presence had induced to revolt, he was no better than a discredited adventurer, who had wasted the fruits of two successful campaigns by a wild venture in Sicily. His old servant Cineas was dead, and his faithful Epirote troops were largely replaced by untrustworthy Italian mercenaries whom he had not the means to pay. Still he did not abandon the struggle. He opened his third campaign (275 B.C.) by marching to the aid of the Samnites, whose territory was occupied by the consul M'. Curius. At Beneventum¹ he fought his third and last battle with Rome. His attempt to surprise the Roman position miscarried, the legions held their own, and his elephants, terrified by the Roman archers and by firebrands, wheeled about and charged through the ranks of the army they were intended to protect. His troops dispersed and his camp taken, Pyrrhus had neither

Third Italian
Campaign,
275 B.C.

Battle of
Beneventum.

¹ Then Maleventum. The name was changed to Beneventum on its colonization by the Romans in 268 B.C.

men nor money wherewith to continue the struggle. In the same year he returned to Epirus, leaving Tarentum in charge of Milo with a considerable garrison. His career continued to show the old restlessness. After failing to capture Sparta, he assaulted Argos in the Peloponnese, and in that ancient city a tile cast from a housetop by an old woman ended his eventful life (272 B.C.).

§ 118. On receiving news of his death, Milo gave up Tarentum to the Romans (272 B.C.), and in the same year the Samnites, Lucanians, and Bruttians laid down their arms. In 270 B.C., aided by Hiero, the new ruler of Syracuse, the Romans stormed Rhegium, which had for ten years been held by the Campanian mutineers. They took an exemplary vengeance upon the offenders, putting every surviving member of the garrison to the sword.

The Romans were now undisputed masters of the peninsula. From the *Ager Gallicus* to the Straits of Messina every opponent had been discomfited and disarmed, and Etruscans, Samnites, and Greeks became every year more inclined to bear the supremacy of Rome with patience. Her rule indeed was usually remarkable for its justice and clemency: for though she forbade her subjects to meddle with the mysteries of government, and suffered no interference with her foreign policy, she exacted no tribute, only demanding the equipment and payment of a moderate force to assist her in the field. Throughout Italia—now extending as far northwards as the Arnus (*Arno*) and the Aesis (*Esino*)—she pursued her old policy of favouring the aristocrats at the expense of the popular and patriotic party. In the Etruscan towns, which nominally at least retained their independence, the government was entrusted to aristocracies who were but the nominees and servants of

Rome. Similarly, in Capua the Campanian Knights, who had been mainly instrumental in admitting the Romans to the town (§ 93), were invested with the rights of a privileged class, and even pensioned with funds extorted from their fellow countrymen. But in other respects the subjects of Rome had little ground for complaint: their local self-government, their language and customs, remained intact, and if it performed nothing else, Roman rule at least established peace in lieu of the perpetual conflicts which had hitherto been the bane of Italy.

§ 119. A further series of colonies was sent out by Rome at the conclusion of the war. In 273 B.C. two citizen colonies were established in Lucania, Further Colonies. at Paestum (*Pesto*) on the site of the ancient Poseidonia and at Cosa near Thurii. A Latin colony was sent (268 B.C.) to Beneventum, in the heart of the Samnite land. It was situated on the great Appian Way, which was about the same time prolonged from Venusia to Tarentum and Brundisium. In the same year the whole body of the Sabines, with only a few exceptions such as the inhabitants of Reate (*Rieti*) and Amiternum (*S. Vittorino*), received the full franchise. Five years later (263 B.C.) another Latin colony was founded at Aesernia (*Isernia*), a few miles to the north of Beneventum. Three colonies—Ariminum (*Rimini*, 268 B.C.), Firmum (*Porto Fermo*, 264 B.C.), and Castrum Novum (at the mouth of the *Salinello*, 264 B.C.)—served as outposts against the Gauls. Of these the last alone was a citizen-colony: the two others were Latin, and it is a noteworthy fact that Ariminum did not receive to the full extent the privileges which had hitherto been bestowed on all Latin colonies. Whereas previously the citizen of a Latin colony enjoyed the privilege of free migration to Rome, a citizen of Ariminum could only do so provided

he had held public office in his native town ; and this restriction was henceforward imposed on all new Latin colonies.¹ Now that Rome was mistress of Italy, her citizenship was of great and ever-increasing worth, and she did not intend that its privileges should be too easily acquired.

¹ They were commonly spoken of as the "Twelve Colonies," and their peculiar franchise was known as the *ius Arimini*.

CHAPTER VI.

THE STRUGGLE WITH CARTHAGE.

§ 120. The Phœnicians.—§§ 121—123. Carthage.—§ 124. Cause of the First Punic War.—§ 125. Capture of Messana and Siege of Agrigentum.—§ 126. First Roman Navy ; Battle of Mylae.—§ 127. Ecnomus.—§ 128. Regulus.—§ 129. Battle of Panormus ; Siege of Lilybaeum.—§ 130. Battle of Drepanum.—§ 131. Conclusion of the War.—§§ 133—135. Gallic and Illyrian Wars.—§ 136. The Barcidæ in Spain.—§§ 137—145. The Second Punic War : In Italy.—§ 146. In Sicily.—§ 147. In Spain.—§§ 148—150. In Italy (continued).—§ 151. In Spain (concluded).—§§ 152—154. End of the War.

§ 120. CARTHAGE was a colony of the Phœnicians established, so tradition declared, a century before the foundation of Rome (853 B.C.). The Phœnicians were a Semitic nation who settled about the year 2000 B.C. along the Syrian coast. Their territory, Phœnicia, was a mere belt of coast-land, not more than 180 miles long, and at no point exceeding forty miles in width. The barrier of the Lebanon range protected them to some extent against the powerful nations of the interior, but they never utilized it, as they might have done, to form the bulwark of a national liberty. Content to be tributaries of whatever great power might for the time be in the ascendant, provided that they were free to develop their commerce, they were the first great commercial people of the ancient Mediterranean, and gathered wealth from all its shores and even from the Atlantic. In search of the *murex*, the shell-fish which

furnished them with the famous Tyrian dye, they advanced from one point to another, establishing their factories or marts at every step. They are found even before the year 1000 B.C. in Cyprus, in Rhodes, in Crete, and about all the shores of Greece; and so, still pushing westward, they came to Sicily and to Africa, where in 1140 B.C. they founded their factory of Utica (near *Porto Farina*). A century later they made a settlement at Gades (*Cádiz*), on the coast of that land of Tarshish or Tartessus, whence they brought gold for the temple of Solomon in Jerusalem. Still later (853 B.C.), a body of wealthy citizens emigrated from Tyre to Africa, and founded, a few miles distant from Utica, a city known by its inhabitants as Kirjath-Hadeschath, "The New Town," and by the Romans as Carthago, the famous Carthage. According to Roman legend, the leader of these emigrants was Dido (or Elissa), and their object was to escape from the tyranny of Pygmalion, who had murdered Dido's husband and usurped his throne in Tyre.

§ 121. By this date (850 B.C.) the greatness of Tyre and Phoenicia was rapidly waning. The Phoenician merchants had been driven from the eastern basin of the Mediterranean by the rising power of the Greeks, and elsewhere they were only represented by a few scattered factories, without cohesion and without room for expansion. Carthage, however, was an exception: situated upon the shore of a most fertile land, and commanding the finest harbour on the African coast, she rapidly took the lead amongst the trading cities of the west. Her merchants penetrated even to Britain, to the Baltic, to the Canaries, and to the Cameroons in their quest for trade. She early renounced the national apathy of the old Phoenicians, and set herself to the task of consolidating a great empire in the western basin of the Mediterranean. The

The Growth
of Carthage.

westward advance of the Greeks, who had Hellenized most of the coast of Sicily by the year 600 B.C., received an effectual check. The Etruscans learned that Carthage was more to be desired as an ally than as a foe; and thus, even in 500 B.C., the Carthaginian territory extended eastwards to Barca (*Barca*) and Cyrene (*Ghrennah*), and westward beyond the Pillars of Hercules (*Straits of Gibraltar*). Corsica and Sardinia, the western half of Sicily with its great harbours of Panormus and Lilybaeum, she regarded as her provinces. Malta, and the Lipari and Balearic Isles, were hers; and through Gades and other Phoenician settlements about the coasts of Spain, she had gained a firm foothold in that peninsula. The treatment which the Carthaginians¹ meted out to their African subjects and allies was notorious for its severity. The towns in the neighbourhood of Carthage, many of them old Phoenician factories, were occupied by a half-breed population known as Liby-Phoenicians, the product of the intermarriage of the conquering people with the native Libyans. With one exception, all these—Hippo Regius (*Bona*), Hadrumetum (*Susa*), the Greater Leptis (*Lebda*) and the Lesser, etc.—were forbidden to fortify themselves, and taxed heavily both in men and money. The Lesser Leptis, for instance, paid the extraordinary contribution of a talent a day. The ancient settlement of Utica alone escaped this fate, probably because there the Phoenician element was too strong to allow of any fear of disaffection; and as a rule, whenever Carthage concluded a treaty with a foreign state, she placed Utica upon an honourable equality with herself.

¹ The Romans called the Carthaginians in general *Poeni* (adj. *Punicus*), transferring to them the name which more strictly belonged to the Phoenicians proper. The name *Carthaginienses* properly signified only the actual natives of the town of Carthage.

The country round the immediate possessions of Carthage to the south and west was occupied by Numidians, Mauretanians, and Gaetulians—branches of the native Libyan race—who for the most part acknowledged the Carthaginian supremacy by paying tribute and supplying contingents.

§ 122. Carthaginian citizens furnished only the officers of her armies ; they did not serve in the ranks—a fact not due to any cowardice or lack of enterprise on their part, but simply to the consideration that their lives were too valuable to be thrown away when other material was plentiful. Hence mercenaries were constantly employed ; and they were collected from every available nation, subject or otherwise. The Balearic Isles provided the best of slingers, the Ligurians made an excellent light infantry, the African tribes supplied in inexhaustible numbers the finest light cavalry of the west ; and we hear of Gauls, Etruscans, and even Hellenes in the Carthaginian armaments. From the days of Pyrrhus' invasion of Sicily the Carthaginians, following his example, attached to every army an elephant corps. It was, however, for her navy that Carthage was especially famous : her seamen had no rivals in the west and her vessels of war were counted by hundreds. Yet the weakness of her military system is palpable enough : her mercenary troops, owing to no ties of patriotism, and only to be kept in allegiance by success and the plunder which it brought, were always liable to turn against the masters who had bought their services. The choice of commanders lay with the oligarchic council, and despite the jealousy with which an oligarchy commonly views any extensive military command, the Carthaginian commanders-in-chief were invested with almost dictatorial authority, limited to no fixed term. There were two checks only upon his powers : firstly, he was accompanied by

a civil commission, which exercised at least a moral control over his actions ; and secondly, he knew that culpable failure was likely to meet with terrible requital. More than one unsuccessful leader was nailed to the cross in the heyday of the nation's prosperity. And yet Carthage could and did produce generals both capable and successful—more frequently, it has been said, than did Rome, at least during the years of the struggle between the two nations—despite the biassed choice of oligarchic monopolists, despite the menace of death in the event of misfortune and the unstable and heterogeneous character of the mercenary armies which they led.

§ 123. Our knowledge of the earlier constitution of Carthage is gathered from Aristotle, who says that its stability was something to admire, in- ^{Government.}asmuch as he could find no occasion on which it had been seriously endangered even by attempts of its own members to make themselves despotic rulers. When we first learn anything of the government, a Select Council, consisting of two Suffetes or "Judges" (who acted as presidents, and originally no doubt had possessed regal authority) and twenty-eight ordinary members, had the sole authority. It declared war, made peace, and appointed generals, while the Suffetes acted generally as its Executive, occasionally leading the army in person. The mass of the populace had no privileges and no voice in the government.

But in the nature of things such a constitution could not remain unaltered, particularly in a mercantile state where wealth was every day bringing new men to the front. A council of thirty men, holding their position for life, afforded too few prizes for the ambition of a nobility of merchant-princes at once rich, powerful, and numerous ; the more as the offices of Suffete and Councillor, and con-

sequently those of General and Admiral, had fallen inevitably into the hands of a few families to the exclusion of their fellow-nobles. Accordingly there was formed a second Council of one hundred and four members, commonly known roundly as "The Hundred," who controlled the Select Council just as the latter controlled the Suffetes. Thus the Select Council was gradually superseded and its powers transferred to The Hundred. With The Hundred rested the audit of the actions of Councillors, Suffetes, and Generals alike, while they seem to have purposely avoided office themselves, content to exercise control over others. Thus the constitution of the city was still an oligarchy of the closest kind, although the actual centre of power had shifted to a somewhat larger if not less irresponsible body than the original council. The mass of the people remained as destitute as ever of political rights. In a Greek town the presence of a commercial lower class carried with it the assurance of political disquietude and democratic agitation: it was otherwise with Carthage, whose seafaring multitude retained the old Phœnician indifference to political questions and theoretic freedom.

§ 124. The scene on which Roman and Carthaginian

The First
Punic War,
264-241 B.C.

fought out their first conflict for supremacy was the island of Sicily, which, lying as it does between Europe and Africa, has in all ages been the subject of dissension between the two continents. In 264 B.C. Sicily was in unequal proportions divided between three masters. By far the largest part was in the hands of the Carthaginians, who, as already related (§ 116), had regained their position on the withdrawal of Pyrrhus, and now claimed as their own the great harbour-fortresses of the extreme western coast together with Selinus (*Selinunte*), Heraclea Minoa (upon *Capo Bianco*), and

Aggrigentum (*Girgenti*), once flourishing centres of Greek commerce, learning and magnificence. The eastern shore of the island was under the influence of Syracuse, which after suffering the miseries of anarchy for many years following the death of Agathocles, was now ruled by Hiero, a young and capable general who had won distinction in service against the Mamertines. The latter were masters of Messina, the Sicilian port upon the strait facing the Italian Rhegium. Once the mercenaries of Agathocles, they had some twenty years before (284 B.C.) requited the hospitality of the Messanians by slaying the citizens and distributing amongst themselves their wives, their wealth, and homes. In 265 B.C. they were vigorously besieged by Hiero, and were compelled to look abroad for assistance. They were sure of support from the Carthaginians, for whom the possession of Messina was all-important; on the other hand their sympathies as Italians were with Rome. At first the pro-Roman party gained the upper hand, and offered to surrender the city to Rome in return for aid against Carthage. While the Romans were deliberating, Hiero and the Carthaginians formed an alliance and closely pressed the siege of the city. This caused the party in favour of Carthage to become predominant, and they admitted into the citadel a garrison under the Carthaginian Hanno. In Rome the Senate were slow to decide. On the one hand they shrank from a step which seemed perilous and adventurous; this would be their first extra-Italian war: Hiero was their staunch ally; the morality of an alliance with rebels and malefactors was doubtful. On the other hand, it was necessary to prevent Carthage from commanding the sea-route to Tarentum. The final decision lay with the people, who admitted the Mamertines as *socii* (265 B.C.).

The Cause of
War.

§ 125. In the spring of 264 B.C., when C. Claudius arrived at Rhegium in advance of the main force, he learnt that Messana was already occupied by Carthaginian troops. Nevertheless he at once crossed the straits, and at a public conference with the citizens contrived by a ruse to seize the commandant of the Carthaginian garrison. The captive officer, to secure his freedom, evacuated the citadel, which was promptly secured by the Romans. Soon afterwards, Appius Claudius Caudex, the consul, eluding the Carthaginian fleet, crossed the straits on a dark night, and attacked the Syracusans who lay encamped near the town. Hiero, uncertain of the good faith of his Carthaginian allies, retired towards Syracuse, and left the consul free to throw his whole force upon the Carthaginians, who forthwith raised the siege of Messana.

Capture of
Messana.

The second campaign (263 B.C.) went still more in favour of the Romans. Not merely did they retain Messana, but most of the Greek cities in the island voluntarily opened their gates to them. To crown all, Hiero himself, chagrined at the remissness of his allies, changed his policy and opened negotiations for peace. The terms dictated by the Romans placed at their disposal all the great resources of Syracuse, and for nearly fifty years they found in Hiero a faithful and unwearying friend.

Thus far the Carthaginians had evinced an apathy only explicable upon the supposition that the war had come upon them by surprise and that they were entirely unprepared to meet it. Messana had been in their hands, but they had lost it through the cowardice of their general. With their superiority in ships, they might have prevented the Romans from ever crossing the straits. At least they should have retained the friendship of Hiero. Yet in every instance their cause had been

Siege of
Agrigentum,
262 B.C.

ruined by their lack of energy. In the third campaign they bestirred themselves in earnest. The famous Agrigentum (*Girgenti*)—or, as the Greeks termed it, Acragas—a town situated on a rocky plateau surrounded by steep precipices at about a mile from the southern coast, became their basis of operations, and herein Hannibal the son of Gisco began to reorganize the scattered Punic forces. The Romans at once laid siege to the town. Unskilled in this branch of warfare, their only hope of reducing so impregnable a position lay in blockading and starving out the defenders, while they themselves were liberally supplied with provisions by the energy and fidelity of Hiero. A double line of circumvallation had been drawn round the town, when in the fifth month of the siege a Carthaginian army marched to the relief from Heraclea Minoa (*Capo Bianco*), and encamped in the rear of the besiegers, thus intercepting their supplies. Two months elapsed without a decisive engagement, and the position of the Romans was growing almost untenable, when the Carthaginians at length gave battle and were utterly defeated. Hannibal, however, contrived to escape with the troops at his command. The wretched inhabitants of Agrigentum thereupon surrendered at discretion: most of them were sold into slavery, and their city was pillaged and sacked. Thus with the exception of the great fortresses of the west, Sicily had even in the third year fallen before the Roman arms; yet twenty further campaigns were to be fought before the victory was finally won.

§ 126. In fact, it soon became apparent that the efforts of Rome were practically futile so long as
The First Roman Navy. Carthage retained the command of the sea. Not only were such coast towns of Sicily as had been won by the Romans continually exposed to the attack of Car-

thaginian squadrons, but the coast-line of Italy itself, notwithstanding the citizen-colonies long since established expressly in view of such a contingency, was equally at the enemy's mercy. Disembarking from their galleys, the latter harried the open country, firing and destroying everything within reach ; and carrying off the population into slavery, disappeared as swiftly as they came. In the construction of an adequate fleet lay the only means of defence, and the Romans, although unequalled for their qualities as foot-soldiers, were almost as ignorant of the sea and all matters thereto appertaining as their enemies were experienced. Yet, as we are told, in less than two months after the axe had been laid to the first timber, a fleet of one hundred and twenty sail put out to sea. Whatever credence we attach to the various stories related by patriotic writers—how, for instance, the Romans only secured a pattern for the quinqueremes (vessels with five banks of oars) in a Carthaginian ship that had luckily stranded on the coast two or three years before—and whatever qualifications of our own we impose on their achievement—for it is impossible to doubt that they derived very material assistance from the skilled mariners of the Greek and Etruscan cities—with all these deductions, the achievement remains amongst the most notable in their annals. Not less striking an instance of their resourcefulness is afforded by the novel tactics which they adopted. At that period vessels of war were manœuvred not by sails but by oarsmen, and the actual combatants on deck were comparatively few in number ; for the first object in naval warfare was to disable the enemy's vessels by charging them in such fashion as either to sweep away their oars or to sink them by the thrust of the powerful iron beak (*rostrum*) attached to the prow. Success therefore depended on the readiness

with which oarsmen and vessel responded to the captain's orders, while personal bravery was of little account. The Romans were as remarkable for physical courage as they were deficient in seamanship. They could not hope to hold their own against the long-practised skill of the Carthaginian mariners. To neutralize this, and to avail themselves of the valour of their legionaries even at sea, they invented boarding-bridges. To a mast in the fore-part of the ship was fastened by a strong hinge a ladder or drawbridge, thirty-six feet in length and four feet broad, protected by railings and furnished at the further end with a sharp spike. While not in action the bridge remained raised: when within range of an enemy's vessel it was suddenly allowed to fall; the spike sank securely into the adversary's deck, forming a stable gangway across which the legionaries might rush and so reduce the struggle to a mere hand to hand fight. The new invention was soon put to the test. Early in 260 B.C. C. Duillius, with a hastily constructed fleet of one hundred vessels, met the slightly larger force of the Carthaginians off Mylae (*Melazzo*), on the north-eastern coast of Sicily. Hannibal, the Carthaginian admiral, bore down on his antagonists in full assurance of an easy victory, but the boarding-bridges and Roman bravery disconcerted the skill of his sailors: fifty Carthaginian ships, including the admiral's own monstrous seven-banked galley, were taken, and the rest put to flight. For this, the first naval victory of the Romans, Duillius received unprecedented honours, and a column decorated with the beaks of the captured vessels was erected in the Forum—the famous *Columna Rostrata*.

Battle of
Mylae,
260 B.C.

§ 127. The campaigns of 259 B.C. and 258 B.C. were marked chiefly by the loss and recapture of some unimportant places in the interior of Sicily. In the latter year

the Romans, to whom the naval power of the Carthaginians was now less formidable, crossed to Corsica, and made that island an outpost for operations against Sardinia, and in 257 B.C. a naval battle was fought with indecisive result off Tyndaris (*Tyndaro*), not far from Mylae. Still no crushing blow was struck by either side, and at last the senate, wearied of the damage inflicted by the protracted war upon the trade and shores of Italy, decided, in imitation of Agathocles of Syracuse, to cross boldly to Africa and so carry the war into the enemy's territory. In 256 B.C. both sides had again equipped enormous armaments: the Roman fleet consisted of 330 vessels manned by something like 150,000 sailors, and the Carthaginian force was even more numerous. The two consuls, M. Atilius Regulus and L. Manlius Vulso, were coasting the southern shore of Sicily on their way to the opposite coast of Africa, when at a point between the promontory of Ecnomus (near Gela, *Terra Nova*) and the town of Heraclea Minoa they encountered the Carthaginian fleet. On both sides the obstinacy of the combatants was on a par with their numbers; but the boarding-bridges were again brought into play, and when darkness fell more than one half of the Carthaginian fleet had been either sunk or captured.

Battle of
Ecnomus,
256 B.C.

§ 128. The way to Africa was now open, and thither Regulus sailed. After reaching the Hermaean promontory (*Cape Bon*), he coasted eastwards until he came to the town of Clupea (*Kalibaiiah*), where he disembarked. The country in the neighbourhood, favoured by the climate and the irrigation of innumerable canals, was like a garden in its luxuriant fertility; and all around were prosperous villages and towns and the magnificent villas of the wealthy Carthaginian merchants.

The Expedition
of Regulus,
256, 255 B.C.

Over all this region Regulus ranged at his will, gathering in slaves and spoil of enormous value to his camp at Clupea. After a brief interval his colleague Vulso was recalled to Rome with one half of the army, but this event caused no change in the tactics of Regulus. His depredations went on as before, and the Carthaginians, who were probably embarrassed by a revolt of their mercenaries, seemed absolutely incapable of defending more than the walls of their capital. In their distress they opened negotiations for peace; Regulus, however, insisted not merely on the evacuation of Sicily, but on the complete submission of Carthage in matters of foreign policy, and to demands so outrageous the Carthaginians would not listen. Regulus, who had now established himself at Tunes (*Tunis*), scarce ten miles from Carthage, retained the command as proconsul into the following year, 255 B.C. His good-fortune, however, suddenly deserted him. Among the Greek mercenaries in Carthaginian pay was a certain Spartan, Xanthippus by name, who had perhaps acquired his knowledge of war by service in Asia. During the winter he reorganized the cavalry and the force of elephants, and, entrusted with the sole command at the opening of the campaign, ventured to descend into the plains and offer battle to the Romans. Chiefly owing to the charge of the elephants, the invaders were utterly defeated: only a paltry remnant of 2000 made good their escape to Clupea, and Regulus himself was taken prisoner. The senate at once despatched a huge fleet, larger even than that which had fought at Ecnomus, to rescue the survivors. The attempt succeeded: the Romans defeated a Carthaginian fleet off the Hermaean promontory and took on board the relics of the ill-fated expedition; yet further misfortune followed, for on the return voyage all but eighty ships

perished in a fearful hurricane off Cape Pachynus (*Cape Passaro*), the southern angle of Sicily.

Regulus himself, as is nearly certain, died a natural death in captivity, and there would be no need to mention his name further but for a magnificent The Legend of Regulus. fable which, originating in an attempt to conceal an act of shameless barbarity, was fostered by the patriotism of Roman historians and immortalized by Horace. The story runs that after he had languished in prison for five years, the Carthaginians released him on parole in the expectation that he would advise the senate to make peace. But nothing was further from his intention. when he came to Rome he exhorted the senators to fight on until Carthage was subdued; and then, refusing to look on his wife and children, he departed once more with cheerful countenance into captivity, although he well knew the tortures that awaited him. On his return he was put to death with the most brutal cruelty; and his wife, to whom the senate had entrusted the keeping of two noble Carthaginian captives, revenged his fate by taking a revolting vengeance on her helpless prisoners. Modern criticism agrees in regarding this last discreditable episode as the sole element of truth in the whole story: the rest was invented to palliate the disgusting brutality of a Roman matron.

§ 129. After the defeat of Regulus, the scene changes again to Sicily, whither the Romans, undaunted by recent events, sent a fresh fleet of over 200 Battle of Panormus, 250 B.C. vessels in 254 B.C. An important success was gained in the capture of Panormus (*Palermo*), one of the few places of strength that still remained Carthaginian: but the victory was counterbalanced in the following year, when an expedition, sent to raid the African coast, was first stranded on the "Drifts" (*Gulf of Khab*) and

foundered subsequently off the Lucanian coast to the number of 150 sail. In 251 B.C. the Carthaginians in their turn resumed the offensive. An armament of 200 ships, 30,000 men, and 140 elephants, was sent under a general named Hasdrubal to attempt the re-conquest of Sicily. In 250 B.C. Hasdrubal led his forces against Panormus; but his incapacity in manœuvring the elephants led to an utter defeat at the hands of L. Caecilius Metellus—a calamity which he expiated by suffering crucifixion on his return to Carthage. The triumph was a great one: the Carthaginians again made fruitless overtures for peace, and it was to this occasion that legend referred the imaginary embassy of Regulus. In the same year the Romans, now recovering from the despondency caused by the failure of their last naval efforts, advanced with a fleet of 200 sail and two consular armies against Lilybaeum (*Marsala*) and Drepanum (*Trapani*),¹ the last strongholds of the Carthaginians. By far the most considerable of these was Lilybaeum, situated on the most westerly promontory of the island. On two sides, the town was protected by the shallows and sunken rocks of the environing sea; and where it adjoined the land, it was secured by massive walls and a moat so wide and deep as to be almost unassailable. Its spacious harbour was difficult of entrance; indeed, the sand-banks and hidden reefs which lay before it were well-nigh impracticable to all but those who were familiar with their intricacies. Such was the fortress that the Romans set about besieging in 250 B.C. They could hardly suspect that, in spite of their unremitting efforts, ten years would elapse before their

Siege of
Lilybaeum,
250 B.C.

¹ This place had been converted into a harbour-fortress by Hamilcar about 258 B.C., in place of Eryx (*Monte S. Giuliano*), which he dismantled and razed.

object was attained. At first indeed they made considerable progress; but Himilco, the commandant, was a man of resource and daring, and despite the threatened treachery of his Gallic mercenaries and the stubborn efforts of the Romans, he held the town until winter came. Then the suffering of the besiegers became acute, and cold, hunger, and the plague decimated their ranks.

§ 130. But if nothing was effected in 250 B.C., the ensuing year brought positive misfortune. P.

Claudius Pulcher, son of the great censor of 312 B.C. and one of the consuls for this year, Battle of Drepanum, 249 B.C. possessed a full share of that arrogance and violence which was believed to be the especial characteristic of the Claudian line. His first operations were directed to blocking the entrance of the harbour of Lilybaeum and so cutting off the town from the supplies constantly thrown into it by Carthaginian cruisers. Failing in this, he sailed towards Drepanum, where lay a fleet under Adherbal. Before venturing upon a battle, it was essential for the auspices to be taken, and the auspices in this particular case would be obtained from the manner in which certain sacred chickens took their food. Word was brought that the birds refused to eat; whereupon Claudius ordered them to be thrown overboard, remarking "If they will not eat, they shall drink." Whether the anecdote is altogether veracious may perhaps be the subject of doubt. Claudius, entering one horn of the sickle-shaped harbour of Drepanum, found Adherbal in the act of leaving by the other. For Claudius to remain where he was was to be caught in a trap: endeavouring to retire, his fleet—210 vessels in all—fell into confusion in the narrow waterway, and thus cooped up close to the shore in a position which precluded all manœuvring, it lay helpless before Adherbal's attack.

Claudius was utterly defeated ; though he himself escaped, 20,000 of his men were captured and of his ships all but thirty were sunk or taken. Yet the tale of Roman misfortune was still incomplete, for a fleet of transports, 800 in number, in which the consul L. Junius Pullus was bringing up provisions to the starving forces before Lilybaeum, was driven inshore at Ecnomus by the Carthaginian admiral Carthalo with the loss of eighty sail, while the residue were wrecked to the last ship near Camarina (*Camarana*). The only success of the year was won when Pullus seized the temple of Venus at the summit of the lofty Mt. Eryx, and made it a Roman centre of attack.

§ 131. After the battle of Drepanum and the defeat of

Conclusion of
the First Punic
War, 241 B.C.

Claudius, the character of the war changes ; the Romans no longer attempted to meet the Carthaginians on the sea, contenting themselves with a blockade of the still unconquered harbour-fortresses of Lilybaeum and Drepanum ; while the Carthaginians despatched no more large armies to the scene of war, but, led by the famous Hamilcar, surnamed Barca or "Lightning," the father of the still greater Hannibal, resumed their old policy of raiding the Italian coast. After one of these expeditions, Hamilcar in 247 B.C. occupied Mt. Hercte (*Monte Pellegrino*) on the coast near Panormus, whence for three years he harassed the Romans by his continual sallies and alarms. In 244 B.C., probably to be closer to the beleaguered fortresses, he changed his quarters to Mt. Eryx, in spite of the fact that both the summit of the mountain and the plain below were in the enemy's possession. At length in 242 B.C. the Romans resolved to make one supreme effort to end the war, and a fleet of 200 vessels was equipped. The admiral, C. Lutatius Catulus, intercepted near the Aegates Insulae (*Favignana, Levanzo, &c.*) off

the west coast of Sicily the Carthaginian fleet conveying supplies to Lilybaeum, and gained by the aid of his deputy the praetor Q. Valerius Falto a great and final victory. By this time both nations were exhausted by the struggle and anxious to arrange a peace. The terms agreed upon by Catulus and Hamilcar were more reasonable than might have been expected: certainly they did not approach in severity those so light-heartedly proffered by Regulus. Carthage was to evacuate Sicily; to take no measures of retaliation against Hiero of Syracuse; to give up all prisoners of war; and to pay a ransom of 2200 talents in twenty years. A commission sent out by the senate raised the indemnity to 3200 talents, a third to be paid at once and the rest in ten annual instalments. In other respects the terms of peace remained unaltered. The Carthaginians opened the gates of the two fortresses which had so long resisted the Roman arms, and the First Punic War came to an end. It must have been evident from the first that the struggle would be renewed. Neither of the contending powers had inflicted decisive damage upon the other, though the Romans had certainly suffered more than their enemies. Even the surrender of Sicily was rather a moral than a material loss to the Carthaginians; while between the years 252—247 B.C. alone the muster-roll of Roman citizens showed a loss of more than 46,000 men. In little more than a score of years the struggle recommenced.

§ 132. No sooner had Carthage concluded the war with Rome (241 B.C.) than she was involved in new and even greater peril. It was only by his consummate genius that Hamilcar Barca had been enabled to keep his untrustworthy mercenaries to their allegiance during the last years of the late war, for the home government had furnished him with neither money nor supplies.

Terms of
Peace.

The Inexplicable
War.

Consequently, when he sent back his troops from Sicily to Carthage, considerable arrears of pay were due to them. The Carthaginian government either could not or would not satisfy their claims: an attempt to cajole them drove them to mutiny, and the capital was besieged by a horde of 20,000 barbarians and desperadoes collected from almost every nation of the Mediterranean. But there was greater misfortune to come: the native Libyans and the subject towns, including even Utica, threw off the Carthaginian yoke and joined the rebels. It seemed that Carthage was doomed: not merely was she destitute of ships and treasure and troops, but even in this time of peril her councils were divided by furious quarrels and party feuds. The peace-party, which found a leader in Hanno styled "The Great," included the majority of the Select Council and The Hundred; the war-party, headed by Hamilcar Barca, derived its main strength from the poorer classes, who protested against the abandonment of a national policy to gratify oligarchical greed and exclusiveness. At last the government was compelled to give the command to Hamilcar, as previously in Sicily. His combined popularity and generalship changed the face of affairs, and in the fourth year, amid unparalleled barbarities on both sides, the Inexpiable or Truceless War came to an end, 237 B.C.

Sardinia was garrisoned for Carthage by a small force of mercenaries. Following the example of their fellows in Africa, these also threw off their allegiance: they attempted to seize the island for themselves, but finding the resistance of the natives greater than they had bargained for, they volunteered to surrender themselves and the island to Rome. In defiance of all justice the senate accepted the offer, and the ex-

Cession of
Sardinia,
240 B.C.

postulations of Carthage were met only with the threat of instant war unless she should at once abandon her claim to Sardinia and pay a further sum of 1200 talents. For the time Hamilcar advised compliance, but the wrong sank deeply into his soul: under the smart of this injustice he caused his son Hannibal, now a child of nine, to take a solemn vow of eternal hatred to the Romans—a vow which was redeemed to the full in after years.

§ 133. Before resuming the narrative of the struggle between Rome and Carthage—and the peace of 241 B.C. was hardly ratified before there occurred Conflicts with the Gauls. fresh collisions between the two powers—it will be convenient to describe the steps by which Rome extended her frontier beyond the northern Apennines to the Padus (*Po*), and secured her sovereignty over the Adriatic. For many years after the battle of Lake Vadimo the Gauls made no further movement, remaining in a state of unwonted calm due partly to the doom of the Senones, partly no doubt to the fact that their more restless warriors had found employment in the First Punic War by serving as mercenaries on the Carthaginian side. In 238 B.C. they once more bestirred themselves: the Boii, the most powerful of the Gallic tribes, summoning to their aid their kinsmen beyond the Western Alps, attacked Ariminum, which was Rome's most recent and most advanced colony in the north and the especial object of their hatred. The confederates effected nothing on this occasion, for they quarrelled and turned their arms against each other; but in consequence of this disturbance, proposals for settling colonists on the devastated lands of the Senones about Ariminum began to be discussed at Rome, and in 232 B.C. the popular tribune C. Flaminius carried a measure to this effect, in spite of the

violent opposition of the senate and of the nobles, who had occupied the land and hoped in time to make it their own property. Unlike some other agrarian laws, that of Flaminius seems to have been enforced with vigour, and many impoverished citizens found new homes in the north.

§ 134. The Gauls looked on quietly for some time, but

Galic War,
225 B.C.

in 225 B.C. the Boii, leaders as before in revolt, organized an alliance which included the Insubres and most of the tribes in Cisalpine Gaul, though the Cenomani and the Illyrian Veneti joined the Roman side. To meet their attack L. Aemilius Papus, one of the consuls, was posted at Ariminum, while a second army of Umbrians and Sabines was intended to guard the passes from Northern Italy into Etruria. The other consul of the year, C. Atilius Regulus, was absent in Sardinia. It was naturally expected that the Gauls would direct their first efforts against Ariminum; but instead of so doing they turned southwards, forced the passes of the Apennines, and marched straight upon Rome. They were not however to repeat the day of the Allia: by the time they reached Clusium (*Chiusi*) their accumulation of booty was such that they prepared to retreat, satisfied with their present spoils. Aemilius Papus was now at their heels, and his colleague Atilius Regulus had landed at Pisae (*Pisa*) with the army from Sardinia. At Telamon (*Telamone*), on the coast of Etruria, near the river

Battle of
Telamon,
225 B.C.

Umbro (*Ombro*), the retreating Gauls were hemmed in between the two armies, and though they fought with the courage of their nation, they were cut to pieces almost to the last man. Regulus fell indeed, but with him fell 40,000 Gauls. The Romans resolved to follow up their advantage and to crush the Gauls in their own lands. Three campaigns sufficed for this object. In 224 B.C.

the Boii and the Lingones submitted unconditionally. In 223 B.C. C. Flaminius, the author of the agrarian law of 232 B.C. and now consul, crossed the Padus and crushed the Insubres after an engagement in which he owed more to the sturdy valour of the legionaries than to his own skill. In 222 B.C. the Insubres, in consequence of a further victory of the consul M. Marcellus¹ and the taking of their capital Mediolanum (*Milan*), laid down their arms. The valley of the Padus thus passed completely under Roman influence; and the new conquest was secured by the establishment of two important Latin colonies at Placentia (*Piacenza*) and Cremona (*Cremona*), and by the extension of the great highway (now first called the Flaminian, after its completer the famous C. Flaminius) from Narnia across the Apennines to Ariminum (220 B.C.).

§ 135. When Rome had completed her line of colonies—Ariminum, Sena Gallica, Firmum, Castrum Novum, Hatria—by the occupation of Brundisium (*Brindisi*, 244 B.C.), it was evident that she would speedily assert control over the adjoining sea. After the First Punic War the Adriatic became more and more infested by Illyrian pirates, who, favoured by the dangerous creeks and innumerable islands of their wild and mountainous coast, preyed with impunity upon the merchant vessels of the Upper Sea and upon the coast towns of Greece. At length not even such considerable places as Apollonia (*Pollina*) and Epidamnus (*Dyrrhachium*, *Durazzo*) were secure from their raids, while the people of Corcyra (*Corfu*) were forced to surrender their once powerful island and to

¹ Marcellus won in this campaign the third and last—and only historically authenticated—*spolia opima*. General-in-chief of the Roman forces, he slew with his own hand the opposing leader Viridomarus, routed his army, and ended the war:

accept as their ruler a certain Demetrius from the island of Pharos (near *Salona*). The evil spread beyond endurance, and in 230 B.C. the senate, moved by the entreaties of the people of Issa (*Lissaa*), and still more by depredations on Italian commerce, sent the envoys C. and L. Coruncanius to the pirates' capital-stronghold of Scodra (*Scutari*). At that time Queen Teuta was governing for her young son Pinnes, and stung by some remarks of the Romans, she caused the younger of the envoys to be waylaid and slain. The senate retaliated by sending (229 B.C.) both consuls across the sea. There was scarcely an attempt at resistance. Demetrius of Pharos handed over Corcyra on the first appearance of the invaders, and then assisted them in their attack on the Illyrian strongholds. By the following year (228 B.C.) all was quiet: the Illyrians were forbidden to sail beyond Lissus (*Alessio*), and were deprived of a part of their territory, which went to aggrandize the traitor Demetrius. The gratitude of the Greeks was unbounded: the Athenians admitted the Romans to the holy mysteries of Eleusis, and Corinth, not to be outdone, invited them to the Isthmian games, then in course of celebration. This was the first intercourse between the Romans and the Greeks in their own land.

For some years the Romans experienced no serious trouble from this quarter, but when they be-
Second Illyrian War, 219 B.C. came involved in further conflicts with the Gauls, Demetrius of Pharos turned traitor once more and recommenced his plundering expeditions. In the spring of 219 B.C. he was easily deposed by a Roman force under L. Aemilius Paullus. He found a refuge at the court of Philip of Macedonia, where he lived to foment hostilities between the two nations.

§ 136. At the close of the Inexpiable War Hamilcar Barca found himself the acknowledged leader of Carthaginian politics. The services which he had rendered to his country in Sicily against Rome and in Africa against the mercenaries had brought his party to the front, and the discredited oligarchs were obliged to look on passively while he was invested with the sole control of the army, subject only to the voice of the popular assembly. In possession of this dictatorial authority he resolved to win for his country a new empire in Spain, a country of inexhaustible wealth and in every way superior to the lost island of Sicily. Moreover, the Spanish tribes afforded the material for armies not less valiant than numerous, and the country offered a new and formidable base of operations against Rome. For it was no secret in Carthage that the head of the Barcidæ had pledged himself and his family to be avenged on Rome.

In 237 B.C. he crossed to Gades (*Cádiz*), and with that port for his capital he steadily pursued his schemes, organizing a military force and conquering or winning over the native tribes, until he died in battle nine years later, 228 B.C. He was succeeded by his son-in-law Hasdrubal, who founded a new capital in Carthago Nova (*Carthagena*), and extended the Carthaginian power as far north as the Tagus. When he fell (221 B.C.) by an assassin's hand, that Hannibal whom Hamilcar had caused to swear eternal enmity to the Romans had attained maturity. He was now twenty-eight years old: his training in the hardest of military schools had made him an adept in every art of the soldier and the general, and he was endowed in the fullest degree with the subtlety and persistence of his nation. He at once set about the work to which his father had dedicated him. His first two campaigns were directed

against some tribes on the southern bank of the Iberus (*Ebro*). These ended, he deliberately threw down his challenge to Rome by laying siege to Saguntum (*Murviédro*), a Spanish town which Rome had taken under her protection some years before. The senate sent an embassy warning him to desist, but Hannibal was deaf to its admonitions, and after a terrible siege of eight months—for Spaniards have ever been noted for their stubborn resistance—stormed Saguntum, 219 B.C. Thereupon a Roman embassy to Carthage demanded the surrender of Hannibal. The demand was refused, and war was formally declared.

§ 137. In several points the Carthaginians were at a disadvantage as compared with the Romans: The Cause of the Second Punic War. their naval force was of the weakest, their treasury had scarcely recovered from the exhaustion of her late struggle, and—what was of greater import than all else—while Carthage found it a hard task to keep her subjects in obedience, there was growing throughout Italy the feeling that Rome deserved her position as head of the Italian nations. Yet old sores still rankled: whatever position the Latins took up, Hannibal might reasonably hope that the Marsians, Samnites, Campanians, Lucanians, and Bruttians would remember their humiliation and rise against their masters when he appeared among them. But his surest allies were the Gauls of Northern Italy—those Boii and Insubres whom the Romans had only four years since reduced, and in whose territories they had during this very year (218 B.C.) erected the fortress-colonies of Placentia and Cremona—and it was their country which he determined to make the scene of his first campaign. In the summer of 218 B.C. Hannibal set out from Carthago Nova with a force of 90,000 foot, 12,000 horse, and 37

elephants. Between the Iberus and the Pyrenees the native tribes were up in arms, and so costly was their reduction that when Hannibal had at length effected it and detached a force to keep them in check, and had further dismissed such of his own troops as were faint-hearted, he had remaining but 50,000 men and 9000 horse.

Reaching the Rhone without further opposition, he forced a passage in the face of some hostile

Passage of
the Rhone.

Gauls, and was already marching up the left bank northwards, when he learned that a Roman army had been landed at Massilia (*Marseilles*). The Romans in fact had just missed their last chance of intercepting Hannibal before his appearance in the valley of the Padus. Early in the year they had raised two armies: of these, one under Tiberius Sempronius Longus sailed to Sicily with a

view to crossing thence into Africa; P. Cornelius Scipio was to lead the other to Spain and there

The Romans
out-generalled.

attack Hannibal on his own ground. That Hannibal intended to invade Italy never occurred to Roman minds: they fancied that they would themselves be left to take the offensive, and that the double attack upon Africa and Spain would effectually paralyze their enemies' movements. Hannibal's real design came upon them like a revelation when P. Cornelius Scipio, coasting leisurely towards Massilia on his way to Spain, learned first that the Carthaginians were on the Rhone, next that they had crossed the river and were already marching for the passes of the Alps. The news caused no change in the destination of his troops, though their presence at this critical moment in the valley of the Po might even now have ruined Hannibal's plans. Scipio had not the strength of character to modify on his own responsibility the deliberate policy of the senate: he sent on his two legions to Spain under his brother

Gnaeus, and himself returned to Genua (*Genoa*). The destined attack of Sempronius upon Africa was even more abortive: he had got no further than Sicily when he was recalled with both his legions to assist in the defence of Italy.

§ 138. Hannibal crossed the Rhone in the neighbourhood of Arausio (*Orange*). Since the enmity of the Ligurian tribes and the movements of Scipio prevented him from passing into Italy by way of the sea-coast, he was obliged to make use of one of the five northerly passes. In their order as one travels from north to south these are (1) the Great St. Bernard, through the Pennine Alps; (2) the Little St. Bernard, through the Graian Alps; (3) the Mont Cenis, through the Graian Alps; (4) the Mont Genève, leading over the Cottian Alps; (5) the Col d'Argentière. It is certain that Hannibal did not pass by the Great St. Bernard. Livy, one of our two chief authorities, expressly states that all writers declared that the first people encountered by Hannibal on descending into Italy were the Taurini. Our other great authority, Polybius, also indirectly implies this. Now, the Taurini dwelt near Turin, in the valley of the Duria Minor (*Dora Riparia*). The only passes leading into that valley are the Mont Genève and the Mont Cenis; for the Little St. Bernard is too far to the north, and the Col d'Argentière is too far to the south. Thus Hannibal must have crossed by one or other of these passes. Now Livy expressly says that Hannibal marched by one of the two passes to which the Druentia (*Durance*) valley leads; Polybius does not contradict this. These two passes are the Col d'Argentière and the Mont Genève. We have already seen why the former must be excluded: hence the pass by which Hannibal crossed the

Alps was the Mont Genève. Adapting Livy's narrative to this conclusion, we may re-construct his actual route as follows: From the confluence of the Isara (*Isère*) with the Rhone Hannibal marched along the *Isère* as far as Grenoble. Thence he turned south-east up the valley of the Drac, crossed the Col Bayard near Gap, and so reached the Durance. Then, fighting his way inch by inch against the hostile tribes, he followed the Durance valley upwards past Embrun to Briançon, and so on to the Mont Genève. His men had by this time suffered greatly from fatigue; they were also disheartened by the perils of the march and the intense cold: but their courage rose when the general pointed out that the spoils of Italy were within their grasp, and after a rest the descent began. In its downward course the army found the road entirely broken away by an avalanche or landslide. With immense toil a new road was made, and at length the Carthaginian forces, "unkempt and well-nigh ensavaged" and sadly diminished in numbers, reached the valley of the Dora Riparia, where they stormed Taurasia (afterwards Augusta Taurinorum, and now *Turin*), the capital of the hostile Taurini.

§ 139. When P. Cornelius Scipio returned from Massilia and reached Placentia, he found two legions awaiting him in the valley of the Padus, where they were acting with nothing but disaster against a new rising of the Boii, whom the colonization of Placentia and Cremona and the promptings of Hannibal's emissaries had driven once more to arms. With these troops he instantly hastened westwards along the northern bank of the river, crossed the Ticinus (*Ticino*), and engaged the Carthaginians for the first time in an unsuccessful skirmish upon that stream, himself receiving a severe wound. He then crossed to the southern bank of

The First
Campaign,
218 B.C.

the Padus, and retreated to Placentia. Hannibal followed him closely, and while Scipio encamped on the left or western bank of the Trebia (*Trebbia*), a small stream flowing from the Apennines into the Padus, he took up his position on the opposite bank, about six miles from Placentia. A battle was becoming imminent when Scipio was at length joined by the other consul, Tib. Sempronius Longus, with the two legions recalled from Sicily. Sempronius, irritated by his disappointment of a campaign in Africa, and longing to strike a decisive blow before his term of office expired, resolved to force on a battle. Nothing could be better suited to Hannibal's plans than such a frame of mind: he posted his brother Mago and a squadron of cavalry in

Battle of
the Trebia,
218 B.C.

ambush, where rushes and brambles concealed a dried-up watercourse, and at daydawn sent out a detachment of Numidian horse to entice the enemy across the river. The challenge was eagerly accepted, and when the Numidians purposely retired, the Romans, though sleet was falling and they had taken no food to prepare them for the coming struggle, rushed in pursuit through the icy waters of the Trebia and past Mago's ambush. Their cavalry soon fell back, and the infantry, after a gallant fight with Hannibal's main body, was already thrown into utter rout when Mago started from his ambuscade and attacked it in the rear. The consuls retreated to Ariminum with the miserable remnant of their legions, leaving Hannibal in possession of all Cisalpine Gaul excepting the two fortresses of Placentia and Cremona.

§ 140. The consuls for 217 B.C. were C. Flaminius and Cn. Servilius. Of Flaminius' political sym-

The Second
Campaign,
217 B.C.

pathies we have already spoken: he was the champion of the poorer classes, and his second election to the consulship was only won after a fierce

electioneering struggle with the nobles. Even then the senate set to work against him all the machinery of superstition, and when he set off to Ariminum without having first gone through the customary formalities, it insisted upon his immediate return. Flaminius, not for the first time in his career, paid no heed to the demand: leaving his colleague at Ariminum, he established his own camp near Arretium (*Arezzo*) in Etruria and awaited Hannibal's movements. As soon as spring rendered the passes practicable, Hannibal crossed the Apennines, somewhere to the north of Luca, and gained the plains about the upper Arnus (*Arno*), now flooded through the melting of the snows. Here among the swamps his men suffered terribly, and Hannibal himself lost an eye from ophthalmia, before reaching the higher ground near Faesulae (*Fiesole*). Thence Hannibal, learning that the consuls were not in conjunction, marched past Flaminius' quarters at Arretium and proceeded southwards until he reached the northern shore of L. Trasimenus (*Lago di Perugia*) between Cortona and Perugia. Knowing that Flaminius would follow him to protect Rome, Hannibal waited at a point where the horns of a semi-circular range of hills approached the lake so closely as to leave but narrow defiles by its shore. At the further pass he posted some of his troops in full sight of the enemy; the rest he carefully concealed about the more northerly defile. A mist hung all along the defile when in the early morning Flaminius with his 30,000 soldiers marched into the trap. When the whole force was now between the two divisions of the Carthaginian army, Hannibal gave the signal for attack. His troops rushed down from the hills, and while some blocked up the defile in the rear, the others set upon

The Battle of
Lake Trasim-
enus,
217 B.C.

the main body of the Romans. It was impossible for the legions to form in line in so confined a space, and they were cut down almost without resistance. Six thousand men forced their way out, only to surrender to Hannibal's cavalry. The entire army was destroyed or captured. Flaminius himself, seeing that all was lost, died sword in hand. Soon afterwards Servilius the other consul was reduced to inactivity, for his cavalry, sent from Ariminum to effect a junction with Flaminius, was annihilated among the Umbrian hills.

§ 141. Moved by these disasters, the senate resolved to revive the dictatorship, an office that had almost fallen into abeyance. But according to constitutional practice only a consul could name a dictator, and now Flaminius was dead and communication with Servilius was impossible. The matter was referred to the comitia, and by the vote of the people Q. Fabius Maximus was made Pro-dictator, and M. Minucius Rufus his Master of Horse.


Contrary to general expectation, Hannibal did not march on Rome after his victory at L. Trasimenus. Fully aware that it was useless for him to attempt the siege of a place so strongly fortified, he passed through Umbria to the Adriatic Sea, and allowed his weary soldiers to rest awhile in the fertile plains of Picenum. Thence he proceeded leisurely through the lands of the Vestini, Fabius Cunctator. Marrucini and Frentani, gathering in booty from all sides, until he came to Apulia. At Arpi (near *Foggia*) he was once more confronted by a Roman army, but the tactics of its general were such as no Roman had ever before employed: Fabius had resolved not to tempt fortune by a pitched battle, and despite all the provocations of Hannibal, who devastated the country before his eyes, and the impatience of his own officers, he persistently

followed the Carthaginians from place to place, cutting off stragglers here, capturing a baggage-train there, intent only on out-wearying the invader and gaining time for Rome to recover from her wounds. He dogged Hannibal's steps from Apulia to Beneventum (*Benevento*); from Beneventum into Campania, deservedly called the garden of Italy; and looked on without interference while villages and homesteads went up in flames. Once, in a defile by the upper waters of the Volturnus (*Volturno*), it seemed as though he had trapped the Carthaginian. But Hannibal's craft had not deserted him: by tying lighted faggots to the horns of some oxen, and driving the terrified animals over the heights upon one side of the valley, he induced Fabius to abandon the head of the pass and hurry after them in pursuit of the imaginary fugitives. Hannibal then marched quietly out, again ravaged Samnium, and so returned to Apulia, where he made Gereonium, between the Tifernus (*Biferno*) and the Frento (*Fortore*), his headquarters. At this time Fabius had gone to Rome, leaving Minucius in command. The young and impetuous Master of Horse was anxious to strike a blow, and actually won some small advantages over the hitherto unbeaten Carthaginians. His success had a great effect on parties at Rome: Minucius, the nominee of the popular party, was raised to an equality with Fabius, whose nickname of Cunctator or the Laggard expressed the small esteem in which he was held. The two commanders now divided their forces and occupied separate encampments; whereupon Hannibal, perfectly informed of the state of affairs, laid an ambush and tempted Minucius to an engagement. He was in imminent danger of annihilation, when Fabius generously came to his aid and beat off Hannibal. Not to be outdone, Minucius laid down his separate authority.

§ 142. The consuls for 216 B.C. were C. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paullus. Varro, a man of

The Third
Campaign,
216 B.C.

obscure origin, was the champion of the popular party; Aemilius Paullus, a man of some military skill, belonged to the aristocrats. The consuls took the field with the unprecedented number of 80,000 foot and 6,000 horse, and since the defection of the allies was feared if the ravages of Hannibal were continued with impunity, the new commanders were ordered to



abandon the tactics of Fabius and strike a blow at the earliest opportunity. When they arrived at Gereonium they found Hannibal badly off for provisions and pay for his troops, who were getting discontented. In May Hannibal suddenly left Gereonium, crossed the Aufidus (*Ofanto*), and seized the Roman magazines at Cannæ (*Canne*), where he encamped. The Romans followed him to the Aufidus and remained on the left or northern bank, where they fortified a large camp. They also pitched a

smaller camp on the right or southern bank. Since the ground on the north bank was on the whole better fitted for cavalry, in which the Carthaginians excelled, Hannibal crossed to the north bank and made a second encampment there. He then offered battle, which the Romans refused. But they had been sent from Rome to bring on a battle with Hannibal. They therefore crossed to the right or southern bank, where the ground was somewhat less open and, when Hannibal followed, offered battle which he accepted. After the preliminary skirmish of light-armed troops, the Gallic and Spanish cavalry (*A*) on Hannibal's left, commanded by Hasdrubal, engaged the Roman cavalry opposite. They fought in the barbarian manner, and, without manœuvring, rode the Roman cavalry down and cut them to pieces. Meanwhile the Roman and allied legions (*b, c*) attacked the Gallic and Spanish infantry (*CCC*). The Romans were in closer order than usual to begin with, and either owing to the general's orders or automatically the formation grew closer and deeper as the fighting proceeded. As a result, when the Gauls and Spaniards gave way and the Romans advanced, the legions passed between the columns of African infantry (*BB*), which faced in right and left and attacked them on the flanks. They were still maintaining an equal struggle when Hasdrubal's heavy cavalry, which had passed round the Roman rear and aided the Numidian cavalry (*D*) to disperse the allied cavalry (*d*), fell on their rear and completed the circle. The Romans were now driven closer and closer together till they could not even draw their swords, and Hannibal's troops spent the rest of the day in massacring them. The Romans left 50,000 dead (including Paullus and eighty senators) on the field, and subsequently both their camps and 10,000 prisoners were captured.

§ 143. Any other state than Rome would have abandoned the struggle after so frightful a defeat, and even at Rome for a short time there was panic.

Feeling in
Rome.

One of the consuls had perished, and many of the other magistrates were either dead or absent. The senate was reduced to a mere handful. The loss of men and treasure was beginning to be felt severely : at least 120,000 citizens had already perished ; and not merely were so many homes left vacant or ruined, but the domain land, the pastures, and the mines of Southern Italy were in the hands of the enemy, and so long as this remained the case there must be a grievous diminution in the revenues on which the government chiefly depended. After the first shock, however, hope revived : there was no fear of the revolt of the cities of Latium or of all the many colonies and fortresses where-with Italy was studded. Fabius the Laggard infused some of his own stubborn courage into the remnant of the senate. M. Marcellus was ordered to proceed to Apulia and collect the survivors of the battle ; Varro, the surviving consul, was publicly thanked because he had not despaired of his native land. In the next year (215 B.C.) the senate was restored to its usual complement by the admission of 177 new members ; money was raised by new war-loans and by sumptuary duties on plate and similar luxuries, and a force of 18 legions, or (including the allies) about 200,000 men, was put into the field. To fill up the complement of the legions 12,000 criminals and slaves were liberated and armed.

§ 144. The character of the war now undergoes a change : the onward sweep of Hannibal's career, which lends such interest to the first three campaigns, terminates with this his greatest victory. The war becomes a record of sieges and marches and counter-

Character of the
War after
Cannae.

marches, in which Hannibal's genius, though in reality as great as ever, shows to less brilliant effect. The Romans indeed gave him little opportunity of dealing any further crushing blows : they reverted to the tactics of Fabius, who had first taught them how to withstand their terrible antagonist, and resolved for the future never to stake everything on a pitched battle, but to rely chiefly on the network of fortresses which they had spread over Italy. Keeping thus on the defensive at home, they were able to pass to the offensive abroad, and finally to compel the withdrawal of Hannibal from Italy for the defence of his native land.

Such a policy was the last for which Hannibal could have wished. It was only by brilliant victories that he could hope to win to his side the subjects of Rome in Italy : he must show himself able to defend them if they dared to renounce their allegiance, and it was to prove this that he had thrice welcomed the hazard of a pitched battle. His sole prospect of ultimate success lay in the dissolution of the Roman confederacy, for his own forces were too few to capture Rome, no matter how often they might defeat her armies. He was without the materials or the numbers requisite for constant sieges. He could neither coerce Rome without the aid of the Italians, nor win the aid of the Italians against their will. If they were ever to join him at all it would surely be after his last superlative victory. But he was disappointed. The minor peoples of the south—Hirpini and Caudini, Calabrians, Lucanians and Bruttians—joined him indeed, but these were just the peoples least to be feared as foes and least valuable as friends ; but general rising in his favour there was none, and as it did not come now, he knew that it would not come at all. It only remained for him to maintain himself

Position of
Hannibal.

in Italy until he could be joined by his brother Hasdrubal with a second army from Spain. Then perhaps he might be able to coerce the Italians at large, and with them Rome herself.

§ 145. At the moment of his triumph indeed it seemed that

Revolt of
Capua,
216 B.C.

his hopes might be realized. He was joined by many Apulian cities—notably Arpi, Salapia, and Herdonea ; by the Lucanians and Bruttians ;

and by those inveterate enemies of the Roman power, the Samnite cantons of the Hirpini and Caudini. What was a greater gain, immediately after Cannae he was admitted into Capua, next to Rome the wealthiest and most flourishing city of the peninsula. In Capua the aristocratic party of the Knights was generally devoted to the Romans, who had granted them the full suffrage and settled on them an income from the Capuan domain-lands. One of their number however, Pacuvius Calavius, was a staunch partizan of Hannibal, and, supported by the populace, he extorted from his compeers a sullen assent to his policy. Hannibal spent the winter of 216 B.C. at Capua, in the neighbourhood of which, at Mt. Tifata, he fortified a camp, after spending the autumn of that year in more or less successful attempts upon the various towns of Campania : at Nola he met with a repulse, Nuceria and Acerræ welcomed him, Casilinum he only reduced after a protracted

The Campaign
of 215 B.C.

and stubborn resistance from its petty garrison, Cumæ and Neapolis he failed to take. On the other hand, Locri and Crotona admitted him (215 B.C.) as a means of casting off the Roman yoke ; so that, although he made little progress in Campania, where Roman influence was all-powerful, he established himself firmly in the more southern parts of Italy, so securing free communication with Carthage by sea. But it became every day more clear

that Hannibal must look for allies elsewhere than in Italy. He found one in Philip, King of Macedonia, with whom the overtures of Hannibal's emissaries answered entirely to his own wishes : he was jealous of the recent interference of the Romans in Illyria, and believed himself able to deal with them there while Hannibal kept them busy in Italy. Accordingly he concluded an alliance with Hannibal, but he proved so irresolute an ally that the senate never found it needful to detach any large force for service beyond the Adriatic.

In the next year the consuls retook Casilinum and raided the lands of the revolted Samnites.

Hannibal was foiled in an attack on Tarentum,

214 B.C.

and lay passive for the greater part of the year, waiting in vain for reinforcements from Spain, from Carthage, and from Macedonia. Philip made as if to attack Apollonia, now in dependence upon Rome, but changed his mind and remained inactive. Similarly the year 213 B.C. slipped away without material results. The Romans gained some small successes in Bruttium ; but so far as Italy was concerned, the war settled down into a

213 B.C.

§ 146. Meanwhile Sicily was in confusion. Hiero, the old and faithful ally of Rome, died in 215 B.C., after a long and prosperous reign, leaving his kingdom of Syracuse to his grandson Hieronymus, a boy of fifteen. Prompted by foolish family intrigues, the young prince opened communications with Hannibal, and notwithstanding the warnings of Appius Claudius, the Roman praetor in Sicily, framed a convention by which he was to receive the whole of the island in return for his assistance. At Syracuse

The War in
Sicily,
214 B.C.—210
B.C.

§ 147. The year 212 B.C. was thus marked by a signal and most important gain in Sicily: elsewhere it brought serious disaster to the Roman arms.

The War in
Spain,
218 B.C.—212
B.C.

Both in Italy and in Spain the tide was with the Carthaginians. It will be remembered that

P. Scipio, after failing to intercept Hannibal near the Rhone, sent forward his army under his brother Gnaeus Scipio into Spain (218 B.C.). That officer speedily won over the country between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, although it had apparently been subdued by Hannibal just before. He made Tarraco (*Tarragona*) his head-quarters, and there in 217 B.C. he was joined by his brother Publius, the consul of 218 B.C., with 8000 fresh troops. This energetic action of the Romans (which, it must be remembered, occurred after the disastrous battle of Trasimenus) had

Battle of Ibera, great influence on the war, for in 216 B.C., the
216 B.C.

year of Cannae, the two Scipios routed Hasdrubal at a place called Ibera, just when the latter was preparing to march to the assistance of his brother Hannibal. But for this check, the Romans would have been obliged to meet two armies in Italy at the most critical period of the struggle, and with Hasdrubal devastating the north while Hannibal held the south, they must very possibly have been forced to submit. The victory was attended by a further benefit: a powerful reinforcement of 12,000 foot which Mago, the youngest brother of Hannibal, was to have led to Italy, was thereby diverted to Spain. Emboldened by their success, the Scipios carried on the struggle with vigour: at Illiturgi they are said to have routed the Carthaginians with a loss of 60,000 men; and whatever exaggeration may be contained in the narrative of their panegyrists, no doubt they gained further important victories, which enabled them to advance south of the

Ebro and retake Saguntum, 215 B.C. To some extent their progress was due to an insurrection of Syphax, a tributary Numidian prince, which kept the Carthaginians busy nearer home. The Scipios sent Roman officers to help the insurgent, and themselves, for the first time in Roman history, hired mercenaries on a large scale. It seemed as though the Carthaginians might be driven entirely from Spain; but, Syphax submitting, Hasdrubal and Mago crossed from Africa with their entire forces, and in the campaign of 212 B.C. cut off the armies of P. and Cn. Scipio in detail. Both the brothers were killed while fighting at the head of their troops, Carthaginian influence was fully re-established in Spain, and it seemed as though the oft-attempted project of sending reinforcements thence to Hannibal was about to obtain realization.

Defeat and
Death of the
Scipios,
212 B.C.

§ 148. The Romans were almost as unfortunate in Italy. Early in the year Tarentum went over to Hannibal. The loss was due to a useless act of cruelty perpetrated by the Romans, who punished with death the attempted escape of some Tarentine hostages. The anti-Roman party in Tarentum took advantage of the general indignation to admit Hannibal; but M. Livius Macatus, the governor, kept possession of the citadel, nor, in spite of the repeated efforts of the Carthaginians, was he ever dislodged. Heraclea and Thurii followed the example of Tarentum, so that Rhegium was the only city on the southern coast that remained faithful to the Romans. But Hannibal still found it impossible to gain a permanent footing in the cities round Capua, and Capua itself was daily hemmed in more and more closely by the legions. The Romans, in fact, whose armies had hovered about the rebel city in the last two campaigns,

The Italian
Campaign
of 212 B.C.

resolved to make the punishment of Capua the first object of the war, and to take such vengeance as should effectually keep the other cities of Italy to their allegiance. The Capuans became straightened for provisions: they appealed to Hannibal, but allowed the convoy he sent to be captured through their own remissness, and the Carthaginian had to appear in person to relieve the blockade. No sooner did the consuls hear of his approach than they retired, and for the time Capua was saved. Hastening south again, Hannibal marched against the other armies which Rome had put in the field, and defeated one in Lucania and a second near Herdonea (*Ordona*) in Apulia—the latter, under Fulvius Flaccus, so utterly that of 18,000 men barely 2000 escaped. Yet scarcely had he turned his back on Capua than the three Roman armies gathered again around the doomed city, and beleaguered it with a double line of works. Once more the Capuans appealed for succour, and Hannibal promised that he would appear at the fit season.

§ 149. In the spring of 211 B.C. it was evident that
Fall of Capua,
211 B.C. Capua could hold out no longer. On learning its danger, Hannibal marched again into Campania, hoping that the legions would withdraw at his coming as they had done in the preceding year. But by this time they were secure behind their intrenchments, and though Hannibal pitched his camp hard by on Mt. Tifata, they stirred not. To storm their position was hopeless, and Hannibal could only draw off his troops towards Rome on the chance that they might follow and be tempted to an engagement. He proceeded slowly along the Latin Way, marking his passage with fire and pillaging, but only one of the investing armies moved. He stayed before Rome some days, but to assault those massive walls was out of the question, and he marched away in the direction of

Samnium. Soon afterwards Capua surrendered. The leaders of the revolt had already put themselves beyond human vengeance. Of the remainder, fifty-three senators were scourged and beheaded, three hundred of the noblest Campanian youths were thrown into prison at Rome to die of starvation, while the common people were either sold into slavery or distributed among the Latin colonies. The city was deprived of its autonomy and put under the jurisdiction of a prefect from Rome. Such was the fall of Capua, nor did it ever recover from its overthrow.

In this year (211 B.C.) the statecraft of the senate brought about a coalition of the most powerful Eastern states against Philip of Macedon, notably of the Aetolians and of Pergamum (*Bergamo*) in Asia Minor. As a party to the coalition Rome sent a handful of troops across the Adriatic, but for the most part she was able to keep her enemy employed without cost to herself by judicious handling of her allies upon his borders.

§ 150. The loss of Capua was the greatest blow that had yet befallen Hannibal: it was useless now for him to hope that smaller towns would join him, or that there would occur any serious revolt from Rome. Yet though driven out of Campania, he was still master of Southern Italy: in 210 B.C. he gained over the praetor Cn. Fulvius Centumalus a second victory at Herdonea, almost as decisive as that of 212 B.C., and routed the consul M. Marcellus at Numistro, perhaps in Lucania. In 209 B.C. the senate was startled by the refusal of twelve of the Latin colonies to contribute further to the war. The cause of their refusal is unknown: probably it was sheer exhaustion, as they were mostly small communities. The remaining eighteen colonies, chiefly those at some considerable distance from Rome, showed no signs of flagging

loyalty, and the incident passed over. It was none the less an alarming symptom, and it found an echo, though for less satisfactory reasons, in Etruria, whither it became necessary to send yearly contingents to overawe the disaffected. In this year Q. Fabius Cunctator, consul for the fifth time, had the satisfaction of recovering Tarentum through the treachery of a Bruttian in the garrison, while Hannibal was engaged as successfully as ever with M. Marcellus or in Bruttium. The victors treated the captured city as harshly as custom allowed: they sold 30,000 of its people into slavery, and carried off all its famous statues and pictures to Rome. If Hannibal still had hopes of any assistance from Philip of Macedon, they were sadly weakened by the loss of this harbour. The chief object of the campaign of 208 B.C. was the recovery of Locri; its results were absolute failure and the death of M. Marcellus, now enjoying his fifth consulate, near Venusia. Marcellus and his fellow-consul Crispinus had ridden out of their camp to reconnoitre, when a body of Numidian horse surprised them. Crispinus escaped only to die of his wounds; Marcellus fell fighting. Hannibal burnt his body with the usual rites, remarking that though he was not a great general he was a brave soldier. The epitaph was not undeserved: though merciless and avaricious, Marcellus had ever shown himself loyal and stout-hearted in the long struggle against Hannibal; he had been the spear of Rome as Fabius was her shield; he had never routed Hannibal, but neither had he been routed like a Varro or a Flaminius; and he had done what no one else had done in history in taking Syracuse by fair siege. Locri was saved, but when the next campaign came, the only districts that remained faithful to Hannibal were Bruttium and Apulia. But there had at last reached him

Death of Marcellus, 208 B.C.

news that (207 B.C.) Hasdrubal had eluded the Romans in Spain and was in full march for Italy. Could he only effect a junction with his brother, he might yet be able to renew the struggle on equal terms.

§ 151. Though the death of the Scipios (212 B.C.) had apparently left Spain in the hands of the Carthaginians, the senate despatched troops in the following year to contest the prize with them.

The War in
Spain,
211 B.C. — 208
B.C.

When further reinforcements were sent in 210 B.C., the command was bestowed on P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of the dead P. Scipio, the consul of 218 B.C. Though he was only twenty-four years of age and had filled no public office save that of aedile, he seemed to have a hereditary right to conduct a Spanish war; and indeed he always treated Spain rather as a fief of his own than a part of the empire, disposing of its armies and wealth practically at will. He early justified the choice of the citizens. In 210 B.C., hearing that the three Carthaginian commanders in Spain were stationed at great distances from one another, and that Carthago Nova was garrisoned by only a small number of troops, he conceived the bold idea of marching 300 miles through hostile territory and assaulting that stronghold. The attack succeeded, and the seat of the Carthaginian government in Spain became with all its treasure and munitions of war the prize of the victor.

By this time Hasdrubal Barca, the brother of Hannibal, was determined at every cost to make his way into Italy. Leaving Carthago Nova in undisputed possession of the Romans, he set out on his long march in 208 B.C. He is said to have been routed by Scipio at Baecula (*Boyle*) on the upper Baetis (*Guadalquivir*) with a loss of 20,000 men, but his defeat must have been much exaggerated—possibly to exculpate Scipio for allowing so terrible a foe

to descend on Italy—inasmuch as he at once crossed the Pyrenees by one of the western passes, and had arrived in Gaul before Scipio learnt what had become of him. In the early spring of 207 B.C. Hasdrubal crossed the Alps, and, welcomed by the Gauls and Ligurians of Northern Italy, advanced to Sena (*Sinigaglia*) on the eastern coast.

§ 152. The Romans had long been aware of Hasdrubal's

intentions, and made their preparations for this
The Battle of
the Metaurus,
207 B.C. campaign with even more than their usual care.

The consuls for 207 B.C. were C. Claudius Nero and M. Livius Salinator: Livius was entrusted with the command in the north, while Nero watched Hannibal. Having reached Sena, Hasdrubal sent a letter to his brother asking him to meet him in Umbria; but Hannibal was marching from one point of Southern Italy to another in the face of superior numbers, and the messengers, instead of finding him, fell into the hands of Nero near Tarentum. Thus Nero was perfectly informed of Hasdrubal's movements while Hannibal was still ignorant of them. He at once took upon himself the responsibility of quitting his own province regardless of the result, and with a picked force of 8000 troops set out without attracting the notice of Hannibal and joined Livius before Sena. Hasdrubal discovered that both consuls were opposing him and concluded that his brother had been defeated. Seeing no chance of a successful battle, he prepared to retreat across the Metaurus (*Metauro*). His guides misled him in the darkness of the night, and when day dawned he had no alternative but to prepare for battle, with troops exhausted and an impassable river behind him. The result was the destruction of his army. Hannibal only learnt of his brother's defeat and death when Nero ordered the head of Hasdrubal to be thrown into his camp. His last hope

gone, he withdrew into the recesses of Bruttium. In 205 B.C. he lost Locri, and learnt that Philip had concluded peace with Rome; after which he had nothing more to lose but his ability. That he never lost, and amongst the uplands of Bruttium for two years longer he continued the struggle, invincible as ever, until he was summoned home to defend Carthage, 203 B.C.

§ 153. The defeat of Hasdrubal was doubly disastrous, for it involved the loss of Spain. Hasdrubal Gisgo and Mago offered the best resistance Last years of the War, 207—202 B.C. they could with the weakened forces at their disposal; but step by step they lost ground, until Gades (*Cádiz*), their last foothold, was abandoned in 205 B.C. All resistance of the Spaniards was stamped out with the sternest barbarity. In 206 B.C., when the conquest of Spain was practically complete, Scipio had returned to Rome resolved to attack Carthage at home. He was unanimously elected consul for 205 B.C., and despite the opposition of Fabius Cunctator and the majority of the senate, he obtained Sicily as his province. with a grudging permission to carry the war into Africa if that course should seem advisable. For such a purpose neither men nor ships were voted on an adequate scale, but Scipio's mere name soon raised a sufficient army from Italian volunteers, and the Etruscan towns furnished him with a fleet. After spending a year in Sicily to complete his arrangements, he sailed from Lilybaeum as proconsul early in 204 B.C. He landed without opposition not far from Utica, which he at once Scipio in Africa, 204 B.C. proceeded to besiege. He had expected to receive effective help from Massinissa, prince of the Numidian Massyli; but unfortunately Massinissa had just been ejected from his kingdom by Syphax and the more westerly Numidian Massaesyli, and was wandering in exile

with a scanty body of followers. However, he did good service by accustoming the Romans to Numidian tactics, and after the summer of 204 B.C. had passed away without any decisive action, he prompted Scipio to attack the camps of Hasdrubal Gisco, the Carthaginian general, and his ally Syphax, and to set their rush-covered huts on fire. A terrible slaughter ensued, as many as 40,000 of the enemy perishing, but Hasdrubal Gisco and Syphax made their escape to levy a second army, and Utica was still untaken. Scipio's successes continued in 203 B.C. He defeated Hasdrubal and Syphax at a place called the "Great Plains," and Massinissa followed up the advantage by capturing Syphax and the strong fortress of Cirta (*Constantine*); so that the whole strength of the Numidian people was now directed against the Carthaginians. Unable to continue the struggle longer, the Carthaginian government, after a fruitless attempt to negotiate a peace, in despair ordered the recall of Hannibal and of his brother Mago, who had been rousing the Ligurians against Rome. Mago died of a wound on the voyage home; but Hannibal, abandoning with many a regret the Italian land over which he had ranged at will for fifteen years, obeyed the mandate and landed at the Lesser Leptis, 203 B.C. Wintering at Hadrumentum, he took the field again in 202 B.C. for the last time. Opposed to him were Scipio and Massinissa: the latter he at first defeated, but on the Battle of Zama, River Bagradas (*Mejerdeh*) he was attacked by 202 B.C. the combined Romans and Numidians. Many of his levies were raw recruits incapable of contending against the trained legions, but his veteran troops kept their ground and died where they stood. The battle ended in Hannibal's first and final defeat: it was fought on the 19th October, 202 B.C., and is usually known as

the battle of Zama (*Djama*), though that place was some days' march to the east. Peace was concluded in the same year. The terms offered by Scipio were severe : Terms of Peace. the Carthaginians were to give up all their ships of war save ten ; to pay 10,000 talents in '50 years ; to recognize Massinissa as king of all Numidia ; to give up Spain, and such islands of the Mediterranean as they still retained ; and worst of all, to wage no war in Africa or elsewhere without the consent of Rome. Scipio, henceforward known by the *agnomen* of Africanus, returned to celebrate a splendid triumph.

§ 154. So the war ended. Abroad its results may be summed up as follows : Spain became a Roman province, although nearly two centuries were to Results of the Second Punic War. elapse before its unruly tribes submitted entirely to the foreign rule ; the hitherto independent state of Syracuse was amalgamated with the rest of Sicily and placed under the authority of a Roman governor ; Numidia passed into dependence on Rome, to be utilized as a convenient tool for the humiliation of Carthage ; and Carthage was degraded into a helpless mercantile city without army or freedom of action.

In Italy, those districts which had sided with Hannibal were punished without mercy ; the lands of Capua, the entire breadth of Bruttium, most of Lucania and Apulia, and many cantons of Samnium and Picenum were confiscated to the state. In addition the Romans began to set an ever-widening barrier between themselves and the other peoples of Italy. Those communities which possessed the passive franchise (*civitas sine suffragio*) were advanced to the full franchise : but this was the sole reward which the Italians received for their loyalty, while the position of the Latins (*nomen Latinum*) altered so much for the worse that few of

the allies cared to exchange their own charters of federation for the once envied Latin rights. In accord with this new policy of Rome were the repeated expulsions of Latin citizens from Rome, the curtailment of their privilege of migration to the capital, and the refusal to establish any further colonies with Latin rights. Of these the last to be planted on Italian soil was Aquileia (*Aguileia*), 184 B.C.

The effects of the war on Rome itself will be described subsequently. Briefly, it gave increased powers to the senate at the expense of the magistrates and the comitia; while, owing to the depopulation caused by the struggle, the old class of farmers disappeared and their lands were bought up by capitalists who worked large grass-farms by means of slaves. Many of the dispossessed agriculturists left the country to make a living by selling their votes at Rome. or by serving in the legions.

STEMMA OF THE SCIPIOS

I. Cornelius Scipio.

P. Cornelius Scipio, killed in
Spain, 212 B.C.

Cn. Cornelius Scipio Calvus,
killed in Spain, 212 B.C.

P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus
Maior, the victor of Zama,
202 B.C.

P. Cornelius Scipio Africanus.

(by adoption)

P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus
Africanus Minor (son of I.
Aemilius Paulus), rased Carthage,
146 B.C.

CHAPTER VII.

THE FIRST PERIOD OF FOREIGN CONQUEST.

§§ 155—159. The Fate of Alexander's Empire and the condition of the East in 200 B.C.—§ 160. The First Macedonian War.—§§ 161—165. The Second Macedonian War.—§§ 166—170. The Syrian War.—§§ 171—175. The Third Macedonian War.—§ 176. The Fourth Macedonian War.—§§ 177, 178. The Achaean War.—§§ 179—181. The Third Punic War.—§§ 182, 183. Wars in the North of Italy.—§§ 184—186. Spanish Wars.—§ 187. Cato the Censor.

§ 155. THE close of the Second Punic War left Rome without a rival in the western Mediterranean. In the East, however, there was an almost unlimited field of conquest, and thither she turned her legions. Nor was this policy without justification. In the first place, the intrigues of Philip of Macedon, coming as they did at the most critical period of the struggle with Carthage, might have proved fatal to the existence of Rome, and could hardly pass without punishment now that she was free from her Punic enemy. Secondly, there was a possibility that the Macedonians might, under an enterprising ruler, burst upon Italy as Hannibal had lately done. Thirdly, Egypt was the granary of the Mediterranean, and it was politic to preserve that country and its teeming produce for the benefit of Rome's increasing population, and to prevent it from becoming a dependency of Syria or Macedonia. Yet the Romans at large were little desirous of a new war of

unknown magnitude; and the career of Eastern conquest upon which they now entered was rather thrust upon them than sought for.

§ 156. Before narrating the course of the war with

The Fate of
Alexander's
Empire.

Macedon, it will be necessary to sketch the position of the nations bordering on the eastern Mediterranean at the commencement of the second century B.C., and in order to do so we must go back to the time of Alexander the Great, from whose military achievements the civilized East had taken a new political shape. When Alexander died in 323 B.C., he had brought beneath the sway of Macedon all the kingdoms of the ancient world which were recognized as anything more than barbaric. In Europe he was master of all Hellas—including the famous Athens, Sparta, and Thebes; in Africa, of the ancient kingdom of Egypt; and in Asia, of the whole country eastwards to the Indus—that is, of the vast regions attached more or less loosely to the fallen Persian empire. And though at his death his conquests at once fell asunder, yet the Greek philosophers and merchants who followed him introduced Greek civilization and the Greek language over all this great extent of country.

The royal line of Alexander was soon thrust from its heritage, and the provinces of his empire became the spoil of the Macedonian generals who had helped to conquer them. After many quarrels, coalitions, and wars, the most powerful of Alexander's officers, Antigonus of Asia, was defeated at Ipsus in Phrygia, 301 B.C.; and the bulk of his empire went to Seleucus, who was thus the first of the kings of Syria known from him as the Seleucidae. Egypt, the second of the great kingdoms which arose from the wreck of Alexander's empire, remained under the rule

of the Ptolemies, who had been in possession of it since the first partition in 323 B.C. Macedonia, the third of the great powers, ultimately fell into the hands of Demetrius Poliorcetes, the son of Antigonus, and it was his great-grandson, Philip V., who first of the Macedonian kings came into conflict with the Roman power.

§ 157. The unwieldy Syrian empire, too heterogeneous to be controlled by any but the strongest will, was soon enfeebled by the revolt of its out-
In Asia,
Syria.
 lying dependencies. There thus arose in Asia a number of virtually autonomous principalities, of which the most influential were the semi-barbaric kingdoms of Bithynia, Pontus, Armenia, Cappadocia, the confederation of the Galatians, the mercantile state of Pergamum, and the maritime league of Rhodes. While Asia Minor—especially the districts of the coast—paid only nominal obedience to the Seleucidae, in the farthest east and north-east the wild peoples of Bactria and the Caspian were still less under control, and in the south there was perpetual fighting against the encroachments of the compact Egyptian monarchy. Only in the inland districts of Syria and in Mesopotamia did the “king of kings” rule with anything like unquestioned authority.

The Galatians, kinsmen of the Senones who had burned Rome, were the descendants of a host of Gauls
The Gala-
tians.
 who, after overrunning Macedonia and Greece in 280 B.C. and the following year, crossed into the heart of Asia Minor, and there settled in the country known as Galatia—the land of the Asiatic Gauls. They were divided into three tribes—the Tolistoboi, Trocmi, and Tectosages; and each of these was again divided into four cantons, called Tetrarchies. The government was in the hands of twelve Tetrarchs, controlled by a senate of three hundred.

These Asiatic Gauls, a terror to their effeminate neighbours, repeatedly defeated the armies of Syria, and eventually compelled the Seleucidae to pay them tribute.

The kingdom of Pergamum (*Bergamo*), which was to become under Roman patronage the leading state of Asia Minor, was called into existence by the resolute defence shown by one Philetaerus when the Gauls swept over Asia, 279 B.C. Attalus, the first of his successors to receive the title of king, made his capital a great commercial city and the rival of Alexandria as a centre of Greek learning.

Rhodes, which threw off the yoke of Macedon immediately after the death of Alexander, made itself the head of a confederacy of Greek communities—including Sinope, Smyrna, Samos, Abydos, Byzantium and Mitylene—which fringed the coast of the Aegean. By policy the Rhodians were close allies of Egypt and Pergamum; and not being desirous of acquiring possessions on the mainland, they were on good terms with the leading powers of the East, to whom their great naval force rendered them of consequence.

§ 158. Under the descendants of Ptolemy, Egypt became a great mercantile state, which in conjunction with Rhodes and Pergamum dominated the trade of the eastern Mediterranean. Following the policy of commercial expansion, it had annexed Coele Syria and Phoenicia, Cyprus and Cyrene; its influence was paramount along the southern shore of Asia Minor; and it held Ephesus, Samos, and some places in Thrace. Its capital, Alexandria, was the most populous and wealthy city of the East, and, like its allies Pergamum and Rhodes, fostered all that was best in Greek philosophy, science, and art.

§ 159. Macedonia, in spite of the poverty and exhaustion caused by the conquests of Alexander, was still a formidable power. It still held all Greece in subjection : in northern Greece the Thessalians, Euboeans, Locrians, Phocians, and Boeotians were either loyal subjects or allies, and the Peloponnesus was secured by the friendship of the Achæan League, which more than counterbalanced the hostility of Sparta, Messenia and Elis. The greatest enemy of Macedonia among the Greeks was the Aetolian League ; for Athens, though adverse as ever, had sunk through economic distress and internal troubles into insignificance. Demetrias (*Goritz*a) in Thessaly, Chalcis in Euboea, and Corinth, three fortresses known as the "Fetters of Greece," were garrisoned by Macedonian troops.

In Greece itself we still hear of Athens, Sparta and Thebes ; but those once famous states were politically impotent. At Sparta the old monarchy had disappeared and the city was in the hands of a tyrant. Thebes was as a rule devoted to Macedonia. What strength there was in Greece was to be sought in the newly-formed leagues of Achæa and Aetolia. The Achæan League, which originally consisted of four petty cities on the northern coast of the Peloponnesus, is first heard of in 280 B.C. From that date it grew steadily though slowly, becoming of no great importance until 251 B.C., when Aratus of Sicyon expelled the Macedonian garrison from that town, and to every one's surprise, instead of making himself its despot, united it to the League. The act gave a new impetus to the confederacy ; and so successful were its leaders, that within five-and-twenty years their League comprised virtually all Peloponnesus with the exception of Sparta, Messenia and Elis. Unfortunately the resolute opposition of Sparta compelled Aratus to turn for aid to

In Europe.
Macedonia.

The Achæan
League.

Antigonus Doson of Macedonia (223 B.C.), and though the defeat of Sparta was secured, it was only at a heavy price: it gave to the Macedonians a firm hold upon the Peloponnesus by the occupation of Corinth and other important places, and it made the League politically subordinate to the northern power.

The League of the Aetolians, a nation of free-booters half Hellenic and half Albanian, held a position inferior only to that of Macedonia and the Achaean League. The Aetolian League. With both the latter powers it waged a bitter feud, and, to crush its rivals, did not scruple to make alliances with Rome, or to break them when that foreign power dealt too leniently with those enemies.

§ 160. After the victory of Cannae, Hannibal, who saw in the Macedonian soldiery—the troops with which Alexander had conquered the East—the materials for completing the overthrow of Rome, The First Macedonian War, 214 B.C.—205 B.C. invited King Philip V. to cross the Adriatic and join him in the attack. Philip, who had seen with uneasiness the presence of Roman troops in Illyria, was not disinclined to accept the proposal, and came to an understanding with Hannibal in 215 B.C. But the Romans had intercepted a previous embassy, and knew what was threatened: in 214 B.C., before Philip could act, they despatched M. Laevinus to Illyria to find some means of keeping the Macedonians busy in Greece. To secure his line of communications with Italy, Philip besieged Apollonia (*Pollina*), the strongest fortress in Illyria, but his fleet was burnt and his camp taken. This reverse at once reduced him to inactivity. Two years later, 212 B.C., Laevinus, still in command as admiral, organized a formidable coalition. The Aetolians joined the Romans with alacrity, and were followed by the mass of the mountain tribes who lived west of the Pindus range.

The Achæan League remained faithful to Macedonia, but all those states of central and southern Greece—Athens, Elis, Messenia, and above all Sparta, now under the tyrant Machanidas—which were jealous of the League, readily rose at the call of Laevinus. In Asia, Attalus of Pergamum supplied him with money from his immense wealth, seeing in Rome a possible protector against his dangerous neighbours, Antiochus of Syria and Philip. The senate had gained its object: for ten years Greece was distracted by a war that wasted her forces and resources, while Laevinus, and after him P. Sulpicius Galba (consul in 211 B.C.), looked on and fomented the feuds. At last the Aetolians, who suffered as greatly as any of the combatants, grew tired of the horrors and cruelties of the suicidal struggle, and, in spite of Roman intrigues, concluded peace with Philip (205 B.C.). The Romans did the same: they gained no territory, but conquest had not been their aim: at the cost of a handful of troops and a few ships they had prevented the Macedonians from uniting with the Carthaginians, at a time when such a union would probably have been fatal to Rome.

§ 161. Philip had made trial of the strength of the western power, and had no desire to encounter it again. He possibly sent a few troops in secret to assist Hannibal at Zama, but with this exception he did nothing to aid his ally.

He turned his arms once more to the East.

In the year of the peace (204 B.C.) died Ptolemy Philopator, King of Egypt, leaving the throne to his son, Ptolemy Epiphanes, then five years old. Always jealous of the maritime empire and wealth of Egypt, Antiochus and Philip united to take advantage of the new king's helplessness, and agreed to a Treaty of Partition by which Egypt, Cyprus, and

The Second
Macedonian
War, 200 B.C.
—197 B.C.

The Compact
between Syria
and Macedonia,
205 B.C.

Ptolemy's possessions in Syria were to belong to the Seleucids, while the dependent islands of the Aegean, with Ionia and the Cyrenaica, were to be the share of Philip. Antiochus at once seized Coelesyria and Phoenicia, while Philip proceeded to attack the Greek cities in Thrace and Asia. Though vigorously opposed by Rhodes, Pergamum, and Byzantium, he took Chalcedon, seized Miletus and Samos (in the Egyptian sphere of influence), and secured the Thracian Chersonese and the Hellespont by the capture of Lysimachia and the reduction of Abydos in 200 B.C. He was defeated by the allies at Chios, but won a victory over Rhodes near Miletus.

Meanwhile the young Ptolemy, incapable of defending his kingdom unaided against the coalition, threw himself upon Roman protection. The senate was in a dilemma: it did not desire war, yet it could not permit the corn trade and other commerce of Egypt to pass into the hands of a hostile power, or the power of Philip to be augmented by the acquisition of the supremacy of the Aegean. For the present, however, it was contented with purchasing the inactivity of Antiochus by the surrender of the Egyptian possessions on the coast of Syria, that it might be left free to deal with Philip alone.

At this juncture the Athenians, allies of Rome, were attacked by Philip as the champion of the Acarnanians, because they had put to death two of the latter nation for an unintentional profanation of the sacred mysteries of Eleusis. Herein the senate found a *casus belli*, and war was resolved upon. When, however, P. Sulpicius Galba, the consul, convened the assembly, the people, still exhausted by the struggle with Hannibal, refused to take the field again so soon, and it was only by means of the unfounded statement that

Declaration of
war by Rome,
200 B.C.

Philip was preparing to invade Italy, that the consul was able to secure the vote which he desired.

§ 162. Two legions only were despatched with the consul to Illyria; for the senate was resolved to fight, The allies of Rome and Macedonia. as in the first war, with Grecian rather than with Roman troops. It had allies in the East both numerous and powerful. Attalus of Pergamus and the Rhodian League, irritated by fresh attacks of Philip on the towns about the Hellespont during this very year, gladly assisted the Romans with a respectable fleet. The Athenians of course joined Rome, but their aid was of little value. The Aetolians were less cordial: they had, they considered, been utilized in the previous war as tools by the Romans, and thrown aside when useless, but on the other hand, Philip had offended them anew by some recent aggressions. For the present, therefore, they hesitated. Acarnania, Phocis, Locris, Thessaly, and Boeotia went heartily with Macedonia; the Achaean League remained neutral. Outside Europe, Egypt was forced into alliance with Rome, although foreseeing that the presence of the Roman power in the Aegean would damage her own influence there; Antiochus was deterred from assisting Philip by his war with Egypt for the possession of Syria.

It was late in the year 200 B.C. when Galba arrived at Apollonia, and he could do no more than or- The First Campaign, 200 B.C. ganize a confederacy of the border tribes of the Pindus range with a view to a joint attack upon Macedonia in the ensuing spring. Meanwhile the fleet moved round to the eastern coast and surprised Chalcis in Euboea, a place of such importance that, as mentioned above, with Demetrias in Thessaly and Corinth on the Isthmus, it was termed one of the "Fetters of Hellas." The Roman admiral had not troops enough to

garrison his acquisition, and was obliged to abandon it on the approach of Philip, after burning all the stores there collected. The king in revenge passed into Attica, where he vainly endeavoured to storm Athens, and ravaged her territories to the very walls, destroying all the monuments of art and history which came within his reach.

In the following year, 199 B.C., Galba, whose successor had not yet arrived, made his way through the Illyrian mountains into the west of Macedonia. After some indecisive fighting, he was out-manceuvred by Philip, who occupied the passes through which the Romans must shortly retreat to their winter quarters in Illyria, and nearly met with serious disaster. However, the legions made good their retreat to Apollonia; and then Philip, left to deal with the border tribes who had, according to their compact with Galba, attacked Thessaly and Macedonia all along the northern and western frontiers, routed them in succession. The Illyrians were driven back in the north, while the Aetolians, who had by this time resolved to support the Romans, met with severe punishment in Thessaly. The only real success of the campaign was won when the combined Roman and Rhodian fleets captured Oreus (*Orei*) in the north of Euboea. On the whole Philip so far had decidedly the best of the war, and he was encouraged to cross the Macedonian frontier into Epirus for the next campaign.

The Second
Campaign,
199 B.C.

§ 163. Late in the autumn of 199 B.C. the Consul P. Villius Tappulus took over the command of the legions from Galba, but before he could achieve anything he had to give place to the consul for 198 B.C., T. Quinctius Flaminius. This general crossed to Apollonia in the spring of 198 B.C., and joined his army, which lay entrenched before that of Philip in a narrow

The Third
Campaign,
198 B.C.

gorge of the Aöus (*Vovussa*). The Macedonian position was so strong that Flaminius did not venture to assail it. At last after some weeks of indecision the treachery of the Epirote chief Charops furnished the consul with guides, who led a strong division of the Roman forces by a circuitous march into the rear of the enemy's position. The simultaneous attack in front and rear utterly confounded the Macedonians, who hastily retreated to their own country leaving 2000 men on the field. The battle threw all Thessaly into the hands of Flaminius save a few towns which still held out against his assaults. Philip entrenched himself anew near Mt. Olympus, in the gorge of Tempe (*Lykostomon*), the key of Macedonia on the Thessalian border-line. He still retained possession of Chalcis and Corinth, and the consul desisted from further advance upon Macedonia until he had secured Southern Greece. After long negotiations he succeeded in drawing the Achaean League over to Rome, much against its will indeed, because such an alliance, in addition to giving too great power to the invaders, placed it side by side with its natural foes the Aetolians, also allies of the Romans.

In Asia meantime Antiochus had shown signs of coming at last to the support of his ally. His army was already moving towards the Hellespont, and was engaged in raiding the territories of Attalus, when envoys from the senate arrived to remonstrate. Antiochus allowed himself to be turned from his purpose, and left Philip to his fate.

Thus deserted by his one powerful ally, and seeing the Romans masters of all Greece excepting the "Fetters," which must sooner or later fall, Philip endeavoured to conclude peace. At an interview between Philip and Flaminius an armistice of two months was arranged, in the course of which envoys were sent to Rome to treat with the

senate. But one question was put to them : was Philip willing to surrender all Greece with its three fortresses ? To this demand the envoys could only reply in the negative, and they returned home without success. At the same time Flaminius was appointed proconsul to continue the war, and fresh reinforcements were sent out.

§ 164. In 197 B.C. the Boeotians were coerced into joining the Romans. Philip, however, made one last effort. He raised what forces he could by enrolling even boys in his ranks, reinforced the garrisons of Corinth and Chalcis, and marched out into the plains of Thessaly. The two armies met near Cynoscephalae ("The Dog's Head"), a name given from their shape to the isolated heights with which the plain of Scotussa is here broken. The conflict was brought on suddenly, neither army being aware of its proximity to the other owing to intervening hills ; and for some time the fortune of the day was doubtful. One wing of the Roman legions was utterly broken by the charge of the phalanx, the flower of the Macedonian infantry, ranged sixteen deep, and armed with twenty-four-foot pikes ; but another division, falling upon the moiety of the Macedonians under Nicanor when thrown into disorder by inequalities of the ground, cut it to pieces. A few companies, brought to bear upon the rear of the victorious phalanx under Philip, turned the victory of the latter into complete defeat. Eight thousand Macedonians fell ; five thousand more were taken prisoners.

The Fourth
Campaign,
197 B.C.

Battle of
Cynoscephalae,
197 B.C.

Macedonia had perforce to accept whatever terms were offered by the Romans. Most of her enemies in Greece itself, particularly the Aetolians, would gladly have seen her blotted from the map of nations. Such a course did not suit the policy of the Romans, which aimed at pre-

serving the balance of power between the Greeks, Syria, Pergamus, and Macedonia, as well as maintaining a strong frontier against the Celts and Thracians of the north. The annihilation of Macedonia would be equivalent to setting Antiochus free from all check in the East, and also to inviting the incursions of the savage northern tribes. By the terms of peace drawn up by Flamininus, and ratified by the senate some months later, Philip lost all his foreign possessions in Asia, Greece, and the Aegean Sea; he was to pay an indemnity of 1000 talents; and he entered into the usual bond not to make war upon, or alliance with, any civilized people, without Rome's consent, and to limit his army to 5000 men, his fleet to five transports. He was also to lend help to Rome when called upon.

It remained for Flamininus to settle the affairs of Greece. The time had not yet come for annexing that country to the Roman dominions, and a plan had to be devised by which the various states should act as a check on one another and Macedonia. To the assembled Greeks at the Isthmian Games of 196 B.C. was read the proclamation that all those Greeks who had been dependent at any time upon Philip were now to be free and independent. The Achaean League was treated with respect, but the Aetolians, who regarded the victory as due in a large measure to their aid, were bitterly disappointed when Thessaly, instead of being handed over to them, was divided into four autonomous cantons, and they received for their share only Phocis, Locris, and Ambracia.

§ 165. In the Peloponnesus, the war between the Achaeans and Spartans still continued. Philip had given up Argos to Nabis: that town was by the mandate of the

senate henceforth to be free, but Nabis declined to surrender it. Flamininus, still proconsul, was invited by the united Greeks to free Argos and themselves from the despotism of Sparta, and he at once descended, together with a large Achaean force, into Laconia, 195 B.C. He gained no great success, and after some months was glad to leave Nabis still in possession of his city after despoiling him of his treasures, fleet, and dependencies, including even the coast towns of Laconia proper. The Achaeans murmured because their ideal of uniting all Peloponnesus under their rule was not realized: but the policy which had spared Philip caused Nabis also to be spared as a counterpoise to the influence of the League. During two years more, Flamininus moved about from town to town, doing his best to organize the affairs of Greece and to strengthen a party in favour of Roman views.

Evacuation of
Greece by the
Romans,
194 B.C.

In 194 B.C. matters were sufficiently quiet for the Roman garrisons to be withdrawn from the "Fetters" and other towns in their occupation. Flamininus himself returned in the same year, and the splendour of his triumph was as great as that of Scipio the conqueror of Carthage.

§ 166. Thus far the senate had shown no desire to be involved in eastern affairs. The first two Macedonian wars had been forced upon it by the necessities of self-defence or of policy; and the complete withdrawal of the legions in 194 B.C. proved clearly that territorial empire was not the senate's aim. Its only wish was to reduce to a political subservience all powers which might possibly threaten danger: thus it had reduced Macedonia and Hellas, yet had left each free and autonomous. Accordingly the prospect of a

The Syrian
War, 191 B.C.—
190 B.C.

new war in Asia Minor which immediately supervened was more distasteful than ever, as it was more distant, and was only entered upon when all negotiations had proved futile.

Antiochus III. had so far carried out his part of the Treaty of Partition as to annex southern Syria (Coelesyria and Phoenicia) to his own dominions. He then proceeded to attack in detail Caria, Lycia, and the other dependencies or allies of Egypt in Asia Minor, until, in 196 B.C., he even crossed into Europe and established himself in Thrace by the rebuilding of the impregnable fortress of Lysimachia (*Hexamili*).

Now Rome had but lately gone to war with Philip to prevent his gaining in Asia Minor exactly the influence which Antiochus had now acquired—command of the seaboard of Ionia and the territories of Pergamum, and control over the trade of the Rhodian League, Egypt, and the Aegean. They could not suffer the Seleucids to acquire what they had withheld from Philip, particularly when the latter was no longer capable of balancing Syrian influence. Still less could they allow the Seleucids to extend their power so far as to get a firm footing in Europe, for that was merely to transfer to Thrace what Macedon had lost. Finally, they must protect the interests of their ally Eumenes II.—he had succeeded Attalus I. as king of Pergamum in 179 B.C.—and of the Rhodians. They sent envoys ordering Antiochus to quit Europe and give up the newly conquered Asiatic cities.

Antiochus saw that he must fight at last, though he had Allies of Syria
and Rome. lost the opportunity of joining with Philip against Rome. He proceeded to strengthen himself by alliance with the kings of Egypt, Cappadocia, Bithynia, and the Galatians; came to terms with the Rhodians by liberal concessions; and lent a ready ear to

Thoas the Aetolian, who declared that all Hellas (especially the Macedonians and Spartans) was ready to rise against the Romans if the Syrians would but give the sign. On the other hand, Eumenes of Pergamum stood firmly by the Romans. In all this Antiochus was abetted by Hannibal, to the last faithful to his oath of undying enmity to Rome. After the battle of Zama the vanquished general had put down the oligarchs at Carthage, introduced democratic reforms in the government, and set the finances of the state on a good footing. His enemies revenged themselves by accusing him at Rome of inciting the people to war, and he was forced to fly, 195 B.C. He threw himself heart and soul into the cause of Antiochus, and was only prevented by the jealousies of Antiochus' other advisers, and by the remissness of the king himself, from using the Syrian forces to rouse Carthage once more to war, invade Italy anew, and bring upon Rome at one blow the combined armies of the East and West.

§ 167. The war broke out before Antiochus was in any way prepared. The Aetolians, impatient of delay and anxious only to avenge themselves on what they considered the ingratitude of Rome, made simultaneous attempts to surprise Demetrias, Chalcis, and Sparta. They were successful at Demetrias, but at the other points they failed with loss, and though Nabis was slain at Sparta, the city soon after joined the Achæan League and was thereby lost to Antiochus; for the League, ever at feud with the Aetolians, had no alternative but to side with the Romans. Athens and Thessaly did the same. Philip was far too indignant with Antiochus to join his old and faithless ally. The unanimous rising of Hellas of which Thoas had spoken was reduced in reality to a feeble confederacy of the Aetolians, Boeotians,

Antiochus
occupies Greece,
192 B.C.

and Magnes about Demetrias. However, Rome was at the time harassed by a vexatious war in Spain and Liguria. The great king landed in the Gulf of Pagasae (*Angistri*) late in 192 B.C., occupied Demetrias, gained by surrender Chalcis and with it all Euboea, took several towns in southern Thessaly, and then retired to spend the winter in revelry at Chalcis. Appius Claudius was only able to prevent the occupation of northern Thessaly.

§ 168. Had Antiochus made full use of his opportunities

First Campaign : the
Romans in
Greece,
191 B.C.

he might possibly have secured the support of united Greece. He had forestalled the Romans by his sudden arrival in Greece, but to do so he had sailed with a miserable force of about 10,000 foot ; and while no reinforcements reached him during the winter months, the few troops with him were thinned by sickness and enervated by indulgence. The Aetolians brought him but 4000 men. He had not numbers sufficient to keep the field when, early in 191 B.C., M'. Acilius Glabrio, the consul, appeared in Thessaly with forces amounting to 40,000 men of all arms. The new general wasted no time : he determined to drive the king from Greece before succour could reach him there. Antiochus had entrenched himself at Thermopylae : Glabrio charged up the pass where once Xerxes' troops had charged, but with a very different result. The phalanx of Antiochus gave way at once, and its flight became a carnage when M. Porcius Cato fell upon its flanks and rear, having crossed the mountains by the path which had once brought the Persians upon Leonidas. The Great King fled to Asia ; Chalcis and Demetrias surrendered ; and while the Romans spent the remainder of the year in fighting the Aetolians and pacifying southern Greece, Philip, now their cordial ally, revenged himself upon Antiochus by once more overrunning as

much of Thessaly as had taken up arms for the latter. By sea C. Livius gave battle to the Syrian fleet near the bay of Corycus between Chios and Ephesus, and by his victory obtained complete command of the Aegean and of the passage of the Hellespont (*Straits of Gallipoli*).

§ 169. The commander in the second campaign, 190 B.C., was nominally L. Scipio, but as his legate was appointed his brother P. Scipio Africanus, the conqueror of Carthage, with whom rested all real authority. The army crossed the Hellespont without opposition, for Antiochus, terror-stricken by fresh defeats of his navy, was by this time anxious only for peace. He endeavoured to purchase terms, but Scipio refused to accept anything less than the cession of all his dominions to the west of Mount Taurus. The Romans advanced into Lydia, crossed the Hermus (*Sarabat*), and at the foot of Mount Sipylus near Magnesia (*Manissa*) L. Scipio gave battle to an army of 80,000 Asiatics and won a decisive victory. Antiochus is said to have lost 50,000 men; the Romans little more than 300.

Second Campaign: the Romans in Asia, 190 B.C.

Battle of Magnesia, 190 B.C.

Scipio now offered the same terms of peace as before, and this time Antiochus did not refuse them. The River Halys (*Kyzyl-Irmak*) and the Taurus range became the western limit of the kingdom of the Seleucidae; all lower Asia passed under the protectorate of Rome, and even Cappadocia and the Armenias, Nearer and Further, though lying east of the Halys, became independent sovereignties. Antiochus paid 15,000 talents as an indemnity, and reduced his fleet to ten ships. The territory of which he was deprived went chiefly to reward the loyalty of Pergamum and Rhodes. Eumenes received the Syrian possessions in Thrace, and of those in Asia, Phrygia, Pisidia and Pamphylia, in addition to Mysia and Lydia.

Settlement of Asia, 189 B.C.

The Rhodians were aggrandised by the acquisition of Caria and Lycia, while the Greek cities of the coast (such as Byzantium and Cyzicus) remained free and independent. Thus Pergamum became a great kingdom, a vassal state bound to Rome by every tie of interest and gratitude, and strong enough to overawe the remainder of western Asia, while counterbalanced itself by the still powerful kingdom of Macedonia, also a vassal state of Rome. Once again the senate showed its unwillingness to commit itself to a foreign policy in the East by annexing no portion of the conquered king's territories, but the course which converted the Roman power from an Italian to a Mediterranean empire was already begun; and though Asia was left unvisited by the legions for nearly 100 years more, the land passed little by little from a protected to a subject state.

§ 170. The settlement of Asia had been in great part arranged by Cn. Manlius Vulso, the consul of 189 B.C., aided by a commission of ten. Although peace was restored, Vulso was unwilling to return to Italy without some kind of victory. Accordingly he attacked the Galatians on the plea that they were dangerous to the kingdom of Pergamum, and marching into their territory, defeated them without difficulty and carried off a great quantity of booty. No doubt it was a gain to have quieted such a nation of freebooters, but Vulso, by conducting a campaign without the mandate of the people and senate, set the precedent of ignoring the government at home, which ultimately transferred the sovereignty of Rome from the senate to the army.

In the same year, 189 B.C., the other consul, M. Fulvius Nobilior, ended the war in Aetolia. After the expiry of the six months' armistice granted in 190 B.C., the Aetolians

had resumed their aggressions on their neighbours. Fulvius now attacked them from all sides with the aid of Macedon and the Achaean League, captured Ambracia (*Arta*), their last stronghold, and ended the war with a slave-hunt. The Aetolians were confined to their own territory, forced to surrender Cephallenia (*Cefalu*) and Zacynthus (*Zante*) to Rome, and to make the senate the arbiter of their disputes.

The Subjection of the Aetolians.

§ 171. The success of the Romans in the war with Syria had been largely due to the aid of Philip, who thus revenged himself on his self-seeking ally. In return he hoped to reap some commensurate reward, but found his hopes disappointed. Macedonia was left at the close of the war exactly as at its outbreak, and Philip was repeatedly thwarted in his efforts to recover something of his lost possessions in Thessaly and Thrace. Exasperation confirmed his determination to strike one more blow for his freedom, but he would not plunge rashly into this last struggle. He set himself to restore the strength of Macedonia by every means in his power. The finances were reorganized, fresh settlers were introduced, the army, small as the treaty made it, was admirably trained. In the midst of his preparations and his vexations he died, 179 B.C. Three years before (182 B.C.) he had ordered the execution of his son Demetrius, his own and his people's favourite, whom he had too late discovered to be the victim of a treacherous accusation on the part of Perseus, an elder but illegitimate son.

The Third Macedonian War, 171 B.C.—168 B.C.

Perseus, who thus secured the throne by his brother's death, inherited all his father's hatred towards Rome. He continued zealously the preparations for reasserting his place amongst the kings of the East, and soon won the

entire confidence of his own nation. He made alliances with Syria and Bithynia, and with Cotys king of the Odrysae, the most warlike and powerful people of Thrace. His northern frontier he secured against the possible enmity of the barbarians; and, like his father, he is said to have invited the Bastarnae of Moesia to join him in an invasion of Italy by way of the head of the Adriatic. The plan failed, and Perseus was forced to adopt the old and oft-repeated scheme of expelling the Romans from Illyria and arousing the Greeks against them, and also intrigued, it was said, with the Carthaginians as Antiochus had done. But Hannibal was dead now. After the peace with Syria, that general, again a fugitive, had taken refuge at the court of Prusias, King of Bithynia. Thither the senate had sent to demand his surrender, and he had taken poison to escape that disgrace. He died in 183 B.C., in the same year as did Scipio his conqueror, who had also lived long enough to experience the ingratitude of his nation. Attacked on various petty charges, particularly on one of embezzlement in the Syrian campaign, Scipio had left Rome. Declaring that his country should not even have the honour of burying his ashes, he died in retirement at Liternum in Campania.

§ 172. Many circumstances favoured the plans of Perseus. Throughout Greece there was a general reaction against the dominion of Rome, in which the Aetolians and the Boeotians were especially active. The power of Eumenes, purchased by treachery to the cause of Greece, was now viewed with detestation, and no concessions could redeem its character in the eyes of Hellas. In 172 B.C. that king in person made complaint to the senate of the proceedings of Perseus. He pointed

Accession of
Perseus,
179 B.C.

Position of
Perseus,
172 B.C.

out his attacks on Abrupolis, a Thracian chieftain and ally of Rome, and his alliance with Boeotia and Aetolia, and declared that he was on the eve of re-uniting all the East against Rome. The senate was alarmed, and in secret declared that war must be waged without delay. Perseus was aware of Eumenes' action, and made an unsuccessful attempt to assassinate him at Delphi.

Had Perseus acted at once he might have driven the Romans from Greece. Unfortunately, while he hesitated the prompt action of the Romans dissolved the threatened coalition of Hellas. Epirus and the western frontiers of Macedon were strongly occupied, and Boeotia was detached from the cause of Perseus. Seeing the inactivity of the Macedonian king, his promised allies repented. The Rhodians, however angry with Eumenes, could not be expected to fight against Rome. Perseus' Illyrian allies, Bithynia, Syria, and Carthage, followed this example. Himself and Cotys were left alone; but Perseus had at his call a nation of warriors all of one mind, 45,000 trained troops, and treasures and stores for ten years of war.

§ 173. The senate had decided on war in 172 B.C., but a quarrel with one of the consuls prevented any action from being taken. Next year, the Centuriate Assembly voted for war, and the consul P. Licinius Crassus advanced into Thessaly, where he was reinforced by contingents from Pergamus, the Achæan League, the Aetolians, and Thessalians. Between Mount Ossa and the town of Larissa (*Larissa*) he was attacked by the Macedonians, and driven back within his lines with the loss of nearly 3000 slain or captured. The news roused in Greece fresh sympathy for Perseus; but the dread of Rome was too pronounced to allow of any open revolt, and Perseus himself made overtures for peace instead

The First
Campaign,
171 B.C.

of following up his success. Crassus refused to negotiate, but when war was resumed he met with a second reverse at Phalanna, not far from the scene of the first engagement. Though again successful, Perseus now evacuated all Thessaly, and devoted himself to securing his northern and western frontiers.

In 170 B.C. Aulus Hostilius, a man as incapable as his predecessor, took the command, but by this time the army was so disorganized that he was forced to waste the whole year in restoring discipline, after failing in two attempts to fight his way by the passes from Thessaly into Macedonia.

The third campaign (169 B.C.) opened with the advance of Q. Marcius Philippus, who turned the Macedonian position at Tempe. Although the Romans were now between two fires (for to the south lay Tempe and to the north Dium), Perseus was too incapable to cut off their communications. Instead of striking a decisive blow, the king in panic evacuated the impregnable pass of Tempe, and even ordered his treasures to be sunk. The fall of Tempe threw the key of Macedonia into the hands of Rome, and only a capable general was wanted to bring the war to an end. Dium (*Malathria*) now became the outpost of the Macedonians.

§ 174. By this time the senate was weary of the war and displeased by the cruelties which had been wreaked by its incapable commanders. It had one good general, L. Aemilius Paullus, son of the consul who fell at Cannae, a man whose ability had been proved in the Spanish and Ligurian wars of which we shall shortly speak. He was already an old man who preferred to live in retirement; but the call of the senate brought him once more into the field, and he was elected consul.

He found Perseus entrenched in front of the Roman camp on the banks of the Elpius, a small river immediately north of Tempe. On his left lay the range of Mount Olympus, the passes of which were so carelessly guarded that the new consul was able to surprise them at once and so get in the rear of Perseus, who evacuated Dium and withdrew forthwith to Pydna (*Kitros*). Here the two armies again entrenched themselves, and some days passed in inactivity. On June 22, 168 B.C., a battle was unexpectedly brought on before Perseus could properly dispose his forces. Taken by surprise on rough ground, the heavy phalanx was routed before it could form in battle order. In a short time the entire army of Macedon was dispersed: 20,000 fell, 11,000 were taken prisoners. Perseus gave up the struggle and fled to Samothrace, only to surrender in a few days to the Roman admiral. In fifteen days Aemilius Paullus had ended a war which less capable generals had prolonged to their disgrace for four years. He triumphed in the following year (167 B.C.). Amongst the captives who walked before him to the Capitol were Perseus, his queen, and his three children; and so immense was the treasure which the conqueror brought to Rome, that the senate was able, after paying the entire cost of the war, to remit all direct taxes upon the citizens for many years.

Battle of
Pydna,
168 B.C.

§ 175. Macedonia was now at the mercy of Rome; but the senate, while disarming and isolating it, refused to constitute it a province under a Roman governor. It was split into four departments, that of Pella, that of Amphipolis, that of Thessalonica (*Saloniki*), and Pelagonia. All were debarred from intercourse and intermarriage with one another; the officials of the late reign were deported to Italy, and

Settlement of
Macedonia,
167 B.C.

the government was placed in the hands of the remaining nobles. A tax of one hundred talents was levied annually, half the sum which had been previously paid to Perseus. Cotys remained unmolested, for the senate, not yet prepared to take up a war with the multitudes of Thrace, preferred to bind him to quietude by the show of generosity with which it restored to him his son, who had been made prisoner. Illyria was otherwise treated. The country was re-organized in three isolated states paying tribute, like Macedonia, to Rome. From this date ceased the piracy and brigandage of Illyria, which rapidly became Romanized (168 B.C.).

Throughout southern Greece, the supporters of the fallen Perseus were hunted out, and at once executed or transported to Italy. One thousand leading men of the cities of the Achæan League were thus exiled and retained in or near Rome, including Polybius the historian. The severities of the Romans were outdone by some of the Greeks themselves, notably Lyciscus the Aetolian and Callicrates the Achæan, who became informers, and butchered their enemies or rivals on the plea of supporting Rome.

In Asia, both Pergamum and Rhodes were humiliated. Now that Macedonia had fallen, the kingdom of Pergamum was left with no power to balance it by land; and the Rhodian League, besides enjoying the command of the sea, had offended Roman vanity by offering to mediate between Rome and Macedonia. Pergamum, at least, had supported Rome heartily in the war, but now it fared as ill as Rhodes. The Rhodians were stripped of their territorial possessions in Lycia and Caria, and their commerce was hampered by the formation of a free port at Delos. Eumenes, whose visit to Rome had been the direct

cause of the war, received no reward for his loyalty: on the contrary, the Romans tried to set his brother in opposition to him, encouraged the Galatians to overrun his territories, and deprived him of his quasi-supremacy over Galatia and Pamphylia, both of which were erected into free and independent states. Antiochus had profited by the war with Macedonia to attack Egypt, and he was actually besieging Alexandria when, Of Egypt. immediately after the battle of Pydna, the Roman envoy C. Popilius Laenas presented himself, and bade the king evacuate Egypt forthwith. Drawing a circle with his staff round Antiochus, he demanded an answer before the king stepped from the circle. The "king of kings" submitted to the insult and retired: Egypt passed henceforth under the protectorate of the senate.

§ 176. The division of Macedonia into four cantons led to perpetual dissensions and disputes, and embassy after embassy appeared at Rome to draw the attention of the senate to its own The Fourth
Macedonian
War, 149 B.C.
—148 B.C. particular grievances. For some years after the battle of Pydna there was no overt act of hostility against Rome, but troubles recommenced in 149 B.C. A certain Andriscus, a fuller of Adramyttium in Mysia, gave out that he was Philip, a son of Perseus who was known to have previously died in captivity in Italy, and claimed the Macedonian crown. This adventurer was given up to the Romans by Demetrius, the Syrian king, but he was so carelessly guarded that he escaped, 149 B.C., and speedily gained many supporters among the Macedonians. For a time he met with considerable success; he defeated the praetor P. Juventius Thalna in a pitched battle, and made himself master of all Macedonia and of much of Thessaly. It was not until the close of 148 B.C. that Q.

Caecilius Metellus, the praetor selected to command in Greece, drove him out, and compelled the Thracians, with whom he took refuge, to deliver him up.

After this outbreak Macedonia was no longer treated as a dependent state, but organized as a province on the same footing as Sicily and Spain, and so converted into an integral part of the Roman dominions. To it were attached the Roman possessions in Illyria, including Apollonia and Dyrrhachium and the islands off the coast; and the praetor, who every year took up the government, was regarded also as the protector of Greece. The tribute remained as it had been settled by Aemilius Paulus in 168 B.C., and the towns were suffered to retain their own local government; but Macedonia as a nation ceased to exist.

§ 177. The downfall of Greek freedom occurred almost simultaneously. As in Macedonia, the settlement of 168 B.C. had been followed by a period of intestine feuds and party quarrels, which the Roman senate studied rather to foment than to appease. In 149 B.C. the president of the Achaean League was a certain Diaeus, who, to conceal some misdoing of his own, hurried on the League into an attack on Sparta. The Spartans, though nominally admitting the headship of the League, were as jealous as ever of Achaean encroachment, and appealed to the arbitration of Rome. The League also sent an embassy, but the senate would not give an immediate decision, only promising to send a commission to Greece to investigate the matter. The next year, 148 B.C., Damocritus, the new general of the League, made a fresh attack on Sparta, in spite of the protest of Metellus, the Roman commander in Macedonia. At last, in 147 B.C., the long-expected commission arrived in Greece. The decree

Macedonia
becomes a
Province,
148 B.C.

Rome and the
Achaean
League.

which it brought from the senate was to the effect that the authority of the League should be confined to its immediate territory, and that Sparta, Corinth, Argos, Orchomenus, and Heraclea (near Thermopylae) were to be independent. On learning this the Achaeans, assembled in congress at Corinth, broke out into bitter denunciations of Rome, and the chief of the envoys barely escaped ill-usage. A second commission bore less exacting demands: but Critolaus, the president of the League, was determined to fight out the quarrel, and assured the Achaeans that the Romans were too much occupied with their troubles in Africa and Spain to be capable of coercing the Greeks.

§ 178. In the spring of 146 B.C. Critolaus, disregarding the warnings of Metellus, induced the League to declare war against Sparta. As the Spartans were too much enfeebled to offer resistance, the forces of the League moved northwards into Thes-

The Achaean
War and Sack
of Corinth,
146 B.C.

saly to effect the reduction of Heraclea, that town having taken advantage of the senate's mandate to throw off the control of the League. Metellus moved from Macedonia to protect the threatened position. The mere report of his advance was sufficient to cause the retreat of the Greeks. In Locris they were overtaken by Metellus, and at Scarphea (not far from Thermopylae) met with utter defeat. Few of their number reached the Peloponnesus, and Critolaus was never again seen. Before Metellus could strike the final blow L. Mummius, the consul, arrived with a large army from Rome to conduct the operations against the Achaeans. At Leucopetra, near Corinth, he won a decisive victory: the Achaeans, now commanded by Diaeus, offered but slight resistance, and Corinth fell without a blow into the consul's hands. He removed all the famous works of art from the city, and reduced

it to ashes. So fell the great commercial city of Greece.

The territory of Corinth, Thebes, and Chalcis became the property (*ager publicus*) of the Roman people; accordingly the inhabitants of these places paid as dues (*vectigal*) a fixed proportion of the produce of the soil. The other communities remained formally free, and it was not till the time of Augustus that Greece (under the name of Achaëa) became a province. But the various states were isolated; the citizens of one community could not have *commercium* with the citizens of any other; democracies were replaced by oligarchies; and some of the conquered states had to pay a money tax. The praetor of Macedonia decided disputes between Greek states.

Settlement of
Greece,
146 B.C.

§ 179. The year in which Corinth fell was marked by the downfall of Carthage, and both these events were to a large extent due to the jealousy with which such great commercial centres were

Carthage,
Massinissa,
and Rome.

viewed by the merchant class at Rome.

By the peace of 201 B.C. the kingdom of Numidia had been assigned to Massinissa, the chief of the Massyli. In return for this gift, Massinissa was expected by the senate to act as a spy on Carthage, and to prevent her from regaining her lost power. Under his vigorous rule the kingdom of Numidia acquired a solidity and strength which made it unique among the peoples of Africa. Encouraged by his success, and urged on in secret by Rome, he commenced his aggressions on Carthaginian territory almost as soon as the peace of 201 B.C. was concluded, and continued them uninterruptedly for a period of forty years. The Carthaginians appealed to the arbitration of the senate, but were met only by evasion and injustice.

Carthage, indeed, had recovered with astonishing celerity from her late overthrow; the reforms introduced by Hannibal after the war were so beneficial, that in 195 B.C. the Carthaginians offered to pay down in one sum the remainder of the war-indemnity still due, and their merchantmen again crowded the seas in rivalry with those of the Romans. Hence the merchants of Rome again became jealous: Cato, who had observed the new vigour of Carthage when on an embassy to that city in 157 B.C., never failed to end every speech—no matter what its subject—that he made in the senate with the epilogue *Delenda est Carthago*, “Carthage must be destroyed”; and the sentiment found an echo in the breast of every Roman.

§ 180. Carthage occupied the extremity of a small peninsula running eastward into the Gulf of Tunes (*Tunis*), so indented on either side by lagoons (the Bay of Sokra and the Lake of Tunis), that the neck of the peninsula, across which ran the outer wall of the city, was of no great breadth. This outer wall was triple, so thick and lofty as to provide stalls for many thousand elephants and horses, and magazines of all kinds. Within it, behind other walls of their own, lay the citadel or Byrsa, and the two harbours of the city; of which one, the Mercantile Harbour, was a natural basin, while the other, the Cothon, was a dock of circular form, built to accommodate a war-navy of two hundred sail.

In 151 B.C. the patriotic party in Carthage, driven to desperation by the intrigues of Massinissa, broke out into open war against the Numidians. The senate then determined to interfere; and though the Carthaginians in a panic put the leaders of the war party to death, and offered to make any reparation for violating the treaty, war was declared in 149 B.C. Even then

Description
of Carthage.

The Third Punic
War, 149 B.C.
—146 B.C.


a final embassy tried to deprecate the vengeance of the Romans: three hundred hostages from the noblest families were given up; but when the consul, L. Marcius Censorinus, had crossed to Africa and secured Utica as a base of operations, he made further demands. First he bade them give up their munitions of war, and two thousand catapults and two hundred thousand stand of arms were handed over. Then he bade them quit their city, and withdraw to a new site ten miles from the sea. At last the Carthaginians were roused to fury. To quit the coast was to lose their commerce: as one man they flew to arms, tore in pieces all who spoke of surrender, and when the consul marched on the city from Utica, he found it armed anew and prepared to resist to the last.

§ 181. Censorinus began the attack from the Lake of Tunes, while his colleague, M'. Manilius, encamped before the outer wall in order to cut off supplies from the landward side. The year passed without any decisive action. Massinissa, who proved but a lukewarm ally, died at the age of ninety, and his kingdom was divided between three of his sons—Micipsa, Gulussa, and Mastanabal.

The consul of 148 B.C., L. Calpurnius Piso, obtained no successes: the Numidians showed signs of restlessness, and the siege of Carthage was practically abandoned. At last the senate, weary of its incapable generals, allowed P. Cornelius Scipio to be elected to the consulship, though he was not of the age required by law. The new general, who had served in the first two campaigns in an inferior capacity, was the youngest son of L. Aemilius Paulus the conqueror of Perseus, but had been adopted by the childless P. Cornelius Scipio, the son of the great Africanus.

The Campaign
of 149 B.C.

148 B.C.



Scipio soon restored confidence among his troops by taking the suburb of Magalia. Then erecting a
 147 B.C. line of fortifications across the isthmus, he cut off Carthage by land, while the entrance to the Mercantile Harbour was blocked by the construction of a huge mole. The Carthaginians were thus apparently shut in ; but at the very moment that the mole was completed, they opened a new passage from the Cothon to the sea, and through this their imprisoned vessels sailed out. The Roman fleet was so little prepared for this, that it would probably have been destroyed had the Carthaginians given battle at once. They waited however three days, and were then defeated with severe loss. The blockade was now securely established, and famine ended the struggle.

In the spring of 146 B.C., C. Laelius, the friend of Scipio, and now acting as his admiral, forced his way
 Fall of Carthage, 146 B.C. into the Cothon. The Carthaginians made a last effort in the streets which led upwards to the Byrsa ; but after six days of massacre, they were driven by the flames into the citadel, and there surrendered. The city was rased, and the plough driven over its site, while Scipio uttered a solemn curse on any one who should attempt to found it again.

The territory of Carthage became the Roman province of Africa. It needed but slight defence, for by
 Carthage a Roman Province, 146 B.C. land it was encircled by the allied kingdom of Numidia. Such towns as had aided Rome, including Utica, became free cities ; all such as had held out to the last, like Carthage herself, were treated more harshly, and deprived of their territory.

§ 182. The war with Hannibal had involved the whole of the Gallic tribes dwelling between the Alps and the central

Apennines, and had thus undone the work of assimilation for which the Romans had founded Placentia and Cremona (218 B.C.). After the peace with Carthage this work was resumed, but their brief experience of freedom only made the resistance of the Gauls the more desperate, and on the first attempt to re-introduce colonists from Rome, the Boii, incited by Hamilcar, a Carthaginian officer, commissioned for the purpose, rose in a revolt which drew with it the Insubres and the Ligurians about the head of the Gulf of Genoa. In 200 B.C. the colony of Placentia was sacked, and Cremona was only relieved by a severe battle. In 199 B.C. the legions which had gained that victory were cut to pieces by the Insubres, and the successes by which the Romans were at last able to re-establish themselves at Placentia (197 B.C.) were due rather to quarrels of the Gauls amongst themselves than to the valour or skill of the commanders. The Cenomani went over to Rome, and so decided a fight near Comum (*Como*), after which the Insubres sued for peace (196 B.C.). South of the Po, however, the Boii held out until 193 B.C., when they were crushed near Mutina (*Modena*). One-half of their territory was ceded to Rome, and the remnant of the nation soon after disappeared from Italy. Colonies were planted at Potentia (*S. Maria di Potenza*), Pisaurum (*Pesaro*), Bononia (*Bologna*), Mutina (*Modena*), and Parma; and the country was opened up by new strategic roads, such as the *Via Aemilia* from Ariminum to Placentia.

Subjection of
the Italian
Gauls

The region north of the Po, Gallia Transpadana, was suffered to maintain its national polity of small cantons; no tribute was levied, and the greatest disability imposed on the Gauls was that none of their number could ever become a citizen of Rome. In spite of this the country

was Romanized with extraordinary speed, and the Celtic inhabitants rapidly lost their national character.

§ 183. The Ligurians gave more trouble, though the war in this region was attended with less marked disasters. Their mountain fastnesses, reaching from the neighbourhood of Florence to near Marseilles, were almost inaccessible and could only be opened up by incessant campaigns. In 180 B.C., L. Aemilius Paullus (afterwards famous as the victor of Pydna) reduced the Ingauni, a leading tribe, and next year the Apuani were transported bodily to the almost deserted lands of Samnium about Beneventum. Still the natives were not subdued. In 177 B.C. they took Mutina, and for many years more it was necessary to maintain a military force amongst them. The Arnus was declared their southern limit, and the fortresses of Pisae (*Pisa*), Luca (*Lucca*), and Luna (*Carrara*) were garrisoned to hold them in check ; but the warfare was not definitely ended until 165 B.C. The neighbouring islands of Corsica and Sardinia were equally rebellious. Tiberius Gracchus, father of the great reformers, brought home so many captives from Sardinia at the close of his campaign of 177 B.C., that "Cheap as Sardinians" became a proverb.

§ 184. By the peace of 201 B.C. Carthage had ceded to Rome the whole of the Spanish peninsula. Thus far but a small strip along the eastern coast had been occupied by the Roman arms ; but now the senate, albeit opposed to foreign empire, was constrained to annex this land of minerals, dyes, and wool. In so doing it undertook a task which exceeded in difficulty any other of Rome's conquests : the Spanish wars lasted 200 years, and were only ended finally by Agrippa in the year 19 B.C.

Wars in Spain,
200 B.C.—
178 B.C.

The newly-acquired land was at once divided into two provinces, known as *Hispania Citerior* or *Tarraconensis*, stretching from the Pyrenees to some point south of *Carthago Nova*, and *Hispania Ulterior* or *Baetica* (197 B.C.); and there were created six praetors instead of four, the command of these provinces being entrusted to the new magistrates. Their efforts to introduce Roman authority were met by a general rising of the whole nation, headed as usual by the tribes of the central highlands, the region called by the Romans *Celtiberia* and by us known roughly as the two Castiles. The praetor of Hither Spain was slain, and the war became so serious that in 195 B.C. M. Porcius Cato, one of the consuls, was despatched to restore Roman prestige. After reorganizing his army, he defeated the combined Spaniards near *Emporiae* (*Ampurias*) so decisively that the people of *Tarraconensis* at once submitted; but, on hearing a false report that Cato had sailed home, they rose again and were again crushed. To secure his victory Cato sent simultaneous orders to their strongest towns to dismantle their fortifications forthwith, and each, fearing Roman vengeance for itself alone, did so. The consul proceeded to introduce a regular tribute, and in particular levied dues upon the mines of iron, silver, and gold. Such imposts only exasperated the Spaniards, and though Cato triumphed for his successes, the legions of both provinces were continually in the field, fruitlessly seeking to push their way into the mountains of the interior.

In 179 B.C., after the war had been proceeding year after year with varied results, Tib. Sempronius Gracchus, seeing that force alone would not suffice, combined with it diplomacy and kindness. By granting honourable terms to those who submitted,

The Pacification
of Gracchus,
179 B.C.

enlisting many in the Roman service, settling others on new lands, and in every way sparing the proverbial pride of the Spaniards, he effected a far more lasting pacification than by the capture of 300 of the revolted towns and fortresses. He left his name behind him in the new town of Graccuris, and his memory was long cherished by the people whom he subdued.

§ 185. For twenty-six years the pacification of Gracchus remained a reality, although the extortions of the praetors provoked many complaints from the native tribes. In 153 B.C. there was a revival of the old troubles, and for nearly twenty years following that date both Hither and Further Spain were the scene of perpetual conflict. To relate all the details of the quarrel would not be profitable, but two of the main episodes—the war with Viriathus and the struggle of Numantia against the Romans—are worthy of some notice.

In 150 B.C., Servius Sulpicius Galba, the governor of Further Spain, committed an act of shameful perfidy: on promise of settling the Lusitani in new lands, he induced them to assemble in three bands; then attacking each company separately, he massacred all with the exception of seventeen persons. Galba was impeached on his return, but acquitted by a venal jury in spite of the eloquence of Cato. Among the fugitives, however, from the massacre was a certain Viriathus, distinguished above all his countrymen by activity and courage, by a genius for craft and deceit almost Phœnician, by an aptitude for command not unworthy of a Roman. In 149 B.C., when Rome was busily engaged both in Africa and Macedonia, Viriathus out-maneuvred the Roman army with such striking success that he became the acknowledged leader of the Lusitani. Although the senate sent its best

Renewal of
Hostilities,
153 B.C.

Viriathus, 150
B.C.—140 B.C.

generals against him, his good fortune lasted until he was recognized as an independent chief, 141 B.C. At last the consul of 140 B.C. induced some treacherous followers to murder him. Upon his fall the Lusitani made peace. So ended for the present the wars in Further Spain.

§ 186. There still remained a fierce struggle in the nearer province, where the Arevaci were induced by the successes of the Lusitani to ^{The Numantine War, 143 B.C.—133 B.C.} take up arms, 143 B.C. The chief town of the insurgents was Numantia, which, strongly situated on the upper waters of the Durus (*Douro*), held out for a space of ten years, though it was defended by no more than eight thousand warriors against the whole force of Rome. In the successive campaigns the Romans got little besides disgrace; but the climax was reached in 137 B.C., when C. Hostilius Mancinus was driven from his lines about Numantia and forced to surrender. To save his army from the ignominy of passing under the yoke, he was compelled to acknowledge the independence of the Numantines, who set free his army when his quaestor Tib. Sempronius Gracchus swore to observe the treaty. In spite of the protests of the latter, the senate refused to acknowledge the agreement; and Mancinus, naked and with chained hands, was offered to the Numantines as an indemnity. They refused to receive him, and for three years the struggle continued, until in 134 B.C. the command was given to Scipio Aemilianus, the conqueror of Carthage. Matters had come to such a pass, that the services of the best general of his time were needed to reduce an insignificant country town. Scipio raised troops where other commanders would have failed, for service in Spain was highly unpopular owing to its hardships and slight profits. He also took a picked company of his clients. Micipsa, one

of the sons of Massinissa, sent him men and elephants, and among those serving under him were Jugurtha the Numidian and the famous C. Marius. Many months were spent in restoring discipline; and then Scipio, after cutting off supplies by ravaging the surrounding country, drew his lines round the town, contenting himself with a strict blockade. At the close of 133 B.C. Numantia ^{Fall of Nu-} fell. The few Spaniards who had maintained ^{mantia, 133 B.C.} life by eating the bodies of their dead comrades fired the town and perished almost to a man. After this event the Romans reduced the greater part of the peninsula, though in the remote north and north-west some tribes still refused to accept the foreign yoke.

§ 187. Throughout this period the Scipios had been the most powerful family at Rome. Their great ^{The Scipios and Cato.} antagonist was M. Porcius Cato, of whom mention has been made in the wars with Antiochus, Carthage and Spain. Though only a small farmer of Tusculum, his sterling qualities so attracted the notice of an influential neighbour, L. Valerius Flaccus, that the latter advised him to stand for office at Rome. Cato had already served through the greater part of the second Punic war, when in 205 B.C. he was elected to the quaestorship. After the death of Fabius Cunctator, he took up that hero's policy and led the opposition to the aggrandisement of Scipio Africanus. After being aedile and praetor, he was chosen consul for 195 B.C., in which year, as already related, he campaigned so vigorously against the tribes of Spain, that he is said to have stormed or taken more towns than there were days in his year of office. In 191 B.C. he fought under M'. Acilius Glabrio, at Thermopylae; but on his return, when both were candidates for the censorship, he attacked

his old chief for misappropriation of the booty. The manœuvre, however, did not secure for him the office he desired, for though Glabrio withdrew from the contest, the Scipionic party to which he belonged exerted all its influence against Cato. Cato retaliated by accusing L. Scipio of embezzlement in the Syrian war, while a further charge of corruption against Scipio Africanus caused the latter to retire in disgust from Rome. Thus freed from his more formidable enemies, Cato won the censorship for 184 B.C., and exercised his office with such vigour in expelling unworthy members from the senate and in legislating against luxury, that he gained the title of "The Censor" (*Censorius*). On one occasion at least his severity was not misjudged: L. Quinctius Flaminius, the brother of the "Pacifactor of Greece," had in a Ligurian campaign beheaded a prisoner for the gratification of a worthless favourite, who had missed the games at Rome and wished to see how a man died; for this he was punished by being ejected from the senate. During the remainder of his life, Cato was frequently prosecuted by his political enemies, but such was the confidence of the people in his integrity that he was invariably acquitted. When envoy to Carthage, 157 B.C., he noted the prosperity of the city, and thenceforth advised war on every occasion. He died 149 B.C., aged more than eighty.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE GOVERNMENT AT HOME AND ABROAD.

§ 188. The Nobiles.—§§ 189, 190. The Senate and its Authority.—
§ 191. The Magistrates.—§ 192. The Comitia.—§§ 193, 194. The
Decay of the Farmers.—§ 195. The Growth of the City Rabble.—
§§ 196, 197. The Latins and Allies: their grievances.—§§ 198—
201. Administration of the Provinces, the *Lex Calpurnia de
Repetundis*.—§ 202. The Equestrian Order.

§ 188. WE have seen (§ 71) that with the Licinian Laws of
367 B.C. a new aristocracy came into existence.
The Nobiles. The governing class now consisted of the old
Patrician houses, but still more largely of wealthy plebeian
families who had fought their way to the great magistracies
of the state. The criterion of nobility was now election
to curule office (curule aedileship, praetorship, consulship),
and the descendants of a citizen who had held one of these
posts, were admitted to the ranks of the aristocracy and
regarded as justly entitled to a share in the spoils of
government. The rise of a man from without was viewed
with the utmost jealousy by this narrow circle of some
three hundred families; and a "new man" (a *novus homo*,
i.e. one who was the first of his family to hold curule office
and so cease to be *ignobilis*) was successful at the elections
only when some national crisis had deeply stirred the
voters against the dominant oligarchy.

§ 189. Vacancies in the senate were filled up by the censor.

but as custom had established the rule that those citizens who had held curule office were entitled to a seat in the senate, and as such citizens would amount The Senate. to a large number in the course of five years—the interval between two censorial revisions (*lectiones*)—the censor had few additional places to fill. He might of course assign these to non-nobles, but as a rule he would select senators from the oligarchy of which he was himself a member. Thus the senate was completely in the hands of the governing class.

Since the commencement of the great wars, the power of the senate had grown continuously. Originally the theory of the constitution was that authority rested primarily with the people, and was by the people delegated to the magistrates of their choice, while the senate's functions were to assist in advising the magistrates. But this state of things had long since passed away. The senate, by encroaching on the powers both of the people and the magistrates, was now predominant. The reasons of this development are obvious. The tribes became scattered throughout Italy instead of being located in the immediate neighbourhood of the capital. It was thus impossible for the comitia to be fully attended except indeed on very urgent occasions,—as for instance to vote upon an agrarian law,—or for the citizens who met there to be capable of giving a judicious decision on a complex question of foreign policy. So the comitia was rarely convened except to decide whether war should be declared; the senate conducted wars and arranged the conditions of peace. Its resolutions (*senatus consulta*), which were theoretically (see § 51) decrees of the magistrate on which he had taken his council's advice, were legally binding if not vetoed by another magistrate. The magistrates degenerated into the obedient

ministers of the senate, the more readily because as a rule they were in harmony with the policy of the oligarchy; or if they were not, were liable to be checked by the veto of a colleague or of a tribune—for by this time the tribunes were drawn from the ruling nobility equally with the other magistrates. And yet the position of the senate was insecure. It rested on no constitutional basis. At any time the people might be aroused by some burning question of the hour to flock to Rome and declare their sovereign will in the comitia. If a magistrate was resolved to attack the policy of the senate, the latter body could not prevent him as long as he was in office. All that it could do was to set a fellow magistrate or a tribune to act against him.

§ 190. The authority of the senate ranged over the whole field of government, but its control of the finances, religion, the provinces, and foreign affairs is worthy of some detailed account.

Sphere of the
Senate's
activity.

With regard to the finances, the senate had the control of the domain land, and imposed taxes and import dues. As shown by numerous decrees, it directed the public worship of the state; introduced when it thought fit foreign forms of religion, such as that of the Phrygian Cybele, expelled false prophets and destroyed alleged sacred books. What it did in the famous case of the Bacchanalia in 186 B.C. is a striking instance of its unquestioned authority. In that year the senate found that the rites of Bacchus, introduced some time before from the East, were characterized by flagrant indecency and immorality. It at once issued the decree *De Bacchanalibus*, visiting with death all males who had participated in the ceremonies, handing over the female converts to the judgment of the family tribunal, and giving to the consuls and their officers the fullest powers to hunt out and punish the offenders. When war had

been declared the senate assigned the various commands to the magistrates, decided what forces were to be raised among the Romans and their allies, and what proportion was to be entrusted to each commander. When war was over, either in Rome or by means of a commission sent to represent it abroad, it meted out rewards and punishments, and determined under what conditions treaties were to be made with friends and enemies. It was still more supreme in the case of the provinces, and formed the only body to which oppressed provincials could appeal. Its control over the Italian allies was almost as severe, for it never hesitated to issue the harshest orders to them when public advantage rendered expedient such a course.

§ 191. The magistrates, with an occasional increase in numbers, continued to be the same as in the earlier republic. There were two consuls, who The Magistrates. took the command abroad or presided in the senate at home; six praetors, of whom two (the *praetor urbanus* and *praetor peregrinus*) acted as the chief legal authorities in the capital, while four more were sent out every year to administer some of the newly-formed provinces—Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, the two Spains, &c.; two censors for finance and the revision of the census lists; four aediles (two curule and two plebeian) for police; eight quaestors, of whom two (*quaestores urbani*) supervised the revenue in Rome, two (*quaestores militares*) accompanied the army as paymasters to the troops, while four (*quaestores classici*), first elected in 267 B.C., levied contingents in ships and men from the allies (§ 67), and saw to the corn supply of Rome. Ten tribunes were annually elected as of old, but a strange transformation had come over that magistracy: originally intended to screen the poor, it was now the strongest weapon of the wealthy. The tribunes as a rule

belonged to the governing class, and so far from being feared as revolutionaries, were trusted by the senate to propose all the important laws which it desired to lay before the comitia. After the fiasco of 217 B.C., when Fabius and Minucius were appointed with equal powers, no dictator was created ; if the dictatorial power was needed at any crisis, the senate passed the *senatus consultum ultimum* (*videant consules ne quid detrimenti respublica capiat*, "let the consuls see to it that the state suffer no harm"), which invested the consuls with plenary powers of life and death, and proclaimed in fact a state of martial law. As the dominions of Rome increased, pro-magistrates were appointed with growing frequency, until, as we shall see, in Sulla's time it became the practice for all consuls and praetors to have a second year of office as proconsuls and propraetors respectively.

To prevent any citizen from becoming too powerful by a succession of magistracies, various laws were passed from time to time. Thus in 342 B.C. it was enacted that no one should hold the same office again until after a period of ten years, and about 151 B.C. re-election to the consulship was forbidden. A more general law was the *Lex Villia*

Annalis of 180 B.C., which decreed (1) that no citizen was eligible to office unless he had served ten campaigns ; (2) that the order of quaestor, praetor, and consul must be observed (*i. e.* that election to the consulship was not valid unless the quaestorship and praetorship had been previously held) ; (3) that two clear years must elapse between the tenure of one office and the next. From this it followed, since no Roman could serve until at least seventeen years of age, that he could not be quaestor until twenty-eight, praetor until thirty-one, or consul until thirty-four. If, as was usual, the curule aedile-

ship was filled between the quaestorship and the praetorship, the consulship would not be attained until the candidate was thirty-seven.

§ 192. Of the assemblies of the people, the *comitia tributa* and the *concilium plebis* (which by this time differed from one another only in form) were the chief legislative bodies (see § 76); the *comitia centuriata* declared war and elected the higher magistrates. Since wealth at Rome was now concentrated in a few hands, and more than half the centuries consisted of wealthy men, the power in this assembly had fallen into the hands of the minority. In order that it might not be entirely replaced by the two democratic assemblies, the *comitia centuriata* was about 240 B.C. re-organised on a tribal basis, so that the preponderance of the wealthy minority was greatly diminished. Each of the thirty-five tribes was divided into five classes, and each of the classes into two centuries. There were thus ten centuries in each tribe and three hundred and fifty centuries in all the tribes. As each of the five classes had two centuries in each tribe, each class would consist of seventy centuries in all and have seventy votes (since the unit of voting was still the century). There were also the eighteen centuries of knights and five other centuries (§ 52), so that there were in all three hundred and seventy-three centuries. It will thus readily be seen that knights and the first class now lost their numerical preponderance.

§ 193. In the early republic agriculture was the backbone of the state and the Romans were a nation of small farmers. Unfortunately this stalwart class, which had won so many victories for the republic, was in danger of disappearing outright. The change com-

Reform of
the Comitia
Centuriata.

The decay of
the farmers.

menced with the Hannibalic war. It was upon the small farmers throughout Italy that the whole force of the Carthaginian attack fell: their crops, their stores, their plant, and their houses were alike destroyed, and many of those that survived the war preferred to continue with the legions rather than to eke out a laborious living on their devastated holdings. Those who still struggled to exist on their little farms found many circumstances unfavourable to them. Most inimical of all was the grasping spirit of wealthy neighbours, who appropriated the public domains, and even seized by force or fraud the homesteads of the small agriculturists; but besides this, they had to contend against the importation of cheap corn from Egypt and the provinces, and—a still more difficult task—against the cheaper labour of slaves, who were being introduced into Italy in ever-increasing numbers by the capitalists.

The nature of the public land (*ager publicus*) has been described (§ 54): it was land acquired by conquest and belonging to the state, and therefore could never become the freehold of an individual. A small rental was theoretically charged to the occupier (*possessor*), but in practice, owing to the remissness of the government officials, the public land came to be entirely rent-free. Romans and Italians alike regarded it as private property, and transferred, sold and mortgaged it at their pleasure. The limit fixed by the Licinian Laws of 367 B.C. was soon disregarded, and as previously, the public land, instead of being of use for the rearing of a free peasantry and the rehabilitation of impoverished citizens, fell entirely into the hands of the powerful and wealthy.

By a similar process the small freeholds were absorbed in the wide farms of the rich. Not merely was this change brought about by economic conditions—the importation of

corn from abroad, and the growing need of capital in farming—but the country farmers were evicted by fraud, by distraint for debt, or by force.

§ 194. When the capitalist had thus dispossessed his poorer neighbours, he converted his widely-spreading fields (*latifundia*) into grass farms and cultivated them by the labour of slaves. It was cheaper to purchase many slaves than to hire one free labourer; the slave cost nothing but his starvation rations, the chain which fettered him, and the underground dungeon where he lay like a beast at night. Probably Mommsen is right in declaring that there never was a system of slavery which could approach that of Rome for brutality; “compared with the sufferings of the Roman slaves, the sum of all negro suffering is but a drop.” War, while it drew off annually the best and strongest blood of Italy, poured into the market for slavery the nations from Spain to Syria. At Delos 10,000 slaves were sold in a day; private persons in Rome counted their *familia* (slave-train) by thousands. The demand was so great that the Roman merchants prosecuted their slave-hunts on every frontier, and yet could not glut a mart in which the commodity, when purchased, was worth scarce an effort to preserve. So the slaves drove the free labourers and farmers from the fields, and this happened not only to the Romans, but to every nation of Italy. Depopulation grew apace in Apulia, Campania, and Samnium, but the case of Etruria was worst of all. The capitalist preferred cattle-raising to agriculture. To grow crops requires continuous labour and some knowledge of the laws by which land is used to the utmost, yet rather improved than exhausted. To rear cattle, on the other hand, requires nothing beyond wide acres and a few scattered herdsmen. Cattle-farming took the place of

The *Latifundia*
and Slave
labour.

agriculture: where there were once fields and cottages there were now only ranches and the thinly scattered watch-huts of the slave-herdsmen. Italy, in fact, seemed likely to revert to her original condition as a land of untilled marsh and mountain.

§ 195. The evicted population of the country districts flocked to Rome by thousands. If they were already Roman citizens, they did not of course lose their franchise by change of residence, but continued to vote in the particular tribe in which they had been registered. In this way there were often sufficient members of a tribe resident in the capital to neutralize any ordinary concourse of the genuine country voters. Now votes were worth much to the wealthy man who was desirous of office with all its distinction and profit, and after 200 B.C. bribery and corruption in every form grew rampant. The starving proletariat began to expect "bread and games" from the candidates who claimed their suffrages. The curule aediles spent immense sums of money in celebrating the great festivals and games under their care, for they knew that this was the surest way of gaining election to the higher offices of the praetorship and consulship. Gladiatorial combats and fights of wild beasts (*venationes*) became common from the same cause. Of similar tendency were the free gifts of grain (*frumentationes*) to the people. The government had always regarded the provisioning of the city as part of its ordinary duties, but now wealthy seekers after office began to distribute grain on their own account, and this became increasingly frequent as competition for popularity grew more keen. Already there was beginning to be heard that demand for free doles of corn, which was actually granted by the legislation of C. Gracchus (123 B.C.). Thus it became possible for a rabble of many

The Growth
of the City
Rabble.

thousand paupers to make a living and find amusement.

§ 196. The city rabble was naturally in opposition to the government of the senate; but it hated the Latins and other allies still more, and was ^{The Latins and other allies.} determined not to admit them to the franchise, a question which came into prominence about 150 B.C. The communities which made up Italy consisted either of citizens or allies of Rome. The citizens (*cives*) had either the full franchise, or were passive citizens (*cives sine suffragio*) and belonged to *municipia*. The allies consisted either of Latins (*nomen Latinum*) or of Italian *socii* without Latin rights (§§ 96-97). After the second Punic War the Romans endeavoured to widen the gap between citizens and non-citizens, and to abolish that careful graduation of privilege which had marked the organisation of Italy in 272 B.C. The Roman franchise had now become valuable, and the facilities for obtaining it were accordingly lessened. Some of the more autonomous *municipia*, such as Capua, were degraded to the lowest class, and were governed entirely by a *praefectus* sent from Rome. The *municipia* which had remained loyal were advanced to the now coveted position of full citizen towns. The facilities which enabled Latins to obtain the *civitas* were curtailed. All Latin colonies founded in or after 268 B.C. had no *conubium* with Rome; and only those who had held office could become full Roman citizens. After the foundation of Aquileia in 184 B.C. no further Latin colonies were planted in Italy. Thus the country was split up into two hostile camps, one of citizens, and the other of allies.

§ 197. It could not be expected that the Italians¹

¹ In 133 B.C. the name *Italia* denoted only that part of the peninsula which lay to the south of the Macra and the Aesis. In the time of

would always acquiesce in their inferior position. Their grievances were many and various. In time of war they were called upon to provide as many foot-soldiers and far more horse than the Romans. In spite of this they were not treated on equal terms with the citizens when land and booty was distributed. Generally they enjoyed the right of self-government, but it was always possible for this to be overridden by a law passed at Rome or even by a simple decree of the senate. While the Roman citizen was secure from capital or corporal punishment, an Italian, even though he had filled the highest offices in his native town, might be scourged, beheaded, and generally maltreated at the caprice of any Roman official. One flagrant instance may be noticed: once when a Roman consul was travelling with his wife to Teanum Sidicinum, the lady desired to bathe in the public bath. It was not prepared with sufficient care, and on his wife's complaint the consul caused the chief magistrate of the town to be scourged in the market-place. In spite of such incidents the Italians were in many respects satisfied with Roman rule, and before deciding their claims by an appeal to arms tried repeatedly to acquire the franchise by peaceful means. The delay was partly due to the fact that in most of the Italian communities the upper and lower classes were opposed to each other. The wealthy Italians had been allowed to share in the public land of Rome, and so did not resent so keenly as the poorer classes the unjust pressure of military service and the unfair division of spoil. On the other hand, they eagerly desired the *ius honorum*, so that they might be admitted to the ranks of the aristocracy that was now ruling the world.

Caesar the boundaries were the Macra and the Rubicon. *Italia* did not extend to the Alps until the reign of Augustus.

§ 198. Countries outside Italy were on their conquest reduced to provinces, the great distinction between which and Italy consisted in the fact The Provinces. that, while the Italians helped Rome to conquer the world, the provincials were never entrusted with arms. The *provincia* of a magistrate meant primarily the sphere in which his powers as such were exercised; hence its use to represent that part of the Roman empire which was habitually committed to the control of a governor.

Originally the Roman theory of taxation was that of an indemnity for meeting the expenses of war (*stipendium*). By about 133 B.C., however, Taxation
of the
Provinces. this theory gave place to a new one, to the effect that provincial land (*provinciale solum*) was the *ager publicus* or *dominium* of the Roman people, and therefore subject to the payment of a rent or due (*vectigal*) in money or in produce. Commonly such rental was taken in money, and was therefore a definite annual tax (*tributum soli* or *vectigal certum*) assessed on land. In the case of Sicily, and later of Asia, it took the form of a tithe (*decuma*) of the produce of the land, and was therefore variable as the crops were good or bad. Such of the inhabitants as possessed no land were subject to a poll-tax (*tributum capitis* or *capitatio*). There were also indirect taxes, such as port-dues and frontier dues (*portoria* or *pecuniae vectigales*). Direct taxes were collected by the local authorities in each district and paid to the governor's financial delegate (the quaestor); the tithe and the indirect taxes were sold to companies of tax-farmers (*publicani*) who paid a fixed sum to the state for the right of collecting them.

§ 199. The provinces consisted of communities of various ranks. In addition to Roman colonies (which

only date from 123 B.C.) and communities with Latin rights (§ 97), we hear of the following classes of states:

(1) *Civitates Liberae et Foederatae*, free and federate states.—These were states (such as Athens, Sparta, Gades, Massilia) the basis of whose rights was a definite treaty (*foedus*), sanctioned by the Roman people, sworn to by representatives of Rome and of the community concerned, and therefore irrevocable. The *foedus* secured to them the exercise of their own laws and jurisdiction, and freed them entirely from the control of the governor of the province. Since they were allies their land was their own, and they were therefore free from tribute. Unless specially exempted by the terms of their treaty, these states had to furnish military contingents. All were bound to follow Rome in their foreign policy.

(2) *Civitates Liberae et Immunes*, free states exempt from tribute.—These were states the basis of whose rights was not an irrevocable *foedus*, but merely a revocable charter (*lex data*). This charter was usually given by the people, sometimes by the senate. The position of such states was not so secure as that of federate states; but otherwise the rights of the two classes were the same.

(3) *Civitates Stipendiariae*, tributary states.—These included all states not coming under (1) or (2), and most of the provincial communities fell under this head. As their land was *ager publicus* of the Roman people, they were (as their name implies) tributary. They had certain rights guaranteed by a charter (*lex provinciae*), which was in this case prepared by the general who had conquered the country, assisted by senatorial commissioners. The charter divided the province into districts and determined the tribute of each district. These states had a limited degree of municipal autonomy.

The policy of Rome was to let the subject peoples govern themselves in the main, and thereby to save the cost of maintaining a large staff of officials amongst them. One governor and half-a-dozen minor officers sufficed for a kingdom. In return she took only a sum—often smaller than that which they had paid to their own monarchs when free—sufficient to defray the cost of defending them, which duty now of course fell upon General Policy of Rome. Rome. They were not asked to find troops for the Roman service, and they were allowed to practise their own religion and customs. In point of fact, Roman manners and customs rapidly spread abroad. Few nations made any great resistance to the process of imperceptible Romanization, which was indeed favoured by the wealthier provincials, who delighted to ape the style and manners of their rulers, the aristocracy of Rome.

§ 200. To each province was sent a governor, either consular or praetorian, to maintain the influence of Rome, to defend the country from foreign attack, The Governor. to watch over the conduct and policy of the people, and to decide, or remit to Rome for decision, judicial cases involving loss of life or other serious points. On his arrival the governor published an *edictum*, setting forth the plan upon which he intended to administer justice, and his year of office embraced a series of assizes held at regular centres (*conventus*) of his own choosing, whereat he settled any suits referred to his arbitration. He had an allowance from the state for his travelling expenses, and the provincials were ordered by the senate to provide him with certain necessaries, such as corn (*frumentum in cellam*), salt, etc., at a rate fixed beforehand. Beyond this he had theoretically no claims upon his province. In practice he could find means enough to enrich himself at the

expense of the people, and hence arose the terrible fact that a provincial administration might be made the royal road to wealth. The governor could not leave his province until his successor arrived, nor delay his departure after that event.

The governor was assisted by a number of *legati* of his own choosing, proportionate to the extent of his province. Their duty was to aid him with their counsel in peace and war, and to divide with him the labours of administering justice. He took with him also a number of young nobles (*comites*) in a non-official capacity to learn under him the duties of administration.

The only other assistant of the governor was the quaestor, whose duties were solely financial, though in case of need he might be called upon to command in the field and to assist at the tribunals. He was charged with the superintendence of the tax-collections, the payment of the governor and his *legati*, and in some degree with everything which concerned the finances of the provinces. Governor and quaestor had to leave two copies of their year's accounts behind them.

§ 201. The governor was in fact a monarch. His power was virtually absolute while it lasted, for the senate was far away, and was content if no serious abuses came to its notice. There was every temptation for an unscrupulous and needy governor to rob his subjects, while they had no redress but to appeal to the senate. Now, as we have seen, the governor was himself almost always one of the senatorial oligarchy, and was therefore sure of as much protection as the senate could decently accord. If he were impeached (and this could not happen until he had resigned his province) he must be tried before a senatorial court, where judge and jury had every reason

to acquit him if possible, for each of them expected in his turn to be a governor and to receive the same indulgence. Nevertheless, good governors were not altogether wanting ; and the provincials, whatever they suffered, at least gained peace and security—both so requisite for progress in culture, commerce, and wealth. They had some protection, too, in the fact that many of them became the clients of leading Roman nobles who were in duty bound to aid them in every possible way. So the Marcelli were the *patroni* of Sicily, Gracchus was the *patronus* of many Spanish towns. Complaints against the governors commenced at an early date, and in 149 B.C. was established by the *Lex Calpurnia* a standing court, composed of senators, to hear prosecutions *de Repetundis*, that is, for extortion. Lex Calpurnia
de Repetundis,
149 B.C. This was the earliest of those standing commissions (*quaestiones perpetuae*) which became of importance after the time of C. Gracchus, 122 B.C., as the subject of perpetual quarrels between the senate and the Equestrian Order.

§ 202. With the growth of the provinces is intimately connected the rise of the Equestrian Order The Equestrian
Order. (*ordo equester*) or knights (*equites*), a class which in some sort formed a link between the senate and the lower orders. By this time (133 B.C.) the term *Equites* had come to mean not only the state cavalry, but also, with the exception of senators, all who were sufficiently wealthy to possess the property required for a member of the eighteen centuries of horse, that is, 400,000 sesterces. The eighteen centuries of horse existed now only as so many votes in the comitia ; they were no longer called upon for service in the field, and they only appeared in full armour once a year, when on the Ides of July they rode in procession in honour of the victory of Lake Regillus. As

senators had by a Lex Claudia of 218 B.C. been forbidden to engage in trade, the whole of the financial operations of the state fell to these capitalists. The knights formed themselves into great companies, which undertook the farming of the revenues as a speculation. In this capacity they received the name of *publicani*. They paid a stated sum

The Equites
and the
Provinces.

annually into the treasury, and in return recouped themselves from the provincials. The actual collection lay with their agents, the tax-collectors; and just as it was to the interest of the Equites to get as much as possible out of their agents, so the latter in turn used every possible means to extort money from the subject peoples (*stipendiarii*). Collector, capitalist, and governor alike combined to enrich themselves at the expense of the provinces. The Equites protected their agents, and were themselves protected by the fact that they were themselves men of wealth like the senators, and too valuable as political allies in the comitia to be lightly offended. The quarrel between the two orders did not break out until C. Gracchus initiated his reforms.

CHAPTER IX.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE REVOLUTION.

§§ 203—205. Tiberius Gracchus.—§ 206. The Province of Asia.—§§ 207—214. Gaius Gracchus and his Legislation.—§ 215. The Province of Gallia Narbonensis.—§§ 216—220. The Jugurthine War.—§§ 221—225. War against the German Tribes.—§ 226. Sicilian Slave Wars. §§ 227—231. Events at Rome: Saturninus to Drusus.—§§ 232—235. The Social War.—§§ 236—240. Sulla, Marius and Cinna.—§§ 241—246. The First and Second Mithradatic Wars.—§§ 247—254. Sulla's Return and Legislation.

§ 203. THAT Tib. Sempronius Gracchus who had pacified Spain, 179 B.C., left in the charge of his wife Cornelia two sons; the elder, now about thirty years of age and tribune of the people (133 B.C.), was Tiberius, ^{The first attack on the Senate.} the younger was Gaius. The elder son had distinguished himself by personal bravery at the siege of Carthage, and had seen service in the army of Spain, where his word had saved the army of Mancinus from destruction, 137 B.C. He was brother-in-law of Scipio Aemilianus, for his sister was married to that great general; and he himself had wedded the daughter of App. Claudius Pulcher, a leading noble, consular and ex-censor. While on his journeys to and from Spain he had marked the desolation of Etruria; he now came forward to propose a remedy.

His ideas of reform were not altogether new. C. Laelius, the close friend of Aemilianus, had only abandoned similar ideas because he foresaw that ^{Proposals of Tib. Gracchus.} revolution would ensue—moderation which earned him the

name of Sapiens, "the Prudent." Since the Licinian Rogations (367 B.C.) nothing had been done to prevent the occupation of the state lands by the wealthy: and though those Rogations were still unrepealed, nobody dreamt of enforcing them, and they were now a dead letter. The depopulation of Italy, which threatened to leave Rome without the materials for an army while it filled her streets with beggars, was due to the misappropriation of the public lands and the spread of slave-labour: therefore after taking counsel with App. Claudius, P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus the Chief Pontiff, and P. Mucius Scaevola the best lawyer in Rome and consul for the year, Tiberius brought before the comitia the following proposals, amounting to a re-enactment of the Licinian Laws:—

(a) That no person should occupy more than 500 *iugera* of public land, with 250 extra for each son: the total amount so occupied by one family not to exceed 1000 *iugera*.

(b) That all land thus recovered should be distributed at a small rent to the poor (Italians as well as Romans) in lots of 30 *iugera*, inalienable and hereditary.

(c) That a certain proportion of free labourers should be employed on all estates.

(d) That the redistribution of land should be managed by a standing commission of three, specially appointed and maintained by the state.

§ 204. The bill attacked the entire wealthy class of Rome and of Italy, just as it offered relief to the whole of the pauper population; for in the colonies, municipia, and allied communities alike, the rich had both seized on the public land and ousted the small farmers from their

holdings. All the rich were therefore in arms against the measure. Tiberius did not lay his proposals before the senate, as was customary, but referred the matter directly to the tribes. The country tribes were enthusiastic in their support, and flocked to Rome in immense numbers to vote for the bill.

The Land
Commission.

On the day of voting a fellow-tribune, M. Octavius, vetoed the bill. No vote could be taken: Tiberius retaliated by using his powers of veto against every act of the magistrates, until the tribes were summoned anew. The bill was vetoed a second time by Octavius. Then Tiberius did an unconstitutional thing; he summoned the tribes again, and put to them the question whether they would depose Octavius. They decided in the affirmative, and Octavius was dragged from the tribunes' bench. Then the bill was again put and carried, and as commissioners to execute it were appointed Tiberius himself, his brother Gaius, and his father-in-law App. Claudius.

The senate was beaten, but for the moment contented itself with obstruction. Tiberius' term of office would expire soon (Dec. 10th, 133 B.C.), when it could impeach him; for he could not, in strict law, be re-elected for the ensuing year. Meantime it voted the commissioners no adequate supplies, and watched the difficulties which beset them. There were no means of determining what lands were public and what were not. Everywhere there were endless disputes. Those against whom judgment went, very many of them wealthy Italian *socii*, swelled the ranks of the opposition. Nevertheless the allotments began.

§ 205. Tiberius felt that he was falling, and made new bids for popular support. Just at this time died Attalus III., the last king of Pergamum, bequeathing all his belongings to the Roman state. Tiberius gave notice of a bill to devote the funds so acquired to providing the new settlers with stock for their farms. Next he talked of extending the franchise to all Italians, of shortening the period of military service, of weakening the power of the senate in the jury-courts by extending the right of service to the equestrian order.

In this way he hoped to win his re-election as tribune for 132 B.C. As tribune he would at least be safe from impeachment, whereas now he was not secure even against assassination. The senate determined to prevent his re-election. On the day of voting the tribes began to poll for him ; but the senatorial party declared that his re-election was illegal, and nothing was done. On the morrow both parties were prepared to use force, and P. Scipio Nasica, a bitter opponent of Gracchus, called upon the consul to save the state. When the consul Scaevola refused to shed a citizen's blood, Nasica cried out that the state was deserted by its guardians : he would defend it himself. He led the way to the brow of the Capitol where Tiberius was standing with 3000 of his followers, fell upon them suddenly and put them to flight. Tiberius stumbled as he endeavoured to escape and was struck down by one of the tribunes. Three hundred of his partisans fell, while many more were afterwards put to death by a special commission of the senate.

§ 206. The death of Attalus III. occurred when the senate was too busy to attend to foreign
Acquisition of Pergamum. affairs, and while it tarried, Aristonicus, a natural son of Attalus II., appeared as a claimant for the throne. During the year 132 B.C. he was defeated off Cyme by an Ephesian fleet, but in the following year, having called to arms the slaves, he made himself master of Samos and much of the adjoining seaboard. The senate now determined to send an armed force to Asia. Both consuls were eager for the command. P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, who was also Chief Pontiff, after forbidding his colleague Flaccus, the Flamen Dialis, to leave Rome, secured the prize for himself by a vote of the people ; but his selfish-

ness cost him dear, for he was defeated and killed by Aristonicus in 131 B.C. His successor, the consul M. Perpenna, avenged the defeat, blockaded the pretender in Stratonicea, a Carian town, and forced him to surrender (130 B.C.). The kingdom of Pergamum was then settled by M'. Aquillius, consul for 129 B.C., assisted by a commission of ten senators. Now was constituted the province of Asia, embracing Mysia, Lydia, and the major part of Caria. The southern portion of Caria was given to the Rhodians, and Phrygia went to the king of Pontus, Mithradates V., who had sent troops to assist the Romans; but in 120 B.C. the latter country was taken back and added to Asia, which was, and always remained, the richest of the provinces.

The Province
of Asia,
129 B.C.

§ 207. Although Tiberius was dead, his work had not been in vain. His place as Land Commissioner was taken by P. Licinius Crassus Mucianus, who, as above related, fell in Asia, 131 B.C., and about the same time died another Commissioner, App. Claudius. The vacancies were filled by Carbo the tribune and M. Fulvius Flaccus, both leaders of the popular party, and the allotments continued. The work was real, for within the next decade the census showed an increase of 70,000 citizens, most of whom must have owed their status to the new law. About 129 B.C. the wealthy Latins and Italians, with whose tenure the commission was now interfering, broke out into protest, and declared that their property was being confiscated. The poorer members of the Italian community on the other hand were eager that the laws should be enforced. Both parties appeared in Rome, and called on Scipio Aemilianus, the most powerful of the citizens, to decide between them. Scipio, who had since his

The Italians
and the Land
Commission.

return from Numantia become more and more identified with the aristocrats, declared in favour of the wealthy Italians; and by this attitude, though heretofore a favourite of the people, he now forfeited their affection. But any collision was averted by his death. One day after making a great speech in the senate he was found dead in bed. Later generations accused Carbo of murdering him, but there seems no valid ground for supposing that he met with foul play. So perished the conqueror of Carthage and Numantia, aged 56, in the winter of 129 B.C. Nevertheless he had virtually ended the work of the commission, for he had secured a decree of the people transferring its duties to the consul for the year, C. Sempronius Tuditanus; and as the latter quitted Rome to conduct a campaign against the Iapydes, a piratical tribe of Illyricum, the agrarian distributions came to an end.

Death of
Scipio Aemili-
anus, 129 B.C.

§ 208. The bitterness which had for generations prevailed

The Italians
demand the
Franchise.

between Italians and Romans became now a new element of political discord, for the former began to demand the franchise. The Romans, the poor almost as much as the wealthy, were jealous of their own special privileges and resolved to keep them; and when the question was raised, a tribune carried a motion for expelling all non-Romans from the city, 126 B.C. Thereupon M. Fulvius Flaccus in his consulate, 125 B.C., retorted, by proposing

That any Latin or Italian ally should be allowed to ask for the Roman citizenship, and to get a vote of the comitia on his request.

Flaccus met with little support even from the party he professed to lead. Carbo had already gone over to the senate, and C. Gracchus was absent in Sardinia. The proposal was defeated, and its author removed by being despatched into Gaul to carry on war against the Salluvii.

Instantly the town of Fregellae, one of the most important of the Latin colonies, rose in arms to obtain satisfaction by force, 125 B.C. Fortunately for Rome there was dissension among the insurgents themselves, and Fregellae was betrayed, rased to the ground, and its place taken by a new citizen-colony at Fabrateria.

Revolt of
Fregellae,
125 B.C.

So speedy and decisive a punishment checked whatever disaffection there was. For a space the question of enfranchising the Italians slept, but a fresh and formidable agitator was now on the scene, one who for a few months was virtually monarch of Rome.

§ 209. This was C. Sempronius Gracchus, younger brother of Tiberius, already conspicuous as one of the Commissioners under Tiberius' law.

C. Gracchus.

Nine years younger than his brother, and like him full of designs for reforming the state, Gaius had no need to hunt for popularity. He had served in Spain under Scipio in 133 B.C., and as quaestor in Sardinia in 126 B.C. On his return from that province without authorization (124 B.C.), he was impeached by the senate for complicity in the revolt at Fregellae, but acquitted. All men knew that he had come back to resume his brother's work, and he was elected tribune for 123 B.C.

The constitution of Rome had proved itself incapable of preventing the abuses which follow from the quarrel of the few rich with the many poor. Once a republic of equal citizens, Rome had become now an oligarchy of the most exclusive kind. Gaius set himself to accomplish two objects: to overthrow the oligarchy, and to better the lot of the poorer citizens. His brother had aimed at the latter only, but Gaius was a political as well as a social reformer.

His aims.

§ 210. Ten years after his brother's first tribunate he

brought forward a series of measures calculated to win the support against the senate of the various classes who had grievances demanding redress. The order in which his proposal was introduced is not known, nor again can we be sure of the year, for Gaius was elected to a second tribunate in 122 B.C., and no doubt continued to press forward and develop his schemes.

(i) A *lex frumentaria* decreed that the state should provide corn once a month to all citizens at a price less than half its market value.

(ii) The *lex agraria* of Tiberius Gracchus was renewed but not re-enforced.

(iii) Colonies were to be established at Tarentum and elsewhere in Italy, besides one at Carthage (*Iunonia*), which was to include poor Italians.

Legislation of
C. Gracchus,
123, 122 B.C.

(iv) A series of army-reforms was introduced: all citizens on service were to have the right of appeal from an officer's capital sentence; the soldier's clothing was henceforth to be found in addition to his pay; no one was to be called for military service except between the ages of seventeen and forty-five; a foot-soldier after serving sixteen campaigns, a horse-soldier after ten, was to be free from liability to further service.

(v) In addition to the existing permanent Commission for Extortion (*de repetundis*), others were to be established for the trial of cases of poisoning and murder, and the jurymen in all these courts were to be chosen from the equestrian order.

(vi) The taxes of Asia were to be put up for auction at Rome instead of being collected by the provincials themselves.

(vii) Before the election of consuls for any year, the senate was to decide what provinces should be assigned to them.

The first of these laws secured the support of the proletariat, but it was fraught with the most pernicious consequences, for it increased the depopulation of the country districts by teaching the dregs of the country folk to flock to Rome, where bread was to be had for the asking. The second law Gaius appears to have proposed rather as a tribute to his brother's memory than because he desired to re-open the question of allotments. The third is remarkable as being the forerunner of that colonization beyond the sea which afterwards became a recognized feature of the

Tendency of
these laws.

democratic programme. By far the most important is the fifth. Gaius saw that he needed firmer support than the proletariat could afford him : accordingly he destroyed the union which had previously existed between the senate and the Equites, by raising the latter to a position of rivalry in the state. The control which the senate had hitherto possessed over the law-courts was taken from them and handed over to the merchants and money-lenders of the equestrian order. In other words, the Equites were bribed to take Gaius' side by the prospect of plundering the provinces ; for if any senatorial governor endeavoured to prevent their extortion he did so at the peril of having a charge trumped up against him by the Equites, and being condemned by them in the court where they acted as jurors. The sixth law was also intended to gratify the Equites, for Asia was the richest of the provinces, and presented an almost unlimited field for their malpractices.

§ 211. Thus Gaius had not fallen into the error, which his brother had committed, of relying upon one section of the community only. He had the starving proletariat to back him up indeed, but he had also the great financial magnates of the state. Unfortunately a further law which he proposed in order to win over the Latins and Italians, viz. :—

Proposal of
Gracchus about
the Franchise.

(viii) That the full franchise should be granted to the Latins, and Latin rights to the allies,

broke up the coalition. His motive no doubt was to soothe the Italians for any loss that might befall them through the establishment of the colonies at Tarentum and elsewhere ; but as in the time of Flaccus, the populace objected to sharing their comitial privileges with any new-comers, and they began to fall away from their leader.

The senate saw its opportunity: it would widen the coldness into a quarrel by pretending to become the patron of the poor. A tribune, M. Livius Drusus, was prompted to propose laws—

Counter-proposals of M. Livius Drusus, 122 B.C.

(a) That the small rent-charge for land allotted by the law of the elder Gracchus should be remitted.

(b) That twelve colonies of 3000 citizens each should be established for the benefit of the poor, not beyond the seas but in Italy. The holdings were to be rent-free and alienable.

Gaius was at the time absent, superintending his new colony at Junonia; when he returned it was too late. He was not elected to the tribunate of 121 B.C., and L. Opimius, his most active foe, was chosen consul.

§ 212. Immediately upon the commencement of the

Fall of C. Gracchus, 121 B.C.

consular year, Opimius proposed the abolition of Junonia, having previously worked upon the scruples of the people by aid of the priests, and by the report of awful portents and ill omens connected with the accursed spot. Gaius appeared in the Forum, and one of his supporters struck down Antullius, a sacrificial servant, for some insulting language. A riot ensued, and the senate at once ordered Opimius to assume the powers of a dictator—*videret ne quid detrimenti respublica caperet*, "let him see that the state received no harm." He armed senators and slaves and the few Equites who held by the senate, occupied the Capitol, and on the following morning advanced to the Aventine, where Gaius' supporters were collected. Gaius himself endeavoured to obviate a collision, and M. Fulvius Flaccus, now as ever faithful to the popular cause, sent his son to treat with the senate. The latter arrested young Flaccus, and offered its weight in gold for the head of either Gaius or Flaccus the elder. In the attack on the Aventine the mob was speedily dispersed. Gaius would

have stood his ground but was persuaded to fly. His body was found in the grove of Furinna with that of one slave, who had slain his master by command and then himself.

§ 213. When Gaius fell the popular party was left without a head. His adherents to the number of three thousand were mercilessly tracked out by a special commission under L. Opimius, and the populace made no resistance. Too debased to be loyal, they only cared to get as much as they could, and they now looked to the tribune Drusus to fulfil his promises. But he had only acted as the instrument of the senate, and the senate had no mind to fulfil promises of which the purpose was already served. On the contrary it attacked in detail every act of Gaius' tribunate and gradually recovered most of its power. The question of the *iudicia* alone gave it serious trouble. Yet the memory of the revolution did not die. The mob had learnt its powers: it was sovereign, and could, at will, interfere with every department of government; all that the senate could do was to cajole it and see that none stepped forward to lead it.

§ 214. By one of the laws of Livius Drusus the rent-charge imposed by Tiberius had been abolished, and in 121 B.C. the allotments were made free and transferable. This was the signal for the rich to buy up the land again; and by purchase, mortgage, and other means capitalists once more secured large tracts of land in Italy. But Tiberius had been mistaken in thinking that he could turn city idlers into hard-working peasants. The commission for distributing lands was abolished by a law passed in 119 B.C. This law also enacted that all public land should remain to its present occupiers, who were to be undisturbed in their tenure so long as they paid a fixed rent. The money obtained from this rental was to

The Oligarchic
Reaction.

Fate of
Gracchus'
Measures.
The Agrarian
Laws.

be distributed among the citizens. Finally, in 111 B.C., a
The Lex Thoria, 111 B.C. *lex Thoria*¹ of the tribune Spurius Thorius abolished this tax altogether. This law is very important, since its effect was practically to turn all *ager publicus* into *ager privatus*; for when the *possessores* ceased to be liable to pay rent there was nothing to distinguish the land they occupied from private property. It is true that grass farming and slave-labour grew up afresh; but those who had obtained allotments and refused to sell were confirmed in their holdings, and the number of small peasant proprietors must have been greatly increased by the Gracchan allotment laws. Thus the law of 111 B.C. was on the whole beneficial. Now that there was no *ager publicus*² agrarian legislation took a new form. "Henceforward agrarian laws concern not the rights of the community to its own land, but the duty of the state to provide for its veterans and its poor. It is no longer a question of checking the growth of large estates by settling individuals on state domains, but of using public money to create a peasant proprietorship by purchase."³ But on the whole the oligarchs retained those parts of the

Gracchan reform which were faulty and dangerous, while they rejected those which were statesmanlike and far-seeing. These latter were also bound to come sooner or later, but Gaius had been in advance of his times. The policy of settling Roman citizens as colonists across the seas would have furthered the Romanisation of the empire; but the decree prohibiting any further attempt

¹ Appian says that the law of 119 B.C. was the *Lex Thoria*, but Cicero assigns the law of 111 to Thorius.

² With the exception of certain pasture-lands, and the *ager Campanus*, let on long leases to *publicani* by the censor.

³ Howe and Leigh, *History of Rome*, p. 359.

to refound Carthage (*Junonia*) was carried, and shortly after all other transmarine colonies, with the exception of Narbo (*Narbonne*) in Gaul, were cancelled. Narbo was suffered to exist, since it was of use to the senate from a military, and to the *equites* from a commercial, point of view. The question of the Italian franchise was, for the time, shelved.

On the other hand the mischievous and dangerous features of the Gracchan reform were not interfered with. The knights were too strong The Equites. to be deprived of the jury-courts. The equestrian tax-farmers were to be allowed to plunder the provinces on the understanding that the senatorial governor should share in the spoil without having to dread prosecution for extortion.

The corn-laws the senate dared not touch, though their sole tendency was to fill Rome with paupers The Corn Laws. who would sell their votes for a fresh largess.

§ 215. The conquest of the Ligures was completed in 143 B.C. Between Spain and Italy, however, Wars in Gallia Transalpina. there was no means of communication except by sea. It was manifestly to be desired that the provinces in Spain should be connected more closely with Italy. Accordingly, the senate sent M. Fulvius Flaccus into Gaul in 125 B.C.

The country between the Rhone and the Alps as far as Isara (*Isère*) was occupied by the Salluvii and Vocontii; while beyond these lay the Allobroges and the Aedui. Beyond the Rhone the Arverni in Auvergne were so formidable that the Aedui (about *Autun*) and the Suesiones (near *Soissons*) in the north were their only rivals. Flaccus campaigned successfully (125, 124 B.C.) against the Salluvii and Vocontii; his successor C. Sextius Calvinus defeated the Allobroges who came to the assist-

ance of the Salluvii (123, 122 B.C.); and Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, following up these successes, forced the Allobroges in their turn to summon the Arverni to their aid. The Arvernian king Betuitus brought up 180,000 men to help the Gauls, and the senate despatched the consul Q. Fabius Maximus, 121 B.C., to support Ahenobarbus. In a great battle at the junction of the Rhone and the Isère in that year, the Arverni were utterly routed with, it is said, the loss of 150,000 men, mostly drowned in their flight across the Rhone. The Allobroges submitted at once. Soon afterwards Ahenobarbus captured Betuitus by treachery, and in the battle of Vindalium near Avennio (*Avignon*) reduced the Arverni to peace (121 B.C.). The country from the Lake of Geneva to the Pyrenees was constituted a province,

The Province
of Gallia
Narbonensis.

called Gallia Narbonensis from its chief town of Narbo, where three years later (118 B.C.) was established a colony. Communication with Spain was thus secured. Narbo (*Narbonne*) was colonized partly as a concession to the populace, as some fulfilment of the promises of Livius Drusus, partly as a garrison town for the new province, partly in the interests of the Equites as a commercial rival to Massilia. The town of Aquæ Sextiæ (*Aix*) sprung up where C. Sextius had fixed his head-quarters.

§ 216. When Massinissa of Numidia died, 149 B.C., his kingdom was divided between his three sons; Micipsa was the acknowledged king, but Gulussa, who sent troops to act at the siege of Carthage, was commander-in-chief, and Mastanabal was entrusted with the control of justice. Both the younger brothers died before 118 B.C., and Micipsa, whose death occurred in that year, left his kingdom to be divided between

Jugurthine
War,
111 B.C.—105 B.C.

his own sons Adherbal and Hiempsal, and his nephew Jugurtha, son of Mastanabal. Jugurtha had led a contingent of Numidians to the aid of Scipio in the Numantine war, and besides distinguishing himself by his courage, had intrigued so successfully with many of the leading Romans that he could count upon their support in the future. Now left co-heir with Micipsa's sons, he refused to be satisfied with his share of the kingdom, assassinated Hiempsal (117 B.C.), and forced Adherbal to fly to Rome. The senate divided Numidia between Adherbal and Jugurtha, and a commission under L. Opimius, which was sent to carry out the arrangement, gave the capital, Cirta (*Constantine*), to Adherbal, while the western and more productive region fell to Jugurtha. Five years passed, during which Jugurtha, confident of the connivance of the Romans, continued to harass his adopted brother. Eventually he shut him up in the almost impregnable city of Cirta, 112 B.C., and declined to pay any attention to an embassy of young nobles which was despatched by the senate to interfere. A third commission under M. Aemilius Scaurus, the leader of the aristocracy, was no more successful, and while the senate still hesitated Cirta fell. The inhabitants, many of them Roman and Italian traders, were put to death, and Adherbal was Fall of Cirta,
112 B.C. killed by torture (112 B.C.). Whereupon Jugurtha sent envoys to explain his action and to purchase the acquiescence of the senate.

He was now in possession of the entire kingdom of his grandfather Massinissa, a kingdom stretching from the borders of Egypt on the east to those of Mauretania, the kingdom of Bocchus, on the west, excepting only the Roman province about the site of Carthage. He had a full treasury, an inexhaustible supply of men, and his

Numidians were the finest light cavalry in the world. He had married the daughter of Bocchus, whom he might therefore consider his ally.

§ 217. The senate, after vain endeavours to ignore Ad-herbal's fate, was compelled by the popular indignation and the harangues of C. Memmius, tribune designate, to declare war. The consul L. Calpurnius Bestia, and his legate Scaurus, entered Africa, and when Bocchus appeared likely to support them, Jugurtha offered terms. He purchased a peace which left him in possession of his kingdom at the price of a petty fine and the surrender of his elephants (111 B.C.).

In Rome there was deep anger at the treaty. The senators were again threatened with impeachment by the tribune C. Memmius, and were constrained to summon Jugurtha to defend himself in person, granting him safe-conduct. The king came, bought over one of the tribunes whose veto defeated the purpose of Memmius, and finding that his kinsman Massiva, a son of Gulussa, was suing for restoration, had him assassinated at Rome by an agent named Bomilcar. Whereupon the people forced the senate to cancel the peace and dismiss the king; Sp. Postumius Albinus was entrusted with the command against him.

Sp. Albinus did nothing, for his army was too much demoralized to be serviceable. He left Africa at the close of 110 B.C., passing on the command to his brother Aulus. This general coveted the wealth of Jugurtha, and marched upon his treasure city of Suthul (*Guelma*). The attack failed; the legions, induced by a simulated retreat to follow the king into the desert, were suddenly beset by the entire Numidian army, and lost their camp. The Romans were forced to purchase their lives by passing under the yoke, and by agreeing

Campaign of
L. Calpurnius
Bestia, 111
B.C.

Defeat of Aulus
Albinus, 109
B.C.

to evacuate Numidia forthwith and renew the peace of Scaurus (109 B.C.).

§ 218. Thereupon C. Mamilius Limetanus, tribune, secured the appointment of a special commission (*quaestio Limetana*) to try the senatorial ^{The Quaestio Limetana.} leaders on charges of high treason and corruption. A number were exiled, amongst them Sp. Albinus and L. Opimius, the adversary of C. Gracchus. Scaurus contrived to get himself made president of the commission, and thus saved himself at the expense of fellow criminals not more guilty. The second treaty was cancelled; Q. Caecilius Metellus (the nephew of that Metellus who crushed the pretender Andriscus in Macedonia) was put in command, and amongst his lieutenants was C. Marius, who as tribune in 119 B.C., had made an attack upon the corn-doles. Metellus was a good general, and if he had little scruple on other points, he was at least proof against bribery. Energetic measures reorganized the army, and a great battle on the river Muthul, in which the safety of the Romans was due in large part to the ^{First campaign of Metellus, 109 B.C.} valour of Marius, gave to the invaders possession of the greater part of Numidia. Most of the towns surrendered, but Jugurtha shut himself up in Cirta, and Zama successfully withstood a short siege, during which Metellus' camp was taken (end of 109 B.C.).

Jugurtha felt the danger of his position: he again attempted to negotiate terms, and surrendered much treasure and stores, and probably his capital Cirta; but when asked to surrender himself he refused, and broke off the negotiations. Metellus was sufficiently dishonourable to retain everything that had been given up, though Jugurtha had gained nothing in return. The Numidians, however, were still anxious to continue the struggle. The

town of Vaga (*Beja*), which had opened its gates to the Romans, revolted anew and massacred the entire Roman garrison. Two days later it was recovered and paid the usual penalty, but the Numidian tribes still flocked to Jugurtha. The whole campaign of 108 B.C. was wasted in the idle effort to capture the king amidst his deserts. Moreover Bocchus the Mauretanian seemed not unlikely to aid him. He was afraid of Jugurtha's power, but still more afraid of the prospect of having the Romans as his neighbours.

§ 219. At the close of the campaign of 108 B.C.

Marius returned to Rome as a candidate for the consulship. He was only the son of a Sabine farmer of Arpinum; yet he found supporters enough, for he was a good soldier, and though no orator, was on good terms with the people. He was elected easily, and was appointed to the command in Africa for the campaign of 107 B.C.

Election of
Marius to the
consulship for
107 B.C.

The election of Marius was a serious blow to the aristocrats, for it marked the passing away from them of the monopoly of the higher magistracies. Without birth, money, or patronage, Marius attained by popular will the highest office in the state, and the precedent was not forgotten. A change introduced by Marius was no less momentous: heretofore service in the legions had depended, as had been the case ever since the Servian Reform, upon the possession of a certain amount of property, originally 11,000 *asses*, but subsequently lowered to 4000; Marius did away with this restriction, and threw open the ranks to the *capite censi*, that is, to those citizens on the tribal lists who had not even the lower of these two qualifications. The effect was disastrous in many ways: it opened the way to the formation of armies devoted to the interest

of indulgent leaders, and so heralded the civil wars. But it was necessary in so far as there were scarce any left in Rome who possessed the amount of property requisite under the old system, and were at the same time desirous of military service.

During the year 107 B.C. Metellus still retained the command as proconsul while Marius was levying troops in Italy. It was not until late in the year that Marius appeared and took over the legions. When the new troops, who had as yet seen nothing of war, had been drilled sufficiently, Marius commenced operations by the surprise of Capsa (*Kafsa*), a very strong fortress, with whose fall the whole of eastern Numidia came into the hands of the Romans.

First campaign
of Marius,
107 B.C.

§ 220. Next year, 106 B.C., Marius after a march of many hundred miles, reached the Muluchath (*Mejerdeh*), the border river between Numidia and Mauretania.

Bocchus was alarmed by the progress of the Romans, and supported Jugurtha in the attempt to cut off their retreat. Marius was placed in great peril on at least three occasions during the backward march, and his escape he owed mainly to the courage and dash of L. Cornelius Sulla, his quaestor, who commanded the cavalry. At last he reached his headquarters at Cirta in safety and passed the winter there.

Second
campaign of
Marius, 106
B.C.

To conquer the Numidians in open war seemed a hopeless task and Marius had recourse to intrigue. Sulla served him well in the matter, and Bocchus was induced to betray Jugurtha, albeit his own son-in-law, as the price of the friendship of Rome. Jugurtha was invited to a conference, where he was surprised and surrendered in chains to Sulla (105 B.C.).

capture of
Jugurtha,
105 B.C.

Marius triumphed in the following year, though the

real work of the war had been done by Metellus and Sulla.¹ Although Numidia was thus at the mercy of the Romans it was not converted into a province. The western half was added to the kingdom of Bocchus, while the eastern was made over to Gauda, the half-witted brother of Jugurtha. Jugurtha perished by violence or starvation in the Tullianum at Rome, and while he lay dying the people summoned the conqueror to lead their legions against a far more formidable enemy, the Gauls and Germans of the North.

§ 221. The Ligurian war, and the campaigns of Flaccus and his successors in Narbonese Gaul, had for Conflicts with the Northern Tribes. their object the consolidation of the frontier on the north-west. A similar task kept various commanders occupied on the north-eastern frontier, about the head of the Adriatic and Illyricum. After the war with Teuta little or nothing was done in this direction until 184 B.C., when, on the rumour that Philip of Macedon meditated an invasion of Italy by land with the aid of the Thracian peoples, a colony was settled at Aquileia. Subsequently, when Macedonia became a province, it was found that this acquisition of territory brought the Romans into conflict with the more or less savage tribes who lived to the south of the Danube. Frontier wars of little importance were conducted almost without intermission from 150 B.C. onwards. In 114 B.C. a consul, C. Porcius Cato, and his army marched out of Macedonia and were cut to pieces by the Scordisci, a people dwelling in what is now called Servia. A war thus commenced which lasted until

¹ The chronology of the war from 109 B.C. to 106 B.C. is doubtful. The dates given here are from Ihne.

110 B.C., when M. Minucius penetrated to the Danube and finally crushed the Scordisci. Unfortunately by breaking the strength of this Danubian people, the Romans had destroyed the bulwark which had thus far protected them from a far more terrible foe. The Cimbri, or "the Champions," a people of Germanic origin, had long been hovering about the northern bank of the Danube, unable to force a southward passage in face of the brave Celtic tribes like the Scordisci by which the river was covered. Now the Cimbrian and Roman came face to face.

§ 222. The Cimbri had much in common with the Gauls; they lived only for battle and deeds of valour, owned as king the bravest of their number, sacrificed to their gods their prisoners of war, and had little civilization. They moved along with no fixed homes, living in the wagons which accompanied them. In 113 B.C. they presented themselves at the passes of the Carnic Alps, close to the colony of Aquileia. They were met by Cn. Papirius Carbo, and ordered to quit the lands of the Taurisci, who were friends, that is dependents, of Rome. They obeyed, and Carbo treacherously drew them into an ambushade. They revenged themselves by inflicting a terrible defeat on the faithless Roman, but instead of at once entering Italy, they passed westward over the Jura, and there lived quietly.

The Cimbri.
Defeat of Cn.
Papirius Carbo,
113 B.C.

In this position, however, they appeared to threaten the newly-acquired province of Narbonese Gaul, and to protect this M. Junius Silanus brought up an army in 109 B.C. The Cimbri asked for lands in which to settle:

*And of M.
Junius Silanus
109 B.C.*

Silanus retorted by attacking them, and lost both army and camp. It was most difficult to raise new troops to face these flaxen-haired giants, and the senate was relieved to find that the Cimbri contented

themselves with repeating their demand for lands, and refrained from any advance upon the Roman frontier.

§ 223. But now a new foe appeared. The Helvetii, a

The Helvetii.

Celtic tribe settled in Switzerland, grew restless, and advanced to seek less barren lands to the west of their Alpine homes. The consul L. Cassius Longinus encountered them near Agen on the Garonne, and fell with most of his troops (107 B.C.). The remainder of the army bought its safety by passing under the yoke, surrendering its baggage and hostages, and at once withdrawing. For this treaty the interim commander C. Popilius was impeached on a charge of treason and condemned to exile. Tolosa (*Toulouse*) now revolted, but was recovered by Q. Servilius Caepio in the following year, for neither Cimbri nor Helvetii showed any desire to molest those who did not provoke them. At Tolosa Caepio improved his opportunity by plundering the great temple of the Celtic Apollo, 106 B.C.

In 105 B.C. there were three armies in Gaul to meet the Cimbri, who, under their king Boiorix, now made a definite advance upon Italy. M. Aurelius Scaurus, an ex-consul, was the first victim: completely routed on the eastern bank of the Rhone, he was captured and put to death for the haughty spirit with which he answered his captors. The consul Cn. Mallius Maximus now summoned Caepio, the proconsul, from the western bank, and the combined armies lay side by side at Arausio (*Orange*), to the number of more than 80,000 Romans, exclusive of auxiliaries and other troops. The two commanders quarrelled, and despite the entreaties of the senate persisted in their antagonism. The chief command of course belonged to the consul Maximus, and this galled the pride of Caepio, who ventured to attack the Cimbri single-handed so as to forestall his

colleague in the expected victory. His army perished almost to a man, his camp was taken, and the victorious Cimbri followed up one triumph by ^{Battle of Arausio, 105 B.C.} another scarcely less complete over Maximus (Oct. 6, 105 B.C.). The dead numbered 120,000, of whom two-thirds were Romans. No such defeat had been experienced since the fatal day of Cannae; but, though the road to Italy was open, the Cimbri passed on towards Spain.

The people promptly showed its indignation against Caepio: he was at once deprived of his imperium, his property was confiscated, and his seat in the senate taken from him. There were other symptoms of the popular restlessness. By the *Lex Domitia* of 104 B.C., vacancies in the priestly colleges were no longer filled by co-optation but by the vote of seventeen of the tribes chosen by lot. C. Marius was returned a second time as consul for 104 B.C.

§ 224. His triumph over, Marius left Rome forthwith, and took up the command of what troops were left in the Narbonese, 104 B.C. He carried ^{Second consulship of Marius, 104 B.C.} with him a number of new levies raised in Italy by the extraordinary measures of the consul P. Rutilius Rufus in 105 B.C., when so great was the panic, that it had been necessary to forbid any man capable of military service to leave the country. With these, assisted by contingents from Massilia, the Allobroges, and other peoples of the Transalpine districts who dreaded the Cimbri no less than did the Romans, Marius was able to put the Narbonese in a good state of defence. The Cimbri meantime had entered Spain and had been driven out by the stubborn valour of the Celtiberi. In 103 B.C. they passed northward along the western shore of Gaul up to

the Seine, and were there joined by other German hordes, notably the Teutones. Failing to oust the Belgae of northern Gaul, they once more wheeled about and advanced upon Italy by two routes. The Cimbri made for the passes of the Carnic Alps; the Teutones and Ambrones were to enter Italy by the western roads.

§ 225 Marius had returned for a space to Rome towards the end of 104 B.C. to hold the consular comitia, and had been a third time returned as consul.

Battle of Aquae
Sextiae, 102
B.C.

He employed the year (103 B.C.) as before in preparing the province and his army for the impending struggle. When at last it came (102 B.C.) he was consul for the fourth time, with Q. Lutatius Catulus, an aristocrat, as his colleague. He entrenched himself at the juncture of the Rhone and Isara (*Isère*), and suffered the Teutones and Ambrones to cross the stream and attack his camp without assuming the offensive. The Germans knew nothing of sieges, and soon gave up the task of storming the Roman position. As they passed on towards the Alps, Marius followed cautiously. He overtook them near Aquae Sextiae (*Aix*), where he again entrenched himself upon a hill after a successful skirmish with the Ambrones. Two days later the barbarians attempted to storm his position, and for half the day the fight was obstinate. Then the Germans broke and fled to their baggage-waggons whither the legions followed them. The entire host was annihilated, men, women, and children alike. The victory of Marius was complete, and when he returned to Rome he was chosen consul for the fifth time.

Meanwhile the second horde, the Cimbri, guided and swelled by the Helvetii, had traversed the Brenner Pass and descended the eastern bank of the Athesis (*Adige*) towards the Po. They were encountered by Catulus, the

second consul, with a full army ; but so great was the terror of their name that at first sight of the enemy the legions broke and fled. With difficulty Catulus retreated to the southern bank of the Po, thus leaving all Transpadane Gaul at the mercy of the invaders.

In the spring of 101 B.C. he was joined by Marius, now a fifth time consul, and the two commanders crossed the Po and marched eastwards towards Vercellae (*Vercelli*). At a spot called Campi Raudii they fell unexpectedly upon the Germans. The Cimbri were annihilated as completely as the Teutones had been. Few survived to be the slaves of their conquerors. Henceforth Rome had no German invaders to fear until the days when Alaric led his Goths into Italy.

Battle of
Vercellae,
101 B.C.

§ 226. While the deadly contest with the northern tribes was in progress, Rome was harassed by a servile war. The scene of the uprising was Sicily, where gangs of slaves, starved, overworked and tortured, toiled on the land chained neck to neck. They had broken out into revolt once before in 135 B.C., under the leadership of Eunus, a Syrian juggler who gave himself the title of King Antiochus, and of his lieutenants Cleon and Achaeus. At one time they were in possession of the important towns of Messana and Agrigentum, and were not crushed until P. Rupilius, the consul of 132 B.C., took their strongholds, Enna and Tauromenium (*Taormina*), and crucified 20,000 of his prisoners.

First Sicilian
Slave War.

In 104 B.C. P. Licinius Nerva, the praetor of Sicily, held a court in Syracuse to inquire into the condition of persons who, though belonging to nations in alliance with Rome, had been captured by the slave-merchants and sold into captivity. Nerva ordered the release of no fewer than 800, but when the numbers of those demanding

Second Sicilian
Slave War.

redress continually increased, he grew alarmed at the prevalent excitement and refused to hear any further cases. This was the signal for insurrection: in the east of the island a Syrian magician, Salvius, who assumed the title of King Tryphon, defeated Nerva near Morgantia; while in the west a Cilician, Athenio, a man of considerable ability, gathered a force and placed it under the command of King Tryphon. The slaves held their ground for the next two years, despite the fact that they had to contend against considerable bodies of troops, and it was not until 101 B.C., when the consul M'. Aquillius took the command, that Athenio, now general through the death of Tryphon, was defeated in a great battle and the revolt so came to an end.

§ 227. Since the fall of C. Gracchus the popular party had been without a great leader. Nevertheless
The Coalition
of Marius,
Saturninus,
and Glaucia. it was not crushed. The disasters, corruption, and general misgovernment of the restored senate had only aroused the democrats to renewed efforts, and they had shown their indignation by the prosecution of the incapable generals who had commanded against Jugurtha and the Sicilian slaves. What they needed was a leader with force to back his efforts. As they thought, they had found the necessary man in Marius, who owed his five consulships to them, and who came back from the field of Vercellae in 101 B.C. at the head of a victorious army absolutely devoted to his interests. Accordingly, Saturninus and Glaucia, the heads of the popular party, entered into an alliance with the great general, and in return for his support secured for him a sixth consulship.

L. Appuleius Saturninus had already held office: in 104 B.C. he had been quaestor, but his management of the

corn-supplies was distasteful to the senate and he was superseded, an insult which caused him to join the popular party. When tribune in 103 B.C., he passed or proposed several laws in the interests of the democracy, notably one that sanctioned the distribution of land in Africa among the veterans of Marius, and another relating to high treason (*maiestas*), which was brought in to ensure the inviolability of the tribunes. He found a strenuous and able ally in C. Servilius Glaucia, who seems by no means entirely to deserve the charge of low cunning and low wit which writers of contrary views brought against him. He had won prominence by supporting the claims of the Equites to the jury-courts, of which it seems they were for a time deprived by a law of Q. Servilius Caepio, the defeated general of Arausio. Metellus, the conqueror of Jugurtha, endeavoured during his censorship (102 B.C.) to eject both Saturninus and Glaucia from the senate, but his colleague disapproved of so violent a proceeding. In the elections for 100 B.C. Marius, Saturninus, and Glaucia were candidates for the consulship, tribunate, and praetorship respectively. The soldiery of Marius were present in ample numbers, and Marius and Glaucia obtained the offices they desired. Saturninus however would have failed had not his partisans openly murdered Nonius, who was on the point of being returned for the tenth and last vacancy in the tribunician college.

§ 228. Saturninus proposed—

(i) That the Gallic lands recently occupied by the Cimbri, which by the law of war were now at the disposal of the state, should be distributed among new Roman colonies, and that any senator who refused to swear obedience to the law within five days should be expelled from the senate.

The *Leges*
Appuleiae,
100 B.C.

(ii) That colonies (probably open to Italians) should be established in Transalpine Gaul, Sicily, Achaëa, and Macedonia.

(iii) That corn should be sold by the state at a lower rate than even that fixed by C. Gracchus.

The first of these laws was proposed chiefly to gratify Marius, for the bulk of the new colonists would be his old soldiers, and he would himself receive extensive powers for settling the colonies. The corn law of course conciliated the proletariat. The senate offered what resistance it could, but the combination of army, Italians, and populace was too powerful: the tribunes who vetoed the laws were driven from the place of voting, and the proposals were carried by sheer force. When the senators were called upon to swear to obey the agrarian law, Marius at first declared that he would not take the oath, afterwards however he said that he would obey it so far as it was law—that is, in accordance with the constitution. Metellus Numidicus alone absolutely refused and went into banishment, to the great joy, as people said, of Marius, whose mortal foe he had been since the time when (108 B.C.) he had attempted to prevent the candidature of the latter for the consulship. Before the year was over the alliance between the three politicians was sorely shaken: the proletariat disliked the colonial law; the Equites, whose interests were solely on the side of law and order, were disgusted by the late scenes of violence; and finally Marius, altogether lost amid the storms of the Forum, fell more and more away from his friends.

§ 229. Saturninus and Glaucia were too deeply involved to desist. They had no choice but to secure re-election or to submit to prosecution. Accordingly Saturninus offered himself for a third tribunate, Glaucia for the consulship, for which he was legally unqualified. On the day of the consular elections they saw that C. Memmius, once the agitator in the

Death of
Saturninus
and Glaucia.

Jugurthine war, but now the senatorial candidate, would be returned, and they had him murdered. But the senate was prepared: the nobles and their adherents armed for the struggle, and invested Marius sorely against his will with dictatorial powers. On the day following Saturninus gave regular battle in the Forum to the senatorial party. The latter easily prevailed. The democrats fled to the Capitol, and there capitulated when the water-supply was cut off. Marius confined their leaders in the senate-house, hoping that they would thus be safe; but before any decision could be arrived at with regard to their punishment, the young nobles pulled open the roof and stoned them to death. The senators followed up their victory by the recall of Metellus. Marius, who had ruined the popular party by his indecision, retired in disgust to Asia, awaiting a new opportunity for the display of his military genius.

§ 230. This decisive victory of the senate secured tranquillity for a period of ten years, broken only by two noteworthy incidents. In 95 B.C., by a *Lex Licinia-Mucia*, Latins and Italians resident in Rome were ordered to leave the capital. The law was enforced, but at the cost of civil war, for it was this enactment, as much as any other event, that drove the Italians into the struggle of a few years later. In 92 B.C. the Equestrian order showed once more that it was determined to use its control of the jury-courts for the oppression of the provincials. P. Rutilius Rufus, the legate of the noble Q. Mucius Scaevola in Asia, had repressed in his province with a stern hand the extortion of the *publicani* and their agents. In revenge, he was charged with extortion, and condemned by an unscrupulous Equestrian jury. The falsity of the accusation was sufficiently proved by the reception which the provincials gave Rufus when he went

The Exile of
Rutilius
Rufus, 92 B.C.

into exile in Asia. He was welcomed with every mark of affection by the very people he was declared to have plundered.

§ 231. At length there appeared another reformer, this time from the ranks of the aristocracy. M. Livius Drusus, who was the son of the opponent of C. Gracchus, desired to do justice to the provincials and at the same time to strengthen the senate by depriving the Equites of their judicial powers; to win over the populace by corn and land laws; and to give the franchise to the Italians. He proposed—

(i) That the *iudicia* should be transferred to the senate, which was to be increased by 300 new members.

(ii) That cheap corn should be distributed.

(iii) That the remnant of the public land, notably that in Campania, should be allotted to new colonists.

(iv) [A proposal kept back for the present] That the full franchise should be extended to the Italians.

The Equites opposed him furiously, and while many of the better sort of senators gave him their support, there was a large party which preferred to share the plunder of the provinces with the Equites, and so was hostile. Chief among these latter was the Consul Philippus. It was clearly impossible to carry the laws separately, for the populace, though anxious for colonies, would not have supported the measure for depriving the Equites of their judicial powers; therefore Drusus, despite a law passed a few years before, put them to the vote in a body, and arrested the consul when he attempted to break off the polling. By this means all three laws were passed; but Philippus declared them illegally carried, and it seemed that he would unite with the Equites to use force. The timid senators gave way; the promise which Drusus had made to the Italians became known, and cries of traitor

were raised. The reformer was left alone, or supported only by the Italians, and his laws were cancelled by the very senate for which he acted. A few days later he was assassinated. The Italians, once again disappointed, would wait no longer. Drusus' murder was the signal for the Social War.

§ 232. The victorious party declared that Drusus was in treasonable correspondence with the Italians, The Social War, 90 B.C.—88 B.C. and by a *Lex Varia*, 91 B.C., a special commission was appointed to try the most prominent of his followers. Angered anew by this attack on their friends, the Italians broke out into revolt. The people of Asculum (*Ascoli*) in Picenum led the way by the massacre of a Roman praetor and his attendants. Marsi, Paeligni, Marrucini, Vestini and the tribes of Samnium joined in the insurrection until all central and southern Italy was in arms. Only in Etruria, Umbria and Campania, where the great landowners were strongest, did the Romans hold their own. Corfinium (*Pentima*), a Paelignian town, was selected as the capital of the new confederation. A senate of 500, two consuls, twelve praetors were chosen; a curia and forum were built, and a new coinage was issued. Of the rebel consuls, the Marsian Q. Pompeidius Silo held the north and centre of the peninsula; while the other, the Samnite C. Papius Mutilus, was commander-in-chief of Italy from Campania southwards. The Roman consuls opposed respectively to them were P. Rutilius Lupus and L. Julius Caesar.

The first attack of the Romans was directed against the revolted town of Asculum. Cn. Pompeius First Campaign, 90 B.C. Strabo was here in command against the insurgents, and after serious reverses was able to besiege the place in earnest.

The consul Rutilius Lupus who took the chief command in the north, lost the bulk of his men in surprises and battles when assailing the Marsi, and was at last slain. His successor was as unfortunate, and it was only when Marius, hitherto serving in a subordinate capacity, took the command that the Romans made any headway.

In southern and central Italy, the Romans were even less successful. The colonies throughout the land were now as in the Hannibalic war faithful to their mother city ; but Aesernia, Beneventum, and Venusia were at once beset by the confederates, and the two first soon fell. The consul Caesar was beaten in Samnium. His legate, Crassus, was shut up in the Lucanian Grumentum (*Saponara*) and there forced to surrender. Encouraged by these successes, Mutilus overran all Campania as far as Vesuvius.

§ 233. Thus the results of the first campaign were altogether favourable to the insurgents. The Romans were not sure of any part of the country beyond Latium and northern Campania, for at the close of the year the Etruscan and Umbrian towns revolted and could only be coerced by armed force. For the moment fear did away with party feeling at Rome, and the first sign of this was a motion carried by the tribune, M. Plautius Silvanus, which transferred the Commission on High Treason from the Equites to a jury elected by the tribes; and so ended the spiteful prosecutions in which the moneyed men had thus far indulged. The first victim of the new arrangement was the author of the Commission, Q. Varius. Then the burgesses began to think of compromise with the insurgents. At the close of 90 B.C. the consul L. Caesar carried a *Lex Iulia* to confer the franchise upon every Italian community which had not yet joined the secessionists, and the tribunes, the

The Lex Julia
and Lex
Plautia-Papiria.

above-mentioned Plautius and C. Papirius Carbo, passed another bill (the *Lex Plantia-Papiria*) that any resident of an Italian township who presented himself before a Roman magistrate within two months' date might so acquire the franchise. There was however one important qualification: the new voters were to be registered in eight tribes only. It was a bitter recantation for the selfish citizens, but it was one that was necessary in order to check the spread of revolt. It was politic too, for it offered rewards to all those Italians who deserted the national cause: it spread distrust amongst their ranks and so broke a power never too strongly concentrated.

§ 234. The new year (89 B.C.) opened with a general attack by the Romans. The consuls Cn. Pompeius Strabo and L. Porcius Cato both took command in the northern district, the former, as previously, in Picenum, the latter against the Marsi. S. Caesar, as proconsul, acted in the south, supported by Sulla and Cosconius. After a brave resistance Asculum was stormed by Pompeius, and with the fall of this important place came the submission of the surrounding peoples, the Vestini, Marrucini, and Paeligni. Progress was still more rapid in the south, where Cosconius quickly recovered all Apulia. Sulla, now commander of Caesar's army—for the pro-consul died early in the year—overran Campania, defeated and slew L. Cluentius before Nola and advanced into Samnium. He captured and sacked Aeclanum (*Mirabella*), defeated Mutilus and shut him up in Aesernia (*Isernia*), and took Bovianum (*Boiano*). The Hirpini now made peace; all Campania, except Nola and a few other isolated positions, had already been recovered, while the stronghold of the revolt, Samnium, maintained but the one fortress of Aesernia where the Italian senate was collected.

The Second
Campaign,
89 B.C.

§ 235. In 88 B.C. Pompaedius took over the supreme command of the remnant of the insurgents, but his forces were reduced to 30,000 men, and even the arming of all the slaves who joined him only added 20,000 to this number. In spite of this, he contrived to recover Bovianum (*Boiano*), but fell soon afterwards in a skirmish. The war dragged on for a few months longer, but it had lost all serious proportions: Nola indeed withstood the assaults of three Roman armies, and the Samnites, who were still holding out amongst their own hills, were not conquered until seven years later, 82 B.C. But the *Lex Iulia* and the *Lex Plautia-Papiria* had done their work; and a *Lex Pompeia* of 89 B.C., which conferred upon the inhabitants of Gallia north of the Po the privileges before belonging to the Latins, the *Ius Latii*, completed the disarming of the country.

The result of the war was that the Latins and the bulk of the Italians received the full franchise; but the requisite journey to Rome to take part in the elections could be made only by the richer of them, and by the rabble who had no ties to keep them in their native towns, and who hoped at Rome to earn a living by the help of the corn-doles and by the sale of the votes with which they were now presented. The numerous middle class could not neglect their home duties for the journey, and as mentioned above, the Italians were only registered in eight of the thirty-five tribes, so that their political influence was not great. But a great step had been gained: the war cost 300,000 lives; but it added 80,000 new citizens to the census-roll, and it prepared the way for the enfranchisement of the provincials, which was soon to commence.

§ 236. The close of the social war inaugurated fresh

party conflicts in Rome. Finance was in disorder; the Italians resented their restriction to eight only of the tribes; Marius was angry because his rival Sulla had received the conduct of the war now afoot with Mithradates. Taking advantage of these elements of discontent, the tribune P. Sulpicius Rufus, a distinguished orator and soldier of the aristocratic party, proposed —

The Laws of
P. Sulpicius
Rufus, 88 B.C.

- (i) That the Italians should be enrolled in all the thirty-five tribes.
- (ii) That the sympathizers with the Italian cause who had been exiled by the Varian Commission should be recalled.
- (iii) That the command in the East should be given to Marius.

The two consuls L. Cornelius Sulla and Q. Pompeius Rufus joined the senate in opposing these changes; but the Italians thronged the streets of Rome when the voting came on, and the Sulpician laws were carried amid violent riots in which Sulla all but lost his life. His army was encamped before Nola, and to it he at once hurried. He told his 35,000 men of the proceedings of Sulpicius, and inquired what was their will. They replied by tearing in pieces the tribunes who were sent to take the command from their general, and by marching upon the capital. Marius could levy no adequate force to resist, and when Sulla made his way into Rome almost without opposition, he fled with his chief partisans. Himself, Sulpicius, and ten others of their party were proscribed, and rewards were offered for their heads. Sulpicius was taken at Laurentum and his head was nailed to the Rostra. Marius was arrested as he lay hid in the marshes of Minturnae, but the German slave who was commissioned to execute him, had not the courage to slay the conqueror of the Cimbri. So he was suffered to escape, and fled to the island of Cercina (*Kerkenah*) in the bay of Tunis.

§ 237. Sulla, instead of making himself monarch of

Rome, preferred to rehabilitate the senate, and to leave it to maintain peace and order while he himself restored Roman supremacy in the East. He at once annulled the Sulpician laws, and passed the following series of measures in the senatorial interest—

(1) No measure could be brought by the tribunes before the *Concilium Plebis* which had not received the previous sanction of the Senate.

(2) The *Comitia Centuriata*, re-arranged on the Servian method of voting (see § 52), was to take the place of the tribal assemblies (§ 58) in legislation, and the previous sanction of the Senate was required.

(3) 300 Optimates were added to the Senate.

Of these measures, the second completely broke the power of the tribunes to introduce revolutionary and democratic bills, while the third transferred all ascendancy in the assembly to the rich. Events however prevented either from being carried out. Sulla, in spite of all his power, did not secure the election of his nominees to the consulship, for the choice of the people fell upon Cn. Octavius, an Optimate, and L. Cornelius Cinna, a determined opponent of the senate. Cinna had already opened communications with the exiled Marius and his friends, in order to compass their restoration. But Sulla could not stop to retaliate, for a dreadful massacre of Roman citizens in Asia had just been instigated by Mithradates of Pontus. Accordingly he set sail for the East, leaving behind him Appius Claudius to continue the siege of Nola, Q. Metellus Pius the son of Metellus Numidicus to act in Samnium, and Cn. Pompeius Strabo to command in Etruria.

§ 238. Freed from the presence of Sulla and his army, Cinna took up the democratic policy where it had been left by Sulpicius. The Italians were angry at the abrogation of the law which had promised to distribute them amongst all the tribes alike: Cinna re-introduced this bill and coupled with it another for the

Measures of
Sulla, 88 P.C.

Cinna and
Octavius.

recall of the exiled members of Marius' party. Cn. Octavius, the senatorial champion, resisted him obstinately. Both consuls armed their followers and a pitched battle was fought in the Forum, in which Octavius prevailed and massacred 10,000 of his opponents. In defiance of all constitutional practice, Cinna was deprived of his consulate by the senate, and in his stead was elected L. Cornelius Merula (87 B.C.).

Cinna could rely upon the aid of the Italians, and he at once appealed to them. The army before Nola went over to his side; Metellus was kept inactive by the renewed assaults of the Samnites and Lucanians; Pompeius Strabo, with the army stationed in Etruria, did not appear to protect Rome until Cinna, supported by the tribune C. Papirius Carbo and by Q. Sertorius, a captain distinguished for his services in the Social War, was already encamped before the city. Here Cinna was joined by Marius, who had landed at Telamon in Etruria.

§ 239. The senate, distrustful of Strabo's loyalty, endeavoured to win over the Italians and ordered Metellus to make terms with the Samnites, but ^{Return of} ~~but~~ ^{Marius, 87 B.C.} the latter were already pledged to the opposite side. Metellus then hurried to Rome with the bulk of his men to protect the senate; whereupon the Samnites and Lucanians relieved Nola, and joined Cinna in force. By this time Cn. Pompeius Strabo was dead: it was given out that he had been struck by a thunderbolt; more probably he was murdered by his mutinous soldiers. Octavius and Metellus could render no effectual aid. At last the senate, outnumbered and out-manceuvred, endeavoured to come to terms with the Marians, but the delay brought famine and pestilence into the city, and the slaves deserted to Cinna in large numbers. Ultimately the city surrendered on the

mere word of Cinna that, so far as he could prevent it, there should be no bloodshed. Marius made no sign.

Cinna and Marius entered Rome, closed the gates, and for five days let loose their troops to massacre every Optimate who had not escaped. No rank was spared: Cn. Octavius and L. Merula both fell, although the latter had voluntarily resigned the consulship which had been against his will transferred to him from Cinna. There died too L. Caesar, the author of the *Lex Iulia*, and Q. Lutatius Catulus, the victor of Vercellae. Marius vented his rage like a barbarian, refusing even burial to his victims. But his career was now at an end. On Jan. 17, 86 B.C., a few days after entering upon his seventh consulship, he died.

§ 240. Cinna named L. Valerius Flaccus consul-suffect.

The Rule
of Cinna,
87 B.C.—84 B.C. The former was in fact monarch, and for four years (87—84 B.C.) remained consul by his own decree, nominating even his colleagues without the pretence of election by the people. His one object was to prevent the vengeance of Sulla, whose enactments he at once declared null, forcing the senate to pronounce valid the recently renewed Sulpician law as to the distribution of the new voters; and he compelled the comitia in 86 B.C. to transfer Sulla's army to the command of L. Valerius Flaccus, who was then despatched to the East with his legate Fimbria to depose that general.

The Italians were left to themselves and were content: the provinces mostly acquiesced in the new government, preferring anything to senatorial oppression. In 84 B.C. there arrived letters from Sulla: he had concluded peace with Mithradates, and was now on his way home with his victorious and devoted legions. The news aroused Cinna and his fellow-consul Carbo, and they planned to crush Sulla in Greece before he could reach Italy. The life of

neither was safe, for Sulla's despatch declared that he was coming to put down the revolution, to restore the senatorial exiles, and to see justice done on the murderers of his friends. Cinna endeavoured to throw into Illyricum the few troops which he had still kept under arms ; but they had no mind for civil war, refused to cross the sea, and tore Cinna to pieces at Ancona. It thus fell to Carbo to meet the long threatened attack.

His Death,
84 B.C.

§ 241. Before proceeding with the narration of events at Rome, we must turn back to the exploits of Sulla in the East. In 120 B.C. Mithradates VI., surnamed Eupator, succeeded on the death of his father to the kingdom of Pontus. He claimed descent from Darius Hystaspes the Persian ; in bodily strength and skill he was unsurpassed ; he was something of a *littérateur* ; and he had bravery and subtleness to second his ambition of founding in Asia a monarchy which should oust the Romans from the East. Early in his reign he conquered the Crimea, saving from barbarians like the Roxolani of the Russian steppes the few Greek towns which still maintained their existence as the Kingdom of the Bosphorus, but making them in turn his own dependencies. By the year 95 B.C. he was master of most of the north and south shores of the Black Sea, and his fleet was the most formidable in existence.

Mithradates
of Pontus.

§ 242. Mithradates' first quarrel with the Romans was about the sovereignty of Cappadocia. In 96 B.C. he put a son of his own on the throne, but the senate, on the appeal of the Cappadocians, ordered a certain Ariobarzanes to be recognized as king, 93 B.C. Ariobarzanes was soon expelled by Tigranes of Armenia, at the instigation of Mithradates, but restored in 92 B.C. without difficulty by Sulla, the governor of Cilicia

The Quarrel
about
Cappadocia.

(which had been constituted a province since its conquest in 102 B.C.). The settlement was of no long duration. Not only was Ariobarzanes driven out a second time by Tigranes (91 B.C.), but Nicomedes III., who had just succeeded to the kingdom of Bithynia, was also attacked and dethroned. The two princes invoked the aid of Rome. M'. Aquillius, the son of that M'. Aquillius who had settled the province of Asia in 129 B.C., was sent as envoy to the East. Again there was no serious fighting. Ariobarzanes was restored to Cappadocia and Nicomedes III. to Bithynia. Not satisfied with the achievement, Aquillius, in hopes of making profit thereby, compelled the reluctant Nicomedes to declare war against Mithradates, 89 B.C. Mithradates looked for allies on all sides : to Tigranes, the powerful king of Armenia, he had already given his daughter Cleopatra ; he made overtures to the Thracians and the Greeks, intending, like Antiochus, to carry the war into Europe ; and he allied himself with the Cilician pirates. When war broke out in 88 B.C., he acted with vigour. The Bithynian king and the three Roman generals who assailed him were beaten in detail. M'. Aquillius fled to Pergamus, but was ultimately given up and tortured to death.

The First Mithradatic War, 88 B.C.—84 B.C. The whole of Asia lay at the mercy of Mithradates, who met with no resistance except from Rhodes. He was hailed as a deliverer, and either in consequence of his orders or as the result of an outbreak of national fury, the Romans and Italians in Asia to the number of 80,000 were hunted down and put to death. Mithradates made Pergamus his capital, and converted Cappadocia, Phrygia, and Bithynia into satrapies. By his powerful fleet which swept the Aegean, he was able to send his generals across to Greece and to raise the whole peninsula against Rome, 87 B.C. Sparta, Achaea, and Boeotia were willing to help :

and Athens opened its gates to the Pontic admiral Archelaus. At the same time more Pontic troops were sent into Greece by way of Macedonia.

§ 243. By this time Sulla had landed in Epirus with 30,000 men. He knew that his leaving Rome at this moment meant the overthrow of his recent measures and the triumph of Cinna and Marius; but not to leave Rome meant the loss of the Eastern Empire. His first move was to offer Mithradates terms of peace, by which the Great King might retire on giving up his recent acquisitions. When the offer was declined Sulla marched upon Athens, and having defeated Archelaus in Boeotia, proceeded to invest the city. Such rapid successes speedily influenced the cowardly Greeks: most of the towns bought pardon by instant submission and by gifts of men, money, or supplies. Archelaus and his coadjutor Aristion defended Athens and its harbour the Piræus for many months. Assault was useless, and the slow method of blockade alone could be employed; but even this was a difficulty while Mithradates commanded the seas and supplied the city from his vast resources.

It was not until March 1st, 86 B.C., that Athens capitulated. It was plundered of course, but not deprived of its freedom. Mithradates grew impatient. He might have ruined Sulla's army by a policy of delay: he chose rather to push matters to a head. His general Taxiles, who was in Macedonia with 100,000 foot, marched into Greece. In Boeotia he was joined by the forces which Archelaus now withdrew from the Piræus; and the two generals gave battle to Sulla at Chaeronea (*Kaprena*) in March, 86 B.C. They were utterly defeated, and only a miserable remnant under Archelaus escaped to Chalcis.

Sulla in
Greece.

Capture of
Athens, 86 B.C.

Battle of
Chaeronea,
86 B.C.

§ 244. In spite of this brilliant victory Sulla was still unable to move. He had no fleet, and the utmost endeavours of his legate L. Licinius Lucullus could not collect one; and at this very moment the Cinnan consul, L. Valerius Flaccus (§ 240), was in Epirus, invested by his party with the task of disarming Sulla rather than of crushing Mithradates. But Flaccus was incapable; finding that his men were more likely to desert to Sulla than Sulla's to come over to himself, he avoided a battle, and passed into Macedonia, intending to enter Asia by way of the Hellespont and attack Mithradates at home.

In the same or the following year (86 or 85 B.C.), the Great King sent another expedition into Greece. Archelaus, still with the chief command, again massed his forces in Boeotia, only to fight a second battle with no better result than before. So completely was he defeated at Orchomenus (*Skripu*), that he lost even his camp and barely escaped to Euboea (*Negropont*). As a result, the Pontic forces practically evacuated Europe, and Sulla, after some futile negotiations with Archelaus, spent the ensuing winter in preparing to invade Asia.

The consul Flaccus, escaping from Sulla, had crossed the Hellespont and reached Chalcedon in Asia when a mutiny broke out in which he lost his life. It was headed by a demagogue of no birth, C. Flavius Fimbria, who now took up the command and defeated a Pontic army on the Rhyndacus. At the same time L. Lucullus appeared with a small but well-handled fleet raised from Rhodes and other island states. Fimbria invited his co-operation to capture Mithradates in Mitylene, but Lucullus was too loyal a Sullan, and went on with his own business

of recovering in detail the islands and maritime towns. After this he met Sulla in Thrace, and conveyed the troops of the latter across to the Troad, 84 B.C.

§ 245. The conduct of Mithradates had already alienated the Asiatics. he murdered, confiscated, and insulted on all hands, robbing the rich to find gifts for his favourites and extorting money for the war by every possible means. The various cities showed their resentment by welcoming Lucullus, and the Great King saw fit to offer terms. He endeavoured to purchase his conquests in Asia by offering to support Sulla against the Mario-Cinnan democracy. Sulla refused to surrender any portion of Roman Asia, demanded the complete restoration of the king's recent conquests, a war-indemnity of 3000 talents and the surrender of Archelaus' fleet. Mithradates at last accepted the terms, and then Sulla turned to settle accounts with Fimbria. It was easily done, for Sulla's forces were far the more numerous, and Fimbria's men began to desert at once. The self-made general fled to Pergamum and there killed himself. His two legions took service with Sulla, and were placed under the command of L. Licinius Murena, an officer who had done good service at the siege of Athens and elsewhere.

End of the
First Mithra-
datic War.

The organization of the recovered provinces was rapid and thorough. Nicomedes III. and Ariobarzanes were reseated upon the thrones of Bithynia and Cappadocia, and Mithradates bound himself to live peaceably with them. The few states and towns which had been loyal to Rome—Rhodes, Chios, Magnesia, etc.—were rewarded by the grant of new lands or further privileges. Those which had rebelled were reduced to the *status quo ante*, and were called upon for the tribute which they had neglected to pay during the past five years. The men who

Settlement
of Asia.

had taken a prominent part in the massacre of the Italians were executed. A war-indemnity of 20,000 talents was levied. Sulla had recovered the Eastern Empire, but the cost of the war left its mark upon the provincials, for they now fell more deeply still into the toils of the Roman usurers, toils from which they never escaped until the Republic was overthrown.

§ 246. L. Licinius Murena, left by Sulla in command of the province, was determined to force on a second war with Mithradates. Making a pretext of some preparations of the Pontic king, against the revolted Bosporians, he began to plunder the territories of Mithradates. The latter appealed to the senate at Rome, but Murena seems to have been encouraged by that body to continue the war. On the river Halys however he was defeated with great loss, and compelled to retreat into Phrygia. Soon afterwards there came peremptory orders from Sulla that he should desist from hostilities. Murena obeyed, and for some years Mithradates and the Romans were on good terms with each other.

§ 247. The consuls for 83 B.C., the year in which Sulla sailed home from Greece, were C. Norbanus and L. Cornelius Scipio Asiaticus, the latter a descendant of the victor of Magnesia. Neither was a general: nevertheless they got under arms upwards of 150,000 men to oppose the bare 30,000 of Sulla. The Italians as a whole sided with the government, for the success of Sulla meant the restoration of the senate, and perhaps, as they dreaded, their own disenfranchisement. Most of all the Samnites and Lucanians flocked to resist his return. Landing at Brundisium, Sulla overran Apulia without hindrance. Here he was joined by many of the exiled nobles; chief among these were Q. Metellus Pius

Second Mith-
radatic War,
83 B.C.—82 B.C.

Sulla returns
to Italy,
83 B.C.

and the famous Gnaeus Pompeius, of whom the latter, son of Cn. Pompeius Strabo, had declared for Sulla in Picenum, where he had many clients, and had raised a force of three legions. In Campania Norbanus barred the way, and Sulla, finding negotiations again fruitless, attacked and utterly routed him in the battle of Mount Tifata. Hurrying thence northward he met Scipio at Teanum (*Teano*) and proposed a conference. The two leaders arrived at no decision; but Sulla's veterans, mixing with the recruits of Scipio, persuaded them to desert their commander, and the second consular army thus fell before the invader.

§ 248. In 82 B.C. the revolutionists made a desperate effort to recover their lost ground. Carbo and C. Marius, the adopted son of the great Marius, The Campaign of 82 B.C. were consuls: the former held this office now for the third time; the latter was invested with it at the age of twenty-six, for it was hoped that, for his father's sake, men would hasten to serve under the son's standards. Sulla, after wintering in Campania, advanced into Latium, and at Sacriportus near Signia (*Segni*) met and defeated Marius, and shut up the remnant of his army in Praeneste (*Palestrina*), entrusting the siege of that strong fortress to Ofella. By the orders of Marius, Brutus Damasippus the praetor evacuated Rome, but not before he had convoked the senate in the Curia and there cut down the few adherents of Sulla who had survived thus far. A few hours later Sulla entered the capital, placed in it a garrison, and hurried on towards Etruria, where Carbo held at bay the second division of the Sullan forces under Metellus Pius. This officer had captured several scattered divisions, stormed Sena Gallica (*Sinigaglia*), and by the help of Pompeius had driven Carbo back upon Ariminum (*Rimini*). Carbo now moved into Etruria, and there the Sullans beset him on all

sides. His first engagement was with Sulla in person at Clusium (*Chiusi*), and proved so favourable to Carbo that he detached a large column to relieve the siege of Praeneste. At the same time the entire body of the Samnites and Lucanians, 70,000 men under Pontius of Telesia and M. Lamponius, raised the siege of Capua and advanced to the relief of Praeneste. Carbo's column was cut to pieces at Spoletium (*Spoletto*), and Sulla returned in person to face the Samnites. About the same time C. Norbanus, after some successes in Gallia Cisalpina, was defeated and forced to fly to Rhodes. The victorious Sullans, under Lucullus and Metellus, moved upon Carbo, who gave up hope and fled to Africa. The repeated attempts to save Praeneste had failed. The forces of Ofella blockaded the doomed fortress as vigorously as ever, and the revolutionists in despair resolved to signalize their own destruction by the sack of Rome. The Samnites especially lusted to rase "the wolves' den," and on November 1st, 82 B.C., their entire host quitted the neighbourhood of Praeneste and encamped before the Colline Gate. Sulla hastened to save the city. He appeared within a few hours, and despite the exhaustion of his men, gave battle forthwith. The fight lasted twenty-four hours and left Sulla barely victorious. Rome was saved; the army of the Revolution was destroyed. C. Marius committed suicide and Praeneste surrendered, only to be sacked. One by one the few remaining towns fell. Nola, garrisoned by Mutilus and his Samnites, held out until 80 B.C., and Volaterrae in Etruria did not submit until 79 B.C.

Battle of the
Colline Gate,
82 B.C.

§ 249. Italy and the East were thus in the hands of

The Sullans
in the West.

Sulla; but Sicily, Spain, and Africa were held by scattered bands of Cinna's adherents. Q. Sertorius escaping from Etruria raised a force in Spain, but

was soon forced to fly, though, as we shall see, he afterwards returned and defied the Sullans for many years. M. Perperna withdrew from Sicily at the mere approach of Pompeius, who soon afterwards captured Carbo and put him to death (80 B.C.). Crossing thence to Africa, Pompeius found himself opposed by a large army under Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus. He finished the war within forty days. When he was recalled and ordered to disband his army, his men claimed for him a triumph which Sulla saw fit to accord, though Pompeius was not yet of senatorial rank (79 B.C.).

§ 250. The battle of the Colline Gate left Sulla undisputed master of Rome. He now attempted to stamp out the democratic party. Nearly 5000 persons were executed in consequence of the Sullan proscriptions (published lists of names of people who could be killed with impunity); the property of the victims was confiscated; the Italian towns which had revolted were destroyed; and on the lands (*ager publicus*) thus acquired Sulla settled 120,000 of his veterans, who were to re-populate Italy, restore agriculture, and act as a reserve army for the senate. Having thus destroyed all resistance, Sulla now began the work of re-construction.

Sullan Reign
of Terror,
82 B.C.

An interrex, appointed by the senate, nominated Sulla as dictator, and the appointment was ratified by a law of the comitia. The full title bestowed on Sulla was *dictator legibus faciendis reipublicae constituendae*. Since the office was limited neither by time nor appeal, it will be seen that it was practically a new magistracy, and resembled the old dictatorship (§ 50) only in name. Sulla was for all intents and purposes a monarch.

Sulla Dictator.

§ 251. Throughout 81 B.C. and the following year Sulla attempted by means of constitutional legislation to set back the clock of progress. His main object was the restoration of the supremacy of the senate. Since the senate had long ago done all the work it was competent to do in forwarding the development of the empire, the Sullan *régime* was foredoomed to failure. The constitution of Sulla only checked for a moment the inevitable movement towards monarchy; for it was in monarchy alone, not in oligarchy, that the empire could find its salvation. But in seeking to secure the power of the senate he incidentally effected some administrative and judicial reforms which were useful, practical and permanent. These reforms were, doubtless, intended by their author merely to further the cause he had at heart; but owing to their sound and essentially non-party character they long outlasted the directly constitutional measures.

The *Leges*
Corneliae,
81 B.C.

§ 252. Considerable changes were made in the position of the magistrates. Before the time of the Reactionary Reforms. The Gracchi the tribunes had become the servants of the senate; the democratic reformers had again constituted them the champions of the people and the opponents of the oligarchy. They were now forbidden to propose *plebiscita* to the *concilium plebis* without first obtaining the sanction of the senate. This was important, as nearly all legislative measures were by this time *plebiscita*. Moreover, they were no longer allowed to veto a decree of the senate or stop a vote of the centuriate assembly, and the tribunate was made a bar to any higher magistracy. The number of quaestors was increased to twenty, and since these, on the expiration of their year of office, were entitled to a seat in the senate,

Magistrates.

the censorship fell into abeyance. Other measures dealing with magistrates are described in § 253.

The senate was replenished by the admission of new members; their control of *plebiscita* gave them legislative power; and the judges for the criminal courts were drawn from the senate instead of from the knights. The Senate.

Since *plebiscita* could not be proposed without the sanction of the senate, and the *concilium plebis* had by this time become the main organ of legislation, the power of the people was greatly curtailed. The People. The conservative *comitia centuriata* passed laws, but these seem to have been mere ratifications of the senate's decrees. We do not know whether the powers of the *comitia tributa* were now limited. This assembly was in personnel and organisation practically one with the *concilium plebis* (§ 76); but Sulla does not seem to have prevented the consul or the praetor from summoning the tribes for the passing of *leges*. Moreover, the *comitia tributa*, by electing the quaestors, chose indirectly the members of the senate; but their freedom of election may perhaps have been controlled by the senate.

§ 253. Sulla made some sound and lasting reforms in the administrative and judicial departments. He increased the number of praetors from six to eight, and of quaestors (as we have seen) from eight to twenty. He also gave legal sanction to a custom which had long been growing up. He enacted that consuls and praetors were to remain in Rome during their year of office, and discharge civil and legal functions; the consuls were to have a general control; the urban and peregrine praetors were to have charge (as before) of civil procedure; and the six other praetors were to sit as Permanent Reforms of Sulla: (1) Administrative;

presidents of the reformed criminal courts. On the expiration of their year of office, the two consuls and the eight praetors were to govern the ten provinces as proconsuls and propraetors respectively. Thus the civil authority was divorced from the military; and the civil control of the senate over civil magistrates was extended to the whole of Italy.

The judicial system was reformed by the increase of the number of praetors to eight, and by the
 (2) Judicial. increase of the standing commission (*quaestiones perpetuae*) to at least nine. Besides the court for trying cases of extortion (*quaestio de repetundis*) established by the Lex Calpurnia of 149 B.C., there were new courts for treason (*maiestatis*), violence (*de vi*), assassination (*inter sicarios*), and other offences. The jurymen were taken from the senate instead of from the equites. "Apart from the temporary political purpose served, this was the soundest part of Sulla's reforms. It was the beginning of a clear distinction between civil and criminal jurisprudence, a first attempt to codify criminal law and procedure."¹

§ 254. In connection with the Marian Reforms (§ 219) it will be convenient here to give a brief sketch of the development of the army.

Four periods may be distinguished.

FIRST PERIOD. Under the early kings the Roman army or *legio* ("levy") consisted of 3000 *milites* and 300 *equites*, together with light-armed troops or *velites*.

SECOND PERIOD. The army as reformed by Servius Tullius was based on property qualifications (see § 52). The classes were drawn up in a close array or phalanx.

THIRD PERIOD. Camillus (about 400 B.C.) substituted an open order of formation for the unwieldy and easily dislocated phalanx. The *legio* or army (corresponding more exactly to our brigade) was drawn up in three lines or divisions, known as *Hastati*, *Principes*, and

¹ Howe and Leigh, *History of Rome*, p. 455.

Triarii or *Pilani*, according as they fought in the front line, in the second line, or in the reserve. The *Triarii* were veterans, and were regarded as the chief strength of the legion. Each of the first two classes consisted of 1200 men, broken up into ten maniples (*manipuli*, "handfuls") of 120 men each, the *Triarii* of 600 men, broken up into ten maniples of sixty men each.⁴ Each maniple contained two centuries (*centuriae*) of sixty men each (in the *Triarii* of thirty men each), and each century was commanded by a centurion (*centurio*). The maniples were during this period the tactical units of the legion; they were at first arranged like men on a draught-board, so that the second line could charge through the gaps in the first; but it soon became the custom for the maniples when in action to deploy so as to form a continuous line. From 211 B.C. we hear of 1200 light-armed skirmishers (*velites*). Thus the legion consisted of 4,200 men. The two first lines were armed with the heavy hurling javelin (*pilum*) and the third line with the thrusting-pike (*hasta*). All three lines were equipped with a short Spanish sword (*gladius*) and with a helmet, greaves, and the oblong *scutum*. When the battle began the *hastati* charged, hurling their javelins as they advanced, and then attacking with their swords. They were in due course relieved by the *principes*, and the *triarii* served as a reserve. The regular cavalry attached to each legion numbered 300, divided into ten troops (*turmae*) of thirty men each. The allies (*socii*) furnished an equal number of infantry and three times the number of horse for each legion of the Roman troops. Their contingents were called *alae*, two for each legion. In each *ala* the infantry was divided into five *cohortes* (companies) of 420 men each, and the cavalry into five *turmae* of sixty men each. This makes only 600 allied horse for each legion, but the other 300 formed a special corps. The legion was commanded by six tribunes, and each *ala* by three Roman *praefecti socium*.

FOURTH PERIOD. From the beginning of the third period the maniples were only sections of larger companies called *cohortes*. Marius (see § 219) made the cohort instead of the maniple the tactical division of the legion. The legion now consisted of 6000 men, and was divided into ten cohorts of 600 men, and each cohort into three maniples of *pilani*, *principes*, and *hastati*. Each maniple was divided into two centuries (*centuria prior* and *centuria posterior*). The maniples forming a cohort were arranged side by side. The whole cohort was now armed with the *pilum*, so that the names *pilani*, etc., only stood for distinctions of rank. The centuries (*centuriae*, or in Caesar *ordines*) were commanded by centurions, and the rank of a centurion was determined by his century. The ten centurions of the *centuriae priores* of the *pilani* were called *pili priores* (also *primipili* or *primi ordines*), and ranked as a first class. They formed, with the general, a council of war, and each commanded a cohort. The legion was commanded by a *legatus legionis*, instead of by the six tribunes (whose functions were now administrative and judicial, not military), and next to him came the *pilus prior* of the first cohort. Most of the cavalry now consists of foreign mercenaries (organised as in the third period).

CHAPTER X.

THE FIRST AND SECOND TRIUMVIRATES.

§§ 255, 256. The Rising of Lepidus.—§§ 257, 258. Sertorius.—
§ 259. The War of Spartacus.—§ 260. The First Consulship of
Pompeius and Crassus.—§§ 261—268. The Third Mithradatic War.
—§ 269. Cicero.—§ 270. Caesar.—§§ 271—280. The Conspiracies of
Catilina to the Murder of Clodius.—§ 281. The Parthian War.—
§§ 282—290. Caesar in Gaul.—§§ 291—295. Struggle between
Caesar and the Senate.—§§ 296—299. Constitutional Measures and
Death of Caesar.—§§ 300—310. History of the Second Triumvirate.

§ 255. In 79 B.C. Sulla laid down the dictatorship and
retired to the privacy of his villa at Cumae,
The Rising
of Lepidus. where he died in the following spring, 78 B.C.
The consuls for 78 B.C. were Q. Lutatius Catulus, son of
the conqueror of Vercellae, and M. Aemilius Lepidus. The
latter had been threatened with impeachment for extortion
in Sicily, and to avoid condemnation he suddenly deserted
the senatorial party and ranged himself with the democrats.
Scarcely was Sulla dead when Lepidus, encouraged by the
recent successes of Sertorius in Spain, made an assault on
the new constitution. First and foremost, the tribunate
was to be re-established and the corn-doles renewed.
After this, all lands and property confiscated during the
recent dictatorship were to be restored, and the sentences
by which the adherents of Cinna had been banished, and
their children debarred from public office, were to be
rescinded. The senate, growing alarmed, made a half-

hearted attempt at a compromise : the corn-doles were renewed on the original plan of C. Gracchus, but only in favour of a limited number of the citizens. But the discontented did not wait for the sanction of law : the evicted people of Faesulae in Etruria proceeded to oust the Sullan allotment-holders, and the disputes which followed soon gave the senate opportunity to declare the state in danger, and to despatch Lepidus and Catulus to the disturbed districts. This foolish proceeding would inevitably furnish the head of the sedition with troops ; but the senate hoped to keep Lepidus quiet by administering to him an oath not to turn his arms against his colleague. The consul took the oath, remarking that it would only bind him during his year of office, and went on raising fresh troops for the revolution. He refused to return when recalled, and at the beginning of 77 B.C. sent to demand the restoration of the exiles and the tribunate, and a second consulship for himself.

§ 256. These demands were refused, and Lepidus marched upon Rome. The capital was protected by ^{Defeat of} Catulus and the Sullan veterans, to whom a ^{Lepidus, 77 B.C.} revolution meant the loss of all their recent gains. Cn. Pompeius was despatched to Cisalpine Gaul, where M. Brutus, legate of Lepidus, was at the head of a small force. In a battle fought on the Campus Martius, under the very walls of Rome, Lepidus was defeated and withdrew to Etruria. His legate Brutus was still less successful : he was besieged by Pompeius in Mutina (*Modena*), captured, and put to death. Lepidus contrived to take ship from Etruria after a second engagement, and sailed to Sardinia, where he hoped to maintain himself by the aid of Sertorius. He died, however, before he could effect anything ; and Perperna, the Cinnan leader who had abandoned Sicily to

Pompeius (§ 249), carried the remnant of Lepidus' men into Spain.

§ 257. In 80 B.C. Q. Sertorius, who had previously withdrawn from Spain, returned thither on the invitation of the Lusitanians. Though he had comparatively few troops, he completely succeeded in his attacks on the Sullan generals who were sent against him. The most formidable of these, Q. Metellus Pius, he routed on the Anas (*Guadiana*), while his lieutenant Hirtuleius was as fortunate in the Hither province. Continuing to act with great skill, Sertorius was by 77 B.C. in possession of the entire peninsula, except a few coast towns. From the exiled Marians who flocked to him for protection he formed a senate and found officers for his Spanish army. His chivalry of character gained the affection of the Spaniards, whom he protected against the insolence of his Roman troops, and refused to oppress by excessive tribute, while he worked on their superstition by pretending to be a favourite of Diana, and to receive instructions from her through the agency of a tame fawn. In 77 B.C. he was joined by M. Perperna with the remnant of Lepidus' army.

§ 258. At this juncture Cn. Pompeius arrived to carry on the war. He was fresh from his victory over M. Brutus, on the strength of which he had demanded the post of general in Spain. The senate would gladly have refused; but Pompeius declined to disband his forces, and to avert worse things the senate gave way and invested Pompeius with proconsular authority in Spain. He reached that country in 76 B.C., after passing through Gaul, and at once marched southwards to join Metellus in the Further province. He forced the passage of the Iberus (*Ebro*) in the face of Perperna,

Murder of
Sertorius,
72 B.C.

but was out-generalled by Sertorius in the rest of the campaign. The year 75 B.C. saw the defeat and death at Segovia of Hirtuleius, an irreparable misfortune for Sertorius, which was followed by the junction of Metellus and Pompeius. By the end of the year the senatorial generals were in complete possession of Further Spain, and the war now centred about the Ebro valley and the important towns of Ilerda (*Lerida*), Calagurris (*Calahorra*), and Osca (*Huesca*). Here Sertorius still held his ground. There were few battles, many sieges; and each winter Metellus and Pompeius, owing to lack of supplies, were compelled to retire, one into Southern Spain, the other beyond the Pyrenees. At last Sertorius fell. It was said that he had forgotten his early frankness and simple habits: at any rate he could no longer rely upon the Spaniards, and his own intimate friends conspired to murder him. Twice they failed, and many of them paid with their lives for their treachery. Perperna, however, consummated this villainy by assassinating his general at a banquet at Osca. He had hoped to obtain the place of the murdered leader, but men had no confidence in him, and when he fell into Pompeius' hands he was ordered off to execution. So ended the Sertorian War, 72 B.C.

§ 259. When Pompeius returned to Italy, he found the land devastated by a slave war. Not only were the agrarian evils, which Tiberius Gracchus had tried to combat, more rampant than ever, but the growing popularity of gladiatorial shows had led to the establishment of regular schools (*ludi*) for training the most desperate class of slaves—condemned criminals, prisoners of war, and the like—for their appearance in the arena. It was natural that these men should use the skill so acquired to preserve their lives, and in 73 B.C. a

The War of
Spartacus,
73—71 B.C.

band of seventy picked gladiators, headed by Spartacus, a Thracian of noble blood, and by Crixus and Oenomaus, two Celtic prisoners, broke out of a training school at Capua and escaped to Mount Vesuvius. The insurgents, increased by numbers of runaway slaves from all parts, defeated the magistrates sent against them, and soon all Southern Italy was at the mercy of Spartacus and 40,000 savages, who stormed and sacked the old Greek towns of the coast. So formidable was the war, that in 72 B.C. both consuls took the field. Crixus, who had quarrelled with Spartacus, was defeated and killed in Apulia; but this loss was forgotten in a series of victories which Spartacus won soon afterwards. He defeated both consuls and traversed Italy from end to end, even appearing as far north as Mutina. To wipe out this disgrace, the consuls were in the autumn superseded by M. Licinius Crassus, the richest man in Rome and the representative of the Equites. Spartacus retreated into Bruttium with the design of crossing to Sicily; but the pirates upon whom he relied to carry him across the straits, played him false. Turning northwards again he broke through the lines which Crassus had constructed across Bruttium from sea to sea, but dissensions once more broke out among his followers, of whom the entire German and Celtic portion seceded, 71 B.C. They were cut off by Crassus to the last man, and Spartacus himself soon afterwards perished in a great battle in Lucania. The survivors were hunted down by Pompeius, who had by this time finished the Sertorian War and was marching to the support of Crassus.

§ 260. Thus far the Sullan constitution had endured: the repeated attacks of the democrats had only resulted in the re-establishment of the corn-largess and the removal of the restriction which had made a tribune ineligible for

other offices. But the discontent was great among all classes: the popular party clamoured for the restoration of the tribunate to its old dignity, the Equites demanded that they should again serve in the jury-courts, while both declaimed against the corruption of the senatorial jurymen and governors. When therefore in 71 B.C. Pompeius and Crassus returned to Rome, each bringing with him a victorious army, the senate looked on with unconcealed dread, while its opponents were filled with hope. The generals did not disappoint the popular expectation. On being elected to the consulship for 70 B.C., they led the attack on the government, keeping their armies close to the city in case of need. There were passed three great bills—

The First
Consulship of
Pompeius and
Crassus,
70 B.C.

(i) That the tribunes should again be allowed to bring *plebiscita* before the *concilium plebis* without previous sanction of the senate.

(ii) That the jury-courts (*iudicia*) should consist of three panels (*decuriae*) from the three orders—the senators, the equites, and the *tribuni aerarii*.¹

(iii) That the censorship should be restored with its old power over the senate.

The whole of Sulla's work was undone, except that his reforms concerning the jurisdiction of the standing commissions (*quaestiones perpetuae*) and the division of magisterial duties remained untouched. The tribunician power again became as threatening to the government as it had ever been, and the censors appointed in accordance with the new legislation ejected no fewer than sixty-four members from the senate. Before their year of office was over Pompeius and Crassus quarrelled, and seemed about to turn their armies against each other, but the democrats brought about a half-hearted reconciliation. The consuls disbanded their legions and became private citizens again. Pompeius

¹ Originally tribal officers who collected the *tributum*; later persons possessing between 300,000 and 400,000 sesterces.

however was eager to win fresh laurels, and looked anxiously to the east for the chance of doing so.

§ 261. Since his defeat by Sulla, Mithradates had regained much of his old power. For allies he had the Cilician pirates by sea and Armenia by land: and inasmuch as Rome had destroyed all the other Mediterranean fleets without adequately arming one of her own, the pirates were, if properly handled, invincible, and might even prevent the appearance of any Roman forces in Asia; while Tigranes of Armenia, son-in-law of Mithradates, had almost immediately upon Sulla's retirement from Asia, commenced a series of aggressions which had added a great part of Mesopotamia, Cappadocia and Syria to his dominions, and broken to pieces the empire of the Seleucidae. His boundaries were on the east the Caspian Sea, on the north the kingdom of Mithradates and the Caucasus, on the south the Parthians, whom he had reduced to comparative helplessness. On the west his limit was where he might choose to set it, and Mithradates wished him to swoop at once upon Roman Asia.

§ 262. Dying in 75 B.C., Nicomedes III. left his kingdom of Bithynia to the Romans. This meant the extension of Roman Asia to the very borders of Pontus, and Mithradates knew that sooner or later it would lead to a collision between himself and Rome. He promptly overran Bithynia, made overtures of alliance to Sertorius, and obtained from him a number of exiled Romans to drill his army of 100,000 men and to act as his officers. The pirates assisted in providing him with a fleet of 400 vessels.

The consuls for 74 B.C. were L. Licinius Lucullus and M. Aurelius Cotta. Lucullus, who had been one of Sulla's most capable officers in the First Mithradatic War, was a

Bithynia is
bequeathed
to Rome,
75 B.C.

staunch optimates, but fonder of ease than of politics; and he was that rare citizen, an honest man, who would wink neither at equestrian oppressions nor at military excesses. Supported by Cotta as his admiral on the Hellespont, he commenced the attack by marching through Phrygia with a force of 30,000 men. Luckily for him, Tigranes left Mithradates to take care of himself, but even thus the Romans were seriously out-numbered. By this time Mithradates had got as far as Chalcedon (*Kadikoï*), where he was besieging Cotta. He burnt the Roman fleet in the harbour, but learning that Lucullus was coming to the rescue, he passed on to Cyzicus (*Balkiz*). There he found himself entrapped, unable either to advance or retreat, while want of supplies bred sickness amongst his host (74 B.C.). He was at length compelled, after losing two-thirds of his infantry and almost all his cavalry, to put the residue on board his fleet. Further disasters occurred at sea, and only a stroke of good fortune enabled him to reach Pontus upon a pirate vessel, 73 B.C.

The Third
Mithradatic
War, 74—
65 B.C.

§ 263. The Romans now assumed the aggressive, and in the following year, 72 B.C., Lucullus surprised the Pontic army at Cabira (*Niksar*), and forced Mithradates to take refuge with Tigranes of Armenia. Then leaving his legates to reduce the coast towns, he returned to re-organize the province of Asia. The reduction of the coast was not accomplished for two years, and the re-organization of Asia was attended with difficulties almost as tedious, for the land was brought to the verge of ruin by the exactions of Roman tax-gatherers and money-lenders, following upon the exhausting wars of Sulla. Lucullus performed his task well from the provincials' point of view, less well from his own: for his rectitude raised up against him the enmity of the entire

Battle of
Cabira, 72 B.C.

Equestrian order, and though they could not avenge themselves at once, they found means to do so later on.

§ 264. It was evident to Lucullus that Asia could not be
Lucullus
attacks
Tigranes. secure while Tigranes was unchastised, yet he
 knew that the inert home-government would
 never authorize him to attack so formidable a

power as Armenia. But he was determined to act, and in order to find a valid excuse for war, he sent to Tigranes envoys demanding the surrender of Mithradates. Tigranes was astounded at such a message from a general whose entire force was under 30,000 men : he gave an emphatic refusal, which was all Lucullus desired, and before the Armenian army could be collected a Roman force of 15,000

Battle of
Tigranocerta,
69 B.C. men had laid siege to Tigranocerta, a new city
 which Tigranes had peopled with Greek captives
 from Cappadocia and Syria. In attempting to
 relieve the town Tigranes was defeated utterly : he lost,
 said Lucullus' despatch, 100,000 men as against five Romans
 slain, and the town itself was surrendered (69 B.C.).

§ 265. Yet Mithradates was able to induce the Armenians
Reverses of
Lucullus. to continue the struggle, though he failed to
 find an ally in Phraates of Parthia, who made
 a treaty on his own account with Rome. Accordingly in
 the following spring, Lucullus marched eastward into
 Armenia Proper, intending to attack Artaxata (*Ardaschar*),
 the capital of the empire. But the country was difficult,
 the weather severe, the soldiers weary of long service and
 of the sternness with which their general prevented them
 from plundering while he made a fortune for himself. They
 mutinied, and compelled him to march back across the
 Tigris, and his only exploit in this year (68 B.C.) was the
 sack of Nisibis. But meanwhile Mithradates had armed
 new forces, and successfully assailed the weak detachments

which Lucullus had left behind him in Pontus. His legates sent urgent demands for help, and Lucullus reluctantly abandoned Nisibis, Tigranocerta, and all his recent conquests, 67 B.C. Even so he arrived too late: the Romans had already sustained a severe defeat at Zela (*Zilleh*), and news now arrived from Rome that the people, instigated by the Equites, had deprived Lucullus of the command, and superseded him by the consul M'. Acilius Glabrio. Fresh mutinies broke out among his troops: he could not induce them to confront Mithradates, who overran Cappadocia without hindrance, and he had the mortification to see once more in the possession of the enemy every inch of ground that he had conquered in his eight campaigns. After witnessing this melancholy issue of his brilliant exploits he retired into private life, and spent his days in luxury and literary pursuits, leaving a name that was to be proverbial for wealthy refinement and indolence.

§ 266. The pirates had deserted Mithradates in his hour of defeat, but only to resume the more profitable employment of piracy in the western seas, ^{The} ^{Gabinian Law,} and to make life a burden to the coast towns ^{67 B.C.} and merchants of Italy. Again all classes in Rome clamoured for deliverance from the corsairs, and turned to Pompeius for help, although the democrats were almost as much afraid as was the senate that he might ultimately prove another Sulla or Marius.

Accordingly the tribune Aulus Gabinius brought in a bill conferring upon Pompeius the conduct of the war against the pirates, with proconsular power for three years over the entire Mediterranean and the whole coast to a distance of fifty miles inland. He was to have twenty-five legates of his own choosing, and whatever supplies and funds he desired. Such a bill showed that the fall of the

Republic was very near, for it set up a private citizen as virtual monarch. The bill was carried, and at once the starvation prices which had until then ruled in the markets dropped to the normal rate. Pompeius raised a fleet, swept the western seas, drove the pirates before him to Cilicia, and there routed their united squadrons in a final battle off Coracesium. The whole war was begun and ended in ninety days, and the general might again have sunk into privacy but for the conduct of another


The Manilian Law, 66 B.C. tribune, C. Manilius, who proposed that, as Pompeius was now in Asia, he should receive the command in the war with Mithradates. The powers conferred by the *Lex Gabinia* were not superseded; they were merely extended until such time as Pompeius should choose to declare the war ended. He was left entirely at liberty to make war or peace. There was little opposition, for the senate had learnt its weakness. Q. Catulus, now an old man, endeavoured, as in the case of the Gabinian law, to prevent the passing of a bill so fatal to Republican ideas.

§ 267. In 66 B.C. Pompeius landed in Cilicia, and under the provisions of the *Lex Manilia*, took the command against Mithradates. Men said that he only came to reap the results of Lucullus' labours; but by this time Mithradates had recovered his kingdom, and the war had to be begun afresh. After much manœuvring, Pompeius crossed the Pontic border, and, where afterwards he built the city of Nicopolis (near *Enderes*), entrapped the enemy in a ravine and cut his entire host to pieces (66 B.C.). Mithradates, again a fugitive, and now disowned by Tigranes, fled beyond the Caucasus to Panticapaeum (*Kertch*), the capital of that principality of the Russian Chersonese (*Crimea*) over which his rebel son Machares was suzerain. For a moment

Pompeius defeats Mithradates.

Pompeius seemed disposed to follow, but the hostility of the Caucasian tribes, and the impassable nature of the country, caused him to alter his purpose; and after traversing Armenia as far as Artaxata, receiving the abject submission of Tigranes, and chastising the Iberians and Albanians (65 B.C.), he withdrew beyond the Euphrates to Syria (64 B.C.), and proceeded to settle the affairs of what was once the empire of the Seleucidae. Mithradates, still indomitable, set himself to equip and drill yet another army: it was said that he intended rousing against Rome the warlike tribes of Thrace and the Danube valley. But the patience of his people was exhausted by his levies and his exactions for fresh war-
End of Mithradates, 63 B.C.
material: his son Pharnaces joined in their revolt, and disaffection spread so rapidly that Mithradates was unable even to fly, and slew himself to save from parricide the son who now sent to Pompeius news of his exploit and assurance of his loyalty (63 B.C.).

§ 268. In the settlement of Asia the rivers Euphrates and Halys formed the new frontier; and this frontier was covered by new provinces and secured by client-princes, some of whom were newly appointed while others were confirmed or reinstated. New provinces were formed by the annexation of (a) Syria and Commagene, (b) Bithynia, together with Western Pontus, (c) Crete. The client-princes were: (a) Deiotarus of Galatia, who also received Eastern Pontus or Armenia Minor, protecting Bithynia-Pontus; (b) Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, who also received the district of Sophene, guarding the passage of the Euphrates; (c) John Hyrcanus, high-priest of Judea, which lay between Parthia and Egypt; (d) Tigranes of Armenia, whose loyalty was secured by the cession of lands taken from Parthia; (e) petty princes on the east



bank of the Euphrates, protecting Syria from Parthia. Cilicia was re-arranged so as to include Pamphylia and Isauria. All independent powers west of the Euphrates were suppressed. Commerce was encouraged and civilisation promoted by the founding of new towns. But Pompeius, by neglecting to make a permanent settlement with Parthia, left a serious problem for future generations to grapple with.

§ 269. While Pompeius was absent in the East, two men at Rome had risen into prominence. Cicero, 106—
43 B.C. These were Cicero and Caesar. M. Tullius Cicero, the son of a knight of Arpinum, began his career by pleading in the law-courts, as was customary with young men who aimed at political distinction. His bold defence of Sextus Roscius of Ameria against a worthless favourite of Sulla, attracted public notice, and even aroused the resentment of the dictator. After travelling for two years in Greece and Asia, Cicero renewed his forensic labours at Rome. His success was conspicuous, and he obtained the quaestorship in 75 B.C. In his year of office, which was spent in Sicily, he became exceedingly popular with the provincials, and at their request impeached Verres for misgovernment in 70 B.C. Verres withdrew into exile without waiting for the verdict of the court. Cicero filled the curule aedileship in 69 B.C., and the praetorship three years later, when he warmly supported the Manilian Law in favour of Pompeius. In politics Cicero occupied a middle position: in his early career he more than once exposed senatorial misgovernment and defended popular leaders, but he never committed himself to the democratic programme; least of all had he any sympathy with the ideas and wishes of the mob. He evinced almost equal dislike to senatorial rule. Belonging to the wealthy middle class, Cicero desired to see the government in the hands of the

combined Equites and senate, and it was to this ideal union between the two great orders (*ordinum concordia*) that he devoted himself.

§ 270. C. Julius Caesar belonged as decidedly to the aristocracy as Cicero did to the middle class; Caesar, 102—
44 B.C. for his family was one of the noblest in the state, and traced back its descent to Aeneas and Venus. He was, however, from the first connected with the democratic party, for his aunt Julia was the wife of Marius, and he himself had wedded the daughter of Cinna. When Sulla assumed the dictatorship he bade Caesar put away the daughter of the dead rebel; but Caesar refused—an attitude which drew from the dictator the remark that “there were many Mariuses in the boy”—and fled to Asia, where at Mitylene he won the civic wreath by saving the life of a fellow-citizen. On the death of Sulla, he returned to Rome, but kept aloof from the premature movement of Lepidus and devoted himself to rhetoric and law-pleading. On the way to Rhodes, whither his studies took him, he was captured by Cilician pirates, but while still at their mercy he threatened that they should pay dearly for the insult, and when he was ransomed by his friends, he returned with a few vessels and crucified the offenders. The next few years were passed in the capital, amid profligacy and excesses of all descriptions: but though this life helped to render Caesar bankrupt, it was powerless to impair his vigour either of mind or body. Shortly before the first consulship of Pompeius and Crassus, he came forward as a leader of the Marian party. He was quaestor in 68 B.C. and curule aedile in 65 B.C. When quaestor, he exhibited at his aunt's funeral a bust of Marius, and pronounced a glowing eulogy on that great general, although the senate had ordered all portraits of him to be

destroyed ; and in his aedileship, which he signalized by magnificent games, he angered the government and delighted the populace by setting up on the Capitol those trophies of Marius' Cimbric victories which Sulla had overthrown. As yet, however, Caesar had shown little promise of his coming greatness : he was overwhelmed with debts, and seemed ready to plunge into any scheme, no matter how desperate and dangerous, to secure relief from his poverty. So far was he from his subsequent pre-eminence that at present he was but one among many representatives of an almost discredited party.

§ 271. When the democrats passed the Gabinian and Manilian bills in the teeth of senatorial opposition, they gained a victory which seemed Democratic
discontent. likely to recoil on themselves : for Pompeius, with a triumphant army at his back, was too powerful for a citizen. The popular party endeavoured in his absence to raise up its own chiefs to equal power ; and in so doing it could count on the help of Crassus, the representative of the moneyed interest, who had never forgiven Pompeius since the quarrel in their consulship. Should it be necessary to use violence against the government, materials were not wanting. The mob was always ready for a riot ; those who had been dispossessed by Sulla longed for an *émeute* ; even the Sullan veterans were restless and looked anxiously for fresh campaigns ; and there were many young nobles whose politics were determined by their necessities, and who saw salvation only in the abolition of debts (*tabulae novae*) which might result from a successful revolution.

§ 272. The democratic leader most nearly connected with these discontented and reckless groups was Catilina's
First Plot. L. Sergius Catilina, who returned from governing the province of Africa to seek the consulship at Rome,

66 B.C. Like Caesar, he was of noble family and sunk in debt, and his career, which he began as one of Sulla's blood-hounds, was in men's estimation stained by the most infamous crimes. An impending accusation for extortion in his province prevented him from standing at the consular elections in 66 B.C., and there were chosen P. Cornelius Sulla, a relative of the dictator, and P. Autronius Paetus. Before the new consuls could enter on their magistracy, they were convicted of bribery—a verdict which carried with it perpetual exclusion from office and the senate. In despair Sulla and Paetus joined Catilina in a plot to overturn the government: L. Aurelius Cotta and L. Manlius Torquatus, the consuls who had taken their places, were to be murdered on their entry upon office; and this blow was to be followed up by making Crassus dictator, with Caesar as his master of horse. Catilina beset the senate-house with a band of ruffians, but the plot miscarried twice.

§ 273. For some time after this failure at revolution, the popular leaders proceeded by more constitutional means. Caesar tried to get a proposal carried in the comitia that he should reinstate King Ptolemy Auletes of Egypt, who had been ejected by his subjects. Pompeius would thus be kept out of the wealth of the Nile valley, and Caesar would be able to raise a great military force: but this plan also failed. In the summer of 64 B.C., when the consular elections for the following year were in progress, Catilina and C. Antonius Hybrida came forward as the democratic candidates. The senatorial party had no nominees of its own, and was compelled to vote for Cicero, the champion of the Equites and the country folk. In spite of Crassus' money and Caesar's exertions, the new man from Arpinum was returned at the head of the poll. Catilina was not elected

at all, and Antonius only obtained the second place. Once more the government was safe, for Antonius, a weak and indolent politician, was easily secured by Cicero with the bribe of the province of Macedonia. When the tribunes for 63 B.C. entered on office, the democrats made another effort to secure authority on a great scale. On the plea of providing for poor citizens, the tribune P. Servilius Rullus, proposed the appointment of a Commission of ten men, supported by 200 adjutants of Equestrian rank, with special powers for five years to purchase and allot lands, especially the still undistributed Campanian domain. The funds for buying out the owners of private land were to be found by selling the royal demesnes of conquered kingdoms like Macedonia. No one was to be appointed on the Commission without personally appearing as a candidate. Pompeius was in Asia: therefore his election was an impossibility. Against him would be set Caesar and Crassus, with eight other democratic leaders and 200 moneyed men as supporters, wielding a power over the whole empire as great as was that of Pompeius on the Mediterranean and in the East. Cicero attacked the bill with all his eloquence: the multitude preferred not to take up a position of hostility to Pompeius, and the scheme was frustrated. At the consular elections of 63 B.C. Catilina was again a candidate, but evidently with little chance of success. He knew that Pompeius would soon be back from his conquests, and that if a blow had to be struck, it must be at once. Turning therefore to the discontented throughout Italy—the Sullan veterans, the landless yeomen, the reckless adventurers of the capital, even to slaves and gladiators—he drew together the scattered threads of the conspiracy, and sent C. Manlius, one of Sulla's veterans, to Faesulae to collect a force from the discontented cities of Etruria. But again at the election

his programme, despite its democratic and even socialistic features, failed to arouse enthusiasm, and the feeble senatorial candidates won the day.

§ 274. Catilina appealed to force, but his designs were

The Second
Conspiracy
of Catilina.

common property and all the details of the plot had been learnt by Cicero. On October 20 Cicero denounced Catilina in the senate-house, and the consuls were invested with dictatorial power by the customary formula. Before the week was over the insurrection broke out at Faesulae, and on November 1 an unsuccessful attempt was made to surprise Praeneste. On November 8 Cicero convened the senate, and delivered the famous invective known as the First Catilinarian Oration. Catilina felt that he was no longer safe in Rome, and hurried away to Etruria, leaving the conduct of the plot in the city to the praetor P. Lentulus Sura, C. Cethegus, and others of his associates. He was declared a public enemy, and Antonius sent to take the field against him. For some time further the conspirators in Rome made no move: but it was agreed that on the Saturnalia, December 19, there should be a general rising for the purpose of assassinating Cicero and burning the city. But before the plot could take effect, Cicero had secured evidence which incriminated the chief actors in the plot, and was prepared for vigorous measures. The Allobroges in Gaul, who both as a community and as individuals were overwhelmed with debt, sent an embassy to the senate to ask for some relief in their distress. Lentulus, expecting to find ready tools in the envoys, opened negotiations with them and invited them to join in the plot. They professed to assent to his overtures, while revealing everything to the government. They arranged for their own arrest and the seizure of papers compromising the conspirators; and this done, Cicero on

December 3 arrested Lentulus, Cethegus, Statilius, Gabinius, and others who could not effect their escape. They were put into the custody of leading citizens, for a Roman could not lawfully be either put into bonds or executed. Even Caesar and Crassus were each entrusted with the safeguard of a prisoner. On December 5 the senate met, and debated hotly over their fate: Caesar, while admitting their guilt, did his best to get their lives spared, and seemed at one time likely to succeed, but Cato spoke vigorously for a sentence of death, and his energy decided the question. A few hours later the conspirators were hurried to the Tullianum, and there strangled by order of Cicero. Their condemnation was unconstitutional. It violated the right, which every citizen possessed, of appealing to the people, and Cicero had to suffer for his action at a later date. Early in the month of January, 62 B.C., the troops of Antonius, commanded for the day by M. Petreius, and those of Q. Metellus Celer, closed upon Catilina's small army at Pistoria (*Pistoja*), between Luca and Florentia. The battle was fierce; Catilina fought like a Spartacus, and fell like him amongst 3000 of his men.

Were Caesar and Crassus in the plot? They probably knew of it, possibly they aided it in everything but its worst objects. Crassus, who had more property to lose than any other man in Rome, was not likely to favour a plot which aimed at abolition of debts and general anarchy. Caesar was over head and ears in debt, and might look with more favour even on so extreme an object. An informer implicated both, but perhaps falsely. It was of little moment now. The conspiracy had failed, and Pompeius was more emphatically than ever the greatest power in the state.

§ 275. Whatever the relations of the democrats to the

conspiracy, the defeat of Catilina was a defeat for them too. The Equites, frightened by the attack on property, united, as Cicero wished, heartily with the senate, and even the city mob was disgusted when it learnt that the Catilinarians had proposed to fire their dwellings over their heads. The position of the senate was stronger than it had been for some time past, and the only cloud on the political horizon was the great power of Pompeius. In 63 B.C. Q. Metellus Nepos, an agent of Pompeius, came to Rome to procure for the great general a second consulship and the prosecution of the war with Catilina. The senate, influenced chiefly by the obstinate and unbending Cato, refused both the demands. In spite of this rebuff, Pompeius, though at the head of an overwhelming force, was too honest or too timid to seize his opportunity. He might easily have overturned the ruling oligarchy and, doing what Caesar did thirteen years later, made himself the monarch of Rome. In the autumn of 62 B.C. he landed at Brundisium, but instead of marching on the capital, he disbanded his legions, and after celebrating a triumph in the following year, retired a second time into private life. He had many enemies in the senate, notably Lucullus, whom he had succeeded in the command against Mithradates. He demanded that his arrangements in the East should be ratified as a whole: Lucullus wished each ordinance to be discussed separately. He asked that he might bestow upon his veterans the allotments which they had been promised. In this too he met with a refusal, and the opposition of Cato was so pronounced, that he turned for help to Caesar and the democrats.

§ 276. Caesar was praetor in 62 B.C., and in the following year went out as pro-praetor to Further Spain. When he returned in 60 B.C. he was a wealthy man, and Pompeius

was reduced to a nullity in politics. Neither Caesar nor Pompeius was sufficiently powerful to carry out his aims alone ; united they might succeed. The First Triumvirate, 60 B.C. Accordingly they formed a coalition in the same year, admitting M. Crassus also as a party, because of his useful wealth. Caesar saw clearly that he could never rise to pre-eminence as a mere popular leader with no armed force at his back : he resolved now to gain a provincial command, and thereby raise a military power equal to that of Pompeius. It was arranged that Caesar should be consul for 59 B.C., and should while in office gratify Pompeius by carrying those demands which the senate had refused. The senate resisted as far as bribery could help it, and returned a bigoted aristocrat, M. Bibulus, as Caesar's colleague ; but, urged on by Cato, it had just quarrelled with the Equites about the contract-price of the Asiatic taxes, and so had lost its most reliable supporters. Caesar immediately introduced three bills—

(i) A Commission of twenty was created to allot the Campanian lands among the veterans of Pompeius, and, if necessary, to purchase out of the new Asiatic revenues other lands for distribution.

(ii) The Equites were satisfied by the reduction of their Asiatic tax-contract, which the senate had declined to grant.

(iii) All the proceedings and arrangements of Pompeius in the East were ratified.

The bills were rejected by the senate, and were thereupon submitted to the comitia. Bibulus prorogued the assembly repeatedly on the score of unfavourable omens ; but Caesar disregarded both the augurs and the tribunician veto. His adherents came to the poll armed, and carried the bills ; whereupon Bibulus shut himself up in his house, and took no part in political business for the rest of the year. Soon afterwards the tribune P. Vatinius brought in a bill (*Lex Vatinia*), which, in imitation of the Gabinian and

Manilian laws, conferred upon Caesar for five years (58—54 B.C.) special proconsular command in Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum, with three legions. The comitia passed the bill without difficulty, and the senate, as though to salve its injured conceit with a show of carelessness, voluntarily added the province of Narbonese Gaul and a fourth legion. Caesar had obtained what he wanted—a protracted and wide military command; and he cemented his alliance with Pompeius by giving to him his daughter Julia in marriage.

§ 277. Early in 58 B.C. Caesar set out for Gaul, leaving Pompeius to control the unruly elements of the capital—a task for which he was singularly unfitted. The first move of the Triumvirs was to get rid of Cato and Cicero, the most dangerous of their opponents. Egypt and Cyprus had been bequeathed in 86 B.C. to the Roman people, but instead of annexing the former country the senate preferred to recognize Ptolemy Auletes as its king. Cyprus however presented less difficulty, and Cato was sent thither to effect a settlement. The proposer of the bill was P. Clodius Pulcher, a patrician of ruined name and fortune, but of importance to the Triumvirs through his influence with the democrats. For some time he had been the sworn enemy of Cicero. The quarrel arose from the celebration of the rites of the Bona Dea in the house of Caesar, the Pontifex Maximus, 62 B.C. Though the presence of men was forbidden, Clodius, who had an intrigue with Caesar's wife, obtained admittance in the disguise of a female flute-player, only to be detected and expelled. * He was tried for profaning the mysteries, but acquitted by a corrupt jury. To revenge himself on Cicero, who had upset his plea of *alibi* at the trial and attacked him in the senate, he got himself adopted into a plebeian family

The Vatinius
Law, 59 B.C.

The Exile
of Cicero.

with a view to standing for the tribunate. When tribune (in 58 B.C.) he brought up the never-forgotten execution of Cethegus and his associates. In putting citizens to death without trial, Cicero had violated one of the first principles of the constitution: it was no adequate excuse to say that the sentence was authorized by the majority of the senate. The democrats were eager to revenge the murder of the Catilinarians, and when Clodius introduced a bill "that any one who put a Roman citizen to death without trial should be banished," Cicero, although not mentioned by name, retired from the city into exile. He went to Macedonia, where he spent more than a year in wretchedness, imploring his friends at Rome to obtain his recall.

§ 278. Clodius soon quarrelled with Pompeius by procuring the release of Tigranes, one of that general's Armenian hostage-princes. In the capital, fights, murder, incendiarism, and violence of every kind were of daily occurrence. Clodius headed a regular band of gladiators and ruffians, who terrorized the streets. He found an opponent of congenial temper in T. Annius Milo, who did for the senate what Clodius did on his own or Caesar's behalf. In revenge for the escape of Tigranes, Pompeius supported the oft-debated recall of Cicero. The democrats tried every means to prevent the passing of the bill, but the country voters came up in great numbers, and it was finally carried in 57 B.C. by Milo's aid, after a riot which resembled in its fury the dreadful "day of Octavius" (87 B.C.). Cicero returned amidst the acclamations of all Italy, and the senate welcomed him with open arms. He proved his gratitude by coming forward in the same year to support a bill conferring upon Pompeius the control of the corn-supply for five years. Pompeius did not get the powers he secretly desired but he fulfilled his commission

The Return
of Cicero.

and relieved the scarcity to which Rome was now continually liable. He made a further attempt to gain military command in 56 B.C., applying for a mandate to interfere in Egyptian affairs ; but the senate was determined that he should not regain the overpowering position from which he had just fallen.

§ 279. Indeed, the senate was again full of confidence. It saw that the coalition of 60 B.C.,
The Conference at Luca, 56 B.C. besides being intensely unpopular with the democrats, was virtually dissolved, for Pompeius had become jealous of Caesar. Now that Pompeius was no longer an object of fear, it would proceed to humble Caesar. In April, 56 B.C., Cicero proposed that an inquiry should be made into Caesar's Agrarian Law, and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus declared his intention of getting Caesar recalled from Gaul. Caesar, who was well informed of party movements at Rome, retorted by inviting his allies to meet him at Luca in Etruria. Pompeius and Crassus attended, together with more than 200 senators: so large was the party of the Triumvirs. The leaders came to a fresh understanding, and in the course of the following year (55 B.C.) this took effect in the tenure of the consulship by Pompeius and Crassus, and their immediate action. The tribune Trebonius brought
The Trebonian Law, 55 B.C. in a measure (*Lex Trebonia*) conferring upon Crassus the command in Syria for five years, on Pompeius the government of the two Spains for the same time. These two provinces were, next to Gaul, the most important in the state. Cato's opposition led to riot and bloodshed, but the bill was carried, and Crassus and Pompeius were once more set up as military powers. Crassus, however, could be relied upon to support Caesar, and was, so far, a counterpoise to Pompeius. In their turn the consuls now proposed a law (*Lex Licinia-Pompeia*) by which Caesar's

tenure of his province was extended for another five years, that is, until March 1, 49 B.C. This was all ^{Lex Licinia-Pompeia, 55 B.C.} that Caesar demanded at present: indeed he seemed to have surrendered voluntarily his own superiority, for Pompeius' new command enabled the latter to raise troops in Italy ostensibly for Spanish service and to keep them there; in other words, to garrison Italia proper, and so endanger Caesar's control of the peninsula. But Caesar was concerned first of all to conquer Gaul, and a few years more would only make his army the more reliable.

§ 280. In 54 B.C. Crassus sailed for his province of Syria; Pompeius remained at Rome, sending ^{Murder of Clodius, 52 B.C.} his legates, L. Afranius and M. Petreius to govern Spain in his absence. But he had no control over the city, despite the troops which he held in readiness, and despite the fact that Clodius was now under the control of Caesar. Riots were of almost daily occurrence; Clodius and Milo were in their element. The consular elections were prorogued by violence for a whole year, and men began to talk of appointing a dictator. At last, in 52 B.C., the two free-lances met in a brawl on the Appian Way. Milo was at the time the senatorial candidate for the consulship, and Clodius was exerting every means in his power to prevent his return for that office. In the fight which ensued Clodius was killed. The populace, enraged at their leader's death, attacked Milo and burned his house, and finally fired the Curia, after depositing Clodius' corpse within it, as a fitting funeral pyre. The senate in despair gave Pompeius his wish—the dictatorship. They called it the “Consulship without Colleague.” He immediately called out the Italian levies, made them swear allegiance to his imperium, garrisoned Rome itself, and secured the condemnation and exile of Milo. Again

he was monarch in all but name, for Caesar was far away, and moreover was beset by a dangerous rising of the whole of Gaul, and Crassus had fallen at Carrhae in 53 B.C. Pompeius believed he saw his way to getting rid of Caesar for ever ; and he first secured the prolongation of his own command in Spain for another five years. Armed with this power he commenced his duel with Caesar.

§ 281. The Parthians profited by the downfall of the Seleucid monarchy and the humiliation of Armenia, to establish their power firmly as far as the Tigris, on which river stood their capital, Ctesiphon. Between them and the Roman province of Syria there stretched only the plain of Mesopotamia, and it became yearly more evident that hostilities must ultimately ensue. Phraates, the ally of Rome against Tigranes of Armenia, died about 56 B.C., leaving two sons, Orodes and Mithradates, of whom the latter, on being expelled, immediately applied for aid to Aulus Gabinius, now governor of Syria. Gabinius was at the moment occupied in restoring Ptolemy Auletes to the throne of Egypt against the express command of the senate, and when he returned to the Euphrates, Mithradates had been overpowered and put to death, 54 B.C. At this moment Crassus arrived in Syria, and took over the command from Gabinius.

The richest man in Rome, Crassus at the age of sixty still craved for gold. With him, military command meant opportunity for acquiring further wealth, and the plunder of the East was worth grasping. He spent the year 54 B.C. in pillaging temples and shrines, including that of Jerusalem, and his only military exploit was a reconnaissance into Mesopotamia in which the Parthians were defeated. Encouraged by this success, Crassus, instead of attacking

Parthian
Campaign of
Crassus, 54—
53 B.C.

Parthia by way of Armenia, where his trustworthy ally Artavasdes was king, crossed the Euphrates with seven legions and 4000 horse, and plunged across the desert towards Ctesiphon, 53 B.C. His most trusted adviser was Abgarus, the Bedouin prince of Edessa, who assured him that Orodes was even now in flight with his treasures ; and that unless Crassus took the shortest way to his capital, he would lose the spoils he hoped to win. Abgarus was not more sincere than most of his nation. He was playing into Orodes' hands, and led the Romans away from the Euphrates into a trackless, waterless desert. On the plea of dispersing some Parthian horse, he suddenly left them with his cavalry, and the next day the legions found themselves beset on all sides by the entire force of the Parthian lancers and mounted bowmen. P. Crassus, the ^{Battle of Carrhae, 53 A.C.} son of the Triumvir, perished in an attempt to disperse the enemy, and the survivors of that day were overwhelmed at Sinnaca near Carrhae a few days later, while seeking to reach the Armenian hills. Amongst them fell Crassus himself. The whole Roman force was destroyed ; thousands were carried off to live as serfs in Parthia, and not a quarter of the entire number crossed the Euphrates again.

§ 282. There were two causes which made it necessary to take prompt action in 59 B.C. for securing the province of Gallia Narbonensis—the occupation ^{Caesar in Gaul.} of Eastern Gaul by invading German tribes and the threatened migration of the Helvetii of Switzerland. The most important tribes in Central Gaul were the Arverni, Aedui, and Sequani. The Aedui had shown themselves faithful allies of Rome, and were as a reward placed in a position of superiority over their neighbours. Unable to crush them, the Arverni and Sequani summoned to their

aid a restless German horde known as the Suebi, who were anxious to settle in the fertile lands of Gaul. Under their chief Ariovistus, these speedily conquered the Aedui, 71 B.C.; but when they had done so, they began to tyrannize over all the Gauls alike, and to invite other swarms of their kinsmen to cross the Rhine. All the prayers of the Aeduan noble and arch-druid Divitiacus, a friend of Cicero's, failed to obtain aid from the senate. In 61 B.C. the Helvetii of Switzerland, a Celtic people who were harassed by the incessant attacks of the Germans, resolved to quit their homes in a body, and to pass westward to the thinly-peopled but inviting lands between the Garonne and the Pyrenees. The migration was fixed for March 28, 58 B.C., and its course would lie through the Roman province. However indolent the senate might be, and however much averse to giving to any of its great citizens an opening for the acquisition of new laurels in war, action must be taken at once: for if the Helvetii evacuated Switzerland, the Germans would at once take their place and so reach to the very borders of the Narbonese. Accordingly that province was entrusted to Caesar with an additional legion (§ 276).

§ 283. When Caesar arrived in Gaul, he found the
First Campaign,
58 B.C.
 Helvetii on the point of entering the province by the bridge which spanned the Rhone at Geneva. Three of his legions were stationed far away at Aquileia, but he collected what troops he could, gained by a pretence at negotiation a few days wherein to fortify the Roman bank of the river, and repelled the attempts of the Celts to break through by force. They had no choice but to take the longer route, which lay across the Jura Mountains and through the lands of the Sequani. They crossed the Arar (*Saone*) near Chalons, and there Caesar, who had fetched

his legions from Cisalpine Gaul, overtook their rear guard and cut to pieces one-third of their host. A few days later he drew them into battle near Bibracte (*Autun*), routed them after a long and desperate struggle, and sent the handful of survivors back to their own land to resume the work of protecting Switzerland from the Germans. This was half his task. Within a few weeks he was hurrying to meet Ariovistus, whom he had peremptorily bidden to recross the Rhine, and who had as peremptorily refused to do so. Caesar was aided by the Gallic tribes who had suffered from the aggressions of the Germans, but his troops were raw and timid, and he was embarrassed by what threatened to be a serious mutiny. Nevertheless, he utterly overthrew the Suebi at a spot near Belfort, and drove Ariovistus and the few surviving fugitives back into Germania. He spent the winter in Illyricum, which was now formally reduced to the shape of a province.

§ 284. But Caesar had no intention of merely safeguarding Gallia Narbonensis: he was bent on action which should obviate for all time the peril from which he had just saved the province, and this could only be effected by setting the boundary of the empire at the Rhine. He left his legions in winter quarters among the Aedui as proof of his design, and the Gauls understood it as such. When he rejoined them in 57 B.C. he learnt that the powerful confederacy of the Belgae had collected nearly 400,000 men in the north of Gaul in order to drive him back within the lines of the province. He instantly assumed the aggressive: by playing upon the jealousies of one tribe towards another he won over the Remi (about *Rheims*), the Bellovaci (about *Beauvais*), and the Ambiani (about *Amiens*). The more northerly tribes, especially the Nervii who dwelt between the Scaldia

Second
Campaign,
57 B.C.

(*Scheldt*) and Sabis (*Sambre*), did not submit so easily. They made a desperate assault upon Caesar's army (now raised to eight legions, or 40,000 men, exclusive of Gaulish auxiliaries) when it reached the banks of the Sabis (near *Maubeuge*), and compelled Caesar to fight for his life before he could gain the day. The battle cost them the bulk of their warriors, and they submitted unconditionally.

§ 285. There remained a third struggle with the tribes of the coast, from the mouth of the Liger Third Campaign, 56 B.C. (*Loire*) to that of the Rhenus (*Rhine*). Chief among these were the Veneti of Armorica (*Brittany*), an enemy formidable through their skill as seamen and the powerful build of their huge galleys. In the course of a few months Caesar manned a flotilla, the command of which he gave to his legate, D. Brutus. The Romans owed their victory to an expedient whereby they cut the tackling of their enemies, and so disabled and captured their entire fleet. The whole male population was killed or sold into slavery, the excuse being the fact that they had maltreated the Roman officers sent to demand their submission and tribute.

§ 286. A similar massacre occurred in the following year, when Caesar destroyed the entire mass of Fourth Campaign, 55 B.C. two German tribes, the Usipetes and Tencteri, who had ventured to cross the lower Rhine and ask for territories on the Gallic side of the river. Caesar was determined to vindicate the immunity of the Gaulish shore: in ten days he bridged the Rhine near Bonn, and for nearly three weeks ravaged the lands of the Sugambri, as a demonstration of what he could do if he chose. Then returning, he marched across Gaul to the Straits of Dover, where a fleet was lying ready, according to orders, to transport his legions to Britain.

Britain, originally peopled by non-Celtic tribes, had been occupied by successive waves of Celtic invaders, who kept up communications with their kinsmen in Gaul, and looked with alarm upon the Roman advance. Sailing from Portus Itius (*Wissant*), Caesar made the coast near Romney Marsh, fought his way ashore despite resistance, and advanced for some little way into the country. But there was little spoil to be got and much fighting to be done; his fleet was damaged by a storm, and at the end of a few days he was glad to retire in safety to Gaul.

First
Expedition
to Britain.

§ 287. The winter was spent in preparations for a second invasion, which was conducted upon a more extensive scale. Landing probably in the same place as before, Caesar fortified a camp on the shore to protect his vessels, and advanced to the river Stour. There he met and routed the Britons, who, in presence of this formidable enemy, had laid aside their customary quarrels, and had appointed Cassivellaunus, king of the Cassi (*Middlesex* and *Hertfordshire*), to be their commander-in-chief. Caesar pushed up the Thames valley in pursuit of his enemy, forced the passage of the river somewhere near Windsor, and took by storm the stronghold of Cassivellaunus at St. Albans. That chief was a good strategist, and his scythe-armed chariots broke the Roman lines; but sedition made easy what would have been otherwise difficult to accomplish: Cassivellaunus, in making himself overlord of Central Britain, had put to death a prince of the Trinobantes (*Essex*), and that tribe forthwith went over to Caesar. Cassivellaunus, deserted by his allies, was glad to make terms, and Caesar, doubtless pleased to end his foray so creditably, returned to Gaul. The Romans boasted that

Fifth
Campaign.
Second
Expedition
to Britain,
54 B.C.

they had reduced Britain to the condition of a tributary state, but the tribute was never paid or expected.

The legions were quartered for the winter at various stations throughout Belgica, for the country Revolt of the Belgae. seemed peaceful, and it was not easy to provision so large a force when concentrated at one spot. But appearances were deceptive. Just before sailing for Britain in 54 B.C., Caesar had been forced to put to death Dumnorix, a noble Aeduan who had been in some degree answerable for the movement among the Helvetii, and had always opposed the Romanizing attitude of his brother Divitiacus. The act had aroused the alarm of the Gauls at large, and taking advantage of the separation of the legions, the Eburones, under their chief Ambiorix, attacked the camp of the legates Sabinus and Cotta at Aduatuca (*Tongres*, near *Liège*), and massacred their troops. They then attempted the like with Q. Cicero, the brother of the orator, whose head-quarters were at Charleroi. But Caesar was too active for them: collecting what forces he could, he suddenly swept upon them from his camp at Samarobriua (*Amiens*), relieved Cicero, and routed his enemies. Labienus, wintering near the Arduenna Silva (*Ardenne*s), repulsed the attack of the Treveri and slew their prince Indutiomarus. The lack of united action on the part of the Gauls enabled the Romans to repress the rebellion in detail, but the situation was so serious that Caesar did not as usual spend the winter in Gallia Cisalpina.

In 53 B.C. nothing of importance happened, Sixth Campaign, 53 B.C. except a second raid beyond the Rhine into Germany.

§ 288. In 52 B.C. the petty revolts of the preceding years came to a head. All Central and Southern Gaul rose in one last struggle for independence under the headship of

Vercingetorix, one of the royal line of the Arverni. This man had profited by Caesar's successes to learn the Roman methods of warfare: in the power to govern and combine, in rapid movement, and in strategic ability, he was far superior to any enemy whom Caesar had yet encountered. Taking advantage of Caesar's absence in Cisalpine Gaul, where he was holding the usual assizes during the winter months, Vercingetorix made a bold effort to separate him from his army. Only Caesar's greater boldness and the unsurpassed rapidity of his movements enabled him to elude the Gauls and rejoin his ten legions in Central Gaul. Vercingetorix next prepared to meet the legions, but his plan was novel for a Gaul: declining to risk all in one battle, he resolved to lay waste the country and retreat gradually, drawing his enemy after him until want of supplies should give him the victory. But the Gauls could not bear to destroy all their homes: though hundreds of towns were fired and destroyed, they resolved to spare Avaricum (*Bourges*), the capital of the Bituriges and Gaul's chief city, and here Caesar laid siege to a part of their forces. After four weeks the besieged, having in vain tried to break through the Roman lines, were overpowered and massacred. Then Vercingetorix threw himself into his own capital of Gergovia (*Gergoie*), a well-nigh impregnable fortress, and allowed Caesar to attempt another blockade. This time the Romans failed, and the failure was the signal for the Aedui, thus far faithful, to join the revolt. Caesar was forced to form a junction with the army under Labienus, and thus unite his entire force for the overthrow of Vercingetorix, while for the present the rest of Gaul was left to its own devices. Vercingetorix shut himself up in Alesia (*Alise Sainte Reine*, dept. *Côte d'Or*), an isolated hill-fortress of great strength; and no sooner had Caesar

Seventh
Campaign,
52 B.C.

drawn round it siege-lines sixteen miles in circumference and of immense strength, than the entire forces of the rest of Gaul enveloped him on the outer side. He was hemmed in between the city and the relieving army, and day after day he had to fight against combined attacks in front and rear. But he held his own, routed the army of relief, and finally forced Vercingetorix to surrender.

§ 289. Thenceforward Caesar met with little resistance: he ravaged all Belgica and Celtica from end to end, punishing the rebels with the sternest cruelty. When Uxellodunum (near *Calors*), the last fortress to resist, was at last surrendered, he cut off the right hand of each prisoner (51 B.C.), and so sent them away as an example to others. Success certainly justified his measures; like the Cisalpine Gauls, the peoples of Gallia proper rapidly adopted Roman habits, and when at length the Empire of the West fell, France retained the results of Roman influences to a degree which no other nation could parallel.

§ 290. In 54 B.C. died Julia, the wife of Pompeius and daughter of Caesar, and in the following year Crassus fell at Carrhae. Both these events removed influences that were on the side of peace. While Caesar was engaged in quelling the last struggles of the Gauls, Pompeius and the senate drew closer together and prepared to crush the rival who threatened to destroy both. The position of Caesar was precarious in the extreme: the oligarchs, headed by Cato, had sworn to effect his ruin, and now they were in alliance with the great power of Pompeius. Caesar knew that if he laid down his military authority and entered the city as a private citizen, he might be at once impeached, condemned,

The Question
between Caesar
and the Senate.

Pacification
of Gaul.

and driven into exile. The command bestowed upon him by the *Lex Licinia Pompeia* expired on March 1, 49 B.C., and as he had been consul in 59 B.C. he could not, in accordance with Sulla's ten-years law, be re-elected for any consulship before that of 48 B.C. The elections would take place in the autumn of 49 B.C. : thus there was an interval of at least six months during which he would be open to attack. He had secured some concessions from Pompeius : he need not personally present himself for election (which would involve the disbanding of his army), and he expected that no successor would be sent to take over his province until January 1, 48 B.C. Both these hopes were overthrown, and on March 1, 50 B.C., the senate began to discuss in earnest the question of superseding him. Caesar made various proposals : he offered to resign everything with the exception of Illyricum and one legion, and again on January 1, 49 B.C., Curio, with his approval, moved in the senate that both Caesar and Pompeius should disband their troops. At this last meeting the consul Marcellus' motion was carried, to the effect that Caesar should give up his army before July 1, 49 B.C. This would leave Caesar a private citizen until the date of the elections. His supporter, the tribune M. Antonius, accordingly interposed his veto. But the extreme party held its ground in the senate, and Pompeius was committed to its support. On January 7 martial law was proclaimed. Caesar's adherents, the tribunes L. Cassius Longinus and M. Antonius, together with Curio, declared that their lives were in danger and fled from the city towards Gaul. Cicero was absent as governor of Cilicia during these events, only returning in time to witness the outbreak of civil war. Since the Conference at Luca, he had submitted to the rule of the Triumvirs : and now all that he desired was peace ; but old ties proved too

strong, and after much vacillation, he threw in his lot with Pompeius and the senate.

§ 291. As soon as he heard of the tribunes' flight, Caesar moved across the Rubicon. This river Caesar conquers Italy, 49 B.C. formed the boundary between his province and Italy, and to cross it was equivalent to a declaration of war. People believed that his army was made up of Gaulish savages, but he kept it so well in hand that he won over every one by his moderation. He at once overran Picenum and Umbria. L. Domitius Ahenobarbus occupied Corfinium and endeavoured to stay his progress. Caesar hurried onwards, leaving a small corps to besiege the town, which was soon surrendered by its garrison. All the senators and Domitius himself were at once dismissed free. So rapid were Caesar's movements, so speedy was the change in the attitude of the Italians, that Pompeius lost his head. He had intended to concentrate his troops at Luceria, but he abandoned this design and hurried to Brundisium, in order to cross to Greece. Caesar was unable to overtake him, and the whole Pompeian force with the bulk of the senate crossed to Epirus, and stationed itself at Dyrrhachium. Caesar could not follow, for he had no ships, and besides it was necessary to secure Spain, which threatened his rear. Scarce pausing to seize the state treasures at Rome, he hurried into Spain, where he found himself opposed by L. Afranius and M. Petreius. The armies met at Ilerda (*Lerida*), where Caesar Battle of Ilerda, 49 B.C. was at first put in great straits for want of supplies; but a few days later he forced the entire force of his enemies to surrender, and thereupon C. Terentius Varro, commanding in Further Spain, did the same. Turning back, Caesar received the submission of Massilia, where Domitius was again defending himself against the

Caesarians C. Trebonius and Decimus Brutus. At the end of the year the conqueror entered Rome, which had been governed for him by M. Aemilius Lepidus, son of the consul of 78 B.C. The people had already declared Caesar dictator, and during the twelve days in which he held the office he passed laws to relieve debtors and the financial distress resulting from the war, as well as a bill to recall the still exiled children of those proscribed by Sulla. On laying down the dictatorship, he was elected consul for 48 B.C.

§ 292. The war was far from ended: the west was Caesar's, but Africa and all the east was at Pompeius' back. Already it had been necessary to garrison Sardinia to prevent famine in Rome, and with the same object Curio had driven Cato out of Sicily and thence passed to Africa. He was met there by P. Attius Varus, a Pompeian, and Juba, King of Numidia, and killed in battle. In the first days of 48 B.C. Caesar crossed from Brundisium to Epirus, at a season when no one expected that he would attempt the passage. He brought with him 15,000 men, but the rest of his army remained in Italy with M. Antonius for want of ships, and was there kept inactive for some time by the Pompeian fleet under Bibulus. Caesar occupied many Epirot towns, and finding Pompeius entrenched at Dyrrhachium, proceeded to blockade him there. Pompeius, whose forces were much more numerous, broke through the lines, and Caesar, beaten off with the loss of thirty-eight standards, was compelled to fall back on Thesaly for supplies. He had been already joined by Antonius and the remainder of his troops. Q. Metellus Scipio, who was the adopted son of Metellus Pius and father-in-law of Pompeius, was bringing up reinforcements from Asia by way of Macedonia, and Caesar wished to prevent a junction.

Caesar in
Greece,
48 B.C.

As he expected, Pompeius followed instead of returning to seize Italy. In this course he was eagerly supported by the mob of senators, who thirsted for vengeance on Caesar, and imagined from the battle of Dyrrhachium that victory was already in their grasp. Near Pharsalus (*Fersala*) in Thessaly, Caesar with 22,000 legionaries routed the army of

Battle of Pharsalus, 48 B.C.

Pompeius, more than twice as numerous. Fifteen thousand were slain, amongst them Domitius Ahenobarbus, and 24,000 were captured. Pompeius fled to the coast and sailed to Lesbos, where he met his wife and family. Thence he sped to Egypt, where he hoped to find an asylum with Ptolemy Dionysius, son of that Auletes whom Gabinius, the friend and supporter of Pompeius, had set upon the throne. But Ptolemy feared that Pompeius would aid against him his wife and sister Cleopatra, whom he had just expelled from the throne, and he caused him to be assassinated as he was landing.

§ 293. Sending M. Antonius back to manage Italy,

The Alexandrian War, 47 B.C.

Caesar hurried with 4000 troops to Egypt, whither he arrived a few days after the murder of his rival. In his need for money he demanded payment of some large debts from the Egyptian crown; but the advisers of Ptolemy were slow to meet the demand, and the Alexandrians, angered by the presence of the legionaries, rose against Caesar and besieged him in the palace. The mob, aided by old soldiers of Pompeius, for a time pressed him so dangerously that he was on the verge of destruction. But at last native reinforcements, consisting of Jews and others, reached him from Syria. The Egyptians were defeated in a battle on the Nile; Ptolemy perished, and his kingdom was given jointly to Cleopatra and a younger brother. But much valuable time had been lost, and it was not until March, 47 B.C., that Caesar could

turn his attention elsewhere. Meanwhile Pharnaces, king of the Bosporus, a son of the great Mithradates, had taken possession of Armenia Minor and routed Domitius Calvus, the legate whom Caesar sent from Egypt to reduce him to obedience. Regulating Judaea and Syria on his way, Caesar hurried to meet him, and at Battle of Zela, 47 B.C. Zela destroyed his army and took away his crown. It was of this battle that Caesar wrote the famous words, "Veni, Vidi, Vici."

§ 294. On the news of Pompeius' death, the Roman populace declared Caesar again dictator as well The African War, 47—46 B.C. as consul for five years; and they invested him also, as their champion against Pompeio-senatorial rule, with the powers and privileges of a tribune for life apart from the actual office: a precedent largely used afterwards to establish the principate. Towards the end of 47 B.C. Caesar returned from the East, but soon left the capital for Africa.

After Pharsalus there was a great scattering among the senatorial chiefs. Cicero returned to Rome, and was pardoned by Caesar on condition that he retired into private life. The others—Metellus Scipio, Cato, Gnaeus and Sextus, the two sons of Pompeius, T. Labienus, Caesar's old lieutenant in Gaul—passed to Africa, carrying with them the remnants of the Pompeian army. They united with Varus, the conqueror of Curio, and a force of 120,000 men was rapidly collected. Juba of Numidia, who dreaded the vengeance of Caesar, supported the coalition with his entire cavalry. Late in the year Caesar landed with barely 5000 men. He could not fight with so few: it was necessary to wait for reinforcements. He lay on the coast at Ruspina for that purpose, severely pressed for want of supplies, and harassed by the enemy's cavalry. Towards

the beginning of April, 46 B.C., his whole force was collected, and suddenly invested Thapsus (*Demas*). The Pompeian army, commanded by Scipio, gave battle to relieve the town. They left 50,000 dead on the field, in exchange for fifty slain Caesarians.⁶ Almost all their leaders fell: Afranius at the hands of the enemy; Metellus Scipio, Petreius, and Cato by suicide. The last-named had fled to Utica, where, on news of Caesar's approach, he read over Plato's *Phaedo* on the soul's immortality, and fell upon his sword. From the place of his death he earned his surname of *Uticensis*. He was an obstinate and bigoted politician, who clung to old forms when they were effete, and aped the archaisms of his ancestor the censor; but for all that he was the most formidable of the senatorial chiefs, and with his fall the cause of the oligarchy became hopeless.

§ 295. Caesar returned to Rome and celebrated a magnificent triumph over Gaul, Egypt, Pharnaces, and Juba; for the Roman conscience was not yet so dead as to allow one citizen to triumph over his fellows. After this he received the powers of dictator for ten years and the rights of Comptroller of Morals (*Praefectus morum*) for three years, an office virtually equivalent to the forgotten censorship.

From the slaughter at Thapsus there had escaped T. Labienus and Sextus Pompeius, son of the great Pompeius. They fled to Further Spain, where Gnaeus Pompeius, the elder brother of Sextus, was collecting an army of desperadoes and malcontents; for Spain, never much attached to Caesar, had been estranged by the brutal misgovernment of Q. Cassius Longinus, whom Caesar left as governor of the Further Province after the battle of Ilerda. It became necessary for Caesar to leave Rome again. He landed in Spain late in the autumn, found the Pompeians centralized

⁶ The Spanish War, 45 B.C.

near Corduba (*Cordova*), and after several months of effort brought them to a pitched battle at Munda. His patience was exhausted: his victory cost the lives of 30,000 of his enemies, including Labienus: Gnaeus escaped, to be overtaken and murdered a few days later, while Sextus fled to the mountains and waited for another opportunity (Mar. 17th, 45 B.C.).

§ 296. The battle of Munda left Caesar undisputed master of the Roman world: open resistance to him was henceforth impossible. He was now Problems of the Time. free to turn his hand to those reforms in the Government which were indispensable if prosperity was to be restored to the empire. Once Rome had been a community of equal citizens, as remarkable for their simple and temperate life as for their readiness to serve their country honestly in the field and the council-chamber. Now the government of the senate that had led Rome gloriously through the exhausting struggles with Pyrrhus and Hannibal had sunk into an oligarchic system of jobbery and corruption. Now the whole wealth of the empire was in the hands of some two thousand families, while outside this small circle there was nothing to be seen but a starving proletariat and a gigantic population of slaves and freedmen. But if matters were unsatisfactory in the capital, the condition of the provinces was still worse. From end to end of the empire senatorial governors had pillaged and drained the provinces at their will. No justice could be obtained: for if a verdict were given by the law courts in favour of the victims it was rarely enforced, and never in such a way as to recoup the plundered parties. Lands lay idle, roads went to ruin, and trade stagnated. In time of war the evil was still worse: what the governors and tax-gatherers left was destroyed by soldiery billeted at free quarters everywhere. The most

pressing of the problems that Caesar had to solve were therefore these: By what form of government was the oligarchy to be replaced? What measures were to be taken for remedying the social distress prevalent among the citizens? How were the provincials first to be protected against the rapacity of their masters, and secondly to be rendered capable of ultimately sharing in the duties and privileges of citizens?

§ 297. To Caesar it seemed that the executive powers of ^{Caesar's} government must be centralised in the hands ^{Government.} of one man; and it was by uniting several offices in his own person that he laid the foundations of an autocracy. He held the consulship often. Since 63 B.C. he had been *pontifex maximus* or head of the state religion. In 49 and 48 B.C. he had been appointed dictator for certain temporary purposes; in 46 B.C. he was made dictator for ten years, and it was by virtue of the office thus conferred that he undertook the re-constitution of the state; in 44 B.C. he was made dictator for life, "a revival of the Roman monarchy both in reality and in name."¹ In 46 B.C. he received the title of Imperator for life; the fact that this title was borne by him within the walls of Rome was a sign that the *imperium* was again unlimited, as it had been under the kings, and again carried with it full military and civil power both within and without the city (see § 49). In 48 B.C. Caesar obtained the *tribunicia potestas* for life (see §§ 294 and 325); "it must have been regarded even now as the ideal complement of a lasting *imperium*, valuable for the inviolability it conferred and the 'civil' and popular colouring which it gave its

¹ Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*, p. 337. The kings of Rome, as leaders in war, were called dictators.

holder.”¹ In 45 B.C. Caesar received the *praefectura morum* (the censorship under another form) for three years.

Unlike Augustus, Caesar could not understand the principle of compromise, or the importance of keeping up the forms of things when their reality had been abolished. His watchword was “thorough”; he could not appreciate the strength of constitutional sentiment in the Roman mind. Accordingly, he was at no great pains to see that others enjoyed the shadow of power while he monopolised the substance; this was not because he valued the forms or ceremonies which are mere symbols of power, but rather because his attitude was one of complete indifference. The senate, instead of being the controller of the magistrates and the stronghold of the oligarchy, was reduced to what it had all along been in theory—a purely consultative body. Its members were raised to nine hundred, and amongst the new senators were sons of freedmen and provincials from Spain and Gaul. As regards the magistrates, Caesar obtained by special laws the right of nominating half the praetors and quaestors;² and the functions of both senate and magistrates became more and more municipal in their character.

To meet the social distress in Rome—the result partly of civil wars, partly of economic changes—Caesar adopted some of the reforms which had figured on the democratic programme since the days of the Gracchi. He provided employment by the

Caesar's
contempt of
compromise.

The Senate.

Rome and Italy:
Social
Reforms.

¹ Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*, *ibid.*

² He raised the number of praetors to 16, and of quaestors to 20. Caesar would by the right of *nominatio* make a list of 8 and 10 candidates in each case; and these were sure to be elected by the people.

construction of public buildings; and he tried to diminish the multitude of beggars by reviving C. Gracchus' schemes of colonisation across the seas. He planted citizen-colonies on the sites of Corinth and Carthage; and by this means 80,000 unemployed were put in a position to earn an honest livelihood. He abolished the clubs of Clodius, which were little more than societies for the propagation of crime. He confined the doles of free corn to those who were actually in need of subsistence, and in this way he reduced the number of recipients of this outdoor relief by about one-half. He gave relief to debtors, but refused to cancel all debts. In Italy corn-growing was now almost entirely superseded by the slave-worked pasture-farms of capitalists. Caesar did his best to restore agriculture by making capitalists invest half their capital in land, and by settling veterans as peasant farmers among the agricultural population without dispossessing or buying out the latter. He also enacted that one-third of herdsmen employed on the great cattle-runs should be of free birth.

By the Social War the Italians had gained the Roman franchise; but comparatively few could avail themselves of their voting rights at Rome, while on the other hand the old local patriotism of the Italian townships had been lost through their becoming merged in Rome. Caesar began the great task of defining the judicial and administrative competence of the local magistrates, so that it would not clash with that of the Roman praetor. He also endeavoured to make the municipal constitutions of the various towns (whether they were called, as a result of past history, *municipia*, *coloniae*, or *praefecturae*) uniform with one another.

Political
Reforms in
Italy.

Caesar was the first statesman who frankly recognised that the provinces were an integral part of the empire. He even saw that the whole *raison d'être* of the monarchy was the welfare of the provinces; and he began to demolish the barriers which separated the provincials from the Italians. His great aim was to extend to the provinces the privileges of municipal organization enjoyed by Italy. With this object he bestowed (in 49 B.C.) the franchise on the whole of Cisalpine Gaul and on Gades (*Cadiz*) in Spain, and established citizen-colonies at Arelate (*Arles*) and other places in Gaul, and gave Latin rights to the whole of Sicily.

Caesar also substituted direct money payments for the tithe (*decumae*) in Asia and thus freed that province from the extortionate demands of the *publicani* or tax-farmers. He also imposed limits on the exactions of governors and the rapacity of usurers.

§ 298. Caesar was now bent on asserting Rome's power on the eastern frontier. He had made all preparations for leaving for the East: he had appointed M. Antonius prefect of the city, and had secretly adopted as his son and heir his grandnephew Gaius Octavius,¹ whose mother was Atia, daughter of the dictator's sister. Meanwhile there were jealous whispers abroad: men said that the dictator would soon assert himself openly as king. On the Ides of March (Mar. 15th, 44 B.C.) Caesar went down to the senate-house as was his wont. He was beset by a knot of some fifty of his friends and acquaintances, who importuned him to attend to some petition, and refused to be

¹ His birth-name was C. Octavius, but upon his adoption he took, as usual, the full triple name of the adopter, and added thereto an *agnomen* showing the *gens* from which he was adopted. In full then his name was C. Julius Caesar Octavianus.

dismissed. A few moments later Rome knew that its dictator was dead, stabbed with a score of wounds by his own familiar friends.

§ 299. The chiefs of the conspiracy were M. Junius Brutus and C. Cassius : others were Decimus The Liberators. Brutus, C. Trebonius, Casca, Cinna, and Cimber. The mainspring of the plot was Cassius. M. Brutus, a descendant of the famous L. Junius Brutus who had caused the expulsion of the Tarquins, was roused to emulation by the memory of that great deed. Amongst the sixty or so who swore to kill the tyrant, and boasted of themselves afterwards as "Liberators" and "Tyrannicides," there were few but had received high honour and preferment from the man they murdered : Decimus was governor-designate of Cisalpine Gaul and consul-designate for 42 B.C., Trebonius was about to take the governorship of the province of Asia, while Cassius was praetor-designate for 43 B.C. But all were led away by idle dreams of restoring the glorious past of an age when the Romans were fitted to govern themselves—a past long since buried. Caesar's rule was light, but it was the rule of an autocrat, and the fact that his fellow-Romans had themselves voluntarily ratified his usurpation did not make it less a crime in their eyes ; while they dreaded the day when he should return from his Parthian campaign, once again a conqueror, and perhaps given over to the pomp and insolence of such sovereigns as those of Parthia and Egypt. They could not see that monarchy alone could save Rome from ruin ; they could not see how much Caesar had already done to avert such ruin ; they could only hunt after ideals which prevented their recognizing realities. The best proof of their own lack of reason is to be found in the fact that, the deed done, they had made no preparations for future action. Instead of giving back to Rome the energetic

Republic of old, they gave back only anarchy, for there was no one to take Caesar's place.

§ 300. The conspirators had hoped that the people would support them. It was a grave miscalculation : ^{Antonius and the Liberators.} Brutus and his companions, finding no one willing openly to join them, withdrew to the Capitol ; M. Antonius, the consul, persuaded Calpurnia, Caesar's wife, to hand over to him all the dead man's moneys and papers ; M. Aemilius Lepidus, Master of the Horse and titular governor of Narbonese Gaul and Hither Spain, marched into the city with the Caesarian troops which he had at hand, and sided at once with Antonius. At a meeting of the senate (Mar. 17th) in the temple of Tellus, Cicero marked his re-entry to public life by advising that an amnesty should be at once proclaimed : the question as to whether the murderers of Caesar were right or no was conveniently slurred over, while the dictator's acts and legislation were formally declared valid in a body. Had this not been done, all who owed to his favours either wealth or rank, would have been declared to have no title to either—a matter which personally touched most of the assassins. As things were, the latter were assured of their safety as far as the senate could guarantee it, and remained in possession of the honours to which Caesar had appointed or designated them. Trebonius soon left for his province of Asia, D. Brutus for Cisalpine Gaul ; Brutus and Cassius waited to complete their praetorships before taking over their respective provinces of Macedonia and Syria.

§ 301. The feelings of the people towards their dead hero were clearly shown upon the day of his burial. M. Antonius pronounced over the bier in the Forum the usual panegyric of the dead, and read out the terms of the will

whereby he declared Octavianus his heir, named many of his murderers as legatees, and left to his fellow-citizens as a lasting souvenir of himself his splendid pleasure-grounds beyond the Tiber, besides a legacy of 300 sesterces per man. The mob was worked up to frenzy, as Antonius desired it should be, and turned to wreak vengeance on the murderers, but most of these had already quitted Rome. In spite of this outbreak, the senate had not lost hope that Antonius and Lepidus might be got out of the way, so that it could resume the reins of government. But Antonius was master of the situation, and had no mind to be so disposed of: he intended to take for himself the place from which Caesar had fallen, and it seemed likely to be easily done by help of the legions and the people. Meantime he professed all loyalty to the senate, as did also Lepidus, and pleased them by moving the abolition of the title of dictator. Next he proceeded to make use of the papers which Calpurnia had put into his hands, by quoting these as authority for any wish or act of his own, under cover of the *senatus-consultum* of Mar. 17th, whereby all Caesar's deeds were declared valid. In this way he purchased friends in all quarters: to towns and states he granted remissions of taxes; to individuals he sold honours and privileges; and when there was not forthcoming anything in Caesar's handwriting to support some new measure, he hired the services of a forger to make good the want. The senate found that it had only changed one master for a worse. Antonius had as much reason to fear the Liberators as Caesar had, and to prevent their securing the command of large and wealthy provinces he obtained, avowedly on the strength of some notes of Caesar's, the assent of the people to a law whereby his brother, C. Antonius, received for the year 43 B.C. the province of

Antonius
Master of
Rome.

Macedonia, and Dolabella, his colleague in the consulship, received Syria, the appointments of Brutus and Cassius being cancelled, while he himself replaced D. Brutus as governor of Cisalpine Gaul. The senate fretted, but it was forced to look on at the disarming of its instruments.

§ 302. In April Octavianus, Caesar's heir, now nineteen years of age, had arrived in Rome from the camp at Apollonia, where he had been in readiness for the Parthian Expedition. He found that Antonius had already spent all Caesar's treasure, but by aid of loans he was able to pay the largess of 300 sesterces, and thereby at once gain popularity with the people. He would be a powerful antagonist to Antonius, if only he could be induced to support the senate in earnest. Cicero saw this, and abandoning his intention of leaving Italy, resolved to throw himself vigorously into the struggle. In the famous *Philippics* he made a fierce attack on the whole policy of Antonius, and the effect of these speeches was so telling that Antonius soon after left for Cisalpine Gaul, hoping to establish himself there as Caesar had done before him and so to dominate Rome. But Cicero's animosity encouraged the senate to declare illegal his recent redistribution of provinces, and any molestation of Decimus an act of treason. The consuls for 43 B.C., Aulus Hirtius and C. Pansa, were ordered to defend Decimus. Brutus and Cassius had already left Italy to take forcible possession of Macedonia and Syria.

§ 303. Antonius was desperate. He attacked Decimus and shut him up within Mutina (*Modena*). The consuls supported by Octavianus hurried to the rescue, fought a double battle at Forum Galorum (Ap. 15th, 43 B.C.) and Mutina (Ap. 27th), and raised the siege. Unfortunately both Hirtius and Pansa

Appearance of
Octavianus.

Battle of
Mutina,
43 B.C.

died of their wounds, leaving the command with Octavianus. While Antonius retreated towards Narbonese Gaul, where Lepidus was still in secret friendly towards him, Octavianus marched on Rome with his legions and compelled the senate to give him the consulship. Soon afterwards he broke altogether with the senate and formed an alliance with Antonius and Lepidus. In November 43 B.C. the three—Octavianus, Lepidus, and Antonius—were declared Commissioners for the regulation of the Commonwealth (*triumviri reipublicae constituendae*)¹ for a period of five years. They represented no party and no interest but their own, to further which they at once proscribed 300 senators and 2000 equites, including M. Cicero and his brother Quintus (Dec. 7th). The great orator was killed near Formiae by Antonius' emissaries; his head was carried to Rome and nailed to the Rostra. The triumvirs next turned to get rid of Brutus and Cassius, to whom fled those of the party of liberty who dared not remain in Italy.

§ 304. Cassius and Brutus had established themselves

Battle of
Philippi,
42 B.C.

firmly in their respective provinces while the parties were quarrelling in Italy. Dolabella had been defeated and killed by Cassius; Brutus compelled the surrender of the entire force of C. Antonius, the triumvir's brother. They possessed between them an army of 80,000 foot and 20,000 horse, to provide funds for which they ransacked and plundered the states of Asia without mercy. In the spring of 42 B.C. they concentrated their troops at Philippi near the Thracian frontier of Macedonia, whither Octavianus and M. Antonius had come to meet them, leaving the third Triumvir Lepidus to act as prefect of the city. The army of the Liberators

¹ Unlike the first Triumvirate, the second Triumvirate was recognized by the people, and the title given by means of a law.

was the stronger, but it lacked supplies, for the seas were in the power of the Triumvirs. There were two battles of Philippi: in the former, Cassius was defeated and killed himself, while Brutus' division was victorious; twenty days later the second battle ended in Brutus' suicide and the annihilation of his force. The few who did not choose to submit to the Triumvirs fled to the west, where Sextus Pompeius had emerged from his Spanish hiding-place, and with a pirate fleet was scouring the Tyrrhenian Sea and threatening Rome with a corn-famine. The victorious commanders divided the world between them: Antonius undertook to chastise the Parthians, who were again ravaging Asia, and there to raise fresh money to satisfy the demands of the legions; Octavianus returned to Italy as governor of the west; Lepidus, at all times a mere make-weight, was named ruler of Africa.

§ 305. The troubles of Italy were not yet ended. The ceaseless allotment of lands to successive batches of veterans roused all classes against ^{The Perusine War.} Octavianus, who nevertheless could not otherwise retain that allegiance of the troops which was his sole safeguard. Moreover he was in feeble health, and few expected him to live long; while of his colleagues, Lepidus was incensed at the manner in which he was neglected, and Antonius had a brother Lucius (now consul, 41 B.C.) and a wife Fulvia in Rome who desired to see him sole ruler. These two placed themselves at the head of the evicted Italian land-owners and the dissatisfied part of the legionaries, and drove the prefect Lepidus out of Rome; but the arrival of Octavianus compelled them to fall back upon Perugia. There, after a siege of many months, L. Antonius capitulated, and so ended the Perusine War (40 B.C.); but this collision with his colleague's brother was not calculated

to keep Octavianus on amicable terms with M. Antonius in the East. The refugees from Perusia fled some to M. Antonius, some to Sicily to swell the numbers of Sextus Pompeius' followers.

§ 306. The fortunes of Sextus were prospering rapidly.

Sextus Pompeius in Sicily. While in person he cruised in the Lower Sea, and kept Octavianus and Rome in constant uneasiness as to their supplies, his lieutenant Domitius Ahenobarbus was on the Upper Sea equally a source of trouble to Antonius, now in Greece. As the relations between Octavianus and Antonius became daily more strained, Sextus and Domitius found themselves the object of overtures from both, for they had the power with equal facility to keep Antonius out of Italy or to aid him in landing there. Antonius had settled the affairs of the East, but for some months past he had wasted his time and talents upon Cleopatra, to whom he was a complete slave. The fall of his brother Lucius and the appeals of Fulvia at last brought him to see that Octavianus bid fair to oust him, as he had already ousted Lepidus, from any real share in the Triumvirate; and without waiting for any further excuse, he massed his forces in Greece, won over Domitius and Sextus Pompeius to his side, and suddenly descended upon Brundisium (40 B.C.). But just about this time died his wife Fulvia, whose intrigues, prompted by the desire to win back her husband at any cost from Cleopatra, were the chief cause of Antonius' activity. By the efforts of C. Asinius Pollio, Octavianus was enabled to patch up a new treaty with his rival: while Lepidus was allowed to retain Africa, these two divided the rest of the world between them, Scodra (*Scutari*) in Illyricum being the meridian of division. Such was the Treaty of Brundisium (40 B.C.), which was sealed by the marriage of Octavianus' sister

Octavia to Antonius. To the Triumvir of the East was entrusted the task of chastising the Parthians: Octavianus was to deal with Sextus Pompeius. But Antonius soon drifted back to Alexandria and Cleopatra, leaving his lieutenant Ventidius to conduct operations against the Parthians, who had again overrun all Syria.

§ 307. Meanwhile Sextus, disowned by all parties, seized Corsica and Sardinia, and commenced a blockade of Ostia, whereby Octavianus, who had no ^{Fall of Sextus Pompeius.} serviceable fleet, was compelled to grant temporary terms. By this, the Treaty of Misenum, Sextus received the powers of a proconsul in Sardinia, Corsica, Sicily, and Achæa for five years—that is, he was virtually acknowledged as the equal and ally of the Triumvirs. But within a few months the quarrel was renewed. Antonius refused to surrender Achæa, and when Sextus' vice-admiral Metrodorus put Sardinia and Corsica into the hands of Octavianus, the latter retained them, and Sextus declared war. Octavianus suffered several reverses before he entrusted the war to his lieutenant M. Vipsanius Agrippa, who had recently crushed some risings on the Rhine frontier and in Aquitania (39, 38 B.C.). He took in hand his new duties with energy, and after a year's effort, could put to sea with a force sufficient to confine Sextus to the seas about Sicily. Lepidus landed upon that island with his African legions, while Octavianus attacked it from the north. There was, however, no success until Agrippa in person took the command. He routed one fleet off Mylæ, and revenged a subsequent double defeat of Octavius' squadron by a victory at Nau- lochus (36 B.C.) so crushing that Sextus gave up the struggle and fled to Lesbos. He hoped to find support from Antonius, between whom and Octavianus there had arisen fresh soreness in the preceding year (37 B.C.). Octavia's

influence availed to reconcile the two: by the Treaty of Tarentum the Triumvirs had prolonged for themselves their office for another term of five years, and had united to crush Sextus, Antonius lending a fleet in exchange for two legions to be employed by Ventidius against Parthia. The last act of the naval war came when Lepidus made a fatuous effort to take for himself what Sextus had lost. The attempt was easily crushed, and Lepidus was captured; but Octavianus was content to banish him to Circeii, and to take over Africa for himself (36 B.C.). Antonius made no effort to prevent the fall of the third member of the Triumvirate or to avenge it. He was busy at present on the Euphrates. Sextus, meeting with no aid from Antonius, recommenced his career as a free-lance in Asia, where he was speedily captured and put to death (35 B.C.).

§ 308. For a few years there was a respite from civil

Relations between Octavianus and Antonius.

war: on the one hand Antonius was too much occupied with alternate dissipation at Alexandria and campaigning against Parthia; on the other, Octavianus was busy abroad with a rising of the northern tribes—the Salassi and Taurisci of the Pennine Alps, the Liburni of the coast eastward of Istria, the Iapydes and Pannonians—while at home he lost no occasion of rousing the indignation of the Romans against the un-Roman conduct of his colleague. By the year 34 B.C., the north-eastern frontier of Italy was safe; and in the same year Antonius, to revenge a disastrous repulse inflicted two years before by the Parthians, had overrun the whole of Armenia and captured its king Artavasdes; but his conduct in celebrating a mock triumph at Alexandria, acknowledging as his sons the offspring of Cleopatra, and making a will which disposed of whole kingdoms in favour of the children of the foreign woman, had utterly alienated

the feelings of Rome. Cleopatra urged him to re-assert his rights: she promised him her support in men and money, and bade him strike while there was yet time. ,

§ 309. In 33 B.C. envoys from Antonius made complaint that Sextus Pompeius had been unfairly driven from the position accorded to him by the Treaty of Misenum (39 B.C.), and that Octavianus was allotting the whole available land of Italy to his own veterans without considering the claims of Antonius' troops. Octavianus replied by complaining that Antonius was answerable for Sextus' death, and that his troops were well provided for by the enormous conquests which their commander claimed to have made beyond the Euphrates. At the close of 32 B.C. Antonius massed in Greece his legions, supported by a fleet of 500 galleys, mostly furnished by Cleopatra, and upwards of 100,000 Asiatic allies. Octavianus had only his own legionaries to aid him, but he had Agrippa for his adviser, and no love-affair to unnerve his judgment. He forestalled Antonius' attack by crossing unexpectedly into Greece, and the two armaments confronted each other for many weeks at the promontory of Actium (*Akri*), on the Gulf of Ambracia. There (Sept. 2, 31 B.C.) occurred the decisive battle. Antonius, finding his Asiatic allies and even his Roman officers constantly growing less trustworthy, while his legions murmured at Cleopatra's presence and her mastery over him, was forced at last to bring his fleet into action. It was twice as numerous as the rival flotilla under Agrippa, but less skilfully manned and handled; yet even so it was only the flight of Cleopatra in the heat of the engagement, and Antonius' senseless imitation of her example, which lost the day. The two made all speed to Egypt, while such part of their fleet as was not destroyed by Octavianus' Outbreak of War, 82 B.C. Battle of Actium, 31 B.C.

fire-ships, was surrendered, with the entire land army, to the victors.

§ 310. Leaving Agrippa to return to Rome to control affairs in the capital, Octavianus with a few picked legions proceeded across Greece and through Asia Minor towards Egypt. Cleopatra awaited his arrival in Alexandria: her first impulse had been to fly to the far East, but she had neither allies nor trustworthy troops, and she now resolved to face Octavianus, and attempt to make of him such another conquest as she had made of Antonius. But her artifices were thrown away: her conqueror showed no sign of weakness, and to avoid being paraded in a Roman triumph, Cleopatra killed herself shortly after. Antonius, upon a false report of her death, had likewise made an end of his life, 30 B.C. Thus was Caesar's heir saved the difficulty of dealing with his two last enemies: he could now feel that he was safe. He had saved Rome, and Rome quietly acknowledged the debt. From the day of Actium dates the *de facto* existence of the Principate, and the *de facto* recognition of Octavianus as the first of the Emperors.

Death of
Antonius,
30 B.C.


CHAPTER XI.

THE PRINCIPATE.

§ 311. Settlement of Asia.—§§ 312, 313. Titles and Powers of Augustus.—§ 314. Settlement of Gaul and Spain.—§ 315. Events in Egypt.—§§ 316, 317. The Question of the Succession—Marcellus and Agrippa.—§§ 318, 319. Wars against the Northern Tribes.—§ 320. Maecenas.—§ 321. Family troubles of Augustus.—§§ 322, 323. Wars in Germany.—§ 324. Death of Augustus.—§§ 325—327. The Imperial Constitution.

§ 311. OCTAVIANUS' first care was the regulation of Egypt. It was a country whose occupation by a political rival would be exceptionally dangerous, for its ^{Settlement of Egypt and Asia.} wealth was great, it was strongly situated between sands and seas, and any interruption in its export of corn would reduce Rome to famine. Octavianus therefore refused the senate any share in its government: he placed over it a man of equestrian rank only, and absolutely forbade any senator to set foot on its soil without obtaining his permission. He then journeyed back through Syria and Asia Minor. He made little alteration in the settlement of Pompeius. Few of the native princes had identified themselves with the cause of Antonius: it was therefore both prudent and just to leave them in possession of their sovereignties. Polemo of Pontus, Deiotarus of Paphlagonia, and Amyntas of Galatia were confirmed in their kingdoms, and Herod of Judaea, one of the most formidable of Antonius'

GENEALOGY OF THE CAESARS.



allies, was rewarded by an accession of territory for the instant transfer of his allegiance to Octavianus. Further east, the important kingdom of Armenia was held in check by the Parthian empire, which continually threatened to reduce its weaker neighbours to vassalage.

§ 312. While Octavianus was still in Asia, the senate decreed many honours to the conqueror of Actium. There was accorded to him the privilege Octavianus in Rome.

of wearing on all public occasions the insignia of triumph—the scarlet robe and laurel wreath; quinquennial games were instituted in his honour at home and in the provinces; his name was inserted in the prayers for the safety of the senate and people; and his birthday was celebrated with sacrifices. When he returned to Rome in the summer of 29 B.C. Octavianus, in emulation of Pompeius and Caesar, enjoyed a threefold triumph. Every one wished for peace, and that desire was gratified by the public ceremony of closing the gates of the Temple of Janus for the third time since its foundation. To reward his legionaries, he presented each with a thousand sesterces—a sum for which the recent spoils of Alexandria gave him enough and to spare. At the same time a largess of four thousand sesterces was given to every citizen, and the public distribution of corn was continued on a more lavish scale than ever. The higher ranks were gratified by appointments to the great magistracies; such senatorial families as had sunk into poverty were rehabilitated by munificent grants; throughout the city the temples and historic monuments were beautified and restored, and public works—such as the famous Temple of Apollo on the Palatine, with its museum and library—were undertaken on the most lavish scale.

§ 313. Octavianus had already laid aside the irregular

title of Triumvir, which indeed no longer possessed any meaning; but he was still consul, and he had ^{His Titles and Powers.} been invested with tribunician authority (36 B.C.). In addition, he had assumed the style of Imperator. He wished by apparent deference to the old constitutional formulas to induce the senate to confirm and enlarge the powers he possessed. In this endeavour he encountered no resistance. When at the beginning of 27 B.C. he declared in the senate that his work was done, and that he would lay down the extraordinary dictatorial powers surviving from the triumvirate, the offer was welcomed, but in place thereof the senators decreed him the *proconsulare imperium* for a space of ten years. Octavianus declined to receive it for life, for such an act would have savoured too much of the despotic power of Julius; neither would he accept it over the whole extent of the Roman world, as his great-uncle had done. He handed over to the control of the senate the more peaceful provinces, and retained only such as required the presence of an armed force. According to the theory of the constitution, the censorial powers were inherent in the consul: he was thus enabled when consul for the sixth time in 28 B.C. to revise the list of senators, and in this way to expel unworthy members who had crept into the senate during the troubles of the past twenty years. As he inscribed his own name first on the roll, he became Princeps Senatus, or Head of the House." The title implied no special duties or powers, but was merely a complimentary designation of the most illustrious member in that assembly. It must be distinguished from the title of Princeps, which Octavianus later assumed, and which came to be the Roman equivalent for our word emperor, though it merely described Caesar as *primus inter pares*, the leading citizen in the whole citizen body. From this time dates the

regular Principate—the joint government of the emperor and the restored senate. A few weeks later Octavianus received the title of Augustus, by which he has ever since been known.

§ 314. Secure now in the constitutional sanction which guaranteed his manifold powers, Augustus turned his attention to securing the provinces and frontiers of the west and north. The mountain tribes of northern Spain—the Cantabri, Vaccaei and Astures—were still in arms, and in 27 B.C. Augustus left the city to superintend in person their subjection. On his way through Gaul he held a synod of all the states at Narbo, and there commenced that organization which converted the lands won by Julius into one of the most tractable parts of the empire. Various colonies of citizens and Latins were founded in the Narbonese, while the vast region beyond this was formally divided into three provinces—Gallia Lugdunensis, Belgica, and Aquitania—of which Lugdunum (*Lyon*) became the political and commercial centre. Popular government was encouraged in the native states to the depression of the chiefs and aristocracies which had offered the greatest resistance to the Roman power; and the Druidic worship, always a focus of national sentiment, was as far as possible discouraged. Passing into Spain, Augustus moved against the Cantabri and Astures. The war brought little glory, for the Spaniards avoided pitched battles, and carried on a guerilla struggle which lasted for eight years. The fatigues of the campaign soon told on Augustus, who retired an invalid to Tarraco, leaving his legates to carry on the struggle. At the close of 25 B.C. the Cantabri submitted for a time, but, in spite of the foundation of military colonies, broke out again into revolt when Augustus returned to Rome in 24 B.C. They were not finally subdued

until 19 B.C., when Agrippa completed the conquest which had begun nearly two centuries before, by transferring them bodily to the lowlands. Fifty years later Spain was as completely Romanized as was Gaul, and furnished a list of literary celebrities far exceeding in brilliancy those of any other part of the Roman world. Lucan, Seneca, Quintilian and Martial were all natives of the Spanish peninsula.

§ 315. The scene of these petty wars now changes to the far East. The first prefect of Egypt, Cornelius Gallus, the most graceful writer of elegiacs of his day, had allowed his exalted position to lead him into indiscretions. Statues had been set up in his honour, and his name inscribed upon the eternal monuments of Egypt, while his Roman arrogance had led to serious riots in Alexandria, always a turbulent and unruly city. His failings, slight in themselves, derived an especial importance from the jealousy with which Augustus regarded Egypt. Gallus was ordered by the obsequious senate to return to Rome, where he committed suicide to escape the punishment that awaited him, 26 B.C. He was succeeded by C. Petronius, whose tenure of office was signalized by an expedition to Arabia under the command of Aelius Gallus. The attack was directed against that part of the country known as Sabaea or Arabia Felix, the modern Yemen. ~~The stories of the wealth of Sabaea were no myth: it was the land of drugs and spices, and through it passed the treasures of India on their way to the western lands. In old days that commerce had passed through southern Egypt; now the Egyptian trade was at a standstill, and by the expedition Augustus hoped to restore the old line of traffic as well as to obtain possession of the spice-lands. The effort was a failure: ignorance caused needless risks in the passage by~~

sea southward to Leuce Come (*Haura*), "the White Village"; and when the army struck thence into the centre of Arabia under the guidance of Syllaeus, an officer of the king of the Nabathaeans, it was decimated by sickness. It did indeed reach Mariaba, the capital of a Sabaeen tribe, but it retired without entering the town, and returned to Egypt without either glory or profit. About the time when his subordinate was busied so fruitlessly in Arabia, C. Petronius was acting on the southern frontier of Egypt, where the Ethiopians, accustomed to raiding the upper valley of the Nile during the time of the Ptolemies, continued their forays even after the establishment of the stronger government of Rome. Petronius gained one or two successes, and the Aethiopian queen Candace at length agreed to peace, though she refused to pay the tribute which the prefect sought to impose upon her, 22 B.C.

§ 316. In 23 B.C., on recovering from a severe illness, Augustus, then consul for the eleventh time, laid down that office, which he resumed afterwards only on two occasions. In return the senate prolonged for five years the *proconsulare imperium* which he already possessed, and in some way extended or confirmed his title to the *tribunicia potestas*, which he accordingly dates from this year. During his sickness, the question of a successor was much debated, but two candidates stood out before all others: Marcellus, the youthful son of Augustus' sister Octavia, and M. Vipsanius Agrippa, the veteran companion of Augustus and the warrior who had won for him victory at Mylae and Actium and on many other scenes. The hopes of most men centred in Marcellus, who was married to Julia, Augustus' only child, and was now aedile, though only twenty years of age. "Brief and unfortunate were the loves of the Romans:" Marcellus fell

The Question
of the
Succession.

ill, and died only a few weeks after the recovery of his uncle. His death made way for the advancement of Agrippa, who was at this time engaged in the settlement of the eastern states. To the East Augustus also now proceeded, leaving the capital entirely to the control of its constitutional governors, the senate and the consuls. Parthia was torn by internal dissensions, and the rival claimants appealed to the Emperor. Augustus decided in favour of the reigning monarch Phraates, exacting however as the price of his support the restoration of the standards captured from Crassus on the field of Carrhae. To the great joy of Romans everywhere, this disgrace was thus at last to some degree expiated. At the same time, Tiberius, the eldest son of Augustus' wife Livia by her first husband, secured Roman influence in Armenia by setting Tigranes upon the throne, 20 B.C.

§ 317. During Augustus' absence in the East, the capital Augustus and Agrippa had been disturbed by violent election riots. Agrippa succeeded in quieting matters, but disturbances broke out afresh when he was summoned to Spain to chastise the Cantabri and Astures. The senate, unable, as in the time of Clodius and Milo, to restrain the turbulence of the city, entreated Augustus to return. He was satisfied, for he had shown that the citizens were not capable of governing themselves, and he returned to his post with renewed acclamations and with authority stronger than ever. In 18 B.C. he received the *proconsulare imperium* for a further term of five years, and, as in 23 B.C. and 27 B.C., he was empowered to exercise this authority even within the walls of the capital—a strange deviation from the practice of republican times. Five years later, the death of Lepidus the Triumvir, who had lived unnoticed since his banishment to Circeii, left vacant the office of Pontifex

Maximus. Augustus forthwith assumed it, and so completed the circle of his supremacy in matters civil, judicial, military, and ecclesiastical. The question of the succession continued to give him trouble. Agrippa's persistent claim on the score of faithful services was recognized in 21 B.C., when he received in marriage Julia, the widow of Marcellus. He returned from Spain towards the close of 19 B.C., and was in the following year admitted by Augustus as his colleague in the *tribunicia potestas* as well as in the duties of the censorship. Yet his stern, unsociable nature rendered him unpopular with the people, and Augustus no doubt preferred that one of his own blood should be his successor. In 17 B.C. the Emperor publicly adopted his grandsons Gaius and Lucius Caesar, the sons of Agrippa and Julia. In the same year the disappointed father—for it was evident that he would be passed over if the young princes arrived at maturity—received the duty of administering the East for five years, and retired thither with his wife. He found little of real import to exercise him in Asia: the main event of his mission was a visit of Herod, the most sedulous and dexterous of flatterers, under whose directions Caesarea rose as a delicate compliment to his liege lord. In 13 B.C. Agrippa returned to Italy, but died in the following year.

§ 318. In 16 B.C. Lollius, the commander on the Lower Rhine, was defeated by the German tribes of the Usipetes and Sugambri, who had crossed the Rhine and endeavoured to establish themselves on the Gallic side. They discomfited Lollius for a time, and even captured the eagle of the fifth legion, but the Roman general at length rallied and the Germans retired. But though tranquillity now prevailed, Augustus saw that it was absolutely necessary to establish a firm

Wars against
the Northern
Tribes.

and tenable frontier line from the Lacus Flevo (*Zuyder Zee*) to the Lower Danube. His two stepsons, Tiberius and Drusus, were now in the vigour of manhood, and both were endowed with the mental capabilities that had always marked the Claudian family. Tiberius however, with many good qualities, showed a reserve and awkwardness which contrasted unfavourably with Drusus' frank good-nature. The two brothers made their attack on Rhaetia simultaneously from Gaul and Dalmatia, 15 B.C. The campaign was a brilliant success, and the Rhaeti and other barbarous tribes gave no further trouble. From this period must be dated the commencement of the line of fortresses which remain to-day the military positions on the Danube and Rhine—Pressburg, Passau, Strasburg, Coblenz, Cologne, and others. The command against the German tribes was given to Drusus, and he made it his aim not merely to secure the Roman possessions on the Rhine, but to extend the empire to the Elbe, the shorter course of which river offered an even more satisfactory frontier. The chief tribes with which he had to deal were the Chauci on the shores of the North Sea, the Cherusci about the sources of the Amisia (*Ems*) and the Visurgis (*Weser*), the Usipetes and Sugambri, already mentioned, with the adjacent Tencteri, and further south the Chatti, who extended from the Rhine to the Hercynian forest.

§ 319. In 12 B.C. Drusus crossed the Rhine, while at the same time he sent a flotilla into the northern sea for the purpose of attacking the Chauci from the coast. Bad weather prevented the expedition from getting beyond the shores of Friesland, and it soon returned without gaining any advantage. In the following year Drusus again crossed to the Lippe, which he bridged, and then traversed the lands of the Cherusci

Campaigns of
Drusus and
Tiberius

until he came to the Weser. This was the limit of his advance, but he secured the fruits of the campaign to some extent by constructing a fort on the Lippe. A third campaign was spent mainly in making roads and bridges, and otherwise preparing for a more serious undertaking in 9 B.C. In that year Drusus, after marching through the lands of his allies the Chatti, wheeled northward, crossed the Weser, and devastated the Cheruscan territories as far as the Albis (*Elbe*). There he erected a trophy and turned back; but on the march he was thrown from his horse, and received injuries so severe that he died thirty days later. He had reached the furthest limit of Roman advance, and had warred with considerable success in the midst of the most independent of the German tribes. His work was taken up and continued by Tiberius, who in 8 B.C., and again in 7 B.C., traversed without opposition the German side of the Rhine.

§ 320. In 8 B.C. died C. Cilnius Maecenas, the second of the great ministers of Augustus. Since 40 B.C. he had been constantly employed in matters of state: in 38 B.C. he conducted the negotiations with Antonius which resulted in the treaty of Tarentum, and during the war with Cleopatra he was entrusted in the absence of Augustus with the government of the capital and of Italy. He continued to render important services to Augustus in the establishment of his Principate, and not less valuable was his connection with the great men of letters of the day. Vergil and Horace, who both belonged to his circle, nobly repaid the protection which the powerful minister accorded to them by celebrating in immortal verse the services of Augustus to his country. About 20 B.C. a coolness sprang up between Maecenas and the Princeps: people whispered that Augustus had ceased to

love the man who was his right hand in peace as Agrippa had been in war; and scandal said that Maecenas was vexed by the attentions openly paid to his wife Terentia by the Princeps. Whatever the cause, the two saw little of each other for many years, though in his will Maecenas bequeathed his property to the man he had served so long and faithfully.

§ 321. Augustus was growing old and the question of the succession was still unsettled. Gaius and Lucius, sons of Agrippa and Julia, were almost recognized as heirs-apparent, and their position became stronger with their years. Tiberius, however, who at the emperor's command had put away his own wife to marry the twice widowed Julia (12 B.C.), had claims which could not be ignored, and he was naturally disappointed at the rising influence of the young Caesars. Still greater was the chagrin of Livia, whose most cherished wish it was to see the Principate descend to her son. Again, the marriage of Tiberius and Julia, purely a matter of state policy, brought with it the most melancholy results, for Julia disgraced the palace by profligacy which neither her husband nor father could check. So unhappy in fact was the position of Tiberius, that in 6 B.C. he retired to Rhodes, and lived for some years in virtual exile. The dissoluteness of Julia at last brought its punishment: in 2 A.D. she was banished to the rock of Pandateria, some thirty miles west of Cumae, where she was so sternly treated that none could see her, and even the necessaries of life were denied her. After five years she was allowed to reside at Rhegium; but she never again entered Rome or saw her family. Her disgrace was followed by the death of both the young Caesars: Lucius died of sickness which attacked him at Massilia when on the way to Spain, 2 A.D.; while Gaius,

treacherously stabbed in the siege of an Armenian town, died of his wounds a few months later at Limyra in Syria, 4 A.D. The way was again clear for the advancement of Tiberius, who had returned from his long sojourn at Rhodes on the repeated entreaties of Livia, 2 A.D. Upon him fell all the honours that had lately seemed destined to pass to the young princes. He was at once adopted by Augustus; the *tribunicia potestas*, already conferred upon him in 6 B.C., was renewed for another term of five years, and an immediate opening for military exploits was found for him on the German frontier, where the tribes of the Lower Rhine were again in arms.

§ 322. Tiberius spent the remainder of the year in securing the Roman conquests in Germany by roads and military camps. In 5 A.D. he took The Northern Frontier. vigorous action. A large fleet dropped down the Rhine, coasted along Friesland and sailed up the Elbe, where it was joined by the land army, which had struck across the heart of Northern Germany to that river. So thoroughly were the natives cowed that Tiberius was able to turn his attention to another and more formidable enemy. The Marcomanni, who had once lived upon the Upper Rhine, had withdrawn, before the Roman advance, to the valleys of the Moldau and the Upper Elbe (the modern *Bohemia*). There under Maroboduus, a chief schooled in war and politics by a long residence in Rome, they grew into a Maroboduus. powerful federation, whose forces, amounting to 70,000 foot and 4000 horse and trained on the Roman plan, became a standing menace to the Danubian frontier. Tiberius marched northward from Pannonia against Maroboduus, while another Roman army moved simultaneously to the same goal from the Upper Rhine. The two columns seemed about to gain a brilliant success, when they were

compelled to retire by the news that all Pannonia and Dalmatia was in revolt behind them. Tiberius patched up a peace with Maroboduus and recrossed the Danube. At first the insurgents were successful, for the Roman fortresses had been weakened by the withdrawal of so many legionaries for Tiberius' expedition, and there was great alarm in Rome lest the Illyrians should invade Italy. But new troops were raised and sent to the scene of war under Germanicus, the son of Tiberius' brother Drusus. After three hard-fought campaigns Germanicus could declare the revolt quelled and its leaders captured and slain, 9 A.D.

§ 323. No sooner, however, was tranquillity restored in this quarter than the capital was thrown into consternation by intelligence of an appalling and wholly unexpected disaster. The command in Germany had since 6 A.D. devolved upon P. Quinctilius Varus, who excited wide discontent by his attempts prematurely to force Roman procedure on a country as yet only half subdued. Though many of the Germans had taken service in the legions, they still cherished their national customs, and when Varus endeavoured to introduce Roman laws and police and manners, a conspiracy was formed against him. Its head was Arminius, a chief of the Cherusci, who had long resided at Rome, had been presented with the citizenship and enrolled among the Equites. Varus was warned of the treachery that threatened him; but on reaching the Visurgis, he turned back into the Teutoburgiensis Saltus (*Teutoburger Wald*), one of the wildest parts of Northern Germany. When the legions were entangled in the swamps and forests, Arminius left the Roman camp, and placing himself at the head of his warriors led them to the attack. For three days the legions struggled to escape: then Varus slew himself, and

The Defeat of
Varus, 9 A.D.

the remnant of his forces was cut off almost to the last man. This disaster summoned Tiberius once more to Germany. He spent a year in recruiting fresh legions, and then his army traversed the country for a whole summer without the loss of a man. Nevertheless though Roman prestige was thus restored, no further attempt was made to push the frontier to the Elbe. The Rhine remained as in Caesar's day the limit of the empire.

§ 324. In 13 A.D. Augustus received a renewal of his *imperium proconsulare* for five years; at the same time Tiberius' *tribunicia potestas* was prolonged for a like period, and the *imperium proconsulare* was bestowed upon him too. This virtually made him partner with Augustus in the government, and indeed the emperor, now seventy-six years of age, sorely needed some one to assist him in his duties. He spent the last months of his life in drawing up a record of his deeds and reign. A copy of this (known as the *Monumentum Ancyranum*) has been preserved to us on the walls of a ruined temple at Ancyra in Galatia. Herein Augustus sets forth the dates and nature of the honours decreed to him, his wars and conquests, his arrangements to secure them, his colonies, his measures to aggrandize Rome, the temples he restored and the public buildings which he caused to be built, the largesses which he gave to his people and his legions, his fleets and forces. In a word, it is a summary of his life and work. In the summer of 14 A.D. Augustus was seized with illness at Nola in Campania. Livia despatched messengers to Tiberius, who had returned to Illyricum; but it is uncertain whether he arrived in time to see Augustus alive. "Have I played my rôle well?" asked the dying man of his friends. "If so, applaud me at its close." He died August 19, 14 A.D., in

Death of
Augustus,
14 A.D.

the age of seventy-seven, having been born on September 23, 63 B.C., in the consulship of Cicero.

§ 325. When Augustus died he left the imperial organization so firmly established that its main features lasted for centuries. His first attempt, however, to find a constitutional basis for his power was not wholly successful. In 27 B.C. he made the *pro-*

The Imperial Constitution. *consulare imperium* with annual consulship the The Princes. The Proconsulare Imperium and the Consulship. two chief bases of his rule. This was the first form of the new imperial constitution so far as the powers of the Princes are concerned, and it lasted from 27 to 23 B.C. The *proconsulare imperium* carried with it the command of the armies and fleets of the state, and of the most important provinces. It was essentially a military command, and it therefore conferred no power in Rome or Italy; but, unlike all previous proconsular commands, it could be exercised by its holder while within the walls of Rome. The powers inherent in the consulate were complementary to this military authority. By virtue of the consulship Augustus was supreme in Rome and Italy; and his *imperium* abroad was rendered superior (*maius*) to that of all other proconsuls. The first form of the Principate was tentative; and after a few years Augustus saw that the arrangement was unworkable. "The consulship had admirable republican associations, but was hemmed in by awkward limitations. Its jurisdiction had become almost extinct, its initiative was fettered by collegueship, and the constant usurpation by the Princes of one of the two offices of titular rank was a bar to the legitimate ambition of aspiring nobles."¹ Accordingly, in 23 B.C. Augustus gave up his first plan and established the constitution of the Principate in its

¹ Greenidge, *Roman Public Life*, p. 339.

second and final form. In this year the *tribunicia potestas*, which Augustus had held since 36 B.C., was made annual and confirmed and replaced the consulship as the second prop of the power of the Princeps. In virtue of the *tribunicia potestas* he could control the magistrates and the Senate, and exercise an unlimited power of veto. The idea of Augustus was that the tribunician power should take the place of the consulship as the civil basis of his rule, and that by means of it he should control Rome and Italy, while he governed the provinces by virtue of his proconsular command. But the *tribunicia potestas* was essentially negative in its character; and the real source of the imperial power consisted in the *proconsulare imperium*. Augustus was allowed to retain this *imperium* within the walls; legally this meant that he could rule the provinces without leaving Rome, but practically it came to mean that his *imperium* or "power to command" was as unlimited in Rome and Italy as it was in the provinces.

But even an unlimited *imperium* needed to be complemented by the grant of extraordinary rights. During the course of his principate Augustus had a number of isolated prerogatives bestowed upon him by special enactments. These privileges included the *ius primae relationis*, or right to bring the first motion before the senate, the right of *commendatio* (see § 326), and the *ius edicendi*, or right of laying down valid ordinances. Moreover his proconsular command was declared to be superior (*maius*) to that of other proconsuls. These rights were conferred on Augustus by separate enactments, but in the case of succeeding emperors they were all conferred at the same time by a single *lex de imperio*.

§ 326. Augustus was always unwilling to assert himself too prominently as the master of the state. His policy was to appear only to be the chief officer of the nation, and to encourage as far as possible the fancy that the old form of government by people and senate still went on. Unlike Julius, he did all he could to flatter the senate

by the deference which he paid to it, and gratified

The Senate.

the leading nobles by lucrative appointments. Besides reducing the senate to the convenient number of 600, he improved its status by ejecting men of scandalous lives, and by allowing those to withdraw who were too poor to bear the expenses of their rank. With the senate rested the formal choice of a Princeps; it decreed the honours of a triumph, and its enactments on domestic matters were promulgated as of old. Augustus went further: he shared with it the provinces, giving it jurisdiction over such as did not require the presence of an armed force, and consequently the exercise of imperium; and to these provinces proconsuls and propraetors went out as governors on the choice of the senate. This dual government is known as the Dyarchy of the Princeps and the senate.

The position of the people showed a great change for the worse in the two chief duties which it had

The People.

possessed under the republic—the making of laws and the election of magistrates. Augustus little by little withdrew from the comitia the power of legislation; partly by demanding that he should be the only magistrate to bring proposals before the popular assemblies, partly by claiming that no measure should become law until it received the assent of the senate. In the matter of elections, so greatly did the Princeps interfere by his powers of *nominatio* (actually naming and practically

electing some of the candidates) and *commendatio* (*i. e.* recommending his friends to the centuries and tribes), that only the merest show of authority was left to the people, and with Augustus' death even this disappeared utterly. But the people had now little desire to govern. Provided that the state distributions of corn were on a sufficiently generous scale, and games were occasionally exhibited, they felt contented with their condition. Their political programme was simply *Panem et Circenses*, "Bread and games": it was easy enough to state, though by its heavy tax upon the treasury it often caused embarrassment to the ruler.

The magistrates continued in name at least as under the Republic. Consuls, praetors, quaestors, aediles, and tribunes were still elected and treated with ^{The} the same ceremony as of old, though their jurisdiction was reduced to insignificance by the creation of new officials and the transfer of many of their duties to boards and commissions of senators. Thus the *praefectus urbi*, an officer said to have existed in the regal period and re-established by Julius, was henceforth entrusted with the superintendence of police within the city. Whenever the Princeps left the capital, the importance of this functionary increased very much: he became the emperor's deputy in Rome, and was authorized to take charge of the country to a distance of one hundred miles from the city walls. One board of commissioners was appointed to superintend the public buildings of the city; to others were entrusted the roads, the aqueducts, the navigation of the Tiber, and the distribution of corn. The quaestors and aediles were left with little to do, and generally speaking the magistracies were now valuable only because they opened up to the occupants the chance of becoming governors of the provinces. ✓

§ 327. At the death of Augustus the provinces were as

follows: three divisions of Spain (Tarraconensis, Lusitania, Baetica), four divisions of Gaul (Narbonensis, Lugdunensis, Aquitania, Belgica),¹ Rhaetia, Noricum, Alpes Maritimae, Alpes Cottiae, Pannonia, Dalmatia,¹ Moesia, Macedonia, Achaia, Asia, Bithynia-Pontus, Galatia, Pamphylia, Cilicia, Cyprus, Syria, Egypt, Judaea, Cyrenaica and Creta, Africa and Numidia, Corsica and Sardinia, Sicilia. By the agreement of 27 B.C. they were divided between the Princeps and the senate. Such as were so peaceful and well-organized as to require no military establishment were senatorial; the rest were imperial. The senatorial provinces were Hispania Baetica, Gallia Narbonensis, Macedonia, Achaia, Bithynia-Pontus, Asia, Cyrenaica and Creta, Africa and Numidia, Cyprus, and Sicily. The governors of these provinces were elected by lot, and were all called proconsuls, whether they had previously been consuls or not. They held office for one year only. The governors of the imperial provinces were called praetors (in full *legati Caesaris pro praetore*), since they were under the proconsular command of the Princeps. They were selected by the emperor, and their term of office was dependent on his will. Some of the smaller provinces (such as Judaea) were governed by personal agents (*procuratores*) of the emperor, while Egypt and the Maritime and Cottian Alps were under *praefecti*.

From both classes of provinces the main sources of revenue were the land-tax (*tributum soli*),
 Taxation. assessed on census returns, and the poll-tax (*tributum capitis*) on the incomes of all who possessed no land, together with *vectigalia* or indirect taxes (chiefly

¹ Pannonia and Dalmatia consisted of the old province of Illyricum enlarged.

portoria, harbour-dues). Since the system of tithes (*decumae*) had been abolished by Caesar, the operations of the tax-farmers were confined to the *portoria* and other indirect taxes. In the senatorial provinces the land and poll taxes were collected by the communities and paid to the governor's quaestor; in the imperial provinces they were collected by the emperor's financial agent (*procurator fisci*), who also had control over the outlay of the money. *Procuratores* of the emperor were found also in the senatorial provinces; here they collected the taxes paid by Roman citizens, and other dues (such as the corn supplied by Africa) which went to the emperor instead of the senate. The revenues of the senatorial provinces were paid into the *aerarium*, which had to provide for the pay of the senate's officials, the cost of public works, and the corn-doles. The revenues of the rest went to the *fiscus*, the emperor's privy purse, from which was provided the maintenance of the entire armament of the empire, the pay of the emperor's officials and household, and heavy voluntary outlays to meet deficits of the *aerarium*, especially in the matter of the corn-doles.

To no class did the transference of government from the senate to the Princeps prove of greater benefit than to the provincials. The republican governor had been a despot. Only in extreme cases did the senate venture to assert its sovereign power. Now however there occurred a general tightening of the bonds which united the governor to the central authority. Naturally, it was in the imperial provinces that the change was most felt: there the governor could no longer conduct wars at his own caprice, or harry the provincials by his arbitrary exactions, for his soldiers recognized no master but the Caesar, and the procurator who managed the

The Princeps
and the
Provincials.

finances was responsible to the Princeps alone. Even in the senatorial provinces, the Princeps could make his influence felt, for here too he placed his procurators by the side of the governors. In the peace that accompanied the Principate, the ravages of the civil wars were at length effaced, and after a long interval prosperity returned to the provinces. Roads were built and colonies established; decayed towns were restored; piracy was sternly repressed; and these material benefits were enhanced by the encouragement which municipal institutions received in the provincial towns, as well as by the gradual admission of the provincials themselves to the ranks of Roman citizens.

CHAPTER XII.

THE PRINCIPATE OF TIBERIUS.

§ 328. Accession and Claims of Tiberius.—§ 329. Mutinies of the Armies in Pannonia and on the Rhine.—§ 330. Campaigns of Germanicus against the German Tribes.—§ 331. Project of the Elbe Frontier Abandoned.—§ 332. Arminius and Maroboduus.—§ 333. Germanicus and Piso.—§ 334. Prosecution and Trial of Piso.—§ 335. Question of the Succession.—§ 336. Rise and Fall of Sejanus.—§ 337. Death and Character of Tiberius.—§ 338. Civil Administration of Tiberius.—§ 339. Jurisdiction and Legislation under Tiberius.—§ 340. Provincial Administration.—§§ 341-342. The Western Provinces.—§ 343. The East. Relations with Parthia.—§ 344. Africa.

§ 328. IN theory, the Principate was an elective office, the electing bodies being the Roman people, ^{The Principate} and the Senate as representing the Roman ^{Elective.} people. The senate conferred the *proconsulare imperium*, and the *tribunicia potestas* was granted by the *concilium plebis*.

As a rule the senate and people conferred these powers on someone who already had the support of the army. But side by side with this principle of ^{Principle of} election was the principle of nomination, a re- ^{Nomination to} version to the mode in which the kings of Rome had been appointed. Augustus and most of the emperors who followed him marked their choice of a successor by such nomination; this generally took the form of adoption, coupled with investiture in some of the powers that were

essential to the Principate. Thus Augustus had clearly shown his intention that his son-in-law, Tiberius Claudius Nero, should succeed him, by causing him during his own life-time to be invested with the proconsular command and the tribunician power—the two keystones of imperial authority.

By this process of nomination Tiberius was made the *consors imperii*, or “partner in the imperial power.” Hence at the death of Augustus these powers had only to be renewed by the electing bodies to become operative. But since the Principate was in theory not a regular and permanent office, but only a special and occasional one, the death of one emperor was always followed by an interval, however short it might be, during which the ordinary magistrates ruled, as before, with the help of the senate and people. There was no motto corresponding to “The king is dead; long live the king!”

This resumption of government by its constitutional holders would be especially marked on the death of the first Princeps—since there was as yet no precedent to be followed; and it is therefore not surprising that Tiberius, in spite of his position as colleague of the late Emperor, and the fact that he at once gained over the praetorian guards (§ 338) and sent dispatches to the legions, felt some hesitation about assuming the full powers of government. He was probably not speaking hypocritically or for the sake of effect when he declared that “in a state which had the support of so many great men, they should not put everything on one man,” and that “he was not equal to the whole burden of the state, but would undertake whatever part might be entrusted to him.”

Whether this diffidence was partly assumed or not, it was clear to all responsible men that in the interests of Italy, and still more of the provinces, the powers of government must continue to be centralised in the hands of one individual; and no one was so fitted for the post as the heir and consort of Augustus, who had had a long training in the art of government, and was thoroughly capable both as a soldier and a politician.

Claims of
Tiberius.

The proconsular command of Tiberius was renewed by the senate, not for a stated number of years, as had been the case with Augustus, nor again for life, but "till the state should no longer need his services." The various rights which had been granted to Augustus by special enactments (§ 325) were conferred on the new emperor by a single *lex de imperio*.

The funeral of Augustus, which was an elaborate one, was followed by his deification, the senate decreeing that he should be worshipped as *divus Augustus*. The will was then published and executed; the bequests were found to include one of 43,500,000 sesterces (about £350,000) to the people of Rome. Most of this money was paid into the *aerarium*; the rest was distributed among the tribes.

Funeral and
Will of
Augustus.

§ 329. The first important event of the new reign was the mutiny of the Roman legions in Pannonia and on the Rhine. Their chief grievances were their scanty pay, the hardships and length of the service, and the difficulties placed in the way of those who claimed to be discharged after their time had expired. The pay was only 5d. a day, and out of this the men had to provide clothes, arms, and tents. Twenty years was the nominal limit of service; but in practice thirty or

Mutiny of the
Pannonian and
Rhine legions.

forty campaigns had to be endured. Even when they had completed their term of service they were not disbanded, but were enrolled together under a flag, and compelled to fight in case of need. The demands of the ringleaders were 8½d. a day, a service of 16 years, and rewards instead of further service for the veterans.

It was a moment of great peril for Tiberius. In Pannonia his son Drusus, by taking advantage of an eclipse of the moon, worked on the superstitious feelings of the men and succeeded in restoring order.

But the crisis on the Rhine was more serious. Germanicus, the son of Tiberius' brother, the elder Drusus, commanded the eight legions defending the German frontier. Four of these legions formed the garrison of Lower Germany, and now broke into a mutiny which had for its object not only the redress of grievances, but the election of Germanicus in place of Tiberius. Germanicus indignantly refused the offer of the Empire and by his loyalty saved the position of his uncle Tiberius.

He made concessions to the mutineers, but was unable to restore discipline till he had appealed to their sense of pride and shame by sending away his wife Agrippina (see p. 396) and his child Gaius, who was idolised by the soldiers. The men were stricken with pity and remorse when they saw the daughter of the hero Agrippa and granddaughter of the deified Augustus leaving the camp, in which they should have found protection, for a refuge among strangers. Germanicus seized this opportunity, and by an eloquent speech induced them to return to their allegiance.

§ 330. Germanicus had long desired to resume the task of his father Drusus and his uncle Tiberius and extend

the Roman frontier from the Rhine to the Elbe. The war with the Germans (§ 323) had never been formally ended; and the confederacy of the German tribes, formed after the defeat of Varus, had not been dissolved. As commander of the Rhine army and defender of the frontier, Germanicus was entitled to advance on his own initiative, and, on the pretext of allowing his men to atone for their insubordination, he determined to resume the aggressive.

First Campaign
of Germanicus
against the
Germans.

In the autumn of 14 A.D. Germanicus led detachments of the legions of Lower Germany across the Rhine, and attacked the Marsi (between the Ruhr and the Lippe). He slaughtered many of them at night when they were unprepared and half-intoxicated. On his return he was beset by the Bructeri and other tribes, but drove them off and reached *Castra Vetera* (*Xanten*) in safety.

Next year *Caecina*, the legate of Germanicus, advanced from *Vetera* against the Cherusci (in Westphalia), while Germanicus himself marched from the Upper Province upon the Chatti (in Hesse and Nassau) and penetrated as far as the Eder, his object being to prevent the Chatti from aiding the Cherusci. The Cherusci were at this time disorganised by the feud between the hero Arminius (§ 323), the leader of the national or patriotic party, and his father-in-law Segestes, who led the party friendly to Rome. Segestes, who was being blockaded by Arminius, was relieved by the Romans, and he delivered up to them as a hostage the wife of Arminius.

Second
Campaign.

This expedition was followed in the same year by a more ambitious one. *Caecina* marched to a point on the Upper *Amisia* (*Ems*), while Germanicus sailed to the same spot along the coast of the North Sea. The

combined forces laid waste the land between the Ems and the Lippe, and visited the Saltus Teutoburgien-sis (*Osnabrück*), the scene of the disaster of Varus. On advancing further they with difficulty avoided a similar trap laid for them by Arminius, and were forced to retreat by way of the Ems.

Expedition
beyond the
Ems.

The return journey from the Ems was made by the same routes as the advance. Germanicus, proceeding by sea, was forced to lighten his ships by disembarking two legions. These returned along the shore, and suffered much loss through a spring tide before they rejoined the fleet. Caecina with his four legions traversed a causeway known as the *Pontes longi* or "Long Bridges." He was attacked amid the swamps by Arminius, who all but surrounded him. A disaster similar to that of Varus was averted by the skill of Caecina, aided by the rash folly of the Germans, who, acting against Arminius' advice, attacked the Roman camp instead of completely surrounding the enemy. The assailants were defeated, and Caecina arrived safely at Vetera.

The next campaign (16 A.D.) began with a short expedition into the valley of the Lippe, where a besieged stronghold was relieved and the region between the fort Aliso (*Elsen* on the Lippe) and the Rhine was securely fortified. Then Germanicus began to carry out his great plan of reaching the Elbe and conquering the Germans with the fleet as a basis of attack. Eight legions with their auxiliary troops were conveyed in a thousand transport ships to the mouth of the Ems. The troops were then disembarked and advanced to the Visurgis (*Weser*), where the Cherusci and the rest of the German confederacy, under the leadership of Arminius, stood opposed to them.

Last
Campaign of
Germanicus,
16 A.D.

The Romans forced the passage of the Weser, and a battle was fought in the plain of Idistavisus (near Bückeburg or Minden on the Weser), in ^{Battle of Idistavisus.} which the Romans had a slight advantage. Their further advance was, however, contested: a trap was laid by the Germans, but Germanicus discovered their ambush and attacked them. A desperate conflict on the borderland between the Angrivarii and Cherusci (probably on the Steinhuder Lake) resulted in a decisive victory for the Romans. Many of the German patriots were killed, though Arminius himself escaped; and Germanicus, since the summer was nearly at an end, determined to fall back on the Rhine. Most of the troops returned by sea from the mouth of the Ems, and many of the transport ships were lost by storms and floods in the North Sea.

§ 331. But Tiberius now determined to give up the idea of advancing the frontier of the Empire to the Elbe; for heavy expenses had been incurred, ^{Project of Elbe Frontier abandoned.} the burden of which fell upon the neighbouring Gallic provinces. In spite of his defeats, Arminius still kept the field at the head of the German confederacy; it seemed likely that further campaigns would only result in further losses of men and money, and the Gallic provinces could hardly stand the financial strain. It was true that an army on the Elbe would be too remote to interfere effectively in Italian politics to the same extent as the forces on the Rhine: yet these forces could not safely be advanced to the Elbe, unless more legions were raised for the purpose of keeping the Gauls in order; and the finances of the empire would not suffice to meet so great an expense.

Germanicus was accordingly recalled, not from motives of jealousy, as the enemies of Tiberius suggested, but

owing to political and financial considerations. The policy of the defensive was again resumed on the Rhine; and in order that this might be made more effective, the command of the Rhine legions was divided between two consular *legati*, who commanded respectively in the frontier districts known as Upper and Lower Germany. This command was a purely military one; the three Gallic provinces were separated from it, and each of them was administered by a praetorian *legatus Caesaris* (§ 327).

Of the two frontier districts, Upper Germany was entirely on the left bank, but the Lower province included also a portion of the right bank, with forts along the Lippe. The chief stations of Upper Germany were Moguntiacum (*Mainz*), Argentoratum (*Strassburg*), Bingen (*Bingen*), and the southern Noviomagus (*Speyer*); the chief stations of Lower Germany were Castra Vetera (*Xanten*), the northern Noviomagus (*Nimeguen*), Lugudunum Batavorum (*Leyden*), and Bonna (*Bonn*).

§ 332. When all danger of a renewed Roman attack was over, the German confederacy soon broke up. In 17 A.D. Arminius and the patriotic party among the Cherusci invaded the country of Maroboduus, prince of the Marcomanni (in Bohemia) and chief of the great Suebic confederacy of German tribes between the Elbe and the Vistula. Maroboduus (§ 322) was a cultured man, an admirer and imitator of all things Roman, and he had refused to join Arminius in his patriotic struggle for freedom. On the attack of the Cherusci, two of the confederate tribes, the Semnones (south of Berlin) and the Langobardi (in Mecklenburg and Lüneburg), went over to Arminius.

A battle was fought, the result of which was so far unfavourable to Maroboduus that he was deserted by most of the confederacy and forced to flee to his own people, the Marcomanni. He appealed to Tiberius, who reproached him for not having taken an active part against the Cherusci, but sent his son Drusus to establish peace.

Maroboduus, however, was on this occasion merely protected from annihilation; he was a dangerous neighbour, and Tiberius had determined to Fate of Maroboduus. destroy his power altogether. In 19 A.D. Maroboduus, in consequence of the machinations of Tiberius, was driven from his kingdom by Catualda, a chieftain of the Gotones or Goths (on the lower Vistula), who had revolted from Maroboduus with the rest of the Suebic confederates. The once great chieftain escaped to Italy, and was granted an asylum at Ravenna, where he died in 36.

Catualda did not maintain his position long; he was attacked by the Hermunduri, and like his predecessor had to flee to Roman territory. The adherents of the banished rulers were settled by Tiberius among the Quadi (in Moravia) on the left bank of the Danube, the Quadian Vannius being recognised by Tiberius as ally of Rome and successor of Maroboduus. He reigned peacefully for thirty years.

§ 333. In the East the affairs of Armenia and Parthia required special attention, and Germanicus Germanicus in the East, 17 A.D. was in 17 A.D., after his recall from Germany, invested with full power to represent the emperor in all the provinces beyond the Hellespont.

By the end of 18 he had successfully carried out his mission, which will be more fully described Death of Germanicus. below (§ 343); but the next year he was taken ill, and to the intense grief of the Roman world he died at

Antioch in October. Germanicus was loved both by the people and the soldiers. Though he lacked his father's military genius, he was an able commander, and the success of his Eastern arrangements shows that he was a capable diplomatist. Above all, he was possessed of a kindly and courteous disposition, and it was this that endeared him to all hearts.

Cn. Calpurnius Piso, a man of the highest birth, was made imperial legate (*legatus Augusti pro*
Piso and Germanicus.
praetore) of Syria when Germanicus first arrived in Asia. This proud noble thwarted the plans of his superior in every possible way, disobeying his express commands and altering his regulations. Germanicus at length ordered him to quit the province; but he delayed his departure on hearing of the sickness of Germanicus, and did not actually leave Syria till peremptory commands came from the dying general. On hearing of the death of Germanicus he even made an attempt to recover the province of Syria by force of arms, but was defeated, compelled to surrender, and granted a safe conduct to Rome.

The dead man's friends, and especially his wife Agrip-
Charges against Piso.
pina, believed, or pretended to believe, that he had been poisoned by Piso. It was even darkly rumoured that the emperor had through jealousy encouraged the insolent behaviour of Piso towards Germanicus, and had actually been an accomplice in the murder. These charges found ready credence at Rome, owing to the popularity of the young hero and the arrogance of his enemy, but they were perfectly groundless. There is no proof that Piso had any opportunity of compassing the death of Germanicus, even if had wished to do so; and if Tiberius had been jealous of his nephew he would

not have placed at his disposal the entire resources of the eastern empire.

§ 334. On arriving at Rome, Piso was at once arraigned by a friend of Germanicus. In the ordinary course, the charges of poisoning and of treason Prosecution
of Piso. would come before *quaestiones perpetuae*, presided over by praetors. But under the Empire there were two other criminal courts, that of the senate and that of the emperor. They were both courts of voluntary jurisdiction, and only moved when requested by one of the parties. They could then either themselves undertake the cognisance of a case or refer it to the ordinary tribunals.

The prosecutor requested the emperor to undertake the inquiry. Tiberius and his *consilium*, which consisted of a few intimate friends, listened to some speeches on both sides, and then referred the case to the senate, the other court of voluntary jurisdiction. This he did, partly because there was a feeling that a senator should be tried by his peers, and partly because he recognised that a favourable verdict on the poisoning charge would be misconstrued. The senate was not legally bound to accept the case, but a request of the emperor was equivalent to a command.

When the trial came on, Tiberius in a sensible speech asked the senate to be impartial, deplored the rashness of the friends of Germanicus, and Trial of
Piso. pointed out that the real question at issue was not the ridiculous accusation of poisoning, but the charge of attempting to recover the province of Syria by force of arms.

It was on this count that Piso's defence broke down; treason and military insubordination were fully proved by the prosecution, though it utterly failed to bring home the

accusation of poisoning. But the senate, in face of violent popular feeling, seemed afraid to acquit the prisoner even on the murder charge, while Tiberius showed that he was implacable as regards the military offence. In despair, Piso anticipated the inevitable death sentence by cutting his own throat. This trial is important from the fact that it supplies one of the best examples that have come down to us of the way in which a criminal case was conducted under the Empire.

§ 335. After the death of Germanicus, Drusus Caesar,

Agrippina and her children. the emperor's son, was marked out definitely as the successor to the Principate. This roused the bitter opposition of the ambitious Agrip-

pina, who was anxious that her own sons, Gaius Nero and Drusus, should take their father's place. There was thus open dissension in the imperial household. In 23 A.D.

Death of Drusus.

Drusus Caesar was poisoned (§ 336), and Agrippina's two elder sons, Nero and Drusus, were adopted by the emperor, and designated as his successors, their claims being supported by senate and people alike.

In 29 the death of Livia (called Julia Augusta), the

Death of Livia.

widow of Augustus and mother of Tiberius, caused a change of policy. Livia had been instrumental in securing Augustus' favour for her son, and this debt Tiberius never forgot. Her influence over him was great; and it seems to have been exercised on the side of Agrippina and her sons, which was the popular one in Rome. Immediately after Livia's death Tiberius listened to the counsels of Sejanus (§ 336), and caused the senate to banish Agrippina and her eldest son Nero to a barren island, where they died in 33. Drusus, the second son, met soon after with a similar fate.

§ 336. The great influence which the praefects of the praetorian guard (§ 338) exercised under the Empire had its origin during this reign in the ^{Rise of} power of the praelect Lucius Aelius Sejanus. Sejanus, the son of a distinguished Roman knight, laid the foundation of his power by inducing Tiberius to concentrate the praetorian cohorts, which hitherto had occupied separate camps, in permanent quarters within the city (23 A.D.).

Sejanus thus had at his disposal a military force on which he might rely. He was clever, unscrupulous, and exceedingly ambitious. His ultimate aim was to secure the Principate for himself. The method he adopted for this purpose was to take advantage of the emperor's distrust of the hereditary nobility to make his services indispensable in the government, and then to remove from his path all the claimants to the throne.

By various intrigues he fostered the enmity between Tiberius and Agrippina, and by means of ^{The} informers (*delatores*) procured the condemna- ^{Delatores.} tion and death of many of Agrippina's supporters among the nobility. In 23 he compassed by poisoning the death of the heir-apparent, Drusus Caesar. He then formed a compact with Drusus, the second son of Germanicus, who was ambitious and also jealous of his elder brother Nero. After the death of Livia, he brought about the banishment of Agrippina and Nero (§ 335), and soon after (30) he turned upon his ally Drusus and had him arrested and imprisoned. Drusus was starved to death in 33.

After the death of Livia the power of Sejanus attained its culmination. He now held a position ^{Sejanus} similar to that of Agrippa under Augustus and ^{at the height} was for a time the real ruler of Rome. In 31 ^{of his power.} he was consul, and betrothed to Julia, the grand-daughter

of Tiberius. But the emperor was beginning to feel suspicious of his favourite's designs. Sejanus was required to resign the consulship and was debarred access to Tiberius, while Gaius, the son of Germanicus, was informally recognised as the heir-apparent.

Thinking he could rely on the praetorian guards, Sejanus formed a conspiracy to assassinate Tiberius and Gaius. But the plot was betrayed to the emperor (who then resided at Capreae), and he at once sent Macro, a favourite freedman, to Rome with a "wordy and lengthy" letter to the senate, at the close of which Sejanus was denounced as a traitor. Sejanus was at once imprisoned, and, after a short trial by the senate, executed (October 18th, 31). The praetorian guards did not move in his favour.

Macro was made their praefect; his position was an influential one, though it fell short of that attained by Sejanus, and he soon obtained an ascendancy over Gaius Caesar, who was now designated as the successor of Tiberius.

§ 337. In 26 A.D. Tiberius left Rome never to return.

Tiberius
at Capreae,
26-37 A.D.

Till his death in 37 he lived mainly at Capreae (*Capri*), a small island off the coast of Campania. Under the Republic the annual magistrates never thought of leaving Rome; but Augustus had freed himself from these traditional ties, and it was as a natural development of this exemption that Tiberius spent the last eleven years of his life at a distance from the capital. *

* Tiberius now led the life of a recluse, and thus became very unpopular. We find strange accounts in the historians of his dissipations and debauchery during this period; but these stories were based on malicious court-gossip and

seem to have had little foundation in fact. At any rate, he governed the Empire from Capreae with as much ability and diligence as he had governed it from Rome. Among the privileges conferred on him by the *Lex de Imperio* was that of ordering the senate to meet under another magistrate, and sending written recommendations to it. These recommendations were of course passed as *senatus consulta*.

In 35 Tiberius made a will in which he appointed his grand-nephew Gaius, the son of Germanicus, and his grandson Tiberius Gemellus to be his joint-heirs. Of these two, Gaius was probably destined as his successor. During the year 36 his health failed, and he died on March 16th, 37.

Death and
character
of Tiberius.

Tiberius, besides being a hard worker, was an able and far-seeing administrator. He was also a sound and careful financier. He had a high regard for the welfare of the provinces, and we must remember that the Empire was established mainly that the provinces might be raised to the level of Italy.

Tacitus and other historians represent Tiberius as a tyrant of the worst type. There is no doubt that his reserved demeanour and his judicious economy (which the Roman populace regarded as parsimony) made him unpopular. Since the Empire was as yet far from being firmly established, he was often compelled in self-defence to deal harshly with members of the old nobility. The opposition of the aristocratic families and the senate made him suspicious; and led him to make an invidious use of informers and of the law of treason. Thus a prejudice was created against him; and this prejudice is exaggerated in the account of Tacitus, who, with his republican and aristocratic sympathies, may be said to hold a brief against the Empire. The stories which appear in Tacitus of his

cruelty, hypocrisy, and debauchery must be greatly discounted, since they rest on no firmer basis than court-scandal.

In any case, the real importance of the reign of Tiberius lies, not in his relations with the nobility and the Roman populace, or in his private and family life, but in his civil government, his conduct of foreign affairs, and his provincial administration. The following sketch will serve to justify this statement.

§ 338. At the very beginning of his rule (14 A.D.)

Civil
Administration
of Tiberius.

Tiberius transferred the right of electing magistrates from the people to the senate.

This step was justified by the fact that the *comitia* was unfitted to deal with imperial business. Nor

Election of
Magistrates.

was the real choice in the hands of the senate, but in those of the emperor. In his exercise of the right of *nominatio* Tiberius accepted only two names as candidates for the consulship, and all others who had given in their names were thus debarred from any chance of obtaining the office; while out of at least twelve candidates for the praetorship, he recommended (§ 326) four, and these four *candidati Caesaris* were elected without canvassing. Of the other candidates for the praetorship, he nominated twelve, the consuls nominating the rest.

Thus the Princeps controlled not only the elections but also the list from which the proconsuls of senatorial provinces were chosen by lot. Hence the change in the mode of election was of benefit to the provincials, since the emperor took care to recommend or nominate only those who were likely to make good provincial governors.

It was owing to the long absence of the emperor from Rome that the important office called the prefecture of the city (*praefectura urbis*) first became permanent. The

praefectus urbi was originally a temporary official who acted as deputy of the kings and (down to the appointment of the first praetor in 366 B.C.) ^{The Praefecti Urbi.} of the consuls, during their absence from Rome. Julius Caesar in 46 B.C. revived the office as it had existed under the monarchy; the *praefecti* being his delegates during his absence in the field, as they had been those of the kings. Under Augustus the prefecture was continued as an occasional office; under Tiberius it became practically a perpetual post.

The *praefectus urbi* was guardian of the city, and had great and ever-increasing powers. He had complete police control of the city, and in order that this control might be rendered effectual, he was entrusted with the command of the three city cohorts (*cohortes urbanae*), which were quartered in Rome during the reign of Tiberius. As a means of enforcing his authority, he had criminal jurisdiction extending to a distance of one hundred miles from the walls of Rome. This *praefectura* was as a rule confined to men of consular rank.

We have seen that the power of Sejanus was based upon his position as *praefectus praetorio* or commander of the imperial body-guard. Since the ^{The Praefectus Praetorio.} time of Scipio Aemilianus it had been the custom for a body of picked men, called the *cohors praetoria*, to act as protectors of the Emperor's person. In 28 B.C. Augustus organised nine praetorian cohorts, each consisting of one thousand men, who were attached to the emperor in his capacity of Emperor. They soon came to act also as the garrison of the capital and of the rest of Italy, and were distinguished from the legionaries by being levied for the most part from Etruria, Umbria, or Latium. They also had higher pay and a shorter time of service.

Under Augustus, only three of these cohorts had been stationed within the city ; from 23 A.D. they were united in a single body, and quartered in a permanent camp within the walls of Rome. Their prefect became from the time of Tiberius the most powerful person in the state next to the emperor himself, and we find that the character of the government often depends on the character of the *praefectus praetorio*.

One of the most conspicuous merits of Tiberius as a ruler was his care in financial matters. The expenses of empire, including the payment and maintenance of the legions abroad, and the cornlargess of the Roman populace, were greater than they had been under Augustus. In fact the bankruptcy with which the state had been threatened in the time of Augustus nearly became a reality under his successor. It was averted only by the wise economy of Tiberius. He allowed the enormous architectural works which had been begun by Augustus to come to a standstill ; and he gave no public shows. His policy of retrenchment enabled him to be liberal when there was really occasion for liberality ; he is called parsimonious by Tacitus ; but Tacitus belonged in spirit to the aristocratic class ; and it was the extravagance and ostentation of the Republican nobility that had all but ruined Italy.

§ 339. In the reign of Tiberius the senate first became a court of voluntary jurisdiction in criminal cases. Such cases came in the ordinary course before the standing commissions, but one of the parties could request either the emperor or the senate to undertake the case ; if either accepted it, there was no appeal from the judgment. The senatorial court met under the presidency of a consul, and its cognisance was limited

Criminal Jurisdiction of the Senate.

to ordinary crimes such as murder (when committed by members of the aristocracy), and to political offences such as treason (*maiestas*) or extortion. This court could prescribe the penalty, but its execution might be prevented by the emperor's power of veto. The emperor could also by exercise of this veto forbid the senate to undertake the trial at all.

In 19 A.D. was passed the *Lex Iunia Norbana*, which made certain classes of freedmen independent of their masters, and gave them what was called Civil Legislation. *Iuniana Latinitas*, i.e. the *ius commercii*, or the right of trading and holding property under the forms of Roman law, without the *ius conubii*, or the right of contracting a legal marriage with a Roman.

Tiberius was frequently present at the praetor's court, either for the purpose of hearing appeals against the praetor's judgment and interposing his veto, Tiberius in the Civil Courts. by virtue of his tribunician power, or for the purpose of giving advice which, though technically informal, would have the effect of altering the praetor's judgment.

Tiberius was careful to maintain the rights and authority of the senate, and he was in the habit of referring to that body cases which might well have come before his own *consilium* or cabinet Relations of Tiberius with the Senate. council. But the Empire was yet in its infancy, and the attitude of Tiberius towards the nobles became more and more one of mistrust and suspicion. He was in constant dread lest the senate should put forward a rival who would wrest from him the Principate. It was owing to this distrust that he sought to control the senate by means of the law of *maiestas* or treason.

The phrase *maiestatem populi Romani minuire*, "to impair the dignity or honour of Rome," applied to any

conduct which was calculated "to bring the state into contempt"; and *maiestas* meant any action which infringed the greatness of the Roman people. During the Republic and under Augustus laws were passed which defined the various ways in which treason could be committed.

Under Tiberius any offence against the person of the emperor, who was regarded as the representative of the Roman people, was brought within the scope of the *lex maiestatis*. This was the political engine which Tiberius brought to bear upon those of the nobility whom he regarded with suspicion. Hence we find many trials for *maiestas* during this reign. Informers or professional accusers (*delatores*) were encouraged by rewards to put the law of treason in motion; and prominent members of the senate were accused under the *lex maiestatis* of conspiracy, of swearing falsely in Caesar's name, of defacing or treating with contempt statues of Caesar, or of insulting the emperor by writing or word of mouth.

§ 340. Tiberius constantly studied the welfare of the provinces, and in his provincial administration at least we find abundant proof of his keen sense of duty and of his wise statesmanship. The evils of delation and of the law of treason were felt only at Rome; they did not affect the provinces. If we except a few risings, the importance of which is exaggerated in the narratives of Tacitus, we may safely conclude that the provincials, who formed the greater part of the Roman world, were happy and prosperous under the rule of Tiberius.

Not only did the emperor keep jealous watch over the conduct of the *legati* of his own provinces, but it was in the imperial power that the senatorial provinces found their most effective protection against the exactions of their

proconsuls. A large number of provincial governors were condemned on the charge of extortion during this reign, and it is significant that nearly all of these were proconsuls of senatorial provinces. In 15 A.D. Achæa and Macedonia complained of their burdens, and were, in the words of Tacitus, "relieved from proconsular government and transferred to the emperor."

As regards the imperial provinces, the policy of Tiberius was well expressed in his motto that "the shepherd must shear, not flay, his sheep." In The Imperial Provinces. no cases was taxation increased; in some it was reduced. Tiberius adopted the principle of prolonging indefinitely the commands of the legates who governed his province, so that many officers retained their position to the end of their lives.

Tacitus assigns many different motives for this policy, but the animosity which he felt towards Tiberius made him blind to the true one. This is given us by Josephus, who says that it was out of regard for the provincials themselves that governors were allowed to keep their positions for a long period. If these governors had the prospect before them of a brief tenure of office, they would be tempted to amass a fortune in the short period allowed, and this they could do only by intolerable oppression of the provincials.

The provinces were, as we have seen, generally peaceful under Tiberius. The only serious revolt, that of Sacrovir and Florus in Gaul (§ 341) was a legacy from the reign of Augustus. Tiberius maintained the discipline of the legions, kept the roads in good repair, definitely fixed market-dues, suppressed brigandage, and encouraged commerce.

Prosperity
of the
Provinces
under
Tiberius.

Two famous Jews, Josephus the historian and Philo the

philosopher, have left us their judgment on the provincial administration of this reign. They extol it as being just and wise, and bear testimony to the peace and prosperity enjoyed by the provincials at the time of the death of Tiberius.

We will now give a sketch of the history of some of the provinces and of foreign affairs during this reign.

§ 341. Gaul had been divided by Augustus into four provinces, one (Gallia Narbonensis) being senatorial, and the other three (Aquitania, Gallia Lugudunensis, and Gallia Belgica) imperial. The three imperial provinces were known collectively as the "three Gauls," and each of them was governed by a *legatus Caesaris* of praetorian rank, who was until 17 A.D. under the control of the commander of the Rhenish armies (see § 331). The Gallic provinces required special care in their administration, for in Gaul the Empire came in contact with the Germans on the one hand and the Britons on the other.

The Gallic tribes were not yet fully reconciled to Roman sway. When Tiberius in 17 relinquished his policy of aggression towards the Germans, the anti-Roman aristocracy, thinking that the patriotic Germans would be free and willing to aid them, formed a conspiracy to overthrow the Roman rule (21). The guiding spirits were Julius Florus, at the head of the Treviri, and Julius Sacrovir, a Druid, the leader of the Aedui. Both these men had received a Roman education.

Most of the tribes joined the conspiracy, since the people were oppressed by the burden of the taxes levied to meet the expenses of Germanicus' campaigns. But the revolt was not simultaneous, some of the smaller tribes rising prematurely; moreover the Germans, awed by the

proximity of the Rhine legions, sent no help. The first risings were crushed with ease, and the governors of the German province, aided by treachery, succeeded in dispersing the undisciplined Treviri. Florus fell by his own hand. The movement among the Aedui was somewhat more formidable. Sacrovir seized Augustodunum (*Autun*), the capital of the tribe, but was utterly defeated, twelve miles from the town, by C. Silius, the legatus of Upper Germany. After this rebellion Gaul became gradually Romanised.

§ 342. After Tiberius' reversion to a defensive policy, the German tribes remained on the whole quiet. But the province of Lower Germany included some tribes on the right bank of the Rhine. Among these were the half-savage Frisii (in modern Friesland), whose tribute consisted of the skins of oxen.

War with
the Frisii.

In 28 A.D. the Frisii, goaded by the oppressive manner in which this tribute was exacted, rose in revolt. The Romans guarding the district were besieged in the fortress of Flevum, near the island of Texel. The governor of Lower Germany relieved Flevum, but the Frisian country was so intersected with waterways that the Roman troops could not act in concert or bring about a decisive battle; and several bodies of infantry and cavalry were repulsed or cut to pieces. At length the Romans retired without subjugating the country, and the portion of the Lower province which lay on the right bank of the Rhine was abandoned till the reign of Claudius.

On the Lower Danube, the frontier of the Empire was formed partly by the imperial province of Moesia (Bulgaria and Servia) and partly by the dependent kingdom of Thrace. During the life of Augustus this kingdom had, on the death of king

Risings in
Thrace.

Rhoemetalcès, been divided between his son Cotys and his brother Rhescuporis. Soon after the accession of Tiberius, Rhescuporis, who had received the more sterile districts, set aside his nephew and made himself master of the whole country. He was summoned to Rome to defend his action, and was condemned and executed.

His son and the sons of Cotys now (19 A.D.) received the Thracian principality, but a Roman ex-prætor was appointed regent. This settlement was not accepted by the Thracians, and in 21 an insurrection took place among the most powerful tribes. Some of the rebels besieged Philippopolis (founded by Philip the Great, of Macedon); they were, however, defeated by the prætor of Moesia.

In 25 another rebellion broke out, the fierce mountaineers refusing to submit to the loss of freedom which service in the legions involved. The insurgents concentrated in a mountain fortress, where they were besieged by Poppæus Sabinus, the prætor of Macedonia and Achæa, and were, after great sufferings and a desperate sortie, compelled to surrender.

In 15 A.D. Macedonia and Achæa, which were both senatorial provinces, complained of the burden of taxation under their proconsuls, and were transferred to the emperor, forming a single imperial province. Tiberius sought to secure their freedom from financial caprice consequent on frequent changes of rulers by continuing one man in the government for nearly the whole of his reign.

§ 342. In the East the great Parthian kingdom, which extended from the Euphrates to the borders of India, was the only power that was quite independent of Rome. The conquest of Parthia was never part of the serious policy of Roman statesmen;

The East.
Relations with
Parthia.

the defence of these vast continental possessions would only serve to weaken the Mediterranean Empire. But the situation of Armenia was important. In case of war between Rome and Parthia, the power which controlled Armenia would have distinct advantages for the purposes of attack. Hence during the first century of the Empire there was constant intriguing as well as intermittent warfare between the two great powers for the suzerainty of Armenia.

Importance
of Armenia.

Soon after the death of Augustus, the Parthian king Vonones, a friend of Rome, was driven from his throne by his rival, Artabanus of Media, who then became king. Vonones was accepted by the Armenians as their king, and on being attacked by Artabanus, was seized by Silanus, proprætor of Syria, and detained in custody within the Roman frontiers. Armenia thereupon fell into the hands of the anti-Roman party.

Tiberius did not try to restore Vonones, who was incapable and unpopular, by force of arms, but sent Germanicus (17 A.D.) to arrange a peaceful settlement (§ 333). At the same time he prepared for the contingency of war by annexing the client kingdoms of Cappadocia and Commagene. The direct frontier of Rome was thus extended as far as the Euphrates, and the passage of that river could now be adequately guarded.

Annexation of
Cappadocia and
Commagene.

The mission of Germanicus was a success. He did not attempt to support the incapable Vonones, but set on the Armenian throne the popular Zeno, son of Polemo of Pontus, under the name of Artaxias (18 A.D.). He also gratified Artabanus by removing Vonones, who was intriguing with some of the disloyal Parthian nobles, from Syria to Cilicia. Germanicus at the same time organised

the new imperial provinces of Cappadocia and Commagene. In the case of both these provinces the taxation was made lighter than it had been under the native princes.

The settlement of Germanicus lasted till the death of Artaxias in 34 A.D. Artabanus, treating the now aged Tiberius with a disdain that was quite unjustified, now tried to recover control of Armenia by placing his son Arsaces on the throne. Lucius Vitellius was at once sent with plenary powers to the East; he expelled Arsaces from Armenia by the aid of the neighbouring tribes of the Caucasus, the Iberians and Albanians, and Mithradates of Iberia set up in Armenia. set Mithradates, an Iberian prince, on the Armenian throne. Artabanus sent another of his sons to recover Armenia, but the Parthian cavalry were no match for the Caucasian infantry, and Artabanus' son was vanquished in a hardly contested battle.

Artabanus was deposed in favour of the Parthian Tiridates, and again, after some fighting, restored. Finally in 37 A.D. the Parthian king made an agreement Submission of Artabanus. with Vitellius, who had again led his troops to the Euphrates; in accordance with this Artabanus recognised Mithradates as king of Armenia, while the Romans recognised Artabanus as ruler of Parthia.

§ 344. The Roman dominion in Africa consisted of Africa. Egypt and the province of Africa (*i.e.* Old Africa, or the territory of Carthage and Numidia) and the dependent kingdom of Mauretania. Egypt, owing to its important position as Position of Egypt. "the key of the land and of the sea," was regarded as the private property of the emperor, not as a province of the Roman people. Men of senatorial rank were forbidden access to it, and Tiberius sharply rebuked

Germanicus for visiting Alexandria without permission (19 A.D.), although Germanicus was at the time invested with extraordinary powers in the East.

Africa with Numidia formed a senatorial province, which was divided from Mauretania by the river Ampsaga. The proconsul of Africa had ^{Government of Africa and Numidia.} one legion under him, and was thus the only governor of a senatorial province who commanded an armed force. This arrangement was rendered necessary by the dangers which menaced the province from the Berber tribes of the interior.

The Musulamii, who lived on the southern side of Mons Aurasius (the *Aures*) were the nearest and most powerful of these native tribes; and the legion commanded by the proconsul was stationed at Theveste (*Tebessa*) in Numidia between the Aures and Old Africa. In 17 A.D. the Musulamii broke out in rebellion and chose as their leader the Numidian Tacfarinas, who had once been in the Roman army but had deserted and become a daring free-booter. Tacfarinas was formidable ^{Rising of the Musulamii under Tacfarinas.} because of his knowledge of Roman tactics and discipline, whereas the governors of the senatorial province, being chosen by lot, were often incompetent from a military point of view, and, since they were changed every year, their policy lacked consistency.

The rebellion lasted for eight years (17-24 A.D.), and extended eastwards as far as the Garamantes and westwards over a great part of Mauretania: but in 22 the country of the Musulamii was eventually occupied by the Roman governor, Q. Junius Blaesus, though Tacfarinas himself dragged on a guerilla warfare for two years longer.

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